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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Government IT mega-projects often end in costly failure, despite attempts to identify 
those Critical Success Factors (CSFs) that lead to project success.  This raises questions 
about whether these CSFs are understood, applied and, if so, whether they are having an 
impact on the management and subsequent performance of government IT mega-projects.   
The literature review compared CSFs from the generic and IT project management 
literature to find that they are broadly similar.  CSF frameworks were then assessed to 
find a measure of the impact of CSFs and a measure of ‘performance’ was also defined.  
CSFs were then identified from fifteen reports on IT and information infrastructure 
projects and verified against the CSFs identified in the literature to produce a synthesised 
list of twelve CSFs.  The understanding, application and impact of these CSFs were 
examined through a case study of the MoD’s Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) 
Programme, a government IT mega-project to provide a more integrated and coherent 
Defence infrastructure.   
It was evident that the CSFs were recognised and they appeared to have been understood 
within the DII Programme.  However, the extent to which they have been applied is 
variable with differing effect.  Therefore, the impact that CSFs have had on the 
management of the DII Programme is debatable.  There were areas where the project 
could have been managed better and, therefore, could be performing better, suggesting 
that the overall success of the project is potentially at risk.   
 
The overarching conclusion of this study is that, in terms of the management of the DII 
Programme, the impact of the identified CSFs is variable and, where they are not applied, 
there is an adverse effect on its performance, suggesting a causal relationship.  More 
generally, not applying generic CSFs to project management is likely to lead to failure, 
but is unlikely to assure success.  Unique projects operating in highly specific and 
complex contexts require more contingent solutions.  As a result of these conclusions, 
further case studies are suggested, along with further study into government and MoD IT 
project management and the management of trust in contractual relationships. 
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Chapter One 
Finding the Key to Success:  
Major IT Projects and Programmes in the UK Public Sector 
 
 
1.1.  IT Promise; IT Failure 
 
The public sector in the UK has used Information Technology (IT) since it first appeared, 
seeing it as a means of delivering more efficient services and so relieving the strain on the 
public purse.1  This has led to increasingly large investments in major IT projects and 
programmes, which are initiated with a fanfare but all too often end in failure.  The 
Government is reported to waste more money on IT than on any other area of public 
sector working.2  There have been many attempts by government, academia and other 
reputable bodies to break this cycle by trying to identify those factors that project 
managers need to address in order to avoid failure and ensure successful delivery.  
Despite these efforts, the failure rate remains high with only 30% of public sector IT 
projects delivered successfully in 2008.3   Given that the relevant success factors have 
been correctly identified, this suggests that they are not being given the necessary 
attention, raising questions about whether work in this area has had any beneficial effect 
to date on the outcome of major IT projects or programmes.    
 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to set the scene for this study into the impact of 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) on IT project management in the public sector.  It begins 
by expanding on this opening discussion, assessing the extent of government investment 
in IT against the extent of project failure.  Government IT projects tend to be large, 
complex and expensive.  Very often, they are termed ‘mega-projects’, referring to their 
size and complexity, or programmes, meaning a number of interrelated projects.  For the 
sake of conciseness, the term ‘project’ will be used throughout this thesis, although it is 
recognised that this may not always be entirely precise or correct.  According to the 
Office of Government Commerce (OGC), these projects “seek to implement technology 
on a scale without parallel in the commercial sector”.4  Tackling projects of this 
magnitude brings specific problems and increases the risk of failure.  These problems and 
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risks have been identified in a number of critical reports, which are discussed in this 
chapter along with some of the specific contextual issues that impact on government IT 
projects.  Government context, complex mega-projects and project failure are then drawn 
together into a discussion about the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its Defence 
Information Infrastructure (DII) programme, which promises to improve the business 
processes of the department as well as the battlefield capability of the Armed Forces.  
This is a complex programme being managed within the government context.  It spans 
the periods of the reports under investigation and, therefore, some of the highlighted 
CSFs should have been incorporated into its management processes.  As such, it provides 
an ideal case study for an examination of how CSFs are being adopted at the operational 
level in government IT project management and whether this will assure a return on the 
MoD’s investment in DII.   
 
The large amount of money being spent on the MoD’s infrastructure project reflects the 
increasingly significant amounts that have been invested in IT in both the public and 
private sectors.  In the mid 1960s, North American companies were spending less than 
5% of their capital expenditure on IT.5  With the arrival of Personal Computers (PCs), 
this percentage reached 50% by the end of the 1990s.6  Despite talk of a recession in IT in 
2002, the total amount spent by public and private sector organisations in the UK on all 
aspects of IT (hardware, software, services and staff) was cited as £63 billion, the highest 
figure yet recorded and representing an average of £2,546 per annum for every UK 
employee.7   By 2004, total spending reached £73 billion.8  Overall, UK IT spending was 
expected to fall by 1.8 percent in 2009, largely due to the financial crisis beginning in 
2007.9  However, at the same time, expenditure on IT in the public sector was expected to 
rise by 2.8 percent.10 
 
This increase stemmed largely from the 2002 decision to make the largest ever 
programme of peacetime investment in the public services, increasing IT spending by 
25% to reach £12.4 billion over the financial year 2003-04, equivalent to 1.1% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).11  This spending was concentrated in three areas.  There was an 
84% rise in spending on healthcare IT to finance the NHS IT infrastructure, the National 
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Programme for IT.12  This is arguably the world’s largest single IT project, with an initial 
proposed budget of £12 billion between 2003 and 2008 (from barely a billion in 2002).13 
A 25% rise in spending was allocated to central government IT with a new criminal 
justice network, as well as big new projects in the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise 
and the Department of Trade and Industry.14  Finally, there was a 17% rise in spending on 
Defence IT with investments in two big projects: DII and a secure battlefield 
communications system.15  The stated aim was a £5 billion, ten-year overhaul of Defence 
IT systems.16   
In 2010, the Cabinet Office reported that spending on public sector IT projects in the UK 
was running at £16 billion per year, making government the biggest and probably the 
most experienced computer user in the country.17  However, that year’s Budget saw the 
Chancellor announcing a £500 million cut in IT programmes by 2012-13 along with a 
50% reduction in the use of third party consultants within departments.18  The Coalition 
Government, elected two months later, froze spending on all projects worth more than £1 
million and placed 400 further projects under review.19 
Whilst the steady rise in IT investment in both the public and private sectors may have 
stalled, the belief that spending on IT pays dividends in terms of increased productivity 
and profitability remains prevalent.  In the private sector, IT is no longer simply a 
business tool, but is the means of delivering strategic value and competitive advantage.20  
In 2009, the average company was spending about 4-5% of its revenue on IT, not only to 
enhance efficiency but also as a strategy to support future growth.21 One of the objectives 
of successive UK Governments has been to contain public expenditure by ensuring 
resources are used efficiently.22  This is undoubtedly set to continue with IT seen as a 
critical means of providing this Value for Money (VfM).  To this end, the 1999 
Modernising Government White Paper made a commitment to ‘Information Age 
Government’ as part of the Labour Government’s programme of renewal and reform, 
encouraging the use of new technology to ‘meet the needs of citizens and business’ and 
to ensure that the UK does not ‘trail behind technological developments’.23  Integral to 
this process was the establishment of a Government IT strategy, published as E-
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Government: a Strategic Framework for Public Services in the Information Age.24  IT 
was seen as the means of providing faster communications, a more open relationship with 
citizens, more efficient buying of goods and services, lower administrative costs and new, 
improved services.25   
 
The scale of investment in IT and the expectation of resulting business benefit has placed 
great pressure on government IT procurement and project management.  To date, many 
major projects at key government departments have ended in expensive and embarrassing 
failure, as documented in a series of reports by watchdog bodies such as the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) and the National Audit Office (NAO).  The PAC published 
its report on Improving the Delivery of Government IT Projects in 1999.26  It listed 25 
projects, a number of which had experienced cost overruns, been delayed or abandoned, 
costing large sums of money and inconveniencing the public.  Estimates vary year on 
year but it was thought that about 85% of all IT projects in the public sector were failing 
at this time.27  Examples abound: the Passport Agency suffered severe implementation 
problems over the summer of 1999 due to poor testing before going live, costing £12.6 
million;28 the Home Office Immigration System was started in 1996 and abandoned in 
2001, judged over-complex and out of touch with working practices, while costing £77 
million;29 the Swanick air traffic control centre was due to open in 1996 at a cost of £475 
million and was finally completed in 2002, six years late, £180 million over budget and 
already obsolete;30 Pathway, which was a benefit payment project to develop smartcards, 
collapsed after three years with a loss of £698 million;31 and Libra, the system designed 
to automate the magistrate’s courts and now running several years behind schedule, was 
described by the Chairman of the PAC as one of the worst IT projects he had ever seen.32 
 
According to a survey by the trade magazine Computing, the catalogue of over-budget IT 
projects and cancelled contracts cost more than £1.5 billion between 1997 and 2003.33  
This represents a 50% increase since this survey was last carried out in 2001, but is based 
entirely on estimates.34  Central Government does not keep figures on the cost of its 
problematic IT projects and has no intention of doing so.35   The high failure rate and 
estimates of the amount of taxpayers’ money being wasted have resulted in vociferous 
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concern in both the trade and popular press alongside attempts to pinpoint the causes of 
the problem.  Moores highlights the fact that “IT managers in large private sector 
organisations have sleepless nights thinking about £1 million projects and yet the 
Government believes it can succeed with £100 million initiatives”.36  According to 
Collins, Ministers and IT suppliers encourage one another to think big, to tackle ever-
greater complexity and to deliver the results in the shortest possible timeframes.37  Size 
and complexity is indeed a factor: more than a third of projects have budgets greater than 
£1 million and, of these, four percent are categorised as ‘mega-projects’ with budgets 
greater than £50 million.38  The public sector is more likely to initiate mega-projects or 
programmes than the private sector, due to the scale and complexity of its operations.39  
However, with scale and complexity comes a heightened risk of failure.  These projects 
are defined as “physical, very expensive, and public”.40  They attract a high level of 
public attention due to their inevitable impact on communities, environment and 
budgets.41   
With the press highlighting concerns, the Government has not been complacent about the 
level of project failure.  Indeed, the PAC began reporting on IT failure in government 
back in 1984, having noted “the dangers of general over-optimism about the benefits and 
time scales of computer projects”.42  Fifteen years later, the Government finally initiated 
a major review of failed IT projects, resulting in the so-called McCartney Report, 
Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action, published in 2000.  This identified 10 
areas where improvement was required in order to deliver successful results: 
• Change management; 
• Leadership and responsibility; 
• Project management; 
• Risk management; 
• Modular and incremental development; 
• Benefit realisation; 
• Procurement and supplier relationships; 
• Cross-cutting initiatives; 
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• People and skills; and 
• Learning lessons.43 
 
The 30 recommendations stemming from these areas were designed to improve 
performance and avoid expensive mistakes.  They included initiatives such as the 
Gateway Review Process, a system of sequenced appraisals to ensure that IT projects are 
viable and remain on target, and the appointment of a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) 
for each major project to ensure that it meets its objectives and delivers the projected 
benefits.  However, the headline statement of this report was the idea of IT-enabled 
change: 
 
A change of approach is needed.  Rather than think of IT projects, the public 
sector needs to think in terms of projects to change the way Government works, 
of which new IT is an important part.44 
 
At the end of 2006, the NAO mirrored McCartney’s key message with its Delivering 
Successful IT-Enabled Business Change report.45  It highlights three key areas that impact 
on the delivery of successful programmes and projects: engagement by senior decision 
makers; understanding how to be an ‘intelligent client’; and determining benefits at the 
outset, then actively managing them to ensure their delivery and optimisation.46  From 
these areas stem nine key questions that Central Government departments are encouraged 
to ask before embarking on IT-enabled business change along with eight 
recommendations.   
 
Between 2000 and 2006 when these two ‘book end’ reports were published, eight other 
major reports on public sector IT project failure also appeared, as shown at Table 1.1.  Of 
these, four were published by government bodies and four by other reputable 
organisations.  The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development is an 
international development organisation helping governments tackle the economic, social 
and governance challenges of a globalised economy.  Intellect represents software and IT 
organisations to government and the media, and provides a code of conduct for members.   
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Table 1.1. Reports of Public Sector IT Project Failure, 2000-2006 
Reporting Body Title  Date 
Cabinet Office Successful IT: Modernising Government 
in Action (the McCartney Report) 
2000 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) 
The Hidden Threat to E-Government: 
Avoiding Large Government IT Failures 
2001 
Intellect Getting IT Right for Government 2002 
Office of Government Commerce (OGC) Common Causes of Project Failure 2002 
Intellect IT Supplier Code of Practice 2003 
Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST) 
Government IT Projects 2003 
House of Commons, Work and Pensions 
Committee 
 
Department of Work and Pensions 
Management of Information Technology 
Projects: Making IT Deliver for DWP 
Customers 
2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Improving IT Procurement 2004 
Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) 
and the British Computer Society (BCS) 
The Challenges of Complex IT Projects 2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Delivering Successful IT-Enabled 
Business Change 
2006 
Source: Author 
 
The Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) brings together the UK’s most eminent 
engineers from all disciplines to promote excellence in their engineering practice and the 
British Computer Society (BCS) is the Chartered Institute for IT, promoting the 
advancement of IT science and practice.  All ten reports identify a range of factors that 
are deemed critical to success.  In other words, the authors of these reports clearly believe 
that if project teams take these CSFs into account, then they can significantly increase the 
chances of a successful outcome.   
 
First proffered by Daniel in the 1960s, success factors remain the best-known means of 
addressing the human and organisational aspects of projects.47  However, it was Rockart 
in his seminal paper of 1979 who attempted a full definition of the term ‘Critical Success 
Factors’: 
 
…the limited number of areas in which results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure 
successful competitive performance for the organisation… 
 
…the few key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish… 
 
…areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention from 
management… 
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…the areas in which good performance is necessary to ensure attainment of 
[organisational] goals.48 
 
His suggestion that it is possible to identify a “limited number” or a “few key areas” 
 has resulted in a significant number of studies in both the general project management 
and IT project management literature, which have sought out the lessons from projects to 
compare and contrast different sets of factors in an attempt to produce a definitive list.49  
However, to date, there has been no attempt to assess whether these CSFs have been 
noted and adopted by public sector IT project managers and, if so, whether they do, 
indeed, lead to “successful competitive performance for the organisation”.50  
 
Given this lack of assessment, the value of these reports and their CSFs is questionable.  
Indeed, CSFs are not without their critics and a number of issues have been raised about 
their validity, as will be discussed further in the literature review.  One key problem is 
whether it is possible to identify CSFs that have general applicability across a range of 
different projects.  Can the same approach be adopted, whatever the funding, 
procurement, development or implementation model for a project, with simply some fine 
tuning to reflect variety, scale and complexity?51  Therefore, one of the problems with 
providing such a generic solution for IT project management in the public sector is its 
disparate nature and the fact that “government is different”.52 
 
1.2. “Government is Different” 
 
In 2000, Patricia Hewitt, then Britain’s e-Minister, observed that… 
 
If Jack Welch says that GE (General Electric) is going to become an e-business, it 
does, and pretty quickly.  Government is different.53   
 
What is it about the machinery of government that makes it difficult to redirect and 
change?  What, specifically, makes government ‘different’?  This is partly answered by 
the organisational structure of the UK Government with its 20 departments, over 200 
agencies and 400 local authorities.54  In addition, local government offers more than 750 
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services and central government over 520, carrying out nearly 5 billion transactions a 
year for over 60 million citizens.55  The sheer number of government organisations and 
operations results in cumbersome administrative structures and mechanisms.  
Government exists on many levels, each with its own laws, codes and policies, and with 
authority to create mission statements and organisational structures.56  In addition, it is 
arranged vertically with an insular culture.57  The resulting ‘silos’ create barriers to 
collaboration and deter inter-organisational co-operation, making it difficult to design or 
operate integrated or government-wide programmes.58   
 
It could be argued that this dissipation of authority across multiple decision makers is no 
different to the experience of a global private sector organisation, the point of comparison 
in Patricia Hewitt’s quote.  To follow the GE example, it is made up of six distinct 
businesses, each with its own units producing a wide variety of goods and services 
ranging from jet engines to financial services.  In 2005, the Chief Executive noted that 
“size with complexity breeds bureaucracy”, indicating similar problems to government in 
terms of structure and mechanisms.59  However, it is questionable whether GE operates 
on the same monolithic scale as government or faces the same levels of complexity and 
resulting bureaucracy.  The differences between the private and public sectors are neatly 
summarised by Mercer, as shown at Table 1.2.  The dominating force within the private 
sector organisation is economic whilst, according to Moore60 and Frederickson61, the 
overriding purpose of a public sector organisation is creating public value by meeting its 
mandate and fulfilling its mission.  The imposition of political purpose is also distinct 
from the strategic management freedoms of private organisations.62   
 
Table 1.2. Public and Private Sectors Compared 
Factors Private Public 
Dominating Force Economic Politics 
Decision Making Centralised Pluralist/Special interests 
Mission, Goals, Objectives Well defined, long term Very broad term 
Selection Criteria for Evaluation of 
Alternatives 
Specific economic measures (Return On 
Investment (ROI), profits, market share etc.) 
Ambiguous (public interest, political 
efficiency, cost benefit) 
Chain of Command Distinct Not clear 
Time Horizon for Top-Level Managers Lengthy Short Term 
Source: Mercer, J.L., Strategic Planning for Public Managers, (New York, Questia, 1991). 
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The bureaucracy, mandate and political purpose of government inevitably impact on any 
technical solution that the Government chooses to implement.  Despite this and 
somewhat ironically, there is no central mandatory control of government IT.  The only 
constraints are the Cabinet Office creating strategy and the Treasury providing guidance 
on procurement.63  This is due in part to the federated nature of government, as discussed 
above, with its different parts making their own decisions.64  This means that a universal 
approach to an initiative can only be achieved through persuasion and by attempting to 
build a common sense of purpose.65    
 
Figure 1.1 shows that, as in the private sector, business processes and the organisational 
setting inevitably impact on any technical solution adopted by government.  However, 
more critical than the effect of these processes and the setting are the laws, civil service 
rules and a variety of other procedures or court decisions that also restrict action.66   
 
Figure 1.1. Layers of Complexity Surrounding Government IT Initiatives 
Technical 
Solution
Business 
Process
Organisational 
Setting
Programme, 
Policy and 
Political 
Context
 
Source: Center for Technology in Government, Making Smart IT Choices: Understanding Value and 
Risk in Government IT Investments.  
www.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/martit2?chapter=2&PrintVersion+1, downloaded on 6th 
June 2003. 
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Described as the ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’, it is this additional layer that 
is unique to the public sector and makes it different from the private sector.  The political 
party in power is elected on the basis of proposed services, opportunities and projects 
designed to meet social needs in accordance with the political stance of that party.  
Stemming from these imperatives are policies that translate the “political priorities and 
principles into courses of action to deliver designed changes”.67  Thus, policymaking is 
the pivotal element in this additional layer of complexity, ensuring the transition from 
political vision to programmes and, therefore, implementation.    
 
It is this overarching political framework that makes public sector organisations very 
different from those in the private sector.  It is based on the ‘short-termism’ dictated by 
the maximum five-year period of a government and is subject to a range of checks and 
balances unique to government.  It is this ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’ that 
drives the machinery of government, ultimately controlling the Organisational Setting, 
Business Processes and any proposed Technical Solution.  It is this that makes 
government truly different. 
 
Given this, IT projects are initiated in a context that consists of disparate groups working 
within layers of complexity that are unique to government.  There is an expectation that 
such projects will adopt the CSFs proposed by a series of high profile reports.  As the 
OGC states, “there is no shortage of best practice within the Government IT profession 
and the IT industry”.68  However, there is no mechanism for enforcing adoption of that 
best practice.  In addition, it is questionable whether generic CSFs can provide the means 
of tackling failure in such a disparate and complex environment.  Therefore, in order to 
examine whether the identified CSFs have been adopted and, if so, what value they bring 
in terms of performance, a public sector case study was sought.  The MoD’s Defence 
Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme was identified.  Initiated in 2001, it is a 
complex IT mega-project being delivered into a complex context.   
 
The MoD’s 2007 Autumn Performance Report argued that the Armed Forces had been 
“consistently operating above the level of concurrent operations” that they are currently 
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resourced and structured to deliver.69  In 2010, along with the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), the Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced an 8% fall in 
the MoD Defence budget by 2015.70  In the spirit of the Government IT Strategy that was 
prevalent at the inception of DII and which was discussed earlier, the infrastructure 
programme should deliver faster communications, more efficient buying of goods and 
services, lower administrative costs and the provision of new and improved services, so 
easing the strains on the Defence budget.  Success is, therefore, imperative.   
 
1.3.  Delivering Defence Capability through Complexity 
 
The MoD is one of the largest and most diverse government departments.  Unique in 
having executive responsibility, it is charged with providing both policy and capability, 
whereas the Department of Health, for example, sets the policy, which is then 
implemented by the NHS and social services.  In line with other departments, however, 
the MoD is under pressure to improve its levels of efficiency and to provide VfM.  
Between 1990 and 2000, real Defence spending in the UK fell by some 23%71 while 
equipment costs have been rising by some 10% per annum in real terms, a doubling of 
costs every 7.25 years.72  The 2000 Spending Review provided the first sustained real 
growth in the UK Defence budget since the end of the Cold War, an annual average of 
some 0.3% over the three years 2001/02 to 2003/04.73  The core Defence budget in 
1997/98 was equal to 2.5 per cent of the economy.74  By 2006/07 that had fallen to 2.3 
per cent, before rising again to 2.5 per cent in 2008/09.75  By 2010/11, according to the 
MoD website, the budget was some 11% higher in real terms than in 1997.76   
 
While there has been some increase in resources, this has been offset by increased 
equipment costs and the current operational tempo, which demands capability to support 
rapid joint reaction in operational theatres all over the world.  The MoD operates in two 
arenas, the so-called ‘business space’ and the ‘battlespace’, with the business space 
providing the equipment and personnel to support the battlespace.  Aligned to its 
executive status, discussed above, the conundrum for the MoD is how to maintain the 
roles and responsibilities of UK forces (the policy) with an increasing operational 
  
 1-13 
demand, a relatively static Defence budget and the unit costs of Defence equipment rising 
by up to 10% a year (the capability).77  One way of doing this has been to respond to the 
call for Information Age Government and to streamline its business processes, making 
them more effective and efficient through the use of advanced technologies.  However, 
this is not to ignore the potential effect that IT can have directly on the battlespace.  The 
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998 envisaged that “better IT and communication 
systems will enable greater strategic and operational agility during times of crisis; and 
greater economy of effort”.78  Termed ‘Networked Enabled Capability’ or NEC, this aims 
to integrate sensors, decision makers, weapon systems and support capabilities.79  Several 
major programmes are seen as contributing to the network that will enable NEC.  These 
include Skynet5, Cormorant, Falcon, Bowman and DII.80  This emphasis on information 
and information sharing remains a priority in the more recent SDSR. 
 
The Labour Government allocated a 17% rise in spending for Defence IT in 2002 and 
annual expenditure in this area remained at around the £2 billion mark until 2010, 
averaging about 6% of the total Defence budget.81  However, the 2010 Budget pinpointed 
cuts of £130 million with specific reference to the replacement of legacy systems.82  
Much of the remaining funding is allocated to the provision of DII.  Designed to 
overcome the historic problems of Defence IT being disjointed and non-interoperable, 
this system will provide the foundations, the infrastructure, to support the flow and 
processing of information, including hardware, software, data and network components.83  
DII will support around 300,000 user accounts and 150,000 computers throughout the 
MoD and the Armed Forces.84  It will enable the exchange and sharing of information 
across Defence, as well as providing standard interfaces to systems belonging to Other 
Government Departments (OGDs), allies and industrial partners.85  The scope includes all 
fixed sites in the UK and abroad, as well as maritime platforms and deployed 
headquarters.86  It is, thus, one of the largest IT procurements in the UK public sector.87   
 
The process of procuring DII began in April 2003 and the contract was awarded to the 
ATLAS Consortium almost two years later in March 2005.  The five companies that 
originally made up the Consortium were EDS (now HP), Fujitsu, General Dynamics, 
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EADS and LogicaCMG, who were to work alongside a 500 strong MoD project team.  
The project is overseen by a range of high level bodies and will impact on thousands of 
users.  The ensuing complexity is shown at Figure 1.2.  DII is one of the world’s most  
 
Figure 1.2. Defence Information Infrastructure Programme 
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difficult infrastructure projects.  More correctly termed a programme, indicating that it is 
a portfolio of projects and activities that are co-ordinated and managed as a unit, it clearly 
falls into the category of a mega-project.88  As discussed earlier, Altschuler and Luberoff 
describe a mega-project as “physical, very expensive, and public”.89  DII is undoubtedly a 
physical entity, consisting of hardware, software, servers and networks.  Originally 
costing an estimated £5 billion, it is very expensive, whilst being firmly in the public eye.  
Flyvbjerg identified that mega-projects tend to attract public attention due to their 
inevitable impact on communities, environment and budgets.90  DII will inevitably 
impact on the Defence community, the defence environment and, not least, the Defence 
budget, which is already facing the strains of the major equipment projects and 
concurrent operations set against significant cuts.  In addition, DII has complexity.  It is a 
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project that has many connecting elements, but it is also intricate, entangled and involves 
many non-linear dimensions, as shown at Figure 1.2, which identifies some of the key 
stakeholders, the numbers of people working within the project from the two distinct 
organisations, and the user base.   
 
Given the enormity, expense and complexity of the DII project, does the MoD have the 
capacity to achieve a successful outcome?  It is fair to say that the MoD has a poor record 
when it comes to delivering complex technology projects.  In October 2009, the Gray 
Review of Acquisition reported that the average Defence procurement programme 
overruns by five years and is 40% over budget.91  While this report was not specifically 
aimed at IT projects, there are examples of such failures, although only limited 
information exists in the public domain.  The Defence Stores Management Solution 
(DSMS) was one of the e-business initiatives and a requirement of the SDR in 1998.  The 
project set out to provide a single Defence inventory management system to replace the 
three single services systems and to replace physical stock with data on how, where and 
at what cost stock could be obtained, enabling items to be used as required rather than 
stockpiled.  The MoD announced in 2002 that it was suspending the project after two 
years and £130 million expenditure.   
 
A similar example is DRUMM (Delivering the Requirement for Unit Materiel and 
Management).  This army-specific project was created to handle the inventory 
information supplied to DSMS, again to increase the visibility of equipment, materiel and 
consumption.  This was also suspended in 2002.   In 2006, the NAO identified several 
difficulties in the Bowman programme, which involves the supply of a family of digital 
radios and an associated Combat Infrastructure Programme (CIP).92  The project was 
initiated in 1988 with an in-service date of December 1995, which was not achieved.  In 
July 2000, the MoD launched a new competition.  It had already spent five years and 
£397 million on the earlier stages.93  It subsequently wrote off £51 million of expenditure 
not considered to contribute to the revised programme.94  In July 2009, two contracts 
worth £231 million were awarded to General Dynamics to upgrade Bowman.95  
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The track record does not auger well for DII.  However, it began life in 2001, is due to 
deliver in 2015 and so fits within the scope of the reports on public sector IT project 
failure, framed by the McCartney Report of 1999 and the NAO’s Delivering Successful 
IT-Enabled Business Change in 2006.  These ten reports identify those CSFs most likely 
to improve the chances of a successful outcome if adopted by the project team.  Although 
the OGC acknowledges that there is a plethora of best practice and lessons learned 
available in government IT, it suggests that “these are not always well understood or 
consistently applied”; this is evidenced by the high level of failure of IT projects in the 
public sector.96   
 
This analysis leads to the following research question:  
 
How have the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government been 
used to improve the performance of subsequent projects?   
 
To further clarify this question, ‘lessons learned’ are those lessons identified through the 
ten reports detailed at Table 1.1 above; ‘complex IT projects’ refers to projects or 
programmes where those elements that are the most complex, costly or resource 
demanding involve IT; and ‘government’ is used interchangeably with public sector to 
mean that part of the state dealing with the production, delivery and allocation of goods 
and services by and for the government or its citizens, whether national, regional or local.  
Finally, ‘performance’ describes the successful outcome.  In this context and discussed 
further in the literature review, it can be defined and measured in terms of: 
 
• Reducing the risk of escalation to cost, time and scope; 
• Reducing the resource demands of cost, time and scope; 
• Meeting the expectations of the stakeholders, including the project team, in terms 
of value and usefulness; 
• Improving the scale or certainty of business benefits; 
• Improving the scale or certainty of the project’s contribution to defined strategic 
goals; and 
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• Avoidance of identified strategic environmental factors known to undermine 
delivery or future performance.  
 
It is recognised that these measures of performance may be competing and may also carry 
different weightings depending on the type of project under review.  In addition, there are 
three subsidiary questions that stem from this overarching research question: 
 
1. Are the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government correct 
and comprehensively considered?   This requires a point of comparison, which in 
this case is the academic literature. 
2. Have the lessons learned been differentiated by the type of project?   This requires 
identification of the different types of project. 
3. Has the relative importance of the lessons learned been adequately explored and 
identified?  This requires examination of how lessons might vary across a project 
and product lifecycle. 
 
Based on the overarching research question, a study aim has been formed, as specified in 
Section 1.4 below. 
 
1.4.  Study Aim 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of identified Critical Success Factors 
on the management and subsequent performance of a major government IT project, 
taking as a case study the MoD’s Defence Information Infrastructure Programme. 
 
The study’s enabling objectives are listed below, covering the: 
 
• Exploration of the key CSFs defined in academic studies of project management 
in general and IT project management specifically, along with assessment of the 
impact of these studies; 
• Identification of the key CSFs defined in reports on public sector IT project 
failure and reviews of infrastructure projects; 
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• Synthesis of the CSFs identified in the reports and comparison with those defined 
in the academic literature to ensure that they are correct and comprehensively 
considered; 
• Development of a detailed case study of the design and delivery of the MoD’s DII 
programme; 
• Examination of the extent to which the CSFs have been incorporated into the 
management of the DII Programme; 
• Assessment of the effectiveness of CSFs as a means of delivering IT project 
success. 
 
1.5.  Conceptual Framework 
 
A conceptual framework is a device used to structure, shape and visualise a research 
study, assisting the researcher to answer the research question and meet the aim.  It also 
provides an explicit outline of the thinking behind the research.97 As such, it adds clarity 
for the reader.98  Weaver-Hart describes the conceptual framework as: “a structure for 
organising and supporting ideas; a mechanism for systematically arranging 
abstractions”.99  Thus, it provides a theoretical overview of the intended research and of 
the order within the research process.  Ideally, it should connect all aspects, including the 
problem definition, the aim, literature review, research methodology, data collection and 
analysis.100  The definition of the framework derives from the literature review where the 
conceptual basis for the study and its relationship to the research question, as well as the 
theory underpinning that question, is described.101  The conceptual framework, therefore, 
guides the entire research process, providing a link between theory, early findings and the 
purpose of the study.  This aids decisions concerning the critical features of the research, 
which relationships are likely to be of importance and, hence, what data is going to be 
collected and analysed.   
 
The rationale behind the conceptual framework for this study stems from a clear and 
logical definition of the term ‘information infrastructure’.  Given that the focus of the 
research question is a complex IT project, to what extent does an information structure 
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programme fit within this category and what are the critical components of an IT project?  
An IT project is obviously about technology delivery and implementation, describing 
anything related to computing technology, such as networking, hardware, software or the 
people that work with these technologies.  Pearlson and Saunders define an information 
infrastructure in much the same way: the hardware, software, data and network 
components that support the flow and processing of information in an organisation.102  
This slots an information infrastructure firmly into the category of an IT project.  Both 
definitions are rooted in the technology, yet the stated aim of the DII programme is to 
“enable sharing of information and collaborative working to a variety of groups and 
individuals”.103  This demonstrates that this programme needs to combine technology 
with people and their everyday work processes, creating a system that produces, manages 
and distributes information.  In other words, DII is not simply about technology; it is 
about the provision of an information system, the components of which are shown as an 
amalgamation of people, processes and technology at Figure 1.3.   
 
Figure 1.3.  Components of an Information System 
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Source: Author 
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Laudon and Laudon refine this definition to describe a set of interrelated components that 
retrieve, process, store and distribute information in order to support decision making, co-
ordination and control in an organisation.104  Therefore, in its entirety, an information 
system is a combination of elements (people, process and technology) that produces a 
sum (decision making, co-ordination and control) greater than the combined input of each  
individual element.105  In other words, the interaction of the various components results 
in ‘emergent properties’. 
 
In addition to this, an information system is developed and implemented in a particular 
context, which, in turn, affects the system.  The importance of context when developing 
an information system and the critical “interaction between specific system design 
features and the related features of the organisational setting” are highlighted in the 
academic literature.106  If this context is taken to be the organisation in which the project 
is being managed, then a range of additional factors are likely to affect it.  For example, 
in 1965, Leavitt proposed that an organisation consists of four interacting elements: task 
(or objectives), technology, people and structure.107  Later studies have added factors that 
influence behaviour, such as power,108 culture,109 business process transformation110 and 
resources.111   
 
Therefore, implementing an information system is not simply about understanding the 
technology, the Technical Solution, as defined in Figure 1.1.  It is also concerned with the 
comprehension of the problems that these systems are designed to solve, the architectural 
and design elements, the organisational processes, the people, the setting in which they 
work and the wider environment.  The system is affected by a context and, in turn, the 
system attempts to influence that context.  This leads to the conclusion that technology is 
an enabler in a much wider system, suggesting that information systems are prone to 
failure because they are both embedded in an organisation and interacting with that 
organisation.  Furthermore, Davis et al argue that “an information system is a social 
system that uses information technology”, stressing that attention should be given to both 
information systems and social systems.112  The linkages and interactions between the 
systems need to be identified and understood if a successful outcome is to be achieved.113  
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The emphasis, therefore, is on the ‘system’, a group of interacting, interrelated, or 
interdependent elements that form a complex whole with emergent properties.114    
 
Given this, if DII is an information system and an information system is a social system, 
then it makes sense to use ‘systems thinking’ as a means of shaping this study and, 
therefore, as the basis of the conceptual framework.  Fundamental to this way of thinking 
is the notion of ‘wholeness’ or holism, which provides a means of examining the 
interaction between the IT project, the information system (people, process and 
technology), the social system, the context and the environment.  Therefore, the IT 
project sits within a wider system or context, which provides it with strategy and 
resources and which is separated from its environment by a boundary.  In terms of a 
government IT project, the context was examined in the above discussion regarding the 
essential difference of the public sector with its additional layer of complexity, shown 
diagrammatically at Figure 1.1 above.  This forms the core of the conceptual framework, 
which is shown at Figure 1.4.  This is based on systems thinking with the context  
 
Figure 1.4. Conceptual Framework: Impact of CSFs on Project Outcomes 
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described as a system of systems with interactions taking place between each layer and  
the ‘Technical Solution’ sitting at the core.  The inputs into this system are the identified 
CSFs, which are examined in terms of the extent to which they have been understood and 
applied.  These have an impact, the output of which is the performance or successful 
outcome of the Technical Solution.   
 
The interaction between the context of the IT project and the environment is defined by a 
boundary and each system within that context also has its own boundary.  A ‘closed 
system’ ignores that boundary, failing to interact with its environment, taking nothing 
from it and giving nothing back.  Therefore, over time, it can only deteriorate.115  
Systems that involve people, sometimes called ‘human activity systems’, are always 
‘open’, interacting with their environment.116  However, on occasions, the people inside 
the system consider it closed, paying little attention to the environment while 
overestimating their own power.  Referred to as ‘groupthink’, this is a potential source of 
project failure.117  These systems thinking ideas provide a powerful basis for considering 
systems failure, for examining complex situations and so for exploring the DII 
Programme.  The conceptual framework incorporates these ideas whilst also providing a 
means to answer the research question and aim.   It also underpins the structure of the 
research. 
 
1.6.  Contribution to Knowledge 
The distinguishing mark of a thesis carried out at this level is the requirement to 
demonstrate an original contribution to knowledge.  To this end, it must show that a 
worthwhile research question has been identified with no evidence that this question has 
been answered previously and it must demonstrate that the question has been answered 
by the study.118 
This research contributes to knowledge by carrying out a thorough investigation into an 
IT project within the public sector.  It has been clearly identified above that there are a 
number of factors that make this a very different and difficult context for such projects.  
Furthermore, providing such generic solutions as CSFs for IT project management in the 
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public sector is compromised by its disparate nature.  Despite this, there have been very 
few studies on IT project management in the UK public sector.   
In 2007, Shenhar and Dvir observed that most projects fail to meet time, budget and, 
business objectives, despite the amount that is known about project failure.119  They 
highlight the opportunity that this brings for research to help close the gap between what 
is known about project failure and the application of this knowledge.120  Even the most 
cursory examination of the literature in this area reveals that there is widespread research 
on the success and failure of projects and a large number of studies that identify either 
lists of CSFs or CSF frameworks.  However, there is no evidence in either the general 
project management literature or the IT project management literature of any studies that 
examine whether this theory is being applied in practice and, if so, whether it is having 
any beneficial impact on project outcomes.   More specifically, there has been no attempt 
to assess whether CSFs, particularly those generated by government and related bodies, 
have been noted and adopted by public sector IT project managers and, if so, whether 
they do, indeed, lead to “successful competitive performance for the organization 
(sic.)”.121  This lack of impact assessment potentially calls into question the value of both 
government reports and academic studies on CSFs.  Undoubtedly, not only do the lessons 
have to be identified, they also have to be learned, which means understanding and 
applying them.   
There have been many attempts to combine lists of CSFs.  These take the form of 
comparative studies of different sets of factors, such as the list presented by Fortune and 
White,122 or the distillation of a large number of CSFs into a more usable framework.  
Arguably, DeLone and McLean presented the most famous example of the latter in 
1992.123  There are also attempts to compare success factors with failure factors, such as 
the study by Fowler and Horan in 2007,124 or studies that either synthesise across 
different cases, such as the work by Chua in 2009,125 or that compare across different 
fields of project management, such as the study by Pinto and Covin in 1989 of CSFs for 
R&D projects and construction projects.126  To date, however, no similar attempt has 
been made to compare the factors identified by studies on general project management 
with those identified by studies on IT project management, even though there is extensive 
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work on the latter.  Generally, the two are treated as interchangeable.  Moreover, there 
has been no attempt to compare the theoretical CSFs identified in the scholarly literature 
with those identified in government reports.  This thesis offers extensive work on both 
areas. 
 
Therefore, this study contributes to knowledge on four fronts: the examination of public 
sector IT projects with specific reference to the value of CSFs as a theoretical premise; an 
assessment of whether this theory is being applied in practice and, if so, whether it is 
having any beneficial impact on project outcomes with specific reference to public sector 
project management; the comparison of factors identified by studies on general project 
management with those identified by studies on IT project management; and, finally, the 
comparison of theoretical CSFs identified in the scholarly literature with those identified 
in government reports.   
 
1.7.  Study Structure 
 
Chapter Two of the study critically reviews the current literature on approaches to 
understanding IT project success and failure.  In doing so, it identifies the evolution of 
thinking in the areas of both general project management and IT project management, 
encompassing all relevant literature and both the public and private sector views.  
Chapter Three outlines the research methodology for this thesis, discussing decisions 
about the identification and location of the required data as well as the methods used to 
gather and analyse that data.  Chapter Four examines UK Government initiatives 
stemming from the McCartney report and carries out a detailed content analysis of 
reports on IT project failure in the public sector in order to identify the CSFs in each, 
before creating a synthesised lists of the identified CSFs from these reports.  In addition 
to this, it considers some specific reports on the failure of information infrastructure 
projects in order to identify if there are any CSFs that are particular to this type of project.   
Chapter Five presents the detailed case study of the DII Programme, examining the layers 
surrounding the central core of the conceptual framework: the Programme, Policy and 
Political Context; the Organisational Setting; and the Business Process.  Chapter Six 
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examines the Technical Solution at the core of these layers of complexity before looking 
across the conceptual framework to consider the understanding and application of the 
CSFs, their impact and then assessing the subsequent performance of the project.  
Chapter Seven then summarises the discussion, draws conclusions and provides 
recommendations.  
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Chapter Two 
Understanding Failure and Defining Success:  
A Review of the Scholarly Literature 
 
2.1.  Mind the Gap: Putting Theory into Practice 
 
With project management becoming a formal discipline in the middle of the last 
century, the resulting standardisation of its tools, techniques and methods has made it 
a core activity in modern organisations.1  Organisational effectiveness tends to be 
measured by project success rates, highlighting the plight of the public sector as it 
struggles with cancelled, delayed, over-budget and over-scope Information 
Technology (IT) projects.2  In recognition of these problems, ten major reports were 
published between 1999 and 2006, each aiming to discover why government IT 
projects fail and, using this information, to identify those Critical Success Factors 
(CSFs) most likely to increase the chances of a successful outcome.  The resulting 
recommendations have spawned a plethora of advice and accompanying guidance, 
methodologies, standards and training.  However, these attempts at improvement 
seem to have been in vain with ten major projects identified as being in difficulty in 
2010 at a total cost of around £26.3 billion.3   Thirteen years earlier, Martin Cobb 
posed his famous paradox: “we know why software projects fail; we know how to 
prevent their failure, so why do they still fail?”4  Cobb’s Paradox remains unresolved 
but highlights a key question: have the CSFs identified in these reports been 
recognised, adopted and implemented by government departments and agencies?   
 
This situation was explored in Chapter One, comparing government investment in IT 
projects with the extent of failure; examining the size and complexity of these 
projects; and considering the problems of working in the public sector with its 
‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’ impacting on any technical solutions.  The 
MoD’s Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme is one of the largest and 
most complex projects of its kind in the UK, designed to enable information sharing 
and collaborative working throughout Defence.  Managed within the government 
context, it is being developed and implemented in the shadow of the ten reports under 
investigation.  The expectation is that some, if not all, of the highlighted CSFs have 
been incorporated and embedded into its project management to good effect.  As 
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such, it provides an ideal case study for examining how the lessons learned from 
previous complex IT projects in government have improved the performance of 
subsequent projects. 
 
2.2. A Methodology for Review: Narrative or Systematic? 
 
This chapter presents the literature review, designed to find out what is known and not 
known about the research question.  The first stage in this process was the selection of 
a suitable approach, weighing the pros and cons of a traditional narrative literature 
review against the more rigorous and structured systematic review.5  A narrative 
literature review critiques, summarises and draws conclusions about a body of 
relevant literature and knowledge.6  However, the criteria that make the selected 
material relevant are not always clearly stated.7  They may have been chosen to 
support the researcher’s proposition, thereby producing inaccurate conclusions and 
questionable reliability.8  Furthermore, the chosen method of searching, critiquing and 
synthesising the literature is not always defined, raising issues about its rigour.  With 
no explanation about how the literature review was conducted, it is unlikely that 
another researcher would be able to replicate it.9  
 
A systematic review provides a more transparent account, detailing decisions about 
inclusion and exclusion, whilst clearly stating the criteria used to assess the quality of 
the identified material.10  It has its roots in medicine where meta-analysis, a 
quantitative approach, is used to integrate, evaluate and interpret a large body of 
findings to verify specific cause and effect relationships based on statistical 
evidence.11  In the social sciences, this technique is termed ‘qualitative meta-
synthesis’ or, simply, meta-synthesis.  It is used to understand and explain phenomena 
by taking an interpretative approach whilst still using the same explicit and rigorous 
methods as a meta-analysis.12  However, it is time consuming, putting it beyond the 
means and timescales of many researchers.13   Critics argue that it places too much 
emphasis on quantitative data, favouring ‘hard’ statistical evidence over interpretation 
and distilling too quickly and crudely from large numbers of papers to a small 
selection for in-depth review.14 
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The management literature is particularly challenging to review due to its fragmented, 
trans-disciplinary nature.15  Unlike medicine, there is no consensus on management 
research methods while researchers tend to pose a steady stream of questions rather 
than attempting to integrate and build coherent stocks of knowledge.16  Given these 
factors, while a full-scale meta-synthesis would add logic, rigour and structure to the 
validity and reliability of the findings, it was considered beyond the available 
resources for this research.  However, the alternative was to use a more limited but no 
less structured and precise methodology, specifically designed for organisational 
research and advocated by Denyer and Tranfield, as shown at Figure 2.1.17  Driven by 
a well-focused literature review question stemming from the research question, it uses  
 
Figure 2.1. A Systematic Approach to the Literature 
Step 1: Question Formulation
Step 2: Locating Studies
Step 3: Study Selection and Evaluation
Step 4: Analysis and Synthesis
Step 5: Reporting and Using the Results
•A precise review question
•A series of reviewable questions
•Selection of sources
•Selection of search strategy
•Organisation of results
•Definition of explicit selection criteria
•Extract and store information on data 
extraction forms
•Cross tabulation of the results
•Statement of the problem, the review 
questions, the methodology
•Findings and discussion
•Conclusion
 
Source: Adapted from Denyer, D. and Tranfield, D., ‘Producing a systematic review’, In: 
Buchanan, D.A. and Bryman, A, The Sage Handbook of Organisational Research Methods, (Sage, 
Los Angeles, 2009), pages 671-689. 
 
 
a comprehensive and explicit search strategy, rigorous methods of appraisal and 
selection, and reports the resulting evidence in a way that enables clear conclusions to 
be reached.  This turns the literature review into a research methodology in its own 
right.18  It is more comprehensive and less biased than a narrative analysis, more 
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transparent, more replicable and, therefore, it is considered highly appropriate for this 
research.19   
 
Denyer and Tranfield advocate framing a clear literature review question as a means 
of focusing the review, designed to situate the research and guide the process of 
searching for the required information.  This study asks whether the lessons learned 
from previous complex IT projects in government have improved the performance of 
subsequent projects.  In addition, there are three subsidiary questions: 
 
• Are the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government 
correct and comprehensively considered?    
• Have the lessons learned been differentiated by project type?  
• Has the relative importance of the lessons learned been adequately explored 
and identified?   
 
This review considers the scholarly research relating to these questions, seeking either 
answers or the means to finding an answer through empirical research.  In doing so, it 
examines what is already known about the factors driving the success or failure of 
project management with specific reference to IT projects in the public sector.  It then 
determines whether there is any evidence of these factors being taken into account 
and, if so, whether they have improved the outcomes.  This gives a critical point of 
comparison for this study: whether the policy, in the form of the identified reports, 
describes the same CSFs as those found in the theory, in the form of the scholarly 
literature, so providing the basis for answering the first subsidiary question.  Given 
these factors, the literature review question was framed as follows:  
 
Within the public sector, has the identification of CSFs influenced the 
management of complex IT projects to optimise performance?  
 
Denyer et al suggest developing this argument using four factors: Context, 
Intervention, Mechanism and Outcome (CIMO).20  These fit well with the conceptual 
framework, identified in Chapter One and shown again at Figure 2.2, annotated with 
CIMO.  This clearly demonstrates how the literature has informed the conceptual  
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual Framework and CIMO 
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Source: Author 
 
framework and how the conceptual framework is, in turn, structuring the study.  In 
accordance with the systematic review methodology, subsidiary questions are then 
asked about each of these parts, helping to scope the review and taking account of 
why and how relationships occur between the CIMO parts, and in what 
circumstances, as shown at Table 2.1.21   
 
Table 2.1. Research Question and Subsidiary Questions 
Within the public sector (C), has the identification of CSFs (I) influenced the management of IT 
projects (M) to optimise performance (O)? 
Context 
Which individuals, relationships, institutional settings or wider systems are being studied? 
Intervention 
The effects of what event, action or activity are being studied? 
Mechanism 
What are the processes that explain the relationship between Intervention and Outcome? 
Outcome 
What are the effects of the Intervention? 
How will the impact of the Intervention be measured? 
What are the intended/unintended effects? 
Source: Author 
 
Having identified the questions and scoped the review, a literature search was carried 
out using four electronic databases produced by leading publishers in business and 
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management research: ABI-Inform, Ebsco Business Source Complete, Emerald, and 
Taylor and Francis Informaworld.  Taken together, these give extensive coverage of 
the relevant literature in this subject area.  In each instance, the advanced search 
option was selected and the terms ‘project and failure’ and then ‘project and success’ 
were searched, firstly in the article title field and then in the keyword field.  The 
search was limited in three ways: peer-reviewed journals written in English and dating 
from 1980, the decade that saw IT being adopted in the workplace.  The results were 
judged according to their relevance, as shown in the criteria for inclusion at Table 2.2 
and the citation details of selected papers were stored in a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  The resulting database was then divided into two areas: studies of 
generic project management and those that specifically focus on IT project 
management.   
 
Table 2.2. Literature Review: Criteria for Inclusion 
 
Stages 
 
 
Criteria for Inclusion 
Stage 1: Limits Peer-reviewed 
1980 to date 
English language 
Stage 2: Relevance of Paper Subject: 
Examining success or failure in projects both 
generally and specifically (i.e. case studies) 
Reporting projects in relevant organisations 
Excluding: 
Introductions to general project management for 
specific disciplines (i.e. Project Management 
Success for Accounting); 
Portfolio management; 
Project scheduling; 
Project management structures; 
Project control (i.e. specific financial detail like 
Earned Value Analysis, Net Present Value etc); 
Outsourcing projects; 
Management consulting projects. 
Methodology: 
High quality  
Defensible 
Reliable and valid data 
Source: Author 
 
After assembling the relevant sources, the data analysis and synthesis was undertaken.  
Each paper was read to see if it addressed the review questions, using a set of explicit 
selection criteria, based on Wallace and Wray’s critical analysis template, which is 
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shown at Appendix 1.22  This queries the purpose of each paper, its methodology, its 
relevance and use to the literature review.  Information for every study included in the 
review was stored in the database to provide an audit trail from this review to the 
underlying evidence.   An analysis was then carried out on the relationships between 
the studies, enabling associations to be made.  This resulted in the extraction of the 
key material for review.  Detailed decisions were recorded, precisely specifying the 
basis on which information sources were either included or excluded.  This makes the 
reviewer’s decisions available for scrutiny and evaluation whilst also making the logic 
informing those decisions visible.  The references in the selected papers were then 
used to source other relevant literature, enabling the review to move through a variety 
of sources, as advocated by Bates.23  This process continued throughout the writing of 
this thesis, ensuring that the literature review remained current.  The final stage of this 
systematic review is reporting and using the results, which is the purpose of this 
chapter.  As discussed above, it also seeks information relating to the subsidiary 
questions, as well as a means to measure the Intervention, the identified CSFs, and the 
Outcome, the impact of the CSFs.  Following the CIMO structure, it begins by 
looking at the Context, which seeks to define the individuals, relationships, 
institutional settings or wider systems being studied.   
  
2.3. Context 
 
The conceptual framework situates the Technical Solution within a series of 
contextual layers.  It is the outer layer, the Programme, Policy and Political Context, 
which makes government different, as argued in Chapter One.  Intellect, the IT trade 
body, drew similar conclusions in its 2003 report, Getting IT Right for Government, 
highlighting accountability, publicity and the political environment as key differences 
and recognising the additional complexity that the government context brings, as 
shown at Table 2.3.24   
 
This section of the review considers the academic literature concerned with the 
specific impact of that government context on an IT project.  However, despite the 
high profile failure of public sector IT projects, very few sources were identified.  
Only twelve articles referred to ‘government’ or ‘public sector’ in their titles and, of 
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Table 2.3. Private and Public Sector Projects Compared 
 
Successful Private Sector Projects 
 
 
Successful Public Sector Projects 
Focused on measurable financial and service 
outcomes 
Multiple aims so hard to measure 
Business driven by competition Generally not in competition with other projects 
Often not visible to the public or shareholders Highly visible to the public and the media 
Less constrained by legislation and regulations Constrained by UK and EU legislation 
Open to risk taking Managed in a risk averse culture 
Designed to limit damage when they are in 
difficulty 
Difficult to adapt to change because of scale and 
complexity 
 Likely to interact with other departments 
Source: Intellect, Getting IT Right for Government, (HMSO, London, 2000). 
 
those, only six specifically examined the effect of that context on the project and its 
management, one relating to the Australian public sector, one to the US, three to the 
UK and one comparing government experience across seven countries.  Although 
there are sources that discuss the Defence context, none of them specifically examine 
its effect on an IT project.  Rosacker and Rosacker confirm these findings, observing 
in 2010 that the separate fields of project management, IT project management and 
public sector management are well developed, but that empirical research on public 
sector IT project management remains in its infancy.25 
 
In 1995, Hackney and McBride considered the effect of context and culture on IT 
projects in the UK, looking at 21 local authorities and three hospitals.26  They 
identified three layers within the government context, albeit slightly different to those 
driving this study: external (legislative, commercial and social forces); organisational 
(infrastructure, management style and grouping of actors within interest groups); and 
individual (views of reality, agendas and interactions).  A series of problems stem 
from these layers, including the cultural decentralisation of IT projects, causing “an 
unplanned proliferation of disparate systems”; IT personnel over-emphasising 
operational systems to the detriment of management information systems; and the 
reinforcement of barriers between sub-cultures through incompatible information 
systems.27  Hackney and McBride conclude that IT departments need to improve their 
understanding of the context and culture of their organisations. 
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Writing in 2001, Brown identified three problem areas in the UK public sector: 
software development; insufficient management capacity; and procurement 
methods.28  The large, complex and ambitious IT projects in government often ignore 
the needs of their users and opt for leading edge technology, a situation set to continue 
as long as the Government is under pressure to provide Value for Money (VfM).29  
However, complex IT requires complex hardware and software.30  This is further 
complicated by the speed with which technology changes and the degree of novelty 
involved.31  Despite these ambitions, there is a recognised shortage of in-house, 
specialist IT project development staff in government, which is unable to match 
private sector remuneration.32  This results in projects being outsourced to external 
consultants and contractors.  However, the lack of skills and knowledge makes it 
equally difficult to judge the suitability and viability of the products offered by the 
private sector or to manage the ensuing contractual process.  Brown also raises 
questions about whether external personnel understand the context sufficiently, 
linking to Hackney and McBride’s observations about the need to understand the 
context and culture. 
 
Finally, Brown discusses the government procurement process.  Writing in 2001, he 
questions the use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which the Government 
subsequently withdrew from use for IT projects.33  In preference to PFI, Brown 
advocates developing partnerships with suppliers, along the lines of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP), as they hold the power in this imperfect market, where the general 
demand for IT services outstrips supply with supply, therefore, controlling price.  
Brown also suggests breaking projects into modular phases, rather than taking a ‘big 
bang’ approach.34  This has been happening in the private sector for some time.35  In 
2003, for example, following a series of failures at the financial services company, 
Save & Prosper, a policy was introduced that all new projects should deliver a return 
on investment within six months, resulting in smaller projects with lower risks, 
delivering better results, faster.36  Despite this, government continues with its massive 
projects of almost limitless complexity.  However, a recent report by the Institute for 
Government, a cross-party think tank, berated this outdated model with its traditional 
linear approaches, pre-defined specifications and solutions procured and delivered 
against a pre-determined timetable that cannot keep pace with rapid technology 
change.37  The report calls for a combination of ‘platform’ and ‘agile development’: a 
 2-10
“shared government-wide approach to IT procurement and development” along with 
the use of modular and iterative development techniques.38 
 
At the end of his article, Brown ponders the public sector culture.  From the staff 
perspective, successful projects mean personnel reductions, reduced budgets due to 
expected business benefits and, probably, another large and complex project; failure 
means that staff remain in post with budget intact, unlikely to be subjected to another 
IT project in the short-term.39  While somewhat cynical, this view reinforces the need 
to understand the context into which the project is being introduced.  Brown’s 
conclusion is that the public sector needs to embrace organisational learning by 
recognising its mistakes, learning from them and then communicating those lessons to 
others.40   
 
Reviewing projects in the Australian public sector in 2009, Crawford and Helm 
advocated the need to achieve value by: 
 
• Demonstrating accountability and transparency to satisfy multiple 
stakeholders whilst implementing policy, utilising resources and delivering 
services; and 
• Focusing on improving organisational performance, while implementing and 
adapting to change. 41 
 
They also note the significant impact of politics on projects, with changes in 
ministerial appointment potentially resulting in changes in political direction.  They 
describe ministers as “highly influential and unpredictable stakeholders and sponsors 
to whom it is necessary to respond as a priority”.42  They also note the many levels of 
accountability (to parliament, to taxpayers, to the community and to business) and the 
need for significant compliance with complex legal and legislative frameworks. 
 
In 2010 and writing from the US perspective, Rosacker and Rosacker concurred with 
Crawford and Helm, noting that, in comparison to the private sector, public sector 
managers receive a higher level of scrutiny from a broader range of stakeholders, all 
of whom can potentially challenge their decisions. 43   This accountability means that 
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strategic decisions tend to be in the public domain from very early in the project 
lifecycle, severely hampering the ability to control and manage IT projects.44  In line 
with Brown as well as Crawford and Helm, they note the constraints of laws and 
regulations, referring specifically to the Clinger-Cohen Act in the US, discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Four, which requires US IT projects to follow best practice.  
However, as Rosacker and Rosacker observe, this may not be clearly defined in 
practical or operational terms, making it difficult for project managers to ascertain 
what ‘best practice’ actually means.45   
 
If government is different because of its Programme, Policy and Political Context, 
then the logical conclusion is that all governments must face similar problems with 
their IT projects.  The above discussion suggests some similarities but Dunleavy and 
Margetts tested this hypothesis in 2006, carrying out a comparative study of seven 
countries.46  They scored the performance of IT projects in Australia, Canada, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UK and the US between 1990 and 2003 to find 
sharp variation.  The UK leads the field in terms of cancelled or non-functioning 
projects, while Japan and the Netherlands have the fewest failures.47  The Japanese 
claim that only one of their public sector IT projects has been cancelled in the past 
twenty years, perhaps due to a culture where failure is unacceptable and, therefore, 
unthinkable.   
 
The fact that some governments have a better record of implementing IT suggests that 
the problems in the UK are not insuperable.  It also suggests that the failures may 
relate to specific problems with government processes in the UK, rather than with IT 
projects per se.  As discussed above and in Chapter One, these include complexity, 
scale, lack of professional skills and the procurement process.  The UK also has a 
tendency to run services at a national, rather than regional, level: for example, driving 
licenses are administered centrally in the UK, but locally in many other countries.48  
Automating national government services inevitably results in large-scale, complex IT 
projects.  Dunleavy and Margett’s study also points to the culture of ‘political 
hyperactivism’ in the UK with Parliament regularly altering legislation and 
regulations. 49   The resulting redesign of processes may no longer fit the original IT 
system design, causing major problems during development and implementation, as 
demonstrated by the doomed IT project at the Child Support Agency in 2003.50 
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Although the literature provides relatively little information about the impact of the 
Programme, Policy and Political Context, it does confirm some of the specific issues 
faced by project managers working in this context.  Intellect highlights issues of 
accountability, size and complexity along with legal and political constraints.  
Hackney and McBride confirm the vertical, insular culture, discussed in Chapter One, 
whilst Brown highlights complexity, technical over-ambition, a lack of skills, 
cumbersome processes and, again, cultural issues.  Looking at the Australian and US 
contexts respectively, Crawford and Helm along with Rosacker and Rosacker identify 
similar issues of accountability, transparency and political short-termism.  Dunleavy 
and Margetts pick up on some of these points, identifying particular problems with IT 
project implementation in the UK public sector.  Overall, this section of the review 
confirms that the management of the Technical Solution occurs in a highly specific 
context that impacts upon it in potentially detrimental ways.  Therefore, this 
discussion now turns to the interventions that can be used to improve that project 
management process, the CSFs. 
 
2.4.  Intervention  
 
Intervention refers to the effect of one event, action or activity on another, usually 
describing something deliberate and designed to bring about change.  This section of 
the literature review is concerned with the identification of that action, the application 
of CSFs to project management.  In 1988, de Wit made a clear distinction between 
project success and project management success.51  Project success is based on 
success criteria, the performance of the project’s ultimate product, discussed here 
under the heading ‘Outcome’ at Section 2.6.52  Project management success is 
concerned with CSFs, those inputs to the management of a project that lead directly or 
indirectly to its success.53  However, despite de Wit’s efforts, there is still 
considerable overlap between the two in the literature, making it difficult to 
disentangle them.  The purpose of this section is, therefore, to examine how academic 
thinking about CSFs in relation to project management and projects has evolved over 
the past thirty years.  It begins with an overview of the generic project management 
literature before considering IT project management and then cross comparing.  It 
should be noted that the two are often treated as interchangeable, an approach that is 
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questioned here.  Both have an extensive literature base, narrowed down as a result of 
the systematic approach to this literature review.   
 
2.4.1. CSFs in the Generic Project Management Literature 
 
The idea of CSFs derived from the work of Daniel in 1961 and was formally defined 
by Rockart in 1979.54  He suggested that a CSF analysis would identify “...the limited 
number of areas in which results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure successful 
competitive performance for the organization”.55  Working with Bullen, he later 
broadened the definition, seeing their utility as a planning tool for IT projects, 
although they are also used extensively in generic project management.56  In 1984, 
Boynton and Zmud offered the following definition: 
 
Those few things that must go well to ensure success for a manager or an 
organization (sic.), and therefore, they represent those managerial or enterprise 
areas that must be given special and continual attention to bring about high 
performance (emphasis in original).57  
 
This focus on a ‘few key areas’ has resulted in a significant number of studies over 
the past fifty years attempting to produce a definitive list.58  Early work tended to 
concentrate on the three classical elements of project management, the so-called ‘iron 
triangle’, as shown at Figure 2.3: the management of resource consumption (cost); the 
setting of specifications, requirements or quality (scope); and delivering to a finite 
timescale (time). 59  Whilst still extensively used, the iron triangle is subject to a range 
of criticisms.60  Jugdev and Muller observe that calculations about cost, scope and 
time are made during the planning phase. 61  As such, Atkinson labels them as “two 
best guesses and a phenomenon”, based on incomplete data and highly likely to 
change over the project lifecycle.62  In addition, they only measure the project 
delivery phase, ignoring any longer term benefits from the product and reflecting only 
the concerns of the project team, rather than the broader aspirations of the 
stakeholders.63   
 
Despite these criticisms, the iron triangle persists.  In 2003, Dvir et al studied a range 
of projects, including a number in the Defence context, to find that a well designed 
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initiation phase is the most important factor in project success; organisational set-up 
and project structure are not good predictors.  Formal design and planning documents 
 
Figure 2.3. The Iron Triangle 
Cost
Scope Time
 
Source: Atkinson, R., 'Project management: cost, time and quality, two best guesses and a 
phenomenon, it's time to accept other success criteria', International Journal of Project 
Management, 1999, Vol. 17, No. 6, pages 337-342, this page 338. 
 
help in meeting time and budget constraints as well as ensuring customer satisfaction, 
whilst scope changes during the project lifecycle are unlikely to improve the end 
product and may actually detract from user satisfaction.64  Their work highlights the 
rigour of the iron triangle in keeping the project on track, confirmed by Jugdev and 
Muller’s defence of its continued utility in 2005.  If used intelligently, they argue, it 
can add value, providing a means of clearly assessing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the project management as well as checking the business value of the outcomes.65  
However, limiting measurement to the iron triangle provides only tactical or 
operational value rather than any strategic worth.66   
 
Since the 1980s, much research has taken place to move the idea of CSFs beyond the 
iron triangle and a number of themes have emerged, including the differentiation of 
the project from its product; consideration of more complex, multi-dimensional and 
integrated CSF frameworks; the examination of organisational and managerial 
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variables beyond the immediate project; the rise of a contingency based approach; 
and, most recently, strategic project management.  The emerging realisation that the 
project should be differentiated from its product can be tracked through a series of 
seminal papers by Pinto and his fellow researchers, as shown at Table 2.4.  These 
stem from a 1986 paper written by Slevin and Pinto, presenting a comprehensive list 
of ten CSFs, confirmed in three subsequent studies.  In 1987, Schultz, Slevin and 
Pinto categorised these ten factors as either ‘strategic’, important during the planning 
phase, or ‘tactical’, important during the project phase.67  In 1988 and 1989, working 
with Slevin and then Covin, Pinto confirmed “that CSFs vary throughout a project 
lifecycle with some important in the early stages whilst others become critical later”.68  
The important factors in the early stages are ‘internal’ (i.e. project related): meeting 
budget, schedule and technical performance; while ‘external factors’ (i.e. product 
related), such as customer needs and satisfaction, become more important later.69  In 
other words, the focus is on the project during planning and development but moves 
to the product during implementation and operations.  However, there seems to be an 
inherent danger in separating the two and, in particular, in not considering the CSFs 
for the product throughout both lifecycles. 
 
Further work with Slevin in 1989 looked at 159 R&D projects, including computer 
software and hardware development, to identify four additional factors, also shown at 
Table 2.4.  The first ten are within the control of the project team, while the final four 
may not be.70   These are: the ‘characteristics of the project team leader’; ‘power and 
politics’ (the degree of political activity within the organisation and the perception 
that the project may further the self-interests of specific individuals); ‘environment’ 
(the likelihood of external factors affecting the operations of the project team, either 
positively or negatively); and ‘urgency’ (the perceived importance of the project or 
the need to implement it as soon as possible).  Based on this research, Pinto and Covin 
went on to compare R&D with construction projects, again confirming that factors 
vary over the lifecycle. 71 
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Table 2.4. Slevin and Pinto: Ten CSFs 
 
Source 
 
 
CSFs 
Slevin, D.P. and Pinto, J.K., ‘The Project 
Implementation Profile: New Tool for Project 
Managers’, Project Management Journal, 1986, 
Vol.17, No.4, pages 57-71. 
 
 
1.Project mission        2.Top management support  
3.Schedule/plans        4.Client consultation  
5.Personnel                6.Technical tasks  
7.Client acceptance    8.Monitoring and feedback  
9.Communication      10.Troubleshooting 
Pinto, J.K. and Slevin, D.P., ‘Critical Factors in 
Successful Project Implementation’, IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management, 1987, 
Vol.34, No.1, pages 22-28. 
 
Schultz, R.L., Slevin, D.P. and Pinto, J.K., 
‘Strategy and Tactics in a Process Model of 
Project Implementation’, Interfaces, 1987, 
Vol.17, No.3, pages 34-46. 
Planning Phase (Strategy): 
Clearly defined goals             Sufficient resource 
Top management support       Schedule/plans        
Project Process (Tactics): 
Personnel                                Client consultation                 
Communication                      Troubleshooting 
Client acceptance                    Monitoring and   
                                                feedback 
Pinto, J.K. and Slevin, D.P., ‘Critical Success 
Factors across the Project Life Cycle’, Project 
Management Journal, 1988, XIX, pages 65-75. 
 
1.Project mission         2.Top management support  
3.Schedule/plans         4.Client consultation  
5.Personnel                 6.Technical tasks  
7.Client acceptance     8.Monitoring and feedback  
9.Communication       10.Troubleshooting 
Pinto, J.K. and Prescott, J.E. 'Variations in 
Critical Success Factors over the Stages in the 
Project Life Cycle', International Journal of 
Project Management, 1988, Vol. 14, No. 4, pages 
5-18.) 
Pinto, J.K. and Slevin, D.P., 'Critical Success 
Factors in R&D Projects', Research Technology 
Management, 1989, Vol. 32, No.1, pages 31-36. 
1.Project mission         2.Top management support  
3.Schedule/plans         4.Client consultation  
5.Personnel                 6.Technical tasks  
7.Client acceptance     8.Monitoring and feedback  
9.Communication       10.Troubleshooting 
Plus 
Characteristics of the project team leader 
Power and politics 
Environmental events 
Urgency 
Pinto, J.K. and Slevin, D.P., 'Project Success: 
Definitions and Measurement Techniques', 
Project Management Journal, 1989, Vol. 19, No. 
1, pages 67-75 
CSF Framework: 
Technical validity 
Organisational validity 
Organisational effectiveness 
Pinto, J.K. and Covin, J.G., 'Critical Factors in 
Project Implementation: a Comparison Study of 
Construction and R&D Projects', Technovation, 
1989, Vol.9, No.1, pages 49-51. 
Construction: Conceptual – Mission 
Construction: Planning - Mission; Power and 
Politics; Technical Tasks 
Construction: Execution - Mission; Schedule; 
Client consultation; Client Acceptance 
Construction: Termination - Technical tasks; 
Mission; Communication; Troubleshooting 
R&D: Conceptual - Mission; Client Consultation; 
Personnel; Urgency 
R&D: Planning - Mission; Environmental effects; 
Schedule; Monitor and feedback; Client 
acceptance 
R&D: Execution - Mission; Technical tasks; Top 
management support 
R&D: Termination - Mission; Schedule; Client 
acceptance; Technical tasks; Personnel 
Source: Author 
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In 1989, Pinto and Slevin integrated and synthesised their earlier work to develop a 
framework for project management success, shown at Figure 2.4.  It describes an 
overlap between technical validity (budget and schedule), organisational validity 
(client satisfaction in terms of product use and benefits to the end user through 
increased efficiency or employee effectiveness) and organisational effectiveness 
(value in terms of positive impact, merit or improved efficiency), demonstrating that 
the factors leading to project success are multi-dimensional and interlinked.72  Two 
key themes emerge from this: the project must be technically correct and perform as 
intended, while the project team must work with the client organisation to ensure 
acceptance of the project.73   
 
Figure 2.4. Key Factors in Successful Project Implementations 
TV OV
OE
TV – Technical Validity
OV – Organisational Validity
OE – Organisational Effectiveness
‘True’ Project 
Implementation Success
 
Source: Pinto, J.K. and Slevin, D.P., 'Project Success: Definitions and Measurement Techniques', 
Project Management Journal, 1989, Vol. 19, No. 1, pages 67-75, this page 69. 
 
Despite this early work on frameworks, the mid 1990s saw Belassi and Tukel 
complaining about the continued proliferation of lists of CSFs, varying in scope and 
purpose and either too general or too specific.74  They argue that it is not individual 
CSFs that cause project management success or failure but a combination of multiple 
factors varying in importance as the project progresses through its lifecycle.  Their 
argument confirms and extends the work of Pinto and his colleagues.  Belassi and 
Tukel created a framework, shown at Figure 2.5, consisting of four categories of CSFs 
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relating to the project; the project manager and team; the organisation; and the 
external environment.75  The full description of these factors is shown at Appendix 2. 
 
Figure 2.5. Critical Success/Failure Factors in Projects 
Factors Related to 
the Project Manager
Factors 
Related to the 
Project
Project Team 
Members
Factor Groups
Factors 
Related to the 
Organisation
Client Consultation and Acceptance
System Response
Project Manager’s Performance on the Job
Project Preliminary Estimates
Availability of Resources
Factor Group
Factors Related to 
the External 
Environment
Success or Failure
 
Source: Belassi, W. and Tukel, O.I., 'A New Framework for Determining Critical Success/Failure 
Factors in Projects', International Journal of Project Management, 1996, Vol. 14, No.3, pages 141-
152. 
 
This developed thinking about CSFs by integrating the project dimensions with both 
organisational and environmental factors.  In addition, the framework clearly 
identifies the implications of these factors not being addressed, as well as detailing the 
relationships between individual factors and between different groups of factors.  
Belassi and Tukel stress that these interrelationships are as important as the individual 
factors.  Therefore, it is a combination of several factors from various groups that  
might lead to success or failure.  As they rightly observe, lists of CSFs provide no 
mechanism for taking these interrelationships into account.76 
 
In line with Belassi and Tukel’s work, the 1990s saw an increasing emphasis on the 
organisational and managerial elements of a project, although less emphasis on 
environmental factors.  In 1992 and still listing CSFs, Freeman and Beale offer 
communication management, personal growth, efficiency of execution, managerial 
implications, organisational implications (customer satisfaction), manufacturability 
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and business performance.77  In 1993, Turner highlighted the need to achieve the 
business purpose and provide satisfactory benefit to the owner, user and 
stakeholders.78  Considering the impact of managerial and organisational variables on 
project success in 1996, Tischler et al focused on the project team: its coherence; 
managers who are leaders; the level of technical qualifications; the stability of key 
personnel throughout the development phase; and a professionally experienced 
project manager.79  In 1999, Dvir and Ben David also focused inwards to the 
organisation of the project team but with some reference to wider organisational 
factors: team cohesion; the project team’s perception of the project’s importance; the 
readiness to accept new ideas; creating an atmosphere of partnership; involvement 
and identification of team members; distribution of lessons learned from previous 
projects; creating an organisational culture that encourages cooperation; and a sense 
of identification with the project goals.80   
 
As well as this growing awareness of organisational issues, there has also been 
recognition that not all projects are the same and that they should, therefore, be 
managed in different ways using different CSFs.  Pinto and Covin highlight the 
academic tendency to characterise all projects as similar, ignoring any difference in 
goals or degree of uncertainty confronted.81  Comparing construction and R&D 
projects in 1989, they noted that some CSFs were common to both types of project, 
but that there were also significant differences.82  A year later, Pinto and Mantel also 
examined different types of project to find variance.83  They argue that each project is 
unique and, therefore, little in the way of general project management theory can be 
applied to a particular project in a specific context.84  Thinking along similar lines in 
2001, Shenhar moved the discussion towards the application of contingency theory to 
project management.85  Proposed by Burns and Stalker86 in 1961, Lawrence and 
Lorsch further extended classical organisational contingency theory in 1967,87 as did 
Perrow88 that same year.  In its generic form, it states that a range of external 
conditions (contingency factors) impact on the organization.  The effectiveness of that 
organisation then depends on how it deals with these factors to maintain its fit with 
the environment.   
 
Pich et al also picked up on this idea that projects depend on their context, the ‘state 
of their world’, and the chosen network of actions within that context.89  In their view, 
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the project management discipline with its requirement for task scheduling and risk 
management represents an ‘instructionist’ approach, meaning that pre-specified 
actions are triggered by pre-determined signals.  In order to be able to take the 
appropriate action, the project manager needs to have sufficient available information 
about the state of the world.  However, with a project operating in an ambiguous or 
complex context, there is likely to be inadequate information and it is then a 
combination of knowledge and skills that enables the selection of the best course of 
action.  Similarly, in 2010, Lauras et al highlight the difficulty faced by the project 
manager in trying to control a number of performance indicators or CSFs.90  They 
question whether this is possible in a very complex project environment, particularly 
if that project is unique and subject to its context.91  That same year, Howells et al 
proposed their Project Contingency Theory (PCT), arguing that every project operates 
in a different context and should be managed accordingly.92  They argue that the one 
size fits all approach is sub-optimal and that a project’s structure and management 
practices should be tailored to suit its context.  Despite these persuasive arguments, 
application of contingency theory to project management remains rare.93 
 
In 2001, Lyneis et al moved the debate into the strategic management arena, raising a 
number of important issues on the way.  Concurring with Pich et al, they argue that 
project management takes a partial or narrow view, focusing on either soft or hard 
factors when both are simultaneously important.94   They also contend that, if each 
project is unique, then learning across projects is difficult, which may be why project 
managers continue to make mistakes.  Given this, project managers need to think 
about projects strategically during the design phase; when determining which 
indicators to measure, monitor and control; as part of the risk management process; to 
incorporate learning from past projects; and when making mid-course corrections.   
 
In 2004, Shenhar argued for Strategic Project Leadership, particularly for strategic 
projects initiated to create a company’s future competitive advantage.95  Not only is 
every project unique, but different types of project require different types of 
leadership.  In 2006, Milosevic and Srivannaboon also considered the alignment of 
project management with business strategy, looking at how project management 
influences business strategy and vice versa.96  Linked to this and writing in the same 
year, Dvir et al define four factors for success with an essential and urgent operational 
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need being the most important.97  If a project is considered important by its end-users, 
then it has a better chance of being completed successfully.  The other three factors 
are the cohesion of the development team; the exact definition of the operational and 
technical requirements of the end-product; and the importance of learning 
mechanisms with specific reference to the success of Defence projects.98  Learning 
from past experience, they argue, can substantially improve the chance of success.   In 
2009, Pinto et al moved the discussion beyond the project team to discuss the 
relationships among project stakeholders and the importance of trust, particularly 
between project team and contractors .99 
 
In 2009, Cooke-Davies et al explored how an organisation’s strategy might influence 
not only the nature of the projects that it undertakes but also the appropriateness of the 
project management processes that it adopts.100  The degree of fit between an 
organisation’s strategic drivers of value and the configuration of its project 
management system influences the value that it obtains from its project management.  
Project success is, therefore, related to the right management approach, which is, in 
turn, related to the characteristics of the specific project.  They suggest that a project 
could have a similar influence on organisational strategy.   
 
This summary of academic progress to date on CSFs and generic project management 
is supported by the work of Jugdev and Muller in 2005. 101  Their timeline, shown at 
Figure 2.6, describes the evolution of academic understanding, confirming and 
updating previous work by Kloppenborg and Opfer in 2002.102  It demonstrates how 
the focus has shifted from the project lifecycle to incorporate the product lifecycle and 
from lists of CSFs to more sophisticated frameworks to describe interventions that 
might lead to success.  More recently, the emphasis has switched to strategic project 
management.  Jugdev and Muller based their study on 30 North American articles, 
using supplementary evidence from a few non-specified European articles to verify 
their findings.  It is, therefore, US-centric and does not differentiate between generic 
and IT project management.  Whilst broadly confirming Jugdev and Muller’s work, 
this discussion demonstrates that thinking about CSFs has not evolved in neat 
incremental stages but that ideas have emerged and re-emerged at various points 
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Figure 2.6. Changes in the Measures of Success, 1960 to 2005 
Project Life Cycle
Period 1: Project Implementation and 
Handover (1960s-1980s)
Period 2: CSF Lists 
(1980s-1990s)
Period 3: CSF Frameworks 
(1990s-2000s)
Period 4: Strategic Project Management 
(2000s to date)
Conception Planning Production/Implementation Handover Utilisation Close Down
Product Life Cycle
 
Source: Jugdev, K. and Muller, R., 'A Retrospective Look at our Evolving Understanding of 
Project Success', Project Management Journal, December, 2005, Vol. 36, No. 4, pages 19-31, this 
page 23. 
 
without becoming fully embedded as theory.  This results in considerable overlap in 
the defined periods, making them slightly artificial.  Overall, however, this review 
confirms the gradual move from lists to frameworks and to ideas about contingency 
and strategic management, along with the extension of the lifecycle from project to 
product.  This suggests that that the notion of ‘a few key areas’ applicable to all 
projects in all contexts is too simplistic for an increasingly complex world and that it 
is the work on contingency theory and the resulting frameworks that may contain the 
answers to project failure. 
 
There is evidently much to learn from the project management literature and much to 
inform anyone embarking on an IT project.  However, this review now turns to the 
scholarly debate surrounding IT project management to compare the evolution of 
thinking.  The discussion begins by questioning whether this differentiation is useful 
to an examination of CSFs in terms of IT project management or whether the same 
rules apply to a project whatever its ultimate product. 
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2.4.2. CSFs in the IT Project Management Literature 
 
Research on IT project management shows the same tendency to produce lists of 
CSFs.  However, there are some evident differences from the generic studies.  From 
early on, the IT project management literature contains reference to the complex 
organisational and cultural issues.  There is also an earlier move to CSF frameworks.  
It is likely that these differences are due to the unique nature of IT projects.  In 1986, 
Spector and Gifford noted that IT design is one of the least classical of the 
engineering disciplines with products that are often poorly understood, unmanageably 
complex and unreliable.103  Pinto and Covin highlight the greater risks, unique 
requirements and processes, unpredictable outcomes and difficulties with the 
scheduling of IT projects.104  In 1996, Morris suggested that these characteristics of IT 
projects might be the cause of failure: 
 
IT projects do indeed pose a particular class of management difficulty.  The 
essence of this difficulty is the way that information technology is so 
intimately bound into its organisational contexts.  As a result, issues of 
organisational effectiveness and user involvement are both more complex and 
more prominent in IT projects than they are in most other project industries.  
This puts much greater emphasis on the tasks of project definition and user 
involvement in IT than in other project situations.105  
 
In 2005, Fitzgerald and Russo argued that the many studies of IT projects indicate that 
failure is largely due to organisational and social rather than technical factors.106  In 
2006, Kappelman et al went so far as to assert that “IT projects never fail because of 
technical causes, despite the fact that people and process problems may manifest 
technically”.107   The technical problems with IT projects can be traced back to people 
and process, which then exploit any inherent product risks, such as large size, high 
complexity or novel technology.108   
 
The generic project management literature recognises that there are specific types of 
project in specific contexts, leading to the application of contingency theory rather 
than rigid project management protocols and moving thinking towards strategic 
project management.  It is evident that there is a strong argument for differentiating IT 
projects from other forms of project.  However, is it then sufficient to say that all IT 
projects fit into the same category or are there different types of IT project?  The 
 2-24
discussion about IT project type has expanded into a whole literature on IT portfolio 
management, which is beyond the scope of this review.  Therefore, this discussion 
focuses on the work initiated by McFarlan in 1981, who argues that the differentiation 
of IT projects provides a means of assessing specific risks prior to project 
implementation.  In his view, the level of risk is determined by the size and structure 
of the project combined with the organisation’s experience with the technology 
involved.109   
 
Ward and Griffiths picked up on this work in 1996 with their portfolio model for 
identifying types of IT project, as shown at Figure 2.7.110  They argue that the main 
point of an information system is to add value by exploiting information as a core 
business resource but that there are four different types of IT project that might 
deliver this value.  A strategic IT project is associated with business drivers,  
 
Figure 2.7. Project Type Classification 
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Source: Ward, J. and Griffiths, P., Strategic Planning for Information Systems, (Chichester, 
Wiley, 1996), page 364. 
 
objectives or measure of success and is crucial to strategic and competitive business 
initiatives.  As such, it represents the greatest potential value to the business.  A high 
potential project has unproven but potential value to the business and needs to be 
rapidly evaluated to confirm this.  Most projects are key operational, supporting 
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primary processes that are essential to the day-to-day running of the organisation.  
Support projects are necessary but have low intrinsic value to the business.   
 
Ward and Griffith’s work provides a useful precursor to the use of CSFs in project 
management.  The first stage is to understand the type of project that needs to be 
managed and then to identify the CSFs that are most likely to be relevant to such a 
project.  Different projects require different management approaches.111  Potentially, 
this improves the identification of those areas of management that need special and 
continual attention to deliver success, whilst further reinforcing the need for a 
contingency approach to projects rather than attempting to apply a general-purpose set 
of tools.112   
 
These observations justify the decision to review the project management literature in 
two parts.  They also explain the much earlier concentration on socio-technical and 
organisational factors in the IT project management literature and the greater 
concentration on frameworks as opposed to lists as a means of capturing the ensuing 
complexity.  Of particular interest here is work by Markus and Robey in 1983, Davis 
et al in 1992, Sauer in 1993, Heeks et al in 1999 and Fortune and Peters in 2005, all of 
whom attempt to group and coherently integrate lists of CSFs into frameworks, 
describing not only the areas that need to be managed to achieve success but also the 
interactions between them.   
 
In 1984, Markus noted that,  
 
The impacts of systems are not caused by system technology or by the people 
and organisations that use them but by the interaction between specific system 
design features and the related features of the organisational setting.113   
 
In her work with Robey the previous year, she set out the concept of ‘organisational 
validity’, predating Pinto and Slevin’s framework linking organisational validity with 
technical validity and organisational effectiveness by five years, to identify four levels 
of analysis that can be used to explain IT implementation problems, as shown at Table 
2.5. 114  Pliskin et al went on to suggest a fifth level, the culture-system level,  
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Table 2.5. Levels of Analysis 
Level Description 
User-System Level Degree of fit between users’ psychological 
characteristics and system design attributes in 
terms of users’ motivations or cognitive styles 
Structure-System Level Match between the structural characteristics of an 
organisation and different system design attributes 
Power-System Level Distribution of power within an organisation and 
whether it is at odds with that existing in the 
organisational context of use 
Environment-System Level Fit between the system design characteristics and 
the environment of the organisation in which it is 
used 
Source: Markus, M.L. and Robey, D.  ‘The Organisational Validity of Management Information 
Systems’, Human Relations, 1983, 36, pages 203-226. 
 
concerned with “the fit between the organisational culture presumed in the design of 
the system and the actual organisational culture in the implementing organisation”.115  
Markus and Robey caution that “it is by no means certain that validity will lead to 
effective use or invalidity to ineffective use”.116  This depends on whether the 
information system matches the organisational thinking and behaviour patterns, as 
well as the effectiveness of those patterns in the first place.  In other words, an 
organisationally valid information system might not deliver significant benefits if it 
merely automates inefficient ways of working; alternatively, there might be resistance 
to the implementation of an invalid system but it could yield major improvements in 
organisational effectiveness.117  There is evidently a much earlier realisation of the 
need for the IT project manager to be aware of the organisational ‘fit’ of the project 
than was evident in the generic literature. 
 
In 1992, Davis et al created a framework based on two premises: ‘an information 
system is a social system that uses information technology’ and IS success or failure 
cannot be explained in terms of either the IT alone or the social system alone.118  This 
confirms the views discussed: the IT system is inextricably bound with its context.  
Accordingly, this framework has two dimensions, one concerned with the social 
system and the other with the technical aspects, as shown at Figure 2.8.  Each 
dimension is divided into four, giving 16 areas of ‘potentially useful data for a failure 
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Figure 2.8. Two Dimensional Matrix 
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Management, 1992, 23, 293-318. 
 
diagnosis’.119  Mitev argues that this approach is too narrow, claiming that, 
 
The social system dimension must include the larger social and political 
processes through which the interests of different social groups interact with 
one another and with the technology.  This implies that macro-social and 
historical factors must be investigated as well as the multi-causal relationship 
more immediately involved in failure.120   
 
She raises the spectre of the wider environment and its impact on the project, 
questioning whether it is sufficient to focus on the technology, the managerial issues 
surrounding the project, the organisational structure, culture and context.  She also 
highlights Belassi and Tukel’s view of the importance of interrelationships between 
factors. 
 
Following on from Davis, Sauer focuses on the social and organisational context but 
also highlights the importance of interrelationships.  He developed the Triangle of 
Dependence Approach in 1993 as “a tool to aid analysis of the information systems 
process”.121  His framework, shown at Figure 2.9, demonstrates that each relationship 
is subject to a variety of influences, making some aspects uncontrollable  
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Figure 2.9. Triangle of Dependence 
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Source: Sauer, C., Why Information Systems Fail: A Case Study Approach, (Waller, 1993). 
 
but providing scope to manage others.  The information system relies on the project 
organisation to maintain it; the project organisation relies on supporters for resources; 
and the supporters expect benefits.  If there are any flaws in any of these relationships, 
then it is likely to have a negative impact on the IT project, leading to failure or 
termination.  Again, Sauer recognises the need for organisational ‘fit’. 
 
Picking up on these ideas in 1999, Heeks et al argue that a successful information 
system matches the technical, social and organisational factors in its specific context, 
as well as the perceptions of its key stakeholders.122  Their resulting model is shown at 
Figure 2.10.  Reality describes the current state of the specific context; the Conception 
is the desired state, which refers to the new information system design.  Ideally, a 
system will match existing realities or only require very limited change along these 
seven dimensions.  This proposition has links back to the work of Markus and Robey 
and to Pliskin’s observation that the system design has to fit the organisational 
context.   
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Figure 2.10. Conception-Reality Gap Model 
Conception Reality
Information
Technology
Processes
Objectives and Values
Staffing and Skills
Management and Structures
Other Resources: Money and Time
 
Source: Heeks, R., Mundy, D. and Salazar, A.  Why Health Care Information Systems Succeed or 
Fail.  (Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management, Manchester University, 
1999). 
 
The flaw in this argument is that an information system that exactly matches its 
organisational context is unlikely to change it.123  Yet, the purpose of IT is to support 
and generate organisational change, which brings an inherent risk of failure, 
depending on the degree of change.124  In 1992, for example, the London Ambulance 
Services Computer Aided Despatch system famously failed because the speed and 
depth of change were simply too aggressive for the circumstances. 125  Heeks et al 
conclude that success becomes more likely when change is limited.  Therefore, an IT 
project faces a trade-off between change and risk.  Reducing the size of change may 
increase the chance of success but decrease the organisational benefits; increasing the 
size of change may reduce the chance of success but increase the benefits.126  The 
Conception-Reality Gap Model highlights the role of change in the success or failure 
of an information system.  It is also concerns the match of that information system to 
a highly specific and unique context.  However, unlike Markus and Robey’s earlier 
work, it takes no account of the surrounding environment. 
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Fortune and Peters created the Formal Systems Model (FSM) through a series of 
papers published in 1990,127 1992,128 1993129 and 1994.130  They propose a “common 
conceptual framework for analysis” specifically aimed at understanding complex 
‘human activity systems’, people engaged in purposeful activity that is likely to 
involve the interaction of a range of sub-systems.131  They adapted earlier work by 
Checkland, who identified that any system needed to have a continuous purpose or 
mission; a measure of performance; a decision-taking process; a degree of 
connectivity between the components; an environment with which the system 
interacts; boundaries separating the system from the wider system and the wider 
system from the environment; resources; and some guarantee of continuity.132 
 
In 2005, they related the FSM to IT projects, describing the systems representation as 
“a model of a robust system capable of purposeful activity without failure” (emphasis 
in original). 133  The FSM, shown at Figure 2.11, shows a project managed in such a 
way that all possible points of failure are controlled and all possible CSFs managed.  
It consists of a system (the Formal System), a wider system, representing the next  
 
Figure 2.11. Formal Systems Method 
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Source: Fortune, J. and Peters, G., Information Systems: Achieving Success by Avoiding Failure, 
(Chichester, Wiley, 2005), page 121. 
 2-31
hierarchical level, and an environment.  The wider system affects the system by 
decision makers and monitoring the performance of the system as a whole.  The  
defining the purpose and setting objectives, providing resources, influencing the 
environment disturbs the system both directly and indirectly through the wider system 
and vice versa.  The Formal System has a decision-making sub-system, a performance 
monitoring sub-system and a set of sub-systems that carry out the tasks.   
 
The FSM encapsulates much of the research that has gone before.  It sits the project 
firmly in its context and environment.  It picks up on subjective issues, like 
expectations management, the need for decision-making processes and the 
requirement for the project to ‘fit’ the organisation and beyond.  It also very clearly 
shows the interrelationships between the factors and the groups of factors.  As such, it 
brings together much of the thinking about both generic projects and IT projects, so 
providing an ideal means of scrutinising the Intervention, the application of the 
identified CSFs in the case study, reported in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
As identified by Chua in 2009, there are two threads of research on IT project 
management.134  He termed the first thread ‘specific factors’, the CSF lists, while the 
second thread looks at the systemic nature of IT project management, its particular 
organisational context and the emergent properties that result in its overall success or 
failure.  It is not a single set of static factors but a series of issues and actions.  The 
literature review undertaken for this study found a similar differentiation but has 
focused this discussion of IT project management on the second thread, which is 
where the major difference with the generic project management literature is 
highlighted.  These frameworks show the move to a broader definition of IT project 
management that incorporates the organisation and structure of the project, its context 
and, ultimately, its environment.  There has been a much greater move in the IT 
literature to synthesise factors into interrelating groups.   
 
Both threads are used to compare the two bodies of literature with the frameworks 
disassembled into their component parts, capturing their elements, if not their 
interrelationships.  Whilst recognising the importance of the three-dimensional 
frameworks, the lists provide a much more pragmatic means of examining whether 
the same ‘few key areas’ are being identified in both bodies of literature.  This 
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comparison is based on research carried out by White and Fortune in 2002.  The first 
stage of their work was a survey of 236 project managers.  They were asked to 
identify the CSFs for projects and this revealed that the iron triangle was still the most 
commonly cited measure.135  In 2006, Fortune and White compared their empirical 
research with the literature base, undertaking a comprehensive review of 63 
publications on CSFs in generic project management in an attempt to combine the 
lists into a definitive set.136  They found only limited agreement.  The three most cited 
were the importance of a project receiving support from senior management; clear and 
realistic objectives; and producing an efficient plan.137 
 
Of the publications reviewed, 81% included at least one of these but only 17% 
included all three.138  This list is shown at Table 2.6 to form the basis of a comparison 
with those CSFs identified in this review of the IT project management literature.  
The purpose is to consider whether the IT literature places the same emphasis on the 
same factors or whether it identifies different factors.  Although the CSFs identified in 
the IT literature were interpreted fairly broadly to fit with the CSFs identified by 
Fortune and White, there were two areas where there was no correspondence.  Rather 
surprisingly, there was no reference to ‘project sponsor/champion’ for which 12  
 
Table 2.6. Critical Success Factors Compared 
Generic Project Management CSFs 
Identified by Fortune & White, 2006 
IT Project Management CSFs 
Support from senior management 
(39 citations) 
Ginzberg (1981); Beath (1983); Cerveny (1986); DeLone, (1988); Ewusi-Mensah (1991); Weill 
(1992); Yap (1992); King (1994); CHAOS (1994); Beynon-Davies (1995); Thong (1996a); Ewusi 
(1997); Yap (1997); Keil (1998); CHAOS (1999); Whittaker (1999); Keil (2000); Caldeira (2002); 
Goulielmos (2003); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Fortune (2006); Kappelman (2006); Standing 
(2006); Fowler (2007); Chua (2009) 
(26 citations) 
Clear realistic objectives 
(31 citations) 
Beath (1983); Glaser (1984); Lyytinen (1987); Curtis (1988); Sauer (1988); Boehm (1989); Pinto 
(1990); Rainer (1991); CHAOS (1994); Wateridge (1995); Flowers (1996); Ewusi (1997); Keil (1998); 
Wateridge (1998); Atkinson (1999); CHAOS (1999); Wallace (1999); Whittaker (1999); Keil (2000); 
Wright (2002); Yardley (2002); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); Fortune (2006); 
Kappelman (2006); Standing (2006); Chua (2009) 
(28 citations) 
Strong detailed plan kept up-to-date 
(29 citations) 
CHAOS (1994); Keil (1998); Atkinson (1999); CHAOS (1999); Wallace (1999); Wallace (2004); 
Wallace (2004a); Fortune (2006); Kappelman (2006); Standing (2006); Chua (2009) 
(11 citations) 
Good communication/feedback 
(27 citations) 
Curtis (1988); Rainer (1991); Beynon-Davies (1995); Flowers (1996); Krauth (1999); Wallace (1999); 
Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Kappelman (2006) 
(9 citations) 
User/client involvement 
(24 citations) 
Beath (1983); Markus (1983); Lyytinen (1987); Pinto (1990); Raymond (1990); Ewusi-Mensah 
(1991); Rainer (1991); Symons (1991); Yap (1992); Sauer (1993); CHAOS (1994); CHAOS (1994); 
Wateridge (1995); Flowers (1996); Thong (1996); Yap (1997); Keil (1998); Wateridge (1998); Krauth 
(1999); CHAOS (1999); Wallace (1999); Keil (2000); Beynon-Davies (2002); Wright (2002); Yardley 
(2002); Goulielmos (2003); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); Kappelman (2006); 
Standing (2006); Fowler (2007); Chua (2009) 
(33 citations) 
Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient 
staff/team 
(20 citations) 
McFarlan (1981); Curtis (1988); Boehm (1989); Yap (1992); Barki (1993); King (1994); CHAOS 
(1994); Beynon-Davies (1995); Flowers (1996); Ewusi (1997); Keil (1998); CHAOS (1999); Wallace 
(1999); Zeiger (1999); Keil (2000); Sumner (2000); Brown (2001); Beynon-Davies (2002); Caldeira 
(2002); Goulielmos (2003); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); Kappelman (2006); 
Fowler (2007) 
(25 citations) 
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Generic Project Management CSFs 
Identified by Fortune & White, 2006 
(continued from previous page) 
IT Project Management CSFs 
(continued from previous page) 
 
Effective change management 
(19 citations) 
Beynon-Davies (1995); Keil (2000); Goulielmos (2003); Wallace (2004); Kappelman (2006) 
(5 citations) 
Competent project manager 
(19 citations) 
Boehm (1989); Sauer (1993); CHAOS (1994); Beynon-Davies (1995); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); 
Kappelman (2006); Standing (2006); Fowler (2007) 
(9 citations) 
Strong business case/sound basis for 
project 
(16 citations) 
Pinto (1990); CHAOS (1999); Wallace (1999); Whittaker (1999); Yardley (2002); Kappelman (2006) 
(6 citations) 
Sufficient/well allocated resources 
(16 citations) 
Glaser (1984); Lyytinen (1987); Sauer (1988); Pinto (1990); Beynon-Davies (1995); Wateridge 
(1998); Atkinson (1999); Wallace (1999); Yardley (2002); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); 
Kappelman (2006); Chua (2009) 
(13 citations) 
Good leadership 
(15 citations) 
Beynon-Davies (1995); CHAOS (1999); Caldeira (2002); Goulielmos (2003); Wallace (2004); 
Standing (2006) 
(6 citations) 
Proven/familiar technology 
(14 citations) 
Zmud (1980); McFarlan (1981); Beath (1983); Boehm (1989); Rainer (1991); Barki (1993); Beynon-
Davies (1995); Flowers (1996); Ewusi (1997); Keil (1998); CHAOS (1999); Krauth (1999); Whittaker 
(1999); Keil (2000); Sumner (2000); Brown (2001); Beynon-Davies (2002); Wright (2002); Huang 
(2004); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); Chua (2009)  
(22 citations) 
Realistic schedule 
(14 citations) 
Glaser (1984); Sauer (1988); Boehm (1989); Pinto (1990); Beynon-Davies (1995); Flowers (1996); 
Wateridge (1998); Wallace (1999); Whittaker (1999); Yardley (2002); Wallace (2004); Wallace 
(2004a); Kappelman (2006); Standing (2006); Chua (2009) 
(15 citations) 
 
Risks addressed/assessed/managed 
(13 citations) 
Keil (1998) 
(1 citation) 
Project sponsor/champion 
(12 citations) 
(0 citations) 
Effective monitoring/control 
(12 citations) 
Boehm (1989); Flowers (1996); Wateridge (1998); Wallace (1999); Whittaker (1999); Yardley (2002); 
Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a); Chua (2009) 
(9 citations) 
Adequate budget 
(10 citations) 
Boehm (1989); Yap (1992); Wateridge (1995); Wateridge (1998); Yardley (2002); Wallace (2004); 
Wallace (2004a); Chua (2009) 
(8 citations) 
Organisational 
adaptation/culture/structure 
(10 citations) 
Markus (1983); Lyytinen (1987); Sauer (1988); Barki (1993); Pliskin (1993); Beynon-Davies (1995); 
Flowers (1996); Atkinson (1999); Krauth (1999); Wallace (1999); Zeiger (1999); Keil (2000); 
Beynon-Davies (2002); Caldeira (2002); Goulielmos (2003); Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Wallace 
(2004a); Fowler (2007) 
(19 citations) 
Good performance by 
suppliers/contractors/consultants 
(10 citations) 
Boehm (1989); Yap (1992); King (1994); Beynon-Davies (1995); Thong (1996a); Yap (1997); 
Atkinson (1999); Whittaker (1999); Sumner (2000); Goulielmos (2003); Wallace (2004); Chua (2009) 
(12 citations) 
Planned close down/review/acceptance 
of possible failure 
(9 citations) 
(0 citations) 
Training provision 
(7 citations) 
Beynon-Davies (1995); Flowers (1996); Atkinson (1999); Krauth (1999); Sumner (2000); Wright 
(2002); Huang (2004); Fowler (2007); Chua (2009) 
(9 citations) 
Political stability 
(6 citations) 
Flowers (1996); Wallace (1999); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a) 
(4 citations) 
Correct choice/past experience of 
project management 
methodology/tools 
(6 citations) 
Rainer (1991); CHAOS (1999); Whittaker (1999); Zeiger (1999); Keil (2000); Goulielmos (2003); 
Huang (2004); Wallace (2004); Fowler (2007); Chua (2009) 
(10 citations) 
Environmental influences 
(6 citations) 
Markus (1983); Sauer (1993); Atkinson (1999); Wallace (1999); Beynon-Davies (2002); Caldeira 
(2002); Goulielmos (2003); Wallace (2004); Wallace (2004a) 
(9 citations) 
Past experience (learning from) 
(5 citations) 
Beynon-Davies (1995); Goulielmos (2003) 
(2 citations) 
Project size (large)/level of complexity 
(high)/number of people involved (too 
many)/duration (over three years) 
(4 citations) 
Zmud (1980); McFarlan (1981); Beath (1983); Barki (1993); Sauer (1993); CHAOS (1994); Beynon-
Davies (1995); CHAOS (1999); Wallace (1999); Brown (2001); Beynon-Davies (2002); Wallace 
(2004); Wallace (2004a); Chua (2009) 
(14 citations) 
Different viewpoints (appreciating) 
(3 citations) 
Lyytinen (1987); Raymond (1990); Ewusi-Mensah (1991); Symons (1991); Beynon-Davies (1995); 
Dodd (1995); Wateridge (1995); Dhillon (1998); Keil (1998); Heeks (1999) 
(10 citations) 
Source: Author 
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citations had been found by Fortune and White or ‘planned close 
down/review/acceptance’ for which nine citations had been found.   
 
However, it may be that project sponsor/champion is simply subsumed into senior 
management support in the IT literature.  Two of the top three CSFs for IT project 
management were the same as those for generic project management, ‘Clear Realistic 
Objectives’ and ‘Support from Senior Management’, as shown at Table 2.7.  
However, ‘User/Client Involvement’ featured as the most important CSF, replacing 
‘Support from Senior Management’ in top place and appearing instead of ‘Strong 
Detailed Plan Kept Up-to-Date’.  Of the 58 publications reviewed, 84% included at 
least one of these top three CSFs in comparison to 81% identified by Fortune and 
White and only 13% (17% for Fortune and White) identified all three. 
 
Table 2.7. Top Three CSFs: Generic and IT Project Management Compared 
Generic Project Management IT Project Management 
Support from senior management User/Client involvement 
Clear realistic objectives Clear realistic objectives 
Strong detailed plan kept up-to-date Support from senior management 
Source: Author 
 
Therefore, the CSFs identified for IT project management broadly support the 
findings of Fortune and White in 2006 but also confirm the increased emphasis in IT 
project management on the organisational and cultural issues.  This comparison 
provides the basis to consider whether the CSFs identified from the analysis of the ten 
major reports, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, are correct and 
comprehensively considered, thereby answering the first of the three subsidiary 
questions that stem from the overarching research question: are the lessons learned 
from previous complex IT projects in government correct and comprehensively 
considered?    
 
This systematic review of both the generic and IT project management literature 
confirms that a great deal of work has been carried out to find ways of improving 
project management.  There is sufficient understanding of the CSFs to enable good 
practice in the planning and management of all IT Projects.139  Despite this effort, 
projects are still failing.  According to Collins, the problem with IT failures is not a 
shortage of best practice, but the lack of adherence.140  Part of the remit for this 
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review was to seek evidence regarding the application of CSFs in practice and their 
effect.  However, despite this extensive research, this question appears to have been 
neither asked nor answered and there is little evidence that the guidance is being 
followed comprehensively, although there is anecdotal evidence that it is not.141 
Sauser et al reported in 2009 that, despite their academic popularity, the identification 
of CSF lists and frameworks seems to have had little impact on project management 
practices.142  In their view, few organisations are actually using these findings to 
improve their project management processes.143  However, this is based on the 
continued failure rates rather than scrutiny of the understanding and application of 
CSFs in practice.  In 1988, de Wit questioned the utility of CSFs as good indicators or 
pre-conditions of success or failure and concluded that, while their presence might not 
guarantee successful IT project management, their absence is likely to lead to 
failure.144  Therefore, the discussion moves to consideration of the project or, using 
the CIMO terminology, the Mechanism. 
 
2.5.  Mechanism 
 
In this instance, Mechanism explains the relationship between the Intervention and the 
Outcome.  Referring back to the conceptual framework, this is described as the 
‘Technical Solution’, where decisions are taken about the product, the project and its 
management in relation to the surrounding contextual layers.  Therefore, the focus of 
this section is the project itself.  The purpose is to untangle the definitions of ‘project’ 
and ‘project management’ in order to identify the processes that explain the 
relationship between the Intervention, the application and understanding of the 
performance or, in other words, the CSFs, and the Outcome, the impact of those CSFs 
on the delivered product.  
 
In Chapter One, the pragmatic decision to use the term ‘project’ throughout this thesis 
rather than ‘programme’ or ‘mega-project’ was noted.  However, there are clear 
differences.  In 2005, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) defined a project 
as a “particular way of managing activities to deliver specific outputs over a specific 
period and within cost, quality and resource constraints”; a programme as a 
“management framework for coordinating related projects to deliver outcomes and 
benefits” and a portfolio as “the selection and coordination of an organisation’s 
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complete set of projects and programmes”.145  It should be noted that exceptions to 
these definitions abound: the Manhattan Project and the Human Genome Project, for 
example, were more correctly categorised as programmes, whilst the DII Programme 
began life as a project but was later renamed.146 
 
The OGC’s definition of a project with its emphasis on “managing activities” and 
“delivering specific outputs” could just as easily describe project management; 
projects are often defined in this way in both operational documents and the academic 
literature.  For example, Gottschalk and Karlsen describe a project as a temporary 
organisational structure with a unique, goal-oriented work system that integrates 
technical, procedural, organisational and human elements, identifies and allocates 
resources, and organises and structures activities in accordance with business and 
technical requirements.147  This definition emphasises the management of the project: 
creating a work system, integrating elements, identifying and allocating resources and 
so on.  Shenhar and Dvir also describe a project as a temporary organisation and 
process set up to achieve a specified goal under the constraints of time, budget and 
other resources.148   The Project Management Institute’s (PMI) Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) confirms this view, defining a project as: 
 
A temporary endeavor (sic) undertaken to create a unique product, service or 
result. The temporary nature of projects indicates a definite beginning and end. 
The end is reached when the project’s objectives have been achieved or when 
the project is terminated because its objectives will not or cannot be met, or 
when the need for the project no longer exists.149 
 
Therefore, projects are unique and temporary, set up to deliver a new product or 
service within clear start and end dates, rather than being part of the everyday 
business process.  They are completed when they meet their goals and objectives or, 
alternatively, they are cancelled.   
 
However, given this tendency to link the definition of project management with the 
definition of a project, how is the definition of project management different?  
Writing in 1999, Atkinson revives Oisen’s 1950s definition, which synthesised a 
number of prevalent views: 
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The application of a collection of tools and techniques...to direct the use of 
diverse resources toward the accomplishment of a unique, complex, one-time 
task within time, cost and quality constraints. Each task requires a particular 
mix of these tools and techniques structured to fit the task environment and 
life cycle (from conception to completion) of the task.150  
 
The basis of this description continues to be used.  For example, the British Standard 
for Project Management (BS6079-2 2000) refers to the planning, monitoring and 
control of all aspects of a project and the motivation of all those involved to achieve 
the project objectives on time and to the specified cost, quality and performance.151  In 
2002, Yardley proposed the process of controlling the achievement of the project 
objectives, which he defines as time, cost and scope.  However, there is a confusing 
overlap.  When defining a project, the OGC highlights cost, quality and resource 
constraints;152 Shenhar and Dvir talk about time, budget and other resource 
constraints.153  On the other hand, when defining project management, Oisen refers to 
time, cost and quality154; the British Standards Institute details cost, quality and 
performance.155  It is evident that definitions for both a project and project 
management often include the success criteria and that the same success criteria, the 
iron triangle, are used for both, despite the fact that alternative measures of success 
have been suggested over the years, as discussed above.  However, there is some 
evidence that the shift to broader CSFs is permeating these definitions.  In 1995, the 
UK Association of Project Managers, defined project management as: 
 
The planning, organisation, monitoring and control of all aspects of a project 
and the motivation of all involved to achieve the project objectives safely and 
within agreed time, cost and performance criteria.156 
 
In 2006, this became: 
 
The process by which projects are defined, planned, monitored, controlled and 
delivered such that the agreed benefits are realised.157    
 
 
This clarification of the project process, managing the project through a series of 
stages, is known as the project lifecycle.  Probably the most common description of 
this in IT is the Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC): 
 
• Feasibility study 
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• Systems investigation 
• Systems analysis 
• Systems design 
• Implementation 
• Review and Maintenance.158 
 
A current and popular means of controlling the CSFs across this lifecycle is to 
conduct project reviews at key stages.  Despite this, there is little in the literature that 
assesses the utility of such reviews.  In 2007, Liu and Yetton conducted a study of the 
construction and IT sectors in Australia to examine whether project reviews across the 
lifecycle have any effect on the ultimate performance of the product.159  They found 
that the outcome was largely dependent on the certainty of the task so conducting 
reviews in a high task uncertainty environment, such as might be found early in a 
project’s lifecycle and in an IT project, had a negative effect on performance.160 
 
Much of the early research on IT projects was centred on similar tools and 
methodologies for project management.161  However, Fortune and Peters argue that 
the SDLC is not completely comprehensive, ignoring the ‘pre-feasibility’ stage where 
a need has been identified but not tested further.162  More critically, these stages are 
seen from the perspective of the system developer and not from the point of view of 
the organisation.163  Elvin points out that these models were developed to solve 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s in very different organisational contexts.164  
Therefore, they have limitations when dealing with large projects and significant 
business change in the 2000s.165  These inadequacies have not gone unnoticed and, 
during the last decade, the practice of software development has transformed from 
traditional life-cycle methods to more flexible and dynamic approaches that produce 
systems in much shorter timescales.166  This point was discussed in Section 2.3 in 
terms of the need for platform and agile development in government.  However, it is 
unlikely that these advances alone are sufficient to improve the success rate of IT 
projects.   
 
It is evident that projects have to be viewed as continuous management processes, 
rather than simply an issue of software development.  Winter et al argue that the 
SDLC is focused on a single system, the IT, ignoring the other systems impacted by 
an IT project, especially the social systems.167  Given this, Alter has adapted the 
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SDLC model to produce the Work System Life Cycle (WSLC) model, as shown at 
Figure 2.12.168  In Alter’s view, an organisation is made up of a set of work systems in 
which humans and/or machines perform a business process using information, 
technology and other resources to produce products and/or services for internal or 
external customers.  This perspective brings the wider business context firmly into the 
frame, giving a much broader view beyond the immediate project lifecycle and 
providing a much closer match with current thinking.    
 
Figure 2.12. The Work System Life Cycle (WSLC) Model 
Initiation
Development
Implementation
Operation and 
Maintenance
Redesign
Terminate
Continue
Realisation that the 
implementation is 
incomplete
Realisation that the materials, 
programs and other resources 
that were developed must be 
changed before completing the 
implementation
Changes in 
purpose, scope or 
schedule
Statement of what the problem is 
and what resources and general 
approach will be used to attain 
work system improvements
Materials, computer programs and 
other required resources 
developed and available for 
implementation in the organisation
Work system 
changes 
implemented in 
the organisation 
and 
institutionalised
 
Source: Alter, S. ‘Which Life Cycle – Work System, Information System or Software?’ 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems, October 2001, 7, Article 17, page 12. 
 
The Mechanism explains the relationship between the Intervention and the Outcome.  
As the OGC notes, a project provides a particular way of managing activities to give 
specific outputs.  These activities occur through a number of stages, which have been 
redefined over time to accommodate wider organisational factors and more iterative 
processes.  The interaction between the project, the process of project management 
and the product impacts ultimately on the performance of the organisation.  This is 
discussed further in the next section, which considers the Outcome. 
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2.6.  Outcome 
 
Companies that formally define success, consistently measure their progress towards 
it and act on the results have improved IT project outcomes, according to Thomas and 
Fernandez in 2008.169  The final element for examination in this literature review is 
the Outcome, the formal definition of success.  In line with Thomas and Fernandez’s 
findings, this section asks three subsidiary questions of the literature:  
 
1. What is the effect of the Intervention?   
2. How will the impact of the Intervention be measured? 
3. What are the intended/unintended effects? 
 
In terms of the conceptual framework, Outcome refers to the impact of the CSFs or, in 
CIMO terminology, the effect of the Intervention on the Mechanism, which should 
result in improved performance.  Examining scholarly thinking on defining success 
reveals that it is fraught with difficulty.  If success is hard to define, then its antithesis, 
failure, is also difficult to capture.  Describing the precise nature of success and 
failure is complicated by their rich variety, their multi-causal nature and the fact that 
levels of success and failure vary over the project lifecycle.  Therefore, there is a need 
for a much broader and more complex definition of success in both the generic and 
the IT project management literature.  In 1992, DeLone and McLean claimed that IT 
project success and failure are opposite sides of the same coin and the ensuing 
discussion is based on this premise.170  However, whether discussing success or 
failure, most research is based on unarticulated or unclear definitions.  Shenhar and 
Levy note that project success is probably the most frequently discussed topic in the 
field of project management but the least agreed upon.171  Baccarini confirms that 
there is no consistent interpretation and no accepted methodology for measuring it.172   
 
2.6.1. Effect of the Intervention 
 
The Intervention, the application of CSFs to the management of an IT project, should 
have the effect of mitigating and managing potential risks, those factors or conditions 
that threaten the successful completion of a project.  Therefore, risks are the mirror 
image of CSFs.  Failure to understand, identify and manage these risks is a frequently 
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cited cause of problems in IT project management.173  However, by identifying and 
analysing potential threats, action can be taken to reduce the possibility of failure.  
Since the 1970s, both academics and practitioners have written about risks associated 
with software projects, using anecdotal evidence or studies limited to a narrow portion 
of the development process.174  Despite these efforts, there are relatively few tools 
available to identify project risk factors and a lack of theory to explain the linkages 
between project risk and project performance.  Writing in 2006, Kappelman et al 
noted that IT project management is embarrassingly immature in the mastery of risks 
yet there are significant symptoms or early warning signs of trouble long before 
failure.175   
 
As with CSFs, several lists of risk factors have been published, such as those by Alter 
and Ginzberg176 in 1978, McFarlan177 in 1981, Boehm178 in 1991, Heemstra and 
Kusters179 in 1996, Moynihan180 in 1997 and Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil and Cule181 in 
2001.  Despite this work, there has been little attempt to rank the lists, to establish the 
underlying dimensions of project risk or to develop good assessment instruments.182  
According to Wallace et al, their influence on a project in terms of its outcomes 
remains largely unexplored.183  Therefore, this discussion focuses on the work by 
Boehm, Keil et al and Wallace et al to investigate the relationship between the project 
and risk. 
 
Boehm used his experiences in the Defence industry in the 1980s to build a top ten list 
of software risk items, as shown at Table 2.8.  These risk items have been mapped 
back to the CSFs previously identified in Table 2.6 to show that there is a clear 
relationship, particularly with regard to two of the top three: user/client involvement 
and clear realistic objectives.  However, it is evident that Beohm’s identification of 
risk is firmly fixed in the project and its lifecycle without really considering the 
product lifecycle, the organisational impacts or the external environment.  In 1998, 
Keil et al assembled three panels of experienced project managers from different parts 
of the world and asked them to rank and rate risk in terms of importance to software 
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Table 2.8. Top Ten List of Software Risk Items 
Risk Item CSFs  
(Table 2.5) 
Personnel shortfalls Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient staff/team 
Unrealistic schedules and budgets Realistic schedule 
Adequate budget 
Developing the wrong software functions Clear realistic objectives 
Developing the wrong user interface User/client involvement 
Goldplating Strong detailed plan kept up to date 
Continuous stream of requirements changes Strong detailed plan kept up to date 
Shortfalls in externally furnished components Technology 
Good performance by 
suppliers/contractors/consultants 
Shortfalls in externally performed tasks Good performance by 
suppliers/contractors/consultants 
Real-time performance shortfalls Proven/familiar technology 
Straining computer science capabilities Proven/familiar technology 
Source: Boehm, B. and Ross, R., 'Theory-W Software Project Management: Principles and 
Examples', IEEE Transactions of Software Engineering, 1989, Vol. 15, No. 7, pages 902-916. 
 
projects.184  The resulting list is shown at Table 2.9, again compared with Table 2.6, 
to show that the top three relate directly back to the top three CSFs for IT project 
management as identified by this study.   There is little comparison with Boehm’s 
work.  As identified above, this could be due to the fact that he considered only those 
factors over which the project manager has a degree of control.  All three panels 
identified the same factors, suggesting that there are universal sets of risks with global  
 
Table 2.9. Risk Factors in Order of Importance 
Risk Factor CSFs (Table 2.5) 
Lack of top management commitment Support from senior management 
Failure to gain user commitment User/client involvement 
Misunderstanding the requirements Clear realistic objectives 
Lack of adequate user involvement User/client involvement 
Failure to manage user expectations User/client involvement 
Changing scope/objectives Clear realistic objectives 
Effective monitoring/control 
Lack of required knowledge/skills in project 
personnel 
Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient staff/team 
Lack of frozen requirements Clear realistic objectives 
Introduction of new technology Proven/familiar technology 
Insufficient/inappropriate staffing Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient staff/team 
Conflict between user departments Organisational adaptation/structure/culture 
Source: Adapted by author from Keil, M., Cule, P.E., Lyttinen, K. and Schmidt, R.C., 'A 
Framework for Identifying Software Project Risks', Communications of the ACM, November 
1998, Vol.41 No.11, pages 76-83. 
 
relevance.  Those considered most serious were often seen as being outside the 
control of the project manager.  A key point from this work is the need to look beyond 
the immediate project management risks by considering four key areas: support for, 
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and commitment to, the project (customer mandate), the management of ambiguity 
and change (scope and requirements), a risk management process (execution) and the 
ability to respond to changes in the environment (environment).185   
 
A series of papers by Keil’s team appeared in 2004.  Wallace and Keil confirmed the 
four areas discussed above through an extensive analysis of the original data.186  Then 
Wallace et al surveyed 507 software project managers to identify six dimensions 
based on the original four areas: organisational environment risk; user risk (lack of 
user involvement); requirements risk; project complexity risk; planning and control 
risk; and team risk.187  These were confirmed by Wallace et al and also related to the 
socio-technical literature to create the framework shown at Figure 2.13.188  This has 
links back to the frameworks developed by Pinto and Slevin as well as Belassi and 
Tukel, along with the frameworks developed for IT project management success, 
discussed in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.  It demonstrates that the project team’s response 
to risk influences project performance or outcome (the success of the system 
developed) and process performance (the success of the development process).  It also 
demonstrates that poorly managed projects are likely to deliver products that fail to 
 
Figure 2.13. A Model of Risk and Performance 
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Project 
Complexity 
Risk
 
Source: Wallace, L., Keil, M. and Rai, A.,'How Software Project Risk Affects Project 
Performance: an Investigation of the Dimensions of Risk and an Exploratory Model', Decision 
Sciences, Spring 2004, Vol. 35, No. 2, pages 289-321, this page 294. 
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satisfy user needs or are unsatisfactory in other ways.  Similarly, projects that incur 
cost and schedule overruns are less likely to deliver a successful product.  Risk to 
project management has a negative impact on process and product performance, 
whilst process performance has a positive impact on product performance.   
 
Therefore, the effect of the Intervention, understanding and applying CSFs to project 
management, should result in the mitigation of risks, although it is acknowledged that 
scholarly theory is currently immature in terms of identifying those risks.  The 
application of CSFs should enable better management of the Critical Failure Factors.  
The purpose of the next section is to consider the impact of the CSFs or, in CIMO 
terminology, the effect of the Intervention on the Mechanism to produce a certain 
Outcome.  The aim of this thesis is ultimately to analyse the impact of identified CSFs 
on the management and subsequent performance of a major government IT project.  
Therefore, the conclusions drawn from this literature review are reviewed to provide a 
clear definition and measure of ‘performance’. 
 
2.6.2. Measuring the Outcome 
 
As well as being a measure of project management, the iron triangle, discussed in 
Section 2.4, is also used to define project success.  However, as with the CSFs for 
project management, the scholarly debate has extended beyond this to include much 
wider organisational factors, as indicated by Cleland in 1986: 
 
Project success is meaningful only if considered from two vantage points: the 
degree to which the project’s technical performance objective was attained on 
time and within budget; the contribution that the project made to the strategic 
mission of the enterprise.189 
 
Pinto and Slevin believe that the iron triangle persists as a definition because time, 
cost and scope are controlled by the project team, set by the project stakeholders and 
provide self-imposed boundaries for the project management, making them easy to 
measure.190  Yardley agrees that time and cost are highly visible and easily measured 
against planned and agreed targets.191  However, he notes that failing to meet the 
constraints of the iron triangle does not necessarily mean a failed project.  A 
beneficial increase in scope may result in an increase in budget and time; conversely, 
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a project could fail to deliver benefits despite having met its iron triangle 
constraints.192  Some projects are perceived as a success by the project team but 
regarded as a failure by the users.193  Others are considered failures initially but then 
hailed as a success.194   
 
This argument revives the differentiation between the project lifecycle and the 
product lifecycle, discussed in Section 2.4.1.  In 1999, Lim and Mohamed described 
the micro and macro definition of success or failure.  The micro view assesses project 
delivery (Type I), whilst the macro view assesses the product in terms of customer use 
and satisfaction (Type II).195  Therefore, they argue, any assessment of the project 
outcome should be delayed until the operational stage.196  In 2005, Fortune and Peters 
used a similar method to define failure: Type-1 failures relate to project management, 
occurring when the objectives, including cost, timescales and requirements, are not 
fully met; Type-2 failures relate to the project outcomes, resulting in inappropriate or 
undesirable consequences or side effects for the organisation.197   
 
In 1986, Stuckenbruck argued that, even in the same organisation, different people are 
likely to view success in different ways at different times.198  However, these different 
people can be fitted into recognisable groups who pursue the same interests and share 
the same values, which then define the desirable features of an information system in 
their view.  These groups are more properly defined as stakeholders, “all those 
claimants inside and outside the organisation who have a vested interest in the 
organisation and have a vested interest in the problem and its solution”.199  Over time, 
the definition of success has begun to consider the stakeholders and their views.200  In 
1987, in a seminal piece on project failure, Lyytinen and Hirschheim identified three 
traditional failure concepts, as shown at Figure 2.14: correspondence (the match of the 
information system to the initial design objectives); process (the match to resource 
allocation); and interaction (the match with user requirement).201  Their work strongly 
relates to that of Pinto and Slevin, Markus and Robey, Davis et al and Sauer, as 
discussed above, whose CSF frameworks show very similar linkages and interactions.  
‘Expectation Failure’ expresses the interests and values of the stakeholders and is a 
superset of the other three forms of failure, highlighting the importance of the user in 
assessing the success of a project, thereby shifting the discussion to the softer 
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behavioural and organisational issues, and clearly relating the IT project to the social 
context.202   
 
Figure 2.14. Relationship between the Three Traditional Failure Notions 
Process 
Failure
Interaction 
Failure
Correspondence 
Failure
+
+
 
Source:   Lyytinen, K and Hirschheim, R.  Information Systems Failures: a Survey and 
Classification of the Empirical Literature.  Oxford Surveys in Information Technology, Vol.4, 
1987, Pages 257-309. 
 
Heeks et al picked up on this idea of expectation failure in their 1999 work on health 
care information systems, highlighting the role of stakeholder groups and considering 
the impact if one particular group dominates the design process.203  IT design is an 
objective and rational entity and, as such, does not in itself incorporate particular 
cultural or political values.  However, that objectivity is threatened if one stakeholder 
group imposes their specific rationality on the design, as shown at Figure 2.15.  If the 
IT professionals dominate, then the design will be based on their technical rationality 
and dominated by technology.  Managerial rationality is based on an amalgam of 
process; external stakeholder groups, such as shareholders or governments; legal or 
bureaucratic rationalities; and money.   Therefore, if managers dominate the design 
process, a finance and process-based worldview is likely to dominate.  In the work of 
Heeks et al, the third rationality is Medical, adjusted to Professional Rationality here 
in order to make it more generally applicable.  Professionals have their own objective  
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rationality and, if they dominate the design process, then it is people who override the 
process and technology components of the information system.  In other words, 
different stakeholders groups pursue different interests resulting in different values 
and, therefore, as Walsham noted, they define success in different ways.204  
 
Figure 2.15. Achieving Balance between Stakeholder Groups 
Technical 
Rationality
(Technology Emphasis)
Managerial 
Rationality
(Process Emphasis)
Professional 
Rationality
(People Emphasis)
‘Successful’ 
Implementation?
 
Source: Adapted by Author from Heeks, R., Mundy, D. and Salazar, A., Why Health Care 
Information Systems Succeed or Fail, (Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and 
Management, Manchester University, 1999). 
 
 
Heeks et al foresee difficulties if one viewpoint dominates the design. 205  The 
resulting product is unlikely to match the perceived realities of the other stakeholders, 
resulting in an expectation failure.  In other words, there will be a large gap between 
the formal rational design conceptions and the more informal behavioural realities of 
the organisation.  Walsham describes this difference as a “dynamic socio-political 
process”, which operates at multiple levels within the social context.  The aim is to 
ensure that all stakeholders are involved in the initial design of the system, so that 
their views are aligned and given equal weighting.206  This reasoning suggests that 
there are no general IT project failures, but that failure means a mismatch between the 
design realities and the desired realities of a group of stakeholders.  Therefore, IT 
project failure can be defined as the inability of an information system to meet a 
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specific stakeholder group’s expectations, a view supported by Dodd and Fortune207 
and by Dhillon.208  
 
In addition, a range of factors have been identified that might influence a 
stakeholder’s perception, resulting in their definition of success being misinformed or 
unrealistic.  In 1997, Shenhar and Levy argued that success is often defined using 
simplistic formulae.  For example, stakeholders are often asked to rate project success 
on a scale spanning from total failure to total success, thereby involving all 
performance criteria in one score.209  In 2004, Dix et al specifically categorised 
different stakeholders to show their different priorities with regard to a project, which 
results in a decreasing priority of needs, as shown at Table 2.10, and inevitably 
impacts on their definition of success.210 
 
Table 2.10. Different Categories of Stakeholder 
Category Priority 
Primary stakeholders Actually use the system and whose needs are 
usually predominant 
Secondary stakeholders Do not directly use the system but receive output 
from it and provide input 
Tertiary stakeholders Directly affected by the success or failure of the 
system in some way 
Facilitating stakeholders Involved in the design, development and 
maintenance of the system 
Source: Dix, A., Finlay, J., Abword, D. and Beale, R., Human-Computer Interaction, 3rd Ed., 
(Harlow, Pearson Education, 2004). 
 
More recent work by Snow et al raises questions about the difficulty of ensuring a 
valid assessment not just from stakeholders but also from the project team.211  Their  
research on optimistic and pessimistic bias in the reporting of software project status 
found that project managers are twice as likely to present an optimistic view when 
reporting to senior management.212  They concluded that this was due to a reluctance 
to transmit bad news or, in Walsham’s words, due to the ‘dynamic socio-political 
process’.  This links back to work by Cole in 1997, who recognised the problem of 
getting organisations to talk honestly about their experience of IT project failure213 
along with work by Oz and Sosik in 2000 concerning the importance of 
communication between the project team and senior management, as well as between 
the project team and the users.214  Despite these concerns about validity, stakeholder 
assessments have a strong influence on the final evaluation of the project.215  In terms 
of IT projects and from an IT project manager’s perspective, meeting user 
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requirements is an extremely important means of defining success.216  In fact, Myers 
suggests that the users’ perception is the only valid means of evaluating a project.217   
 
In 2005, Fortune and Peters attempted to bring these views together to offer a clear 
definition of success, incorporating not only the stakeholder view but also that of the 
project team, as well as encompassing the longer-term perspective: 
 
The system achieved what was intended of it; it was operational at the time 
and cost that were planned; the project team and the users are pleased with the 
result and they continue to be satisfied afterwards.218 
 
This potentially provides a simple and straightforward means of defining project 
success or failure.  However, in 2008, Thomas and Fernandez criticised this reliance 
on user satisfaction to define success. 219  In their view, there is a lack of strong 
theoretical evidence for its use.220  In line with the issues raised above, they argue that 
success and failure are difficult to define and measure because they mean different 
things to different people and there is no commonly agreed definition.221  Whilst their 
comments are recognised, it is apparent that success needs to be measured in a 
number of ways and there is a general acceptance that the perception of the 
stakeholders, particularly primary stakeholders, should be incorporated into that 
measure.  As Saarinen noted in 1996, success “cannot be assessed by a simplistic one-
dimensional measure of success” but is a multi-dimensional construct.222  Therefore, 
the discussion now moves to the options for measuring the Outcome. 
 
Drawing on the above discussion, Pinto and Mantel suggest three distinct factors 
against which success or failure can be assessed: 
 
• The implementation process, measured in terms of whether the system is on 
schedule, to budget, meeting technical goals and so on; 
• The value and usefulness of the project as perceived by the project team; and 
• The client satisfaction with the project delivered.223 
 
Their work signals the move to a more framework-based measure of success.  Two 
years later, in 1992, DeLone and McLean wrote their seminal article on the quest for 
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the so-called dependent variable, information system success.224  Prior to this, 
research was concerned with measuring independent variables, such as cost, time or 
the extent of use.  The original article has been cited over 500 times in the Ebsco 
database, indicating the importance of their work.   
 
Using a literature base of 180 conceptual and empirical studies on information 
systems success that had appeared in seven leading publications between 1981 and 
1987, DeLone and McLean categorised them according to a pre-defined taxonomy 
describing six major dimensions or categories of success: system quality, information 
quality, use, user satisfaction, individual impact and organisational impact.  In doing 
so, they found nearly as many measures as studies.  Some researchers had 
concentrated on the desired characteristics of the information system itself (system 
quality).  Other studies focused on the product (information quality), whilst others 
considered the interaction of the product with the recipients (use or user satisfaction).  
Still others were interested in the influence of the information system on management 
decisions (individual impact) or the effect on organisational performance 
(organisational impact).  DeLone and McLean synthesised these elements to produce 
a model, shown at Figure 2.16.   
 
This model was not tested empirically but a number of studies have since done so to 
confirm the significance of the dimensions of success and the relationships between 
them.  For example, in 1994, Seddon and Kiew surveyed 104 users of a university 
accounting system to find significant relationships between system quality, user 
satisfaction and individual impact; between information quality, user satisfaction and 
individual impact; and between user satisfaction and individual impact.225  In 2002, 
Rai et al surveyed 274 users of a university IT system to find that all interactions 
between all of the success dimensions were significant.226   
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Figure 2.16. Information Systems Success Model 
System 
Quality
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User 
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Source: DeLone, W.H. and McLean, E.R., 'Information Systems Success: the Quest for the 
Dependent Variable', Information Systems Research, 1992, Vol.3, No.1, pages 60-95, this page 87. 
 
 
In 1997, Seddon revised the model, questioning DeLone and McLean’s attempt to 
combine variance and process models as well as process and causal explanations in 
their model.227  He also argued for the removal of ‘system use’ as a success variable, 
as it describes behaviour, considered an inappropriate element in a causal model.  In 
2003, DeLone and McLean reviewed the work undertaken since the publication of 
their original model and, as a result, refined it, as shown at Figure 2.17.228  They 
refuted Seddon’s arguments, finding the reformulation complicated and not in 
keeping with their original intent.  They argued that simply looking at use without 
considering the nature, extent, quality and appropriateness of use is insufficient.  
Guimaraes et al tested this model in 2009 through a series of structured discussions 
with top managers, users and IT personnel, to identify the need to add both an IT and 
a corporate perspective.229  They also advise against a standard measure for system 
quality, which has to be measured according to the features that are important to the 
specific system objectives and particular user or management expectations.  They 
argue that researchers employ user satisfaction as a surrogate measure for success.  
That same year, Petter and McLean carried out a meta-analysis, looking at 52 
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empirical studies that examined relationships within the information systems 
model.230  They found support for these relationships and thereby confirmed the 
model’s validity.   
 
Figure 2.17. Updated Information Systems Success Model 
System 
Quality
Information 
Quality Intention to Use
User 
Satisfaction
Net Benefits
Service 
Quality
Use
 
Source: DeLone, W.H. and McLean, E.R., ‘The DeLone and McLean Model of Information 
Systems Success: a Ten-Year Update’, Journal of Management Information Systems, 2003, Vol. 
19, No.4, pages 9-30. 
 
 
In 1997, Shenhar and Levy constructed a similarly multidimensional framework 
derived from a survey of 127 projects, shown at Figure 2.18.231   They identified four 
dimensions of success: project efficiency; impact on customers; business and direct 
success; and preparing for the future.232  They note that these dimensions are 
hierarchical and addressed differently for different projects.  However, project 
efficiency is important in the delivery phase, while the rest are important post-
delivery.   
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Figure 2.18. The Four Dimensions of Project Success 
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Source: Shenhar, A.J. and Levy, O., 'Mapping the Dimensions of Project Success', Project 
Management Journal, June 1997, Vol. 28, No. 2, pages 5-14, this page 11. 
 
In line with Pinto’s work described above, Shenhar et al also concluded that different 
factors are important at different times, as shown at Figure 2.19.  During project 
execution, project efficiency is the only dimension that can be measured.  Once the 
project is complete, the importance of this dimension declines and the second 
dimension, impact on the customer and customer satisfaction becomes more 
important.  The third dimension, business and direct success can only be judged later.  
It takes a year or two before a new product starts to bring in profit or establish market  
share.  Preparing for the future can only be recognised and assessed much later.  The 
long-term benefits of projects will affect the organisation only after three or even five 
years.   
 
It is evident from this discussion that a range of factors make up the ultimate 
performance of an IT project.  The iron triangle remains a key measure of the project 
management lifecycle and, as such, cannot be discounted.  In addition, the impact of 
the project on the stakeholder is critical as well as wider organisational benefits and  
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Figure 2.19. Relative Importance of Success Dimensions and Time Dependency 
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Source: Shenhar, A.J. and Levy, O., 'Mapping the dimensions of project success', Project 
Management Journal, June 1997, Vol 28, No. 2, pages 5-14, this page 11. 
 
the project’s contribution to strategic goals.  Therefore, ‘performance’ in this context 
can be defined and measured in terms of: 
 
• Reducing the risk of escalation to cost, time and scope; 
• Reducing the resource demands of cost, time and scope; 
• Meeting the expectations of the stakeholders, including the project team, in 
terms of value and usefulness; 
• Improving the scale or certainty of business benefits; 
• Improving the scale or certainty of the project’s contribution to defined 
strategic goals; and 
• Avoidance of identified strategic environment factors known to undermine 
delivery or future performance. 
 
This last factor is largely derived from the discussion of Context, but the environment 
is highlighted as a key factor throughout this review of the literature.  Based on the 
evidence relating to the interaction of factors and the uniqueness of projects, it is 
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recognised that these measures of performance may be competing and may also carry 
different weightings depending on the type of project under review.   
 
2.6.3.  Intended and Unintended Effects 
 
There has been reference in the above discussion to the importance of learning from 
previous experience and research suggests that IT projects continue to be susceptible 
to failure because organisations fail to do so.233  The academic study of organisational 
learning considers organisations to be capable of observing their own actions, 
experimenting to discover the effects of alternative actions and then of modifying 
their actions to improve performance.234  This emphasises the contribution of learning 
to the enhancement of organisational effectiveness.  However, in 2001, Hillam and 
Edwards noted that many organisations do not critically examine the causes for 
project failure and this prevents them from learning from their mistakes.235  It is 
acknowledged that it is difficult for organisations to unlearn what they already 
know,236 that they may learn inappropriate behaviours237 or that they may develop 
‘competency traps’, in which knowledge gained from past successes is incorrectly 
applied to present problems.238  Therefore, while the literature tends to see 
organisational learning as a positive force, there are occasions where it might also 
result in negative consequences.   
 
A good deal of evidence suggests that an organisation’s own experience provides a 
base of knowledge.239  However, research also identifies the difficulty of learning 
from experience.  Robey and Newmand carried out a longitudinal study of recurring 
failure at one organisation.240  Despite costly mistakes, the organisation showed a 
persistent pattern of dependence on unproven software and failure to resolve ongoing 
conflict between the users and the IT professionals.  Ultimately, this pattern of failure 
was reversed but it was unclear to the researchers why past experience was ignored 
and why these dysfunctional patterns of behaviour were allowed to continue for so 
long. 
 
Keil and Robey note the strong commitment to IT projects in certain organisations, 
with resources still being allocated despite public controversy and strong 
opposition.241  Empirical research carried out by Keil and Mann showed that 81 per 
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cent of respondents indicated that this had happened in one or more of the last five 
projects with which they had been associated.242  Clearly, there needs to be a balance 
between obtaining commitment and resources for potential IT projects and 
withdrawing commitment or redirecting projects that are failing.  This social and 
organisational phenomenon, known as the “escalation of commitment to a failing 
course of action”,243 raises the question of how troubled projects can be terminated or 
redirected before they consume additional resources.  This is due to a combination of 
factors, including psychological, social and organisational.244   
 
Clearly, the learning process is more complex than simply adjusting action based on 
experience.  This suggests that the history of an organisation cannot be discounted: 
recent experience always contends with previous experience.  In cases where a 
particular information system has proved to be successful, an organisation may persist 
in its use long after it has ceased to be effective.245  Thus, favourable experience with 
an information system can inhibit the use of other systems that could be more 
effective.246  Therefore, older organisational knowledge may create a barrier to the 
acquisition of more relevant knowledge based on more recent experiences.  Much of 
the research relevant to information systems deals directly or indirectly with 
overcoming barriers to acquiring new knowledge.247  Martins and Kambell carried out 
a case study that showed how managers with more favourable experience in 
implementing information systems tend to interpret new information systems as 
opportunities rather than threats.248  This demonstrates the importance of experience 
with technologies that are similar to those being adopted.  From this, it can be 
concluded that an organisation’s experience with information systems may affect 
subsequent implementation success. 
 
There is an argument that organisations like the public sector have learned to fail.  
Meyer and Zucker’s theory of ‘permanently failing’ organisations is an attempt to 
explain the apparently irrational occurrence of projects that perform poorly but are 
nevertheless maintained.249  The theory states that where performance and persistence 
are decoupled, there must exist a group of dependent actors (workers with non-
transferable skills, for example) who derive benefit from the continued persistence of 
the project.  The actions of these actors may force the organisation into poor 
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performance.  Their work applied to the private sector but may be just as applicable to 
the public sector. 
 
2.7.  Summary 
The discussion began with an examination of the Context, which highlighted the lack 
of research into the government context and its impact on the management of IT 
projects.  However, there is some evidence that specific elements of this Programme, 
Policy and Political Context create a difficult culture in which to operate, thereby 
constraining the processes of project management and making IT projects more 
problematic.  This seems to be particularly so in the case of the UK.  This proposition 
will be examined further in the first section of the case study, which is presented in 
Chapter Five and considers the Programme, Policy and Political Context in relation to 
the DII Programme.   
In terms of the Intervention, scholarly thinking on CSFs was examined in relation to 
generic project management before considering IT project management.  This 
demonstrated the evolution of thinking in generic project management: the 
differentiation of the project from the product lifecycle; the move to multi-
dimensional frameworks, emphasising not only the importance of CSFs but the 
criticality of their interactions; the extension of the iron triangle to incorporate wider 
organisational and environmental factors as well as an increased focus on 
stakeholders, including the project team; the recognition of different project types 
operating in unique contexts and, therefore, requiring different approaches, leading to 
a contingency approach to project management and the more recent idea of strategic 
project management.   
IT project management has followed a similar route but has moved more rapidly 
towards organisational factors and an emphasis on the end-user.  This is largely due to 
the unique nature of IT projects, which are complex, unpredictable and closely tied to 
their organisational context.  Within this, different types of IT project may require 
different types of management.  Understanding the type of project enables greater 
clarity in assessing the risks to its successful management and identification of the 
most relevant CSFs.  The Formal Systems Method (FSM) encapsulates much of the 
previous research, clearly considering both the context and the environment, picking 
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up on subjective issues, such as expectations and decision-making, whilst also 
showing the interrelationships.  As such, it provides an ideal measure of the impact of 
the CSFs on the performance of an IT project.  Having reviewed the IT project 
management literature, the CSFs were extracted and compared to work on generic 
project management carried out by Fortune and White in 2006.  This corroborated 
their findings with two of the top three CSFs for IT project management being the 
same as those for generic project management.  ‘User/Client Involvement’ was 
identified as the most important factor rather than ‘Support from Senior Management’ 
and ‘Strong Detailed Plan Kept Up-to-Date’ did not feature for IT project 
management.  Finally, in this section, the lack of research into the application of CSFs 
in practice, along with the outcome of that application was identified.   
The discussion about the Mechanism critiqued definitions of ‘project’ and ‘project 
management’.  It also looked at the project lifecycle, questioning the utility of project 
reviews, particularly for IT projects, and noting the move to more dynamic 
development lifecycles and attempts to incorporate some organisational elements.  
The discussion then moved to the Outcome, firstly reviewing the effect of the 
Intervention by examining the study of risk management.  This is at an immature 
stage in the IT project management literature but follows the same move from lists to 
frameworks as the work on CSFs.  The top three risk factors were the mirror image of 
the top three CSFs for IT project management, further corroborating the CSFs 
identified in the literature.  This section then considered the evolution of definitions of 
success and, from this, created a clear definition and measure of ‘performance’. 
Finally, some key themes relating to learning from experience were discussed, 
including the failure to learn and the commitment to troubled projects. 
2.7.1.  Confirming the Research Gap 
This literature review has revealed two gaps in the literature.  Firstly, there is a lack of 
research on IT project management in the public sector in general and the MoD in 
particular.  This analysis has shown the importance of understanding the 
organisational context, particularly with regard to organisational fit and meeting the 
expectations of the stakeholders involved in the project.  Set against this, though, are 
the specific issues of IT project management in the public sector, contextual issues 
that appear to draw government organisations together as a coherent mass, so making 
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generic lessons highly applicable, if they have the ability to become learning 
organisations.  Secondly, there is sufficient understanding of the CSFs to enable good 
practice but little evidence that this is being applied in practice.   Research activity has 
been concerned with identifying CSFs, rather than seeking evidence that they are 
being understood and used to good effect.  This research asks whether the lessons 
learned from previous complex IT projects in government have been used to improve 
the performance of subsequent projects.  The findings of this literature review confirm 
that there is no evidence that this question has been answered previously.  The next 
stage, therefore, is to identify a suitable research methodology in order to collect the 
required empirical evidence to do so. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
 
 
3.1. Cause and Effect: Assessing the Impact of the Independent Variable  
 
The review of the literature presented in the previous chapter identified the high level 
of research activity on the subject of Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for projects in 
general and, more specifically, Information Technology (IT) projects.  Despite this 
effort, the public sector continues to suffer from IT project failure, indicating a gap 
between the academic rhetoric and the practical reality.  Whilst there has been much 
research to identify and confirm the CSFs, there has been little activity in terms of 
moving the debate onwards by examining the extent to which those CSFs are being 
understood and applied, and whether outcomes are improving as a result.  This 
observation paraphrases the question that this study sets out to answer: how have the 
lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government been used to 
improve the performance of subsequent projects?  In other words, the intention is to 
explore the effect of one variable on another.   The cause or, in research terms, the 
independent variable, is considered to be the CSFs, which may or may not have an 
effect on the outcome of the IT project or Technical Solution, which is the dependent 
variable.  The purpose of this study is, therefore, to conduct causal or analytical 
research and the outcome will be applied research, designed to apply its findings to a 
specific existing problem, the issue of IT project failure in the public sector.   
 
The logic driving the research approach to this question is structured and shaped by 
the Conceptual Framework, discussed in Chapter One and shown again at Figure 3.1.  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how to identify and then locate data in order 
to fully examine each element in this framework, as well as to consider the most 
appropriate methods for gathering and analysing that data.  The first stage in this 
process is to identify the CSFs contained in the ten reports published by government 
and related bodies between 2000 and 2006.  These are shown at Table 3.1, also 
reproduced from Chapter One.  The second stage is the examination of the IT Project 
in relation to its context, as well as the extent to which the identified CSFs have been  
 3-2
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understood and applied.  The final stage is to evaluate the impact of these, whether 
their application has resulted in improved performance.  The detail of this process is 
considered in this chapter, which begins with a discussion of the philosophical 
approach to the research, followed by clarification of the research methodology, a  
 
Table 3.1. Reports of Public Sector IT Project Failure, 2000-2006 
Reporting Body Title  Date 
Cabinet Office Successful IT: Modernising Government 
in Action (the McCartney Report) 
2000 
Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) 
The Hidden Threat to E-Government: 
Avoiding Large Government IT Failures 
2001 
Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) 
Common Causes of Project Failure 2002 
Intellect IT Supplier Code of Practice 2003 
Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST) 
Government IT Projects 2003 
House of Commons, Work and Pensions 
Committee 
 
Department of Work and Pensions 
Management of Information Technology 
Projects: Making IT Deliver for DWP 
Customers 
2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Improving IT Procurement 2004 
Royal Academy of Engineering and the 
British Computer Society 
The Challenges of Complex IT Projects 2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Delivering Successful IT-Enabled 
Business Change 
2006 
Source: Author 
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systematic outline of the research methods, an explanation of the analysis process and 
the response to the ethical issues.  Concerns about the reliability, validity and 
generalisability of the data are also considered within this discussion. 
 
3.2.  Research Philosophy 
 
The first, and perhaps most critical, of the research decisions relates to the 
philosophical stance taken by the researcher.  This provides the foundation for the 
entire study, influencing further decisions about the research methodology and 
methods.  The two possible options are positivism and interpretivism, terms that 
describe different ways of thinking about how knowledge is developed and different 
approaches to the understanding of knowledge, as shown at Table 3.2.  Easterby-
Smith et al note the “traditional assumption that in science the researcher must 
maintain complete independence if there is to be any validity in the results 
produced”.1  Based on this, they show that the two different philosophies result in  
 
Table 3.2. Research Philosophies 
 Positivist Philosophy Interpretivist Philosophy 
Basic beliefs The world is external and objective The world is socially constructed and 
subjective 
Observer is independent Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is value-free Science is driven by human interests 
Researcher should Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
Look for causality and fundamental laws Try to understand what is happening 
Reduce phenomenon to simplest 
elements 
Look at the totality of each situation 
Formulate hypotheses and then test them Develop ideas through induction from 
data 
Preferred methods include Operationalising concepts so that they 
can be measured 
Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena 
 
Taking large samples Small samples investigated in depth 
over time 
Source: Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A., Management Research: an Introduction, 
(London, Sage, 1991), page 27. 
 
different relationships between the researcher and the researched: a positivist stance is 
considered independent of whatever is being observed whilst an interpretivist stance 
is dependent and, therefore, part of whatever is being observed.  However, it can be 
argued that research, whether it is scientific or based in the social sciences, is not 
independent or neutral but inevitably reflects the interests, values and assumptions of 
the researcher and so affects the research decisions.2  The researcher is generally also 
the research instrument and, therefore, necessarily involved, whether the research 
approach is quantitative or qualitative.  Therefore, the required data can only be 
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captured and defined according to a specific perspective.  Attempts have been made 
throughout the planning for this study to recognise any influence or limitation 
stemming from this and, as with the identification of the Conceptual Framework, to 
overcome this bias by taking a very rigorous and logical approach in an attempt to 
ensure that any interpretation is firmly fixed in the data, as demonstrated by the 
process for the literature review.   
 
Either of these philosophical approaches can be adopted in a social science context 
with positivism emphasising the explanation of human behaviour, whilst 
interpretivism emphasises the understanding of human behaviour.  In both cases, 
phenomena are identified, measured and evaluated in order to provide either rational 
explanations or rational understanding.3  In accordance with Table 3.2, Collis and 
Hussey note that positivistic approaches attempt to study human behaviour using the 
same sort of methods employed in the natural sciences.4  Given that this is a piece of 
causal research, which seeks to establish relationships between different variables, 
positivism would seem to be the most viable approach, focusing on facts, looking for 
causality and reducing phenomena to the simplest elements, as detailed in Table 3.2.  
However, reflecting on both the research question and the aim, which is to analyse the 
impact of identified CSFs on the management of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) 
DII Programme, it is likely that any proposed CSFs will have a specific meaning and 
relevance to the people working on the planning, development and implementation of 
the DII Programme.  In addition, these people will have “pre-selected and pre-
interpreted this world”, which will also motivate their behaviour and choices.5   
 
These aspects of human behaviour are shaped by factors that are not always 
observable and so are not as easily measured as phenomena in the natural sciences.  
Saunders et al talk about people as ‘social actors’, taking roles in organisations and 
interpreting events according to those roles.6  Inevitably, this means that the views 
taken by one social actor about a particular situation do not always coincide with 
those of other social actors.  In terms of any research, this means that the views 
expressed by these social actors cannot always be taken at face value but may require 
some interpretation by the researcher based on surrounding knowledge.  Given this, 
any system needs to be considered from a range of perspectives.  Therefore, this study 
requires an understanding of the thinking and behaviour of the people working on the 
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DII Programme so that the project, the success factors and the context can be 
understood from the point of view of those involved.  This relates more naturally to an 
interpretivist philosophy with its focus on human interests, meanings and 
understanding of what is happening in specific contexts.   
 
This conclusion is reinforced by returning to the definition of an information 
infrastructure and following a similar process to that used to determine the Conceptual 
Framework in Chapter One.  The first definition presented was technology-based, 
“the hardware, software, data and network components that support the flow and 
processing of information in an organisation”.7   If this had been selected as the 
working definition for this thesis, then it would most likely have reflected a positivist 
approach by the researcher.  However, the selected definition is an information system 
that involves interaction between people, processes and technology to support 
decision-making, co-ordination and control within a specific context that contains 
social systems, which include a range of cultural, behavioural and other human 
factors.   The subject matter under consideration is indisputably that of the social 
sciences: people, organisations and the impact of technology.  Social science research 
is fundamentally different to natural sciences, as human beings and how they operate 
have to be taken into account.8  In this instance, this matches the preferences of the 
researcher and, therefore, is taken to be the philosophical starting point for this 
research. 
 
3.3.  Research Methodology 
 
Saunders et al define the term ‘research methodology’ as “the theory of how research 
should be undertaken”, a decision that is dependent on the overarching philosophy.9  
The search for a relevant and viable research methodology for this particular study 
involved consideration of a range of different approaches to systematic inquiry, ways 
of obtaining empirical evidence, defined by Collis and Hussey as “data based on 
observation or experience”.10  Each of the different approaches to empirical data 
collection is developed according to a particular paradigm and associated 
epistemological and ontological assumptions, the ways in which knowledge is 
developed and different approaches to the understanding of knowledge.  Given that 
this research is based on an interpretivist philosophy, the most appropriate 
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methodologies were considered to be case study, action research, ethnography 
(participant observation), participative inquiry, feminist perspectives and grounded 
theory.11  These are all qualitative methods, which Collis and Hussey define as “a 
subjective approach which includes examining and reflecting on perceptions in order 
to gain understanding of social and human activities”.12  This fits with the research 
intent of understanding people and their context. 
 
Some of the identified methodologies were discarded fairly rapidly.  For example, 
participative inquiry involves research into one’s own group or organisation,13 which 
was evidently not the case in this instance, whilst feminist research perspectives 
consider gender as a significant factor in understanding the world,14 whereas this 
research is, debatably, gender neutral.  Action research involves an intervention by a 
researcher to change a given situation whilst monitoring and evaluating the results.15  
The premise of this research is to trace cause and effect, rather than to create an effect, 
and to understand the situation, rather than to change it.   
 
Other methodologies were more likely contenders.  For example, ethnography 
requires the researcher to become a working member of the group under study in 
order to understand the situation from the inside.16  As the purpose was to obtain the 
viewpoints of the people involved in the DII project, it was not considered necessary 
for the researcher to share the same experiences as the subjects and a degree of 
objectivity was considered imperative if cause and effect were to be systematically 
traced.  The aim of grounded research is to approach the study with no preconceived 
ideas about what might be discovered or learned.  This would have been difficult 
given the need to identify the relevant CSFs in order to answer the questions, meet the 
objectives and so achieve the overarching aim.17 
 
The most relevant and viable methodology was considered to be case study, which 
Yin defines as: 
 
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.18 
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This was considered to be most appropriate for a number of reasons.  According to 
Yin, a case study research methodology is suitable for research questions based on 
‘how’ and ‘why’ because they deal with operational links needing to be traced over 
time, rather than frequencies or incidences.19  This sits well with both the research 
question that drives this thesis and the causal research approach.  Yin’s definition also 
emphasises context and boundaries.  The overarching theme of systems thinking in 
this thesis similarly confirms the importance of context or environment in relation to 
the system.  This is reinforced by studies carried out by Markus and Robey20 and 
Orlikowski,21 which show that IT is neutral with no specific characteristics or 
qualities of its own; these are derived from the context in which it is implemented and 
deployed.  This means that studying the context is imperative when studying an IT 
project and a case study provides the means to do this, being an exhaustive 
investigation into a subject within its contextual setting, leading to an understanding 
of the dynamics and interrelationships present within that setting, which then impact 
on the subject.22  Stake observes that it is also particularly well suited to studying 
complexity, making it highly appropriate for this study.23   
 
In terms of the research philosophy, case studies can be adapted to either a positivist 
or interpretivist view.24  In relation to this, they can also be associated with both 
theory testing, known as deduction, which tends to be positivist, or theory generation, 
known as induction, which tends to be interpretivist.  Collis and Hussey define 
deductive research as:  
 
A study in which a conceptual and theoretical structure is developed which is 
then tested by empirical observation: thus particular instances are deducted 
from general influences.25 
 
Therefore, theory is tested through empirical observation.  In inductive research, on 
the other hand, theory is developed from empirical observation with “general 
inferences…induced from particular instances”, the reverse of the deductive 
method.26  The theory underpinning CSFs is that they are “the few key areas where 
‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish”.27  Therefore, the few key areas 
likely to result in success for an IT project and, more specifically, for an information 
infrastructure project, need to be identified.  These will then be tested against a 
particular case.  This suggests that the logic driving this research is deductive rather 
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than inductive.  An inductive approach develops theory by drawing general inferences 
after observing reality, whilst this study takes a generally applicable theory and then 
tests it against a particular situation using empirical examination.28  In this case, the 
theoretical model is tested against the DII Programme.   
 
The validity of adopting the case study methodology is further confirmed by the 
strong tradition of case study in the academic field of information systems.29  As a 
research methodology, it is, therefore, well suited to this particular research.   At its 
most basic, the case study entails a detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.30  
Indeed, Stake argues that “a case study is intended to catch the complexity of a single 
case”.31  He expands on this, explaining that “a case study is the study of the 
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances”.32  Some of the best-known studies in business and 
management research are based on this kind of design – a single organisation, a single 
location, a person or an event.33  Yin advises defining the unit of analysis as a single 
organisation.34  In this particular study, this is the UK MoD.  A cross-section group 
within that organisation, the DII Programme, is then defined as the focus of the 
study.35   
 
Despite this, it is often argued that dependence on a single case is problematic, 
preventing the researcher from providing a generalisable conclusion or theory.  
However, it is arguable whether the main purpose of the case study is to generalise.  
Firstly, a case study takes an idiographic approach, exploring the unique features of 
that case (as opposed to nomothetic, which generates universal principles).36  The 
researcher seeks to arrive at a specific conclusion about the case under investigation 
because it is of particular interest and, strictly speaking, the results cannot be 
generalised beyond the population studied.  Therefore, it is inevitable that the results 
of this study will be unique to the DII Programme.   
 
Given that the purpose of a case study is not to yield findings that can be applied more 
generally, it is widely accepted that it is not possible to identify cases that are 
representative of all others and, therefore, case study research does not require a 
number of cases to be selected from a defined study population.  To clarify this, if the 
adopted research methodology is a survey, then a representative sample is found, 
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tested and the findings are generalised to the larger population from which the sample 
was selected, a process known as sampling.  However, while it is not possible to 
generalise from a case study to other populations, it is possible to generalise to 
theoretical propositions.  The critical question is how well the researcher generates 
theory out of the findings and how well they can then be generalised beyond the 
original context.37    
 
The study of the DII Programme is implicit in the aim of this research.  However, in 
clarifying that aim, a decision had to be taken about which case to examine in order to 
test the identified CSFs.  Collis and Hussey suggest selecting “a critical case which 
encompasses the issues in which you are most interested”.38  Yin is more specific, 
identifying four main factors that need to be considered: relevance, feasibility, access 
and application.39  ‘Relevance’ is the extent to which the organisation selected for the 
case study suits the purpose.40  The selection of the DII Programme was justified in 
Chapter One.  It is a mega-project, being undertaken by one of the largest and most 
diverse government departments.  It began life in 2001, is due to deliver in 2015 and 
so fits within the scope of the reports on public sector IT project failure, framed by the 
McCartney Report of 2000 and the National Audit Office’s (NAO) Delivering 
Successful IT-Enabled Business Change in 2006.  ‘Feasibility’ means that the 
researcher should be able to conceptualise, plan, execute and report back on the 
research project within the case study organisation.41  This refers to the practical 
aspects of the research.  Whilst there were other options, such as the NHS National 
Programme for Information, a similar project being undertaken in similar 
circumstances, DII was selected because of the researcher’s affiliation with, and 
knowledge of, the MoD, which enabled access to the relevant sources, both in terms 
of people and documentation.  In addition, the DII Group was located nearby, 
enabling easy access at all times.  Finally, the appropriate managerial and operational 
support was available to ensure successful completion of the study.   
 
The discussion about feasibility incorporates some of the issues of ‘Access’ and 
confirms that the full co-operation of the DII Group was secured for the duration of 
the research.  Further practical aspects included the collected data being available in 
the public domain.  However, the potential sensitivity of that data had to be 
acknowledged and dealt with according to security requirements.  The organisation 
 3-10
was willing to participate and gave support at both the executive and the operational 
levels.  In addition, there was a clearly identified champion for the study.  Finally, Yin 
also identifies the extent to which the case study method can be applied in a particular 
situation, a point that he terms ‘Application’.42  In identifying possible candidates, a 
number of factors were taken into account.  These included size, industry sector and 
the status of the focus on an IT project.  The DII Programme is sufficiently large with 
around 500 personnel on the MoD side and 1800 on the ATLAS Consortium side.  It 
is being undertaken within the public sector by the MoD, which is very mature in 
terms of managing major projects.  The DII Programme, therefore, provided a 
potentially fruitful subject for investigation. 
 
Having decided on case study as the research methodology, the next stage was to 
identify the various possible options and to consider was most appropriate in this 
instance.  Jensen and Rodgers suggest the following types of case study as shown at 
Table 3.3.43  Based on these definitions, the case study of the DII Programme is a  
 
Table 3.3. Types of Case Study 
Case Study Type Description 
Snapshot Detailed, objective study of one research entity at one point in 
time 
Longitudinal Quantitative and/or qualitative study of one research entity at 
multiple time points 
Pre-post Study of one research entity at two time points separated by a 
critical event.  A critical event is one that on the basis of a 
theory under study would be expected to impact case 
observation significantly. 
Patchwork A set of multiple case studies of the same research entity, 
using snapshot, longitudinal and/or pre-post designs.  This 
multi-design approach is intended to provide a more holistic 
view of the dynamics of the research subject. 
Comparative A set of multiple case studies of multiple research entities for 
the purpose of cross-unit comparison.  Both qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons are usually made. 
Source: Jensen, J.L. and Rodgers, R., ‘Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study 
Research’, Public Administration Review, 2001, Vol. 61, No.2, pages 236-246, this page 237-239. 
 
snapshot, a detailed and objective study, as far as possible, undertaken at one point in 
time.  On reflection and given the length of time of this study, a longitudinal case 
study would also have been possible.  Indeed, some aspects of it are longitudinal, as 
interviews were held with certain personnel at recurrent points throughout the study.  
A pre-post case study would only have been possible if the study could have been 
continued until completion of the DII Programme.  However, the timescales for this 
are still uncertain and it is likely that it would have been beyond the resources 
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available for this research.  This same argument applies to both patchwork and 
comparative case studies, although the original intent was to compare the DII 
Programme with the NHS National Programme for IT.  However, it soon became 
evident that it was beyond the available resources to look at more than one complex 
IT mega-project in the required detail. 
 
Myers supplies guidelines for case study work, suggesting that it is based on at least 
the following four stages: 
 
1. Determining the present situation; 
2. Gathering information about the background to the present situation; 
3. Gathering more specific data; and 
4. Presenting an analysis of findings and recommendations for action.44 
 
Therefore, decisions had to be taken regarding the collection of data to inform these 
stages. 
 
3.4.  From Methodology to Methods 
 
The research methodology impacts on the selected research methods and dictates 
decisions about what data to collect, how, why, where and when, as well as how this 
data will be analysed.45  To some extent, the answers to these questions are contained 
within the Conceptual Framework with its basis in systems thinking and its clear 
distinction between cause (the CSFs) and effect (the performance of the DII 
Programme).  This divides the research into two distinct phases: the identification of 
the CSFs and then the testing of the understanding and application of those CSFs in a 
particular project context.  However, it is still necessary to identify feasible and 
desirable research methods for both phases.   
 
3.4.1.  Phase One: Identification of the CSFs 
 
The literature review provided the basis for the identification of the CSFs by 
examining those factors derived from academic study into general project 
management and, more specifically, IT project management.  These academic studies 
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draw on a range of data sources and encompass both theoretical and empirical studies 
as well as both the public and private sector views.  The process for the analysis of 
this data was discussed in detail in Chapter Two and the outcome of the review was a 
synthesised list.  The synthesised list of CSFs from the academic literature base 
provides a point of comparison for the CSFs identified in the reports, which are 
generally based on case studies supported by a relatively cursory examination of the 
literature.  This comparison enables the first of the three subsidiary questions that 
stem from the research question to be answered: are the lessons learned from previous 
complex IT projects in government correct and comprehensively considered?    
 
The process for the extraction of the CSFs from the reports on public sector IT project 
failure began with the McCartney Report of 2000.  Eight other reports were then 
identified that appeared post-McCartney and up to the publication of the NAO’s 2006 
report on Delivering Successful IT-Enabled Business Change, as shown at Table 3.1 
above.  Neither the academic literature nor these reports specifically examine 
information infrastructure projects and, given that this is the remit of the DII 
Programme, analysis of this area was considered critical in order to determine 
whether infrastructure projects differ from other IT projects and, therefore, have 
different CSFs.  A third level of analysis was undertaken, which was based on 
secondary data derived from reports on infrastructure projects.  The type of 
infrastructure project and the type of report was carefully considered to ensure that 
this analysis produced meaningful CSFs.  They were selected on the basis of four 
criteria: 
 
1. The projects had to be public sector infrastructure projects, rather than 
private sector; 
2. The projects had to be complex mega-projects comparable to DII; 
3. The reports had to have been carried out by a government auditing body; 
and 
4. The reports had to give sufficient detail to allow a full analysis. 
 
It was not considered essential to select infrastructure projects that fell within the 
timescale of the ‘book-end’ reports, although ultimately they did.  The main aim was 
to identify if anything is different about infrastructure projects and their CSFs.  On 
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this basis, five accounts of problematic infrastructure projects were selected, as shown 
at Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4. Reports on Public Sector Infrastructure Projects 
Reporting Body Title  Publication Date 
National Audit Office The Implementation of the National Probation Service 
Information Systems Strategy (Home Office) 
2001 
National Audit Office 
 
New IT Systems for Magistrates’ Courts: the Libra 
Project 
2003 
National Audit Office Delivering Digital Tactical Communications through 
the Bowman CIP Programme (Ministry of Defence) 
2006 
National Audit Office 
 
The National Programme for IT in the NHS 
(Department of Health) 
2006 
US General Audit Office 
 
Information Technology: DoD Needs to Ensure that 
Navy Marine Corps Intranet Program is Meeting 
Goals and Satisfying Customers 
2006 
Source: Author 
 
It is recognised that each of these accounts is only partial and most often undertaken 
after the event.  However, each reflects a particular viewpoint on the project and 
reveals the essence of the problem as perceived by the investigating body (the 
relevant Audit Office).  These factors were considered to be comparable across all of 
the reports.  Therefore, it was not considered necessary or practicable to supplement 
this information through additional research.   
The most appropriate method of extracting relevant data and identifying the CSFs 
from both the IT project reports and the information infrastructure reports is content 
analysis.  This research method is used to identify the presence of certain words or 
phrases within a particular text.46  The text is broken down into manageable sections, 
such as word, phrase or sentence, and then coded.   The researcher can then carry out 
further analysis of the codes without losing the linkage back to the original text.  The 
presence, meaning and relationships of these codes are quantified and analysed using 
conceptual analysis and relational analysis.47  Conceptual analysis establishes the 
existence and frequency of concepts in the text by selecting a concept and then 
recording the number of times that it occurs.48  As with most other research methods, 
content analysis begins by identifying a research question and then choosing a sample 
or samples.49  The selection of the sample for this process is detailed above and the 
specified question is ‘What CSFs have been identified in these reports?’  This might 
seem a fairly obvious question to pose as all of the reports make recommendations, 
which could simply be taken as being the identified CSFs and then compared and 
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contrasted.  However, other questions stem from this question.  What was the relative 
emphasis on these CSFs in the text?  Were they the only CSFs discussed?  How 
precise are the words and phrases used to express the identified CSFs?  Does clearer 
terminology emerge from an examination across all ten reports?  Therefore, a fairly 
detailed degree of scrutiny was required to analyse and synthesise the CSFs from 
these reports.   
Given these issues, it is important to clearly define the terms before counting.50  The 
starting point for this was the first of the identified reports, the so-called McCartney 
Report, Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action.  This grouped its findings 
into 11 areas, one of which was the implementation strategy for the 30 
recommendations that stemmed from these themes.  Therefore, it gives a starting 
point of 10 terms, identified in Chapter One as: 
• Change management; 
• Leadership and responsibility; 
• Project management; 
• Risk management; 
• Modular and incremental development; 
• Benefit realisation; 
• Procurement and supplier relationships; 
• Cross-cutting initiatives; 
• People and skills; 
• Learning lessons.51 
The central idea in content analysis is selective reduction, which describes the process 
of going through the text iteratively in order to identify and then refine the themes.52  
The first stage of this selective reduction is the data management, organising the data 
in a way that will facilitate interpretation.  The report under scrutiny was examined in 
some detail to extract the words, phrases and sentences that relate to success or failure 
factors, the so-called ‘meaning units’.  These were copied and pasted into a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet.  Breaking the text into meaningful and pertinent units of 
information allows it to be analysed in greater detail and, therefore, interpreted.53  
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Once selected, the text was coded according to the ten themes identified by 
McCartney to create manageable content categories.54   
Relational analysis was then used to further interpret the content categories.  This 
builds on conceptual analysis by examining the relationships among concepts in a 
text.55  There are many techniques available to do this or, alternatively, researchers 
can devise their own procedures according to the nature of their project.56  Using this 
form of analysis, the text was studied in relation to McCartney’s themes to determine 
whether they gave a suitable level of detail and precision.  This led to the themes 
being refined and more clearly defined in order to produce a list of CSFs.  This same 
process was undertaken for each of the reports under analysis until a definitive list of 
CSFs was produced, based on detailed examination of the ten general IT project 
reports and the five infrastructure reports.   
 
This describes a manual process but, as far back as 1984, Miles and Huberman were 
recommending the use of software tools, which they believed improved the rigour.57  
Currently, there are several popular software tools on the market that can be used for 
content analysis.  These include Nvivo, maxQDA, ATLAS.ti and Coding Analysis 
Toolkit (CAT), which all have similar functionality but very different interfaces.  
They require training in their use and are all fairly expensive.  Although it is faster to 
carry out content analysis by machine, it is also possible, as well as potentially more 
useful, to code a small sample manually.58  One of the main advantages of doing this 
is that the researcher is not alienated from the data.59  In addition, the manual process 
that was developed was systematic, comprehensive and transparent, giving a clear 
audit trail back to the original source data.  Against this, it was time and labour 
intensive with a recognised danger that the researcher would become process oriented, 
losing sight of the outcome by sticking too long at the relational analysis stage.  
However, the advantages of the manual process were considered to outweigh the 
disadvantages in this instance.  An example of the spreadsheet that resulted from this 
process is shown at Table 3.5.   
 
Issues of reliability and validity in relation to content analysis are similar to those 
encountered when using other research methods.  Reliability in this instance refers to 
the ‘stability’ of the interpretation of the text, whether the researcher is able to  
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Table 3.5. Content Analysis Process: McCartney Report 
Meaning Unit Theme CSF 
IT has to fit closely with the new 
working practices 
Benefits Realisation Benefits Certainty 
A clear vision of the context in 
which IT is being implemented 
Business Change Benefits Certainty 
Think in terms of change 
management projects rather than IT 
projects 
Business Change Clarity and Perception 
Improve the delivery of the projects 
themselves 
Business Change Complexity Management 
Deliver improvements to the way 
they do business 
Project Management Constraints Certainty 
Take an overall view of the whole 
change process 
Benefits Realisation Benefits Certainty 
Integration (whole change process) 
is a vital, and ongoing, management 
task 
Business Change Complexity Management 
Achieving integration of all the 
aspects of change requires effective 
leadership 
Leadership and Responsibility Consistency and Coherence 
Responsibility for the delivery of a 
project or programme falls to an 
individual 
Leadership and Responsibility Consistency and Coherence 
Good leadership Leadership and Responsibility Competence and Capacity 
Clear responsibility for IT-based 
change programmes and projects 
Leadership and Responsibility 
Clarity and Perception 
A Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) 
and a description of the SRO Role 
Leadership and Responsibility 
Clarity and Perception 
People in place who have the ability 
to deliver 
Leadership and Responsibility Clarity and Perception 
Highly skilled and experienced 
managers are vital to success 
People and Skills Competence and Capacity 
Improve project management across 
Government 
People and Skills Competence and Capacity 
Matching project managers to 
projects 
Project Management Constraints Certainty 
Increasing (project management) 
skills and awareness 
Project Management Competence and Capacity 
Source: Author 
 
consistently code the same data in the same way over a period of time.  This also 
leads to questions about whether this process could be reproduced.  Would another 
coder or group of coders classify categories in the same way?  Aligned to this is the 
issue of the accuracy of the coding process and the extent to which the classification 
of a text corresponds to a standard or norm statistically.  The overarching problem of 
concept analysis is that the researcher is the research instrument, as discussed above.  
Therefore, conclusions are reached according to decisions made by the researcher and 
the inference that the researcher puts on meanings in particular instances.  This can 
lead to conclusions that are potentially challengeable, as they are bound to reflect the 
interests, values and assumptions of the researcher.60  Therefore, despite all attempts 
to keep this data ‘clean’, it can only be captured and defined according to the 
researcher’s specific perspective.   However, in an effort to overcome this problem, 
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the content analysis was verified by a team of researchers in an organisation called 
Proving Services, who carry out structured assessment of projects and programmes in 
government to determine which will succeed and which are likely to fail. 
 
This process resulted in what was considered to be a more precise and detailed list of 
CSFs than those identified in the McCartney report as well as associated definitions.  
It is presented and discussed in Chapter Four, which also gives a detailed examination 
of the process of identifying the CSFs and the conclusions reached as a result.  The 
final stage was to compare the list derived from the IT project and infrastructure 
reports with the list of CSFs identified in the literature to determine whether the 
lessons learned from previous IT mega-projects in government are correct and 
comprehensively considered.  This reflects Fortune and Peters’ examination of the 
Electronic Patient Records project in the NHS and their argument that considering 
results across a range of different projects rather than relying on individual 
comparisons gives a powerful approach, enabling recurrent themes to be identified.61   
 
3.4.2.  Phase Two: The IT Project 
 
Having identified the CSFs, the next stage of this research was to undertake the case 
study, examining the context of the IT project and then considering whether the CSFs 
had been understood and applied, resulting in a positive impact and, thus, improved 
performance.  In considering the research methods to be employed for the case study, 
it was important for data to be drawn from multiple sources, as shown at Figure 3.2.  
As already discussed, the researcher’s presence within the case study is likely to result 
in personal observations and, therefore, bias.  These converging lines of inquiry 
ensure reliable, valid evidence based on detailed data collection and rigorous analysis 
processes.   Bias might also occur from evidence being obtained from a single source 
and this is overcome by using a wide variety of sources (data triangulation) and 
different methods (methodological triangulation).  Case study researchers often favour 
qualitative methods.62  In this instance, both qualitative and quantitative data was 
collected and analysed.   
 
The selected methods are analysis of primary and secondary sources, observation, 
examination of physical artefacts, interview and survey.  As detailed at Table 3.2,  
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Figure 3.2. Triangulation of Data Sources 
DII IPT 
Case 
Study
DII IPT
MoD
Key Stakeholders
Atlas 
Consortium 
MoD
End Users
Implementation 
and Impact 
Interviews
Impact 
Questionnaire
Secondary 
Sources
Primary 
Sources
Primary 
Sources
Secondary 
Sources
Interviews
Direct 
Observation
Physical 
Artefacts
 
Source: Author 
 
interpretivist research uses “multiple methods to establish different views of 
phenomena” so providing the means for an intensive and detailed examination of the 
DII Programme.  They are also designed to explore the subjective aspects of the case, 
examining and reflecting on perceptions in order to gain an understanding of social 
and human activities.  The data gathered is both primary, original data collected at 
source, and secondary, data that already exists.  The primary data was collected 
through observation, study of physical artefacts, interview and survey.  Secondary 
data analysis includes the scholarly literature review as well as government reports 
and documentation made available by the DII Group, the ATLAS Consortium and the 
MoD in addition to articles about DII appearing in journals and newspapers.  This 
secondary data provides useful background and underpins the primary data gathered 
for the case study in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Observation can be used as a research method in either positivist or interpretivist 
research, involving the researcher as either a participant or a non-participant.  
Participant observation occurs when the researcher is part of the organisation being 
researched, fully involved with the people and the phenomena, which was not the case 
in this instance.63  More applicable to this study is non-participant observation, where 
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people’s actions and behaviour are observed and recorded without the researcher 
being involved.64  The observer is separate from the activities taking place and the 
subjects may be unaware that they are being observed.  This method provided 
additional data about behaviours, actions and interactions observed when the 
researcher was present at the site of the case study.  Data was recorded in note form 
on every visit and was then used to inform the detailed data derived from the 
interviews and their analysis. 
 
Much of the research was focused on the management processes that result in the 
delivery of technology.  However, it has to be recognised that the main purpose of the 
DII Programme is the delivery of the Technical Solution, a designed physical 
structure that delivers functionality.  Therefore, the infrastructure was accessed and 
explored via a terminal based at the Defence Academy.  This enabled assessments to 
be made about its usability and accessibility, again informing and underpinning the 
more detailed data analysis that takes place in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
The principal methods of data gathering were interviews and a survey.  Interviews are 
associated with both positivist and interpretivist methodologies providing a means of 
collecting data by asking selected participants what they do, think or feel.65  If a 
positivistic approach is being taken, then interviews are more likely to be based 
around structured, closed questions, which give quantifiable responses.66  An 
interpretivist approach, however, is based around either unstructured questions, which 
have not been prepared beforehand, or semi-structured questions, which ask about 
broad themes, varying the order and allowing new or more probing questions to be 
asked as required.  This type of questioning is most useful when trying to understand 
reasons for decisions, attitudes and opinions, as well as the meanings that respondents 
assign to various phenomena.67  In addition, respondents may use words or ideas in a 
particular way and being able to probe these meanings can add significance and depth 
to the data.68  Easterby-Smith et al suggest that an interview is the best approach when 
there are a large number of questions to be answered; where the questions are either 
complex or open-ended; or where the order and logic of questioning may need to be 
varied.69  Interviews provide a richness of data, which was the main driver behind the 
decision to research the DII Programme in this way.   
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Interviews also provide a range of other advantages, such as being a useful means of 
data collection for causal or analytical studies, so fitting well with the purpose of this 
study, which is to explain the relationship between variables.  They can be conducted 
face-to-face, by telephone or by email.70  In this instance, the face-to-face interview 
was selected to enable the researcher to ask complex questions and then to follow-up 
the answers in a way that is not possible by email and may prove difficult by 
telephone.  Respondents may be more reluctant to give sensitive or confidential 
information to someone that they have not met and may also be wary of how that 
information is going to be used.71  Therefore, the more personal nature of the face-to-
face interview is likely to result in a greater degree of confidence in replies, not least 
because account can be taken of non-verbal communication as well as the spoken 
word.  In many ways, this is one of the strengths.  In addition, writing out in-depth 
comment is tedious and time consuming in comparison to holding a directed 
conversation with someone. 
 
Having thought about why interviews would be a useful means of data collection for 
this study, decisions then had to be made concerning who to interview, how and 
where, and the questions to be asked.  In terms of who to interview, the focus of the 
research, as defined by the Conceptual Framework, is the Technical Solution, being 
developed and implemented as the DII Programme consisting of the DII Group as the 
MoD customer and the supplier, the ATLAS Consortium.  Access to the DII Group 
was arranged via a sponsor or, as described by Saunders et al, a ‘gatekeeper’.72   
Therefore, access to personnel and the selection of the most appropriate interviewees 
was controlled.  The fact that individuals did not agree to participate in the research 
directly with the researcher and, therefore, might have been unconvinced of its value 
raises some questions about the reliability of the data.  However, all of the participants 
seemed to engage willingly, evidenced by the length of time that interviews took, the 
extent to which people wanted their views heard and the fact that a number seemed to 
enjoy the process, frequently describing it as ‘cathartic’.  Saunders et al describe the 
process of ‘cognitive access’, which means gaining access to the precise data held by 
the participant.73  It was felt that this was achieved, by and large, and that sufficient 
access had been gained to answer the research question and to meet the aim of this 
study.   
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ATLAS originally consisted of five companies: the lead suppliers, HP (previously 
EDS) and Fujitsu, with General Dynamics (which has since left the Programme), 
EADS (now Cassidian) and LogicaCMG.  With regard to ATLAS, a key question was 
whether it was necessary to interview a representative sample from each of the five 
companies.  After much consideration, it was decided that the primary concern of the 
research was not how a Consortium operates or to understand the different concerns 
of each of the companies involved but rather to seek a generic supplier perspective.  
Therefore, it was considered appropriate to view ATLAS as a single entity.  Although 
the employing company of each respondent was known, it was taken to be largely 
irrelevant to the prime purpose of exploring the extent to which the supplier, in the 
form of ATLAS, had understood and applied the identified CSFs.   
 
The next issue was to decide on a representative sample, given that it would be 
impossible to interview a potential population of 2,300.   It was uncertain how many 
would be required at the outset of the research.  Saunders et al note “the difficulty of 
trying to design a viable questionnaire schedule to cope with issues that are complex, 
unclear or large in number”.74  A ‘sufficient’ number of interviews were needed but it 
was difficult to decide at the outset what that number would be.  Thought was also 
given to the order in which the participants were to be interviewed as this can affect 
the emphasis and balance of the emerging issues.75  However, ultimately, the 
researcher had little control over this and had to accept decisions taken by the 
sponsoring body, the DII Group.  This resulted in interviews being held with 11 
members of the DII Group and six members of the ATLAS Consortium.  In addition, 
interviews were held with six other representatives of the wider government context 
to give a total of 23 interviews. 
 
Although 17 respondents from ATLAS and the DII Group might seem like a 
comparatively small sample, the preferred methods for interpretivist research, as 
shown at Table 3.2, include “small samples investigated in-depth over time”.  Given 
that this study was undertaken over a period of six years and some of the interviews 
lasted up to three hours, the sample fulfilled this criterion.  In addition, it became 
evident towards the end of the interview process that the same issues were recurring, 
satisfying the researcher that the sample was fit for purpose.   
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As it turned out, the DII Group sample represented seven of the 11 sections within the 
organisational structure, as shown at Table 3.6, giving access to an appropriate and 
sufficient range of stakeholder perspectives.  On the ATLAS side, the respondents 
included a Chief Executive and representatives of the business strategy and customer 
service areas.  These were from both HP and Fujitsu but with a bias towards HP, 
which was not considered critical.  It should be noted that three of the ATLAS 
Consortium had also worked within the DII Group.  The length of time that they had 
spent on the project, together with their experience of both supply and demand-sides, 
gave a depth and breadth to their responses.  The sample from the DII Group was 
almost double that of the ATLAS Consortium, potentially introducing a flaw in terms 
of the validity and reliability of the research.  However, as the contractor and,  
 
Table 3.6. DII Group Organisation 
Head of DII 
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Battlespace Deputy Head Business Operations 
Deputy Head Commercial Management 
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Engineering  
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Estates North Deputy Head Estates London  
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Estates West Deputy Head Implementation  
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Requirements and Programme 
(Interviewed) 
Deputy Head Service Assurance  
(Interviewed) 
Executive Officer  
(Interviewed) 
 
Source: Adapted from Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment and Support, 
Information Systems and Services, Defence Information Infrastructure: Joint Business Plan 
2009/2010, (London, HMSO, 2009). 
 
therefore, the controlling force behind the structure, organisation, funding and other 
key elements of the project, it was considered necessary to gain as complete an 
understanding as possible of how the DII Group was operating in the face of 
government pressure to improve performance.  In other words, the command and 
control of the Technical Solution lies with the DII Group.  Therefore, more emphasis 
needed to be placed on determining how this group had understood and applied the 
CSFs, before checking this view against the supplier perspective. 
 
A deliberate decision was taken to focus the interviews almost wholly on the DII 
Programme, rather than interviewing social actors in the wider context of the MoD.  
This was because it was considered critical to understand and interpret the context, the 
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Technical Solution and the understanding, application and impact of CSFs from their 
viewpoint.  Referring back to the discussion about research philosophy, the purpose 
was to understand how the personnel within the DII Programme had “pre-selected and 
pre-interpreted this world” and how this was motivating their behaviour and choices.76  
However, it was decided to supplement this by undertaking interviews with six key 
personnel, representing the Office of Government Commerce (OGC), Defence 
Equipment and Support (DE&S), another government department and a government 
agency, as well as Proving Services, the research-based organisation discussed above.  
This provided a view from the wider environment, adding some checks and balances 
to assure the reliability and validity of the data obtained from the interviews within 
the DII Programme. 
 
At the start of the empirical research, two unstructured interviews were undertaken 
with the project sponsor, a member of the DII Group.  The purpose of this was to 
understand the background to the Programme, to begin formulating the questions and 
to identify the key stakeholders in the DII Group and the ATLAS Consortium.  In 
addition to this, a large amount of research had already been undertaken on the basis 
of Healey and Rawlinson’s recommendation that “a well informed interviewer has a 
basis for assessing the accuracy of some of the information offered”.77  In addition, it 
was hoped that this would establish the credibility of the research. 
 
Following on from this, semi-structured interviews were undertaken.   Prior to each 
interview, an agenda was set out, as shown at Appendix 3.  This outlined the scope 
and objectives of both the interview and the research, detailing the broad themes that 
would be covered.  This was intended to promote validity and reliability by enabling 
the respondent to reflect on the answers before the interview took place and to 
assemble any relevant documentation to enable triangulation.  However, preparation 
was kept to a minimum, as the purpose of each interview was to establish the 
perception of the respondent regarding key factors affecting IT project success.  This 
document also gave reassurances regarding confidentiality and anonymity.  The aim 
of the interview was to obtain data to enable the research question to be answered.  
However, each respondent was assured that they could decline to respond to any 
question if they so wished. 
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The time allowed for each interview was largely dictated by the respondent or the 
sponsor, as was the location, which tended to be the office of the respondent being 
interviewed.  Despite the lack of input into this, the selected locations were obviously 
convenient and comfortable for the respondent, which may have created a more 
relaxing atmosphere for the interview, but with the potential for interruption.  
However, this did not occur.  The sessions began with pleasantries in order to put the 
respondent at their ease.  Then the agenda was discussed, explaining the research and 
enabling questions to be asked, whilst also gaining the respondent’s consent and 
giving further reassurances regarding confidentiality.  This was to make the 
respondents more relaxed and open about the information that they were willing to 
discuss.  The interview themes were derived largely from the literature, the reports 
and from experience of the topic.  The aim was to ask the questions in a logical order, 
to use language that was comprehensible to the respondents and to pose the questions 
using a neutral tone.  Open questions were used in order to avoid bias.78  Some of the 
questions were of a theoretical nature, requiring some prior explanation and 
discussion.  Attempts were made to relate these to real-life experiences rather than 
simply presenting abstract concepts.  The questions are discussed in further detail in 
Chapter Six. 
 
In terms of recording the interview data, the preference was to both record and to take 
notes, as advised by Saunders et al.79  Not only did this provide a back-up in case of 
technical failure, it also showed the respondent the importance of their responses.  
The respondent was asked for their permission to record and told that the recorder 
would be switched off at any time at their request.  There was only one instance of 
refusal and only once did a respondent ask for the recording to be temporarily stopped 
due to the sensitivity of the data.  At the end of the interview, the respondent was 
asked for final comments, then thanked and reassured of confidentiality.   
 
As discussed in terms of the research philosophy, the researcher inevitably has an 
effect on the process and data can only be captured and defined according to a 
specific perspective.  Lee raises two key areas where this needs to be recognised and 
efforts made to control the effect.  Firstly, it is difficult to predict or measure potential 
bias, which may occur in terms of class, race or sex, for example.80  The researcher 
needs to be aware of its existence, as it is likely to distort the data and, hence, the 
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findings.  In addition, interviewees may have certain expectations about the interview 
and give what they consider to be ‘correct’ or ‘acceptable’ responses.81  Lee suggests 
that these problems can be overcome to some extent by increasing the depth of the 
interview.82  Secondly, both unstructured and semi-structured interviews are time 
consuming to undertake and problematic in terms of recording, controlling the range 
of topics and analysing the data.83  The questions raised and the matters explored are 
likely to differ between interviews as different aspects of the topic are revealed.84  
Therefore, ideally, all interviews need to be conducted in the same way, not only in 
terms of the same questions being asked but also in terms of the way that they are 
asked.  Furthermore, the interviewer needs to ensure that each person understands the 
question in the same way.  This is known as ‘stimulus equivalence’, demanding 
considerable thought and skill in question design.85  However, this need for 
consistency has to be set against the need to vary the order of the questions, probe 
responses and ask new questions as the situation demands, in order to capture the 
richness of data. 
 
Where possible, the data was transcribed as soon as possible after the interview, in 
accordance with good practice.86  In addition, the following contextual data was noted 
following the interview: the location (i.e. place); the date and time; the environment 
(i.e. surrounding factors, such as noise); background information about the 
respondent; behaviours, actions and interactions observed before, during and after the 
interview; and the immediate impression of the success of the interview.87 
 
Transcription was a lengthy process, taking about eight hours for each hour of 
interview, and resulting in a mass of data for subsequent analysis.  The question of 
how to analyse this data was difficult.  Robson points out that there is “no clear and 
accepted set of conventions for analysis” of qualitative data.88  Initially, a complicated 
process of content analysis was undertaken.  As discussed above, this involved 
breaking the data into separate meaning units, a string of text expressing a single 
coherent thought up to the point where the thought changes.  These were underlined 
and each was allocated a number for the purposes of tracking and organisation.  
Recurring meaning units were then grouped and classified.  However, this process 
was discarded as it was very time consuming and not very productive.  A much more 
pragmatic means of analysis was then devised, which involved creating a spreadsheet 
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for each question.  This worked well as many of the questions required a structured 
response, although there was much unstructured discussion around them.  
Fundamentally, this approach involved quantifying the data, a process to which many 
with an interpretivist philosophy would object.  However, it is justified on the grounds 
that it shows the representativeness or generality of the data, rather than simply 
presenting data without any evidence of how it has been summarised and structured.89   
Once the question responses had been collated in this way, the unstructured material 
was classified according to the CSFs identified in Chapter Four, providing an 
auditable trail of evidence for the conclusions to be drawn in Chapter Six, regarding 
understanding and application of these CSFs.  In effect, this again involved the 
structuring of data but this time into categories.   
 
The final stage of the research was to assess the impact of the CSFs on the DII 
Programme.  To do this, a means had to be found of measuring the views and attitudes 
of the user population.  It was evident that it would be impossible to measure the 
300,000 strong user base in its entirety and, therefore, a method had to be found that 
enabled a sample population to be questioned in order to make inferences about the 
general population.  The most obvious way of doing this is a survey, which usually 
stems from a positivistic philosophy, but can also be associated with an interpretivist 
approach.90  To some extent, the scientific approach was highly applicable here, as the 
main object of this survey was to operationalise concepts (user satisfaction with 
system performance) to enable measurement.  Surveys can also be used for 
descriptive research, fitting with the objective of describing the impact of the CSFs.91 
Having decided on survey as the most appropriate strategy, the next question was 
which data collection technique to use from a range of potential methods, including 
focus groups, structured observation, structured interviews and questionnaires.92  The 
first three were considered too impractical and time consuming, whilst also militating 
against a large sample.  A written questionnaire seemed to offer the most efficient 
means of targeting a relatively broad spread of personnel, allowing a range of views 
to be sought and thereby minimising the risk of bias.   
 
The next decision was how to distribute this questionnaire.  The options considered 
were a traditional postal survey or an online variant.  It takes time and money to 
produce, disseminate, collect, collate and analyse a hard copy survey.  There are also 
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recognised limitations with using a postal questionnaire, namely ‘questionnaire 
fatigue’ and ‘non return bias’.93  The issue of fatigue was a particular problem, as the 
sample population under scrutiny are known to receive a wide range of 
questionnaires, potentially making them reluctant to respond.94  A postal survey could 
also be viewed as a rather old-fashioned way of collecting data, especially when the 
required information concerns an IT project.  Given this, an electronically distributed 
questionnaire was considered a better option.  With cost being a constraint, it was 
decided to compile the questionnaire via a free online survey hosting service called 
SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com).  An alternative electronic format, an 
Excel spreadsheet, was also considered, but it was felt that the time spent in becoming 
familiar with the required functionality would be better spent on other tasks.   
 
In addition to being free, the SurveyMonkey online question editor is intuitive, 
flexible and performs the tasks of response collection and elementary data analysis.  It 
allows for up to ten multi-part questions to be compiled according to templates, with 
associated rules and options for question and response types.  Inevitably, this limit 
placed a constraint on the questioning process, although it was possible to ask a range 
of questions within one question, producing a slightly more complex result.  Up to 
100 responses can be collected at no charge, whilst individual records can be 
scrutinised and purged if they are thought to compromise the integrity of the data set.  
The resulting questionnaire had the added bonus of looking professional and it was 
hoped that this would encourage respondents to engage with it.  It was distributed via 
a hyperlink in an email along with an explanation of the survey rationale, the 
anticipated completion time and assurances of anonymity, whilst also thanking the 
respondent for their support.  Anonymity was an essential means of minimising bias 
and encouraging respondents to be honest in their responses.95   
 
There were a number of issues to be taken into consideration when determining the 
type of questions to use.  Structured questions, characteristic of self-completion 
questionnaires and of a positivistic approach, simplify analysis but reduce the variety 
of response and so the richness of the data to be collected.96  Although the dangers of 
structured questions were recognised, it was considered more imperative to make the 
questionnaire quick and easy to complete in order to overcome the perceived 
questionnaire fatigue and to encourage the maximum response rate.  Of the ten 
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questions asked, three required single responses, six were based on multiple-choice 
answers using differential rating scales and one was an unstructured question included 
to provide high value, qualitative data.  A great deal of time and effort went into 
ensuring that the questions were clear and unambiguous.  They were then reviewed by 
two academics, a DII user, a member of the ATLAS Consortium and a statistician.  
This process of scrutiny resulted in a number of changes.  The questionnaire was then 
piloted by ten respondents to further confirm the clarity, logic and progression of the 
questions.  It received no further comments.  In addition to the ten questions, a 
comment box was included for each question.  It was anticipated that little use would 
be made of this, given the constraints on time experienced by most respondents.  
However, a large number of comments were received. 
 
The questionnaire was categorised into three areas: a heading section to explain the 
purpose of the questionnaire; a categorisation section to identify the profile of the 
respondents; and a data section.  To improve the quality of the answers, the questions 
in the data section were designed to become increasingly specific with a view to 
engaging the respondent as they worked through the questions.  The categorisation 
section included questions about work location, how long DII had been available at 
that work place, length of experience using it and a self-assessment of the 
respondent’s level of skill in using IT.  The data section was in three parts.  The first 
asked for an evaluation of use and included questions about awareness of DII prior to 
its implementation, access to applications and relevant hardware, training and the 
extent to which it had improved on the previously available IT.  The second section 
asked for an assessment of the extent of user consultation, the implementation 
experience, user involvement, the perceived purpose of DII and, finally, an 
assessment of its success.  The final section simply asked for additional comments.   
 
The next consideration was the selection of a sample and the decision was taken to 
use a ‘snowball’ or ‘chain-referral’ sampling technique, which identifies initial 
subjects and then asks them to identify people with a similar interest.97  This method 
is often used if the sample for the study is rare or limited to a very small subgroup of 
the population and it offers a cheap, simple method of sampling requiring a minimal 
amount of planning.98  It also enabled distribution across a broad range of 
establishments, which should have minimised any potential bias toward a particular 
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group.  Respondents were asked to state their work location, which showed responses 
from a variety of locations in the UK as well as Cyprus, Germany, Afghanistan and 
the USA.  The initial request was sent to 20 people but, because of the method, exact 
distribution figures are unknown and non-return tracking was impossible.  However, 
this resulted in 84 responses.  Although the free version of SurveyMonkey analyses the 
data, there is a charge for the downloading of the data and resulting charts and graphs.  
This meant that the only means of creating graphical representation of the data 
collected was to transfer it manually into an Excel spreadsheet, which was a rather 
cumbersome process.  The results of this data analysis are discussed in full in Chapter 
Six. 
 
3.5.  Ethical Issues 
 
Ethics refers to the appropriateness of the researcher’s behaviour in relation to the 
rights of those who become the subjects of the research.99  Ethical issues are defined 
as “the moral principles, norms or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices 
about our behaviour and our relationship with others”.100  The research in this thesis 
was guided by Cranfield University’s Ethics Policy, which states that it is up to the 
research student in consultation with the supervisor to determine whether the 
proposed research requires consideration by the Ethics Committee.  The primary 
ethical principle is that respondents and participants should be protected from 
potential physical, psychological or personal harm.  Kervin suggests the following 
checklist for assessing this: 
 
1. Will the research process harm participants or those about whom information 
is gathered (indirect participants)? 
2. Are the findings of this research likely to cause harm to others not involved in 
the research? 
3. Is accepted research practice being violated in conducting the research and 
data analysis, and drawing conclusions? 
4. Are community standards of conduct being violated?101 
 
The answer to these questions was negative.  In addition, reference was made to the 
six key principles of ethical research, as defined by the Economic and Social Research 
 3-30
Council, which are shown at Table 3.7 along with an assessment of the adherence to 
these principles in this research. 
 
Table 3.7. The Six Key Principles of Ethical Research 
Principle Adherence to Principle 
1. Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to 
ensure integrity, quality and transparency. 
Responsibility for conduct of this research taken by the 
researcher in association with the supervisor and guided by the 
Cranfield University Ethics Policy. 
2. Research participants must normally be informed fully 
about the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the 
research, what their participation in the research entails and 
what risks, if any, are involved.  
Research participants fully advised before interview and 
during the interview process, as well as in an email sent with 
the survey and within the heading section of the questionnaire. 
3. The confidentiality of information supplied by research 
participants and the anonymity of respondents must be 
respected. 
Participants who were interviewed in the course of this 
research are not identified.  The nature of the survey sample 
meant that the respondents were not identifiable unless they 
chose to be. 
4. Research participants must take part voluntarily, free from 
any coercion. 
This was the case in terms of the survey but it was difficult to 
assure this in terms of participants from the DII Group as they 
were nominated by the sponsor.  However, they all seemed to 
engage willingly in the research process and this was 
confirmed by the amount of time that they were willing to 
allocate to it. 
5. Harm to research participants must be avoided in all 
instances. 
There was little likelihood of physical, psychological or 
personal harm to participants in this research.   
6. The independence of research must be clear, and any 
conflicts of interest or partiality must be explicit. 
This was clarified during the introductory session of the 
interview and in the email containing the link to the survey. 
Source: Economic and Social Research Council, Framework for Research Ethics (FRE), 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Framework_for_Research_Ethics_tcm8-4586.pdf, downloaded 
19th January 2010. 
 
3.6.  Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to detail the decisions made about the data collection 
and analysis required in order to address the research question posed in Chapter One 
and to meet the aim of this thesis.  To this end, the research philosophy was identified 
as interpretivist, considering the world as socially constructed and subjective.  The 
purpose is to understand human behaviour, rather than to explain it.  In this instance, 
it was noted that people working on the DII Programme are likely to understand 
something specific in relation to the identified CSFs, that they will allocate them a 
specific meaning and relevance, which will motivate their behaviour.  This means that 
different research participants may express different views and these will require 
some interpretation by the researcher.  The recognition and acceptance of an 
interpretivist philosophy then influences the selections regarding the research 
methodology, how the research should be undertaken, and the methods or tools used 
to collect relevant data.  The chosen methodology is case study, which will 
incorporate a number of methods, including interviews and surveys.  It is suitable for 
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a research question based on ‘how’, examining a subject within its context in order to 
understand the interrelationships that impact on that subject. 
 
However, before embarking on the case study, it was necessary to identify the CSFs 
from a range of carefully selected reports on both IT project failure and information 
infrastructure projects.  The method selected for this was content analysis, using a 
process of selective reduction and relational analysis.   The second stage of the 
research was the case study and a range of research methods was selected to collect 
the relevant data: analysis of primary and secondary sources, observation, 
examination of physical artefacts, interview and survey.  This conforms to the 
interpretivist research approach of using multiple methods in order to understand 
different views of phenomena and to explore the subjective aspects of the case study.  
Decisions then had to be taken about what data to collect, why, from whom, where, 
when and how.  In discussing these issues, the type of research being undertaken was 
defined in terms of the purpose, process, logic and outcome.  The purpose is causal or 
analytical in that it examines the effect of one variable (CSFs) on another (the DII 
Programme), in order to ascertain if there has been a specific change from existing 
norms.  The process is based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods and 
its logic is deductive.  Finally, the outcome is applied research, designed to apply its 
findings to a specific existing problem.  The first stage in doing this is to identify the 
CSFs that appear in the selected reports, discussed above.  The process for this and 
the outcomes are presented in full in Chapter Four.  
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Chapter Four 
Lessons Learned:  
Identifying the Critical Success Factors  
 
4.1.  False Assumptions 
  
In its 1999 Modernising Government white paper, the Labour Government declared 
that it would deliver fundamental and wide-ranging change to the way the public 
sector works through the use of Information Technology (IT).1  This strategic intent 
was reinforced through successive parliaments.  However, eleven years on and the 
newly elected Coalition Government’s Digital Champion, Martha Lane Fox, was 
renewing the call for an online revolution in the public sector, indicating that the 
Labour plan did not come to fruition.2  This demonstrates that the unerring confidence 
in technology is often misplaced and fails to deliver.  To date, UK governments of all 
political persuasions have invested large sums in major IT projects.  In 2005, the UK 
was responsible for about 23% of public sector IT spending across Europe, investing 
40% more than France or Germany.3  However, with the rising cost of the national 
deficit, this spending has been curtailed.  IT projects and services were cut by more 
than £1 billion in the Coalition Government’s Comprehensive Spending Review in 
October 2010.4  However, the belief in IT as a means of delivering efficiency savings 
remains intact.5  The society for IT professionals in the public sector, SOCITM, notes 
the unlimited potential of IT to reform services, but also points to the frequent failure 
of big government contracts to deliver value.6  As Collins observes, “the assumption 
of a happy ending and a concomitant underestimation of complexity, potential 
problems, costs and risks is congenital to large IT projects within central 
government”.7   
 
The publicly visible and much reported catalogue of failed projects confirms Collins’ 
cynicism, particularly those large-scale, complex and bespoke developments so 
frequently undertaken by government.  A range of these, not comprehensive, is shown 
at Table 4.1, clearly demonstrating that the reasons for failure have remained largely 
the same for almost thirty years.  This underlines the research question that drives this 
study: how have the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government 
been used to improve the performance of subsequent projects?  The purpose of this 
chapter is to focus on the ‘lessons learned’ element of that question by identifying 
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Table 4.1. A Selection of Public Sector IT Project Failures, 1980-2011 
 
Project Title 
 
 
Date 
 
Background 
 
Reasons for Failure 
 
National Health Service (NHS): 
Read Codes 3 Project 
 
1982-1998 
 
 
A local development to standardise medical reporting, then purchased by the NHS 
for £1.25 million in 1990 and upgraded to Read Codes 2.  After a £32 million 
investment, version 3 was only operational at 12 NHS sites.   
 
• No business case 
• No cost benefit analysis 
• No investment appraisal 
 
NHS: Regional Information System 
Plan (RISP) 
 
1984-1990 
 
Wessex Regional Health Authority’s RISP project set out to develop five core 
computer systems to achieve integration across the region.  The system cost about 
£43 million and at least £20 million was wasted due to determination to complete the 
project. 
 
 
• Network transmission capability insufficient 
• Work processes changed  
• NHS reorganised 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
• Lack of skilled personnel  
• Poor project management 
 
Department of Social Security 
(DSS):Operational Strategy System 
(Opstrat) 
 
1984-1996 
 
Intended to compute welfare benefits for 20 million claimants at 400 Benefit Offices.  
Costs rose from £700 million to £2,600 million. 
 
• IT management separate from policy making 
• Delivery timescales too short 
• Project too complex; new and changing technology 
• No alignment of business, IT or organisational strategies 
• Lack of skills 
 
Ministry of Defence: Trawlerman 
Project 
 
1988-1997 
 
£41 million met the initial requirements set in the early 1990s.  A replacement 
system in 1997 cost £6 million. 
 
• Fatally flawed design 
• Poor project management 
• Project too complex and over-ambitious 
• Poor communication with supplier 
 
NHS: Hospital Information Support 
System (HISS) 
 
1988-1999 
 
Integration of hospital information systems.  By 1996, it had cost £106 million and 
achieved cost savings of only £3.3 million rather than the projected savings of £10.4 
million.  
 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement  
• Poor project management 
• Poor senior management  
 
Department of Education and 
Employment (DEE): Field System 
 
1988-1999 
 
The £48 million project changed hands from DEE to the new Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs), resulting in an inappropriate design.   
 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
• Poor risk management 
• Poor project management 
 
London Ambulance Service: 
Computer Aided Despatch system 
 
1991-1992 
 
Withdrawn after a short period of service and perhaps several unnecessary fatalities.  
Final costs unknown. 
 
• Poor project management 
• Poor risk management 
• Poor change management 
• Delivery timescales too short 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
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Project Title 
 
Date Background Reasons for Failure 
 
Home Office: Case Record and 
Management System (CRAMS) 
 
1993-2001 
 
National database of dangerous offenders.  Abandoned at a cost of £100 million.  
Probation Officers resorted to card index system. 
 
• Too slow 
• Not easily adaptable to changes in legislation 
• Poor project management 
• Lack of continuity in leadership 
• Lack of governance 
• Poor funding model 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
 
Inland Revenue: Infrastructure 2000 
Project 
 
1994-2000 
 
£1,000 million project involving the installation of 56,000 desktop computers.  By 
1999, staff productivity was in decline as a result of the system.  Final costs were 
close to £2,000 million.   
 
• Project too big 
• Project too complex 
• Too much change 
 
Department of Social Security 
(DSS): 
National Insurance Recording 
System 2 (NIRS2) 
 
1995-1998  
 
System errors resulted in 130,000 pensioners losing more than £43 million in 
pension payments.   
 
• System unable to cope with the volume of data 
• Financial constraints 
• Over ambitious project 
• Lack of user involvement 
 
Post Office: Pathway 
 
1996-1999 
 
£1 billion contract let by the Benefit Agency to use smartcards to automate the 
payment of benefits.  Cancelled at a cost of £698 million. 
 
• Change of payment system in favour of credit transfer 
• Risk management 
• Lack of clarity over requirements 
• Two customers 
 
Passport Agency: Digital Passports 
System 
 
1996-1999 
 
A general upgrade from an earlier system.  Subject to very tight deadlines.   
 
• Too complex 
• Roll out timetable did not allow for the troubleshooting of 
problems 
• Poor risk management 
• Poor business case 
• Poor stakeholder management 
 
Lord Chancellor’s Department: Libra 
 
1996-2008 
 
Following two failed projects in the 1990s, this was an attempt to create an IT 
infrastructure for magistrates’ courts.  The project was based on PFI.  The cost of the 
project has more than doubled to over £400 million and the system is yet to be 
delivered. 
 
• Competition badly handled 
• No governance of individual courts 
• Requirements poorly defined 
• Too much risk passed to the supplier 
 
Home Office: Public Safety Radio 
Communications Project (PSRCP) 
 
1999-2009 
 
£2.5 million contract to establish a police radio network.  Project costs based on 
national implementation. 
 
• Cost too high for individual local police authorities to 
implement 
• No strategic oversight 
• No power to instigate change 
• Poor engagement with end-users 
 4-4 
Project Title 
 
Date Background Reasons for Failure 
Home Office Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate: Casework 
Programme 
1996-2001 System designed to speed up asylum applications.  Contract let to Siemens as a PFI.   
Abandoned at a cost of £77 million.   
• Over complex  
• Did not match the work processes   
• Allegedly, the system development began before the 
requirements had been specified   
• Lack of project management skills 
• Lack of risk management 
• No accountable senior staff 
 
National Air Traffic Services: New 
En Route Centre for Air Traffic 
Control 
 
1990-2002 
 
Expected to open in 1996 but did not open until 27th January 2002.  Over ran its 
budget by £180 million to cost £623 million with a much reduced project definition. 
 
• Scale and complexity 
• Poor relationship with stakeholders 
• Lack of accountability 
• Changing project definition and scope 
• Project management 
 
National Probation Service: 
Information System Strategy 
(NPSISS) 
 
1993-2001 
 
Projected to cost £97 million over ten years and to be complete in 1999.  It was still 
incomplete in 2001 with expected costs at the time of £118 million.  The project 
director changed seven times during the project. 
 
• Lacked governance and support 
• Poor project management 
• Lack of stakeholder involvement 
• Poor risk assessment 
 
Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP): Child Support Agency 
 
1998-2003 
 
Reforms at the Child Support Agency included new rules for child support and a 
simplified calculation for maintenance, supported by a new 
IT system and a substantial business restructuring. Called CS2, the IT system was 
delayed and £456 million over budget.  In 2007, the Government announced it would 
spend a further £300m in an attempt to improve CS2. It still did not work. 
 
• Unclear specifications 
• Poor project management 
• Poor design 
• Poor risk management 
• Too complex 
• Designed to match an over-ambitious processes 
 
Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA): Rural 
Payment Agency's Single Payment 
Scheme 
 
2005 to date 
 
Implementation of an IT system to administer the European Union’s Single Payment 
scheme to farmers in England.  The cost of the IT system rose four fold, from 
£75.8m to £350m, and it may never work reliably. 
 
• Too complex 
• Poor risk assessment 
• Poor accountability 
• Lack of skills 
• Poor project management 
 
Home Office: National Offender 
Management Information System 
(C-NOMIS) 
 
2004 to date 
 
The C-NOMIS project has been handled badly, resulting in a three-year delay in 
programme roll-out, reductions in scope and benefit, and a doubling of programme 
costs 
 
• Poor project management 
• Over complex 
• Lack of resources 
• Lack of accountability and governance 
• Over-ambitious 
• Lack of skills 
Source: Author
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the CSFs that are highlighted in government reports on IT projects and, more 
specifically, on information infrastructure projects.  The conceptual framework for 
this study, shown again at Figure 4.1, describes the thinking on which this thesis is 
based and maps the route of this research.  The IT project sits at the core of the model 
with CSFs as the input.  The purpose of this chapter is to identify the CSFs, as 
indicated on the diagram.  Once identified, this study will examine the extent to which 
these are understood and applied, along with an assessment of the resulting  
 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual Framework: Identifying the CSFs 
Id
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Source: Author 
 
performance of the product.  The ‘Technical Solution’ sits within the government 
context.  As in private sector organisations, that context consists of ‘Business Process’ 
and ‘Organisational Setting’.  Its difference lies in the outer layer, the ‘Programme, 
Policy and Political Context’.  In theory, the CSFs should be understood by the 
organisation and, more specifically, by the project team and applied to the planning, 
development and implementation of the Technical Solution.  The impact of these 
CSFs should be improved performance.  The aim of this study is to examine whether 
this works in practice.   
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The process for identifying these CSFs starts with the so-called McCartney Report of 
2000, Successful IT: Modernising Government in Action, and then incorporates nine 
subsequent reports, shown at Table 4.2, reproduced from Chapters One and Three.   
 
Table 4.2. Reports of Public Sector IT Project Failure, 2000-2006 
Reporting Body Title  Date 
Cabinet Office Successful IT: Modernising Government 
in Action (the McCartney Report) 
2000 
Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) 
The Hidden Threat to E-Government: 
Avoiding Large Government IT Failures 
2001 
Intellect Getting IT Right for Government 2002 
Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) 
Common Causes of Project Failure 2002 
Intellect IT Supplier Code of Practice 2003 
Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST) 
Government IT Projects 2003 
House of Commons, Work and Pensions 
Committee 
 
Department of Work and Pensions 
Management of Information Technology 
Projects: Making IT Deliver for DWP 
Customers 
2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Improving IT Procurement 2004 
Royal Academy of Engineering 
(RAEng) and the British Computer 
Society (BCS) 
The Challenges of Complex IT Projects 2004 
National Audit Office (NAO) Delivering Successful IT-Enabled 
Business Change 
2006 
Source: Author 
 
Other reports appeared during this timescale, broadly concerned with the same subject 
matter, but did not meet the following selection criteria: aiming to identify CSFs for 
IT projects in the public sector; published by influential and respected bodies; and 
much referenced and quoted in the literature.   
 
Based on evidence derived from extensive research of public and private sector case 
studies in both the UK and overseas, the McCartney Report recognised that there is no 
single, simple solution to IT project failure; its headline statement noted the need to 
stop thinking in terms of IT projects and to start thinking about change management 
projects enabled by IT.8  It identified 10 areas where improvement would deliver 
more successful results: 
 
• Change management; 
• Leadership and responsibility; 
• Project management; 
• Risk management; 
• Modular and incremental development; 
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• Benefit realisation; 
• Procurement and supplier relationships; 
• Cross-cutting initiatives; 
• People and skills; 
• Learning lessons.9 
 
The eleventh area, the implementation strategy, detailed the action plan for the 30 
recommendations identified in the other 10 areas.  These section headings highlight 
the areas of activity considered most critical to delivering a successful outcome.  
Arguably, they conform to Rockart’s definition of CSFs, discussed in Chapters One 
and Two: 
 
…the few key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish… 
 
…areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention from 
management… 
 
…the areas in which good performance is necessary to ensure attainment of 
[organisational] goals.10 
 
The problem is that these section headings are very general.  The heading ‘project 
management’, for example, does not provide sufficient clarity about what needs to be 
done for project management to ‘go right’ or what should receive ‘constant and 
careful attention’.  This detail can only be gained by reading the discussion in the 
report.  Conversely, the recommendations are very specific i.e. “Recommendation 4: 
professional development events for Ministers and senior civil servants being 
organised by the Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS) will include 
informing them of their role in, and responsibility for, major IT projects and 
programmes”.11  In order to identify more meaningful and, therefore, potentially more 
useful CSFs, they need to be sufficiently precise and detailed.  Using the McCartney 
Report and these broad headings as a basis, a thorough content analysis of the text 
was undertaken in order to achieve more specific and pertinent CSFs, as detailed in 
Chapter Three. 
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The literature identified that not all projects are the same and they should, therefore, 
be managed in different ways using different CSFs.  Given that the case study under 
examination for this thesis is an infrastructure project, the Defence Information 
Infrastructure (DII) Programme, this raises questions about whether information 
infrastructure projects are different to other IT projects and, if so, whether they have 
different CSFs.  Although the literature identifies different types of project and the 
resulting analysis suggested that IT projects are different, there was no evidence 
directly relating to infrastructure projects.  Therefore, five accounts of infrastructure 
projects were selected, as shown at Table 4.3.  The selection criteria are discussed in 
Chapter Three, Section 3.4.1 and the same process of content analysis was applied.  
They were then compared with those of the general reports to determine a final list of 
‘Identified CSFs’, which is presented at Section 4.5. 
 
Table 4.3. Reports on Public Sector Infrastructure Projects 
Reporting Body Title  Publication Date 
National Audit Office The Implementation of the National 
Probation Service Information Systems 
Strategy (Home Office) 
2001 
National Audit Office 
 
New IT Systems for Magistrates’ Courts: 
the Libra Project 
2003 
National Audit Office Delivering Digital Tactical 
Communications through the Bowman CIP 
Programme (Ministry of Defence) 
2006 
National Audit Office 
 
The National Programme for IT in the 
NHS (Department of Health) 
2006 
US General Audit Office 
 
Information Technology: DoD Needs to 
Ensure that Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
Program is Meeting Goals and Satisfying 
Customers 
2006 
Source: Author 
 
This chapter begins by discussing the commissioning of the McCartney Report, then 
tracking its progress over time before considering its recommendations and key 
outcomes.  The purpose, key findings and CSFs for each of the nine other reports are 
then presented followed by the five infrastructure reports.  The outcome of this 
process is the synthesis of the CSFs from the fifteen reports.  This is then compared to 
the list of academic CSFs identified in Chapter Two, so answering the first of the 
three subsidiary questions that stem from the research question, highlighted in 
Chapter One: are the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in 
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government correct and comprehensively considered?   This requires a point of 
comparison, which in this case is the academic literature. 
 
 4.2.  Starter for Ten: the McCartney Report 
  
As discussed in Chapter One, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) first reported on 
IT failure in government in 1984.12  However, it was another sixteen years before any 
concerted action was taken, prompted by the failure of the Passport Agency’s IT 
project in 1999.  At the same time as the Modernising Government initiative was 
heralding IT as the means to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector, 
the media was carrying headlines crying “passport misery for thousands”.13  
Ironically, this project was ultimately a success but the Government deemed the 
performance level of its IT projects unacceptable and commissioned Ian McCartney, 
then e-Government Minister based in the Cabinet Office, to conduct a review.14  
Although popularly called after McCartney, the process was led by Ann Steward, an 
Australian on secondment to the Cabinet Office and later Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) for the Australian Government.15  The task of the review team was to look for 
lessons that would improve performance and help future IT projects to avoid past 
mistakes, in other words to identify the relevant CSFs.  Indicating the importance of 
this report and the urgency to implement it, five of the 30 recommendations were 
released four months before the publication of the full Report and immediately put 
into practice.16  They were later subsumed into Recommendations 4, 21, 23, 28 and 
30. 
 
Drawing on Cobb’s Paradox, discussed in Chapter Two, McCartney acknowledged 
that the reasons for failure are well known but are not translated into positive action.17  
In an attempt to overcome this perceived inertia and to ensure ‘active ownership’, he 
allocated a delivery deadline and a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for each 
recommendation.18  He also designated an SRO to take overall responsibility for the 
report, namely Andrew Pinder, the e-Envoy in the Cabinet Office, who made an 
interim progress report in December 2000, at which point, 19 of the 30 
recommendations had been fulfilled, as shown at Table 4.4.19  
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Table 4.4. McCartney Recommendations: Achieved (December 2000) 
Areas of 
Concern 
Recommendations Outcome 
 
 
 
 
Change 
Management 
1  Business development to be a key feature in 
the skills framework being developed by the 
Central IT Unit (CITU).  Completed June 
2000 – See Recommendation 25 
Half of the skills framework used in the e-Business 
Skills assessment toolkit now related to business 
development. 
2  CITU/OGC to strengthen the application of 
business development skills across 
government.  Completed December 2000 – 
See Recommendation 25 
Workshop held and actions identified in December 
2000. 
3  Business cases must reflect all of the 
business change to be delivered.  Completed 
August 2000 – See Recommendation 19 
Practical guidance on the contents of a business case 
provided by the OGC using the draft business case 
model provided by the McCartney Review study team. 
Leadership 
and 
Responsibility 
6  An interim checklist of roles and 
responsibilities of the SRO made available by 
June 2000. 
Interim checklist published in June and full version 
published in December. 
 
Project 
Management 
9  Key staff on major projects must undertake 
formal project management training. 
OGC examining competencies and facilitating a 
programme of mentoring. 
10  The Project Profile Model (PPM) to be 
used to assess the difficulty of projects and 
check project management skills. 
PPM and guidance published end of September 2000. 
Risk 
Management 
11  The OGC to investigate methods of 
problem reporting and upward referral. These 
will be based on the PPM. 
Interim risk map published in August 2000. 
OGC developed a flexible method of upward referral 
of risk. 
Modular and 
Incremental 
Development 
13  OGC must refine and expand on the 
preliminary guidance issued by the major IT 
projects review team. 
Briefing in December 2000 and Central Computer and 
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) Information 
System (IS) Management Handbook. 
 
 
 
Benefit 
Realisation 
16  Treasury should review the systems that 
departments and agencies have in place for 
monitoring benefits realisation. 
Departmental Investment Strategies published 
22/11/00.  
17  The OGC should review the results of 
Post-Implementation Reviews (PIRs) and 
ensure that valuable common information is 
widely available. 
OGC published a questionnaire to enable IT projects to 
feed back the results of PIRs, which are then analysed 
and disseminated. 
18  OGC/CITU to examine additional 
measures and guidance to ensure government 
maximises benefits from IT investment. 
OGC examining results of reviews on IT projects to 
identify guidance, training and relevant procedures. 
Procurement 
and Supplier 
Relationships 
19  OGC should audit existing policy and 
guidance on procurement to produce a set of 
materials for IT. 
Procurement brief published, identifying principle 
sources of guidance during the procurement cycle. 
22  OGC to gather information about 
government’s top 10 IT suppliers. 
Information collated by OGC.  Contractual 
performance data was available from December 2000. 
 
 
 
People and 
Skills 
24  CITU/OGC to develop a technical skills 
framework. 
Skills toolkit published by e-Envoy in July 2000.   
Included in the e-business strategies published by 
Information Age Government Champions (IAGC). 
Departments reported back on skills gaps. 
In November 2000, Office of the e-Envoy (OeE)/OGC 
workshop held to review findings and decide on 
necessary action. 
25 CITU to develop an extension to the Skills 
for the Information Age (SFIA) framework. 
27  The Government must support the co-
ordinated and ongoing assessment of its IS 
skills base and ensure improvements. 
OeE updated e-Business skills Assessment Toolkit and 
Departments advised to re-use toolkit each time they 
review their e-business strategy. 
 
 
 
Learning 
Lessons 
28  The draft peer review process developed 
by this study to be implemented by OGC by 
September 2000. 
Interim set of guidance and support material published.   
PPM and Workbooks on Peer Review and Gateway 
Process available. 
29  Government must establish effective 
permanent mechanisms for obtaining and 
disseminating information about managing 
programmes and projects. 
Centre for Management and Policy Studies will use the 
OGC database as a learning resource in training events. 
30  The Government must construct a system 
for gathering, maintaining and sharing 
information about the progress of projects. 
Handover to OGC of review team database and 
specification in May 2000.   
Questionnaire sent to departments via IAGC in 
September. 
OGC developed database in December 2000. 
Source: Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Progress Report on ‘Successful IT: Modernising 
Government in Action’.  (London, Cabinet Office, 29/12/2000).  http://www.e-
envoy.gov.uk/reports-top/$file/successfulit_menu.htm, downloaded 12th January 2004. 
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Pinder also reported on the remaining 11 recommendations, which required action by 
Government Departments and Agencies, as shown at Table 4.5.  A ‘Schedule of 
Outcomes’ was set up to monitor progress, identifying action points and milestones 
for each of the recommendations, while the SPRITE (Successful Projects in an IT 
Environment) programme was developed to oversee the implementation.20  SPRITE 
consisted of three work streams: business focus and direction; people and resources; 
and tools and techniques.  Between them, they supported ten projects, which were 
considered critical to embedding McCartney’s recommendations into working 
practices and culture.21   
 
Table 4.5. McCartney Recommendations: Outstanding Actions (December 2000) 
Areas of Concern Recommendations 
 
Leadership and 
Responsibility 
4  Professional development events for ministers and senior civil servants will include 
informing them of their role in, and responsibility for, major IT projects and programmes. 
5 All IT-supported change projects or programmes must have a single, named, Senior 
Responsible Owner (SRO). 
 
Project Management 
7 The SRO for a project should remain in place throughout or change only when a distinct 
phase of benefit delivery has been completed. 
8 The SRO of each project must ensure that a formal approach to project management, such as 
Prince 2, is applied 
Modular and Incremental 
Development 
12 Departments and agencies must adopt a modular and/or incremental approach to projects, 
unless there are very strong reasons for not doing so. The approach to be taken must be clearly 
documented. 
 
Benefit Realisation 
14 All major projects or programmes must undertake periodic reviews of proposed benefits 
throughout development and implementation. 
15 A post-implementation review must be undertaken and benefits realised assessed against 
projected benefits outlined in the original business case. 
 
 
Procurement and Supplier 
Relationships 
20 Departments and agencies must ensure that they put in place processes that will actively 
encourage co-operation and open a dialogue between supplier and client. 
21 Part 1: Before contracts are signed, suppliers must have produced a realistic plan, including 
timescales, resources and technology.  
21 Part 2: Guidance for departments on how to evaluate such plans should be developed, 
initially by the Treasury Task Force and then by OGC. 
Cross-Cutting Initiatives 23 Cross-cutting projects and programmes must have a unified, regularly updated business 
case. 
People and Skills 26 The work on Civil Service Reform should explicitly take into account the McCartney study. 
 Source: Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Progress Report on ‘Successful IT: Modernising 
Government in Action’.  (London, Cabinet Office, 29/12/2000).  http://www.e-
envoy.gov.uk/reports-top/$file/successfulit_menu.htm, downloaded 12th January 2004. 
 
By the time Pinder reported, just five months after the Report had been published, the 
majority of departments and agencies had appointed SROs for their high profile 
projects, several departments had appointed programme managers to implement the 
recommendations, Ministers were being kept informed and centres of expertise for 
project and programme management were being set up.22   Government was evidently 
eager for action and determined to demonstrate its faith in McCartney.  At the end of 
his initial progress report, Pinder wrote, “the process of implementing the 
recommendations cannot be allowed to stagnate”.23  He promised diligence in 
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following the progress of the McCartney Report via the annual UK On-Line Report.24  
Ironically, this document appeared only twice, in 2001 and 2002. 
 
The demise of the reporting process muddies the McCartney trail, compounded by 
responsibility moving from the Cabinet Office to the Office of Government 
Commerce (OGC) in 2001.25  An independent office of the Treasury, the OGC was 
established in April 2000 to improve central government procurement processes, 
make e-government a reality and manage individual IT projects.  Responsibility for 
McCartney was thought to align more comfortably with this remit than with the e-
Envoy’s more strategic role of overseeing the UK’s place in the online economy.  
However, this change of ownership did not improve overall governance for its 
implementation.  Neither the Treasury nor the Cabinet Office has the over-arching 
authority or power to direct the actions of other departments.26  This means that they 
cannot intervene with IT projects in individual departments; they can only issue 
guidance, provide advice or attempt to promulgate best practice.27  Therefore, 
McCartney’s recommendations continued to be suggestions rather than demands. 
As part of the new remit, the OGC took responsibility for the SPRITE programme, 
which was formally closed in March 2003 with any remaining work incorporated into 
ongoing OGC programmes.  Responsibility for the McCartney Report was further 
convoluted by the departure of the e-Envoy in 2004, resulting in the reconfiguring and 
re-labelling of his Office as the ‘E-Government Unit’.  Pinder’s replacement was Ian 
Watmore, previously UK Managing Director of the consultancy firm, Accenture, an 
appointment reflecting the Government’s decision to recruit private sector specialists 
to its ranks.28  He later assumed the title of CIO concerned with delivering central 
government IT, narrower than Pinder’s e-Envoy role.  Critical to the progress of the 
McCartney Report, Watmore assumed responsibility for IT finance, working in 
partnership with the OGC to monitor major IT projects in government, to advise on 
major investment decisions and to manage the top-level relationship with strategic 
suppliers to government.29   
Just over a year later, Watmore was appointed Head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
Unit (PMDU), established in 2001 to strengthen the Government's ability to deliver 
key public service priorities.30  In terms of the continued implementation of 
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McCartney’s recommendations, he retained overall management responsibility for the 
incoming CIO, John Suffolk, former Director General of Criminal Justice IT.31  The 
progress of McCartney’s recommendations was diverted and eventually overtaken by 
subsequent initiatives.  However, it had highlighted a number of CSFs for IT project 
management in government and initiated action to address them.  Its legacy is the 
strengthening of top top-level leadership and accountability for IT projects as a result 
of two specific recommendations: that every project should have an SRO and that 
every project should be independently reviewed at critical stages.  These initiatives 
are discussed in greater detail in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 below following a broad 
discussion of the content of the McCartney Report. 
4.2.1.  McCartney: Sections and Recommendations   
The McCartney Report is divided into ten sections, each meriting around five pages of 
text and outlining between three and four recommendations, giving a balanced 
presentation with no section appearing more important than the next.  The first section 
discusses Business Change, making three recommendations to increase the certainty 
of business benefit: two concern improving business development skills and one 
achieving the business objectives of an IT project.  Lack of business competence 
results in uninformed business decisions with business cases being used simply to 
gain investment rather than as living documents monitoring progress towards the 
business goals.  McCartney’s declaration that “overall responsibility for delivering the 
business objectives and benefits…must be invested in a single, responsible and visible 
individual, the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)” led to the second section, 
Leadership and Responsibility, with three recommendations concerning the lack of 
active ownership for IT projects.32  These include the SRO initiative, which is 
discussed in Section 4.2.2 below, and the need to improve competence and capacity in 
this area. 
 
McCartney claimed that “ineffective project management has frequently been a major 
contributing factor in the failure of projects”.33  As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
Civil Service favours skills in policy or operations, which do not readily translate to 
managing complex IT projects.  Recommendations 8 to10, therefore, were concerned 
with ensuring a formal approach to project management: adopting PRINCE 2 
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(PRojects IN Controlled Environments 2) (Recommendation 8); undertaking formal 
project management training (Recommendation 9); and assessing in-house project 
management skills and experience against the perceived difficulty of the project 
(Recommendation 10).  
 
The fourth section, Risk Management, links to both Project Management and 
Business Change: project management should be focused on business change and any 
perceived risks to achieving that change must be managed.  In the face of a plethora of 
guidelines, the quality of Risk Management across government was considered highly 
variable, suggesting that the guidance might not be fit for purpose.  Recommendation 
11 requires improved methods of problem reporting and upward referral, so giving 
greater clarity, along with the need to enhance skills in this area.   
 
In terms of managing risk, McCartney notes that projects consisting of a series of 
smaller steps are more likely to succeed.  Despite the focus on failure in this study, it 
is recognised that there are numerous successful public sector IT projects but these 
tend to be smaller, more tightly controlled and with specific targets.34  For example, 
the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) has had several IT-related 
successes, as have many local authorities and some NHS Trusts.35  It is widely 
recognised that IT mega-projects are far more likely to fail and that a high proportion 
of government projects are, by necessity, very large.36  As discussed in Chapter Two, 
this is partly due to the tendency to centralise government services in the UK and 
partly due to political ‘hyperactivism’.  A change in taxes or benefits, for example, is 
likely to involve thousands of new procedures, interacting in unpredictable ways and 
resulting in highly complex, bespoke software.37  In Recommendations 12 and 13, 
McCartney urges the adoption of Modular and Incremental Development, dividing 
complex projects into stages, which can be delivered separately using modular or 
incremental approaches, so introducing greater scalability and flexibility.  
 
The section on Benefit Realisation links back to Business Change, highlighting poor 
systems to track benefits delivery and the lack of central reporting, making it 
impossible for project managers to learn from past projects.  In Recommendations 14-
18, McCartney requires improvements in the measurement and realisation of benefits, 
better processes and the facilitation of knowledge transfer in this area.  He proposes a 
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process termed the Post-Implementation Review (PIR) to check the delivered benefits 
against the benefits outlined in the business case.  However, benefits can only be 
realised with the assistance of the suppliers, discussed in the seventh section, 
Procurement and Supplier Relations.  Recommendations 19 to 22 are aimed at 
improving interactions with IT suppliers: providing clear policy and guidance on IT 
procurement for government agencies and departments; improving communications 
with suppliers; ensuring that suppliers have realistic project plans and that government 
has the capability to assess their viability; and, finally, providing intelligence on the 
top ten suppliers of IT to government by volume and value of business.   
 
Complex IT projects in the public sector often cut across many different agencies, 
making leadership difficult.  The failed Benefits Card Project, for example, was led by 
two organisations, the Department of Social Security (DSS) and the Post Office, each 
with their own distinct aims.38  Even when a single organisation is involved, public 
sector projects have inherently more complex criteria for success than those in the 
commercial sector, which tend to be judged by return on investment.  Obligations to 
provide a universal service and political desires to maintain employment can conflict 
with a project’s original business case.  McCartney recognises these issues in Section 
Eight, Cross Cutting Initiatives.  Recommendation 23 states the need for a unified, 
regularly updated business case monitored by an SRO and with clear allocation of 
responsibility. 
 
The Report then highlights skills shortages in section nine, People and Skills.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, there was an identifiable community of IT professionals in 
the public sector in the 1980s with a recognised career path, training opportunities and 
promotion possibilities.39  With the outsourcing agenda of the 1990s, this community 
was lost, making it difficult for government to compete with private sector salaries in 
order to attract IT professionals back into the public sector.40  The skills listed in the 
McCartney report are taken from a study conducted by Feeny and Willcocks, which 
identifies nine core clusters that an organisation must retain internally: 
 
1. Leadership; 
2. Business systems thinking; 
3. Relationship building; 
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4. Architecture planning; 
5. Making technology work; 
6. Informed buying; 
7. Contract facilitation; 
8. Contract monitoring; and 
9. Vendor development.41 
 
Recommendations 24 to 27 are about providing the competence and capacity to 
deliver major IT-enabled projects.  The final section, Learning Lessons, is again about 
improving performance through enhanced development and skills.  Recommendations 
29 and 30 concern “the need for mechanisms to ensure that best practice and good 
advice are readily available and easy to use”.42  Recommendation 28 suggests the 
draft peer review process, which later became the Gateway Review Process, discussed 
below, along with the other key initiative, the establishment of the SRO role.   
4.2.2.  Senior Responsible Owners 
McCartney highlighted that civil servants are inexperienced at running IT projects 
and, related to this, that there is no senior figure capable of taking control when a 
project goes awry.  To this end, Recommendations 4 to 7 consider the lack of active 
ownership by senior management.43  To overcome this problem, McCartney identified 
the need for an SRO as the business sponsor of the project, a critical role used in the 
project management methodology, PRINCE 2.  In order to ensure that objectives are 
met and benefits delivered, the SRO needs to stay in post throughout the project or to 
move only at a sensible point in its lifecycle.  The role of the SRO is identified as 
oversight of the project brief and business case; ensuring that there is a coherent 
project  organisation structure and logical plan; controlling the progress of the project 
at the strategic level; closing the project, ensuring that the lessons are documented and 
that there is a post-implementation review. 44  Finally, the SRO should refer serious 
problems to top management and/or ministers.45 
All projects now have senior level ownership.  However, in 2005, John Higgins, 
Director General of the IT trade association, Intellect, noted that: “the Senior 
Responsible Owner has to be someone who has responsibility for operational 
objectives, it can't just be the IT director."46  The SRO should have the right skill set 
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and personality to represent the service benefits of the project.47  In 2007, Tony 
Collins, then Computer Weekly’s commentator on public sector IT projects, reviewed 
the creation of this role as “a corrective to flawed custom”.48  However, like Higgins, 
he questioned some of the appointments, noting the tendency to appoint civil servants 
who were due to leave or retire before project completion; to appoint multiple 
responsible owners; or to give responsibility for a mission critical or high risk project 
to someone in their first SRO role.49  His comments suggest a continued lack of 
understanding of the importance of this role.  However, in May 2010, the newly 
elected Coalition Government reinforced the role and, in particular, the need to keep 
the SRO in post for the life of the project.50  
4.2.3. Gateway Reviews 
 
Recommendation 28 made the OGC responsible for implementing a peer review 
process, considered by some to be the most effective of McCartney’s initiatives.  
Based on an idea borrowed from the oil industry, the Gateway Review process was 
introduced in February 2001 to ensure the continued viability of projects by 
scrutinising them at six key Gateways, as shown at Fig. 4.2.  Participation in this 
process is based on the perceived risk of the project, rather than the cost, which is 
tested against the OGC’s Project Profile Model (PPM).51  The quality of the 
subsequent review depends on the independent review team, three to five people with 
a minimum of five years experience of managing £100 million projects.52  The 
Review takes three to five days, awarding projects either a red, amber or green colour 
code: red requires remedial action; amber allows a project to go forward with actions 
required; and green indicates that it is on target, although it may still receive 
recommendations.   
 
There is much anecdotal evidence of the benefits that this process brings but it is 
difficult to find supporting figures.  The NAO reported in Improving IT Procurement 
that 440 Gateway Reviews had been conducted on 254 projects between February 
2001 and March 2004 with three quarters of the Departments rating them as either 
useful or very useful.53  Of the projects reviewed at this time, 28% were in the red 
category, 50% were amber and only 22% were green.54  However, 30% had bypassed  
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Figure 4.2. The Gateway Review Process 
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Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Government IT Projects, 
Report 200, (London, HMSO, 2003), page 19. 
 
the first two Gateway Reviews and entered the process after the business case had 
been prepared.55   
 
The SRO and the project team are responsible for enacting the recommendations of a 
Review, although they are not compulsory.  In 2006, it was reported that eight 
projects had received two successive red gates since April 2003.56  In this instance, 
the only action available to the OGC is to inform the Prime Minister.  In 2005, the 
PAC published The Impact of OGC Initiatives on the Delivery of Major IT-Enabled 
Projects, recommending that the Treasury should withhold funds from IT projects 
where departments consistently ignore the Gateway process and increase their risk of 
failure.57  This action has not been taken and it is likely that a project in difficulty 
requires a very different kind of intervention.   
 
Gateway Reviews are conducted on a confidential basis to encourage an open and 
honest process; very often, even the suppliers are excluded from the results.58  There 
is also no requirement for Parliament to be given timely or accurate information on IT 
projects.59  The OGC collates the results of the Gateway Reviews, identifying trends 
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and lessons but these analyses are not published.  In 2004, the NAO reported that the 
common issues raised in Gateway Reviews have remained broadly similar since their 
inception: the need for involvement of key stakeholders; the clearer identification of 
the roles and responsibilities of departments and suppliers in the governance of IT-
enabled projects; improved development of business cases, particularly scope and 
content; better risk management; and improved skills and resources, including 
resource planning, succession planning, and the quantity and quality of suitably 
skilled staff.60 
 
There has been a great deal of pressure from MPs, the Press and the public to release 
the findings of the Gateway Reviews.  Following a Freedom of Information (FoI) 
request in 2005, the OGC was forced to publish details of its ten most at risk IT 
projects, although they were not named.61  In addition to the eight revealed by the 
NAO in 2004, they had all received consecutive red lights.62  Then, in 2009 after a 
four-year appeal under FoI, the OGC was forced to publish two early Gateway 
Reviews on the Identity Card Project.63  Later that year, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office ordered the publication of Gateway Reviews for several 
multi-billion pound government IT projects, believing that the ‘public interest 
disclosure’ outweighs the benefit of keeping the information out of the public 
domain.64  
 
4.2.4.  McCartney: A Report with No Teeth? 
 
There is no doubt that the McCartney Report was authoritative.  Based on sound work 
by experienced IT professionals, it contained many important elements of best 
practice but has not prevented flawed IT projects.  Audit reports show that projects 
such as the Criminal Records Bureau, the Child Support Agency, Tax Credits, the 
National Programme for IT in the NHS and the National Air Traffic Services have 
repeated mistakes from past project failures.65  The problem is that no penalties are 
imposed on departments and agencies that ignore or disregard McCartney or that are 
seen to repeat the very problems that McCartney highlighted.  Similarly, although the 
OGC has had an important influence on best practice, too many of its 
recommendations are also optional.  There appears to be a lack of governance in 
government.   
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In the US, the IT Management Reform Act (ITMRA, the so-called Clinger-Cohen 
Act) was introduced in 1996 under the Clinton administration.  This legislation was 
designed to reduce the number of IT disasters by forcing adherence to best practice, 
recognising the lack of accountability along with the culture of secrecy and cover-
up.66  All government agencies in the US are required to have a CIO, who reports to 
Congress if their IT Project suffers major deviations from contract or price.  Many 
issues similar to those raised by McCartney are covered by this legislation, such as 
incremental acquisition, purchasing Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) IT rather than 
developing bespoke, and designing and implementing IT management processes that 
maximise value but also take account of risk. 
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act went through the US Senate four years before McCartney 
declared that the UK Government “will not tolerate failure”.67  However, this 
intolerance did not prompt similar legislative action in the UK.  In retrospect, this may 
have been fortuitous.  In many quarters, the Clinger-Cohen Act is considered a failure 
with most criticism surrounding the CIO role.68  In 2010, it was reported that CIOs 
often lack relevant experience and leave too quickly to make a difference; the average 
tenure is two years.69  They do not report to the head of their agency nor do they have 
budgetary authority.70  Relevant and appropriate skills remain an issue.  In 2010, 
fourteen years after its inception, it was reported that government IT managers 
"routinely do not follow even some of the more basic project management 
practices”.71 
 
This question of skills dominates the McCartney Report.  The initial content analysis, 
described in Chapter Three, Section 3.4.1, involved selecting the relevant meaning 
units and then sorting them against the ten themes.  Despite the balanced presentation 
of the themes, this process reveals the emphasis on People and Skills, as shown at 
Figure 4.3, which permeates the discussion of the other nine themes.   For example, 
the discussion of Business Change highlights the lack of business development skills; 
Leadership and Responsibility talks about professional development; Project  
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Figure 4.3. McCartney Report: Content Analysis 
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Management and Risk Management focus on the lack of skills in these areas.  In his 
foreword, McCartney notes, “we still need to improve performance and avoid the 
mistakes of the past”.72  Although the report is usually acclaimed for putting the focus 
on to business change, it is evident that the substance of the Report is the need for 
much higher levels of competence in government and the capacity, in terms of the 
right people in the right numbers, to deliver this competence.  However, Fig 4.3 also 
highlights an emphasis on Procurement and Supplier Relations with government 
needing the skills to manage suppliers but also the need for improved performance 
from the suppliers themselves.  Overall, it is evident that IT projects require 
significant skills and experience on the part of both government and their suppliers if 
they are to be delivered successfully.  How then do the nine subsequent reports 
compare with McCartney and does this theme persist throughout the six years under 
examination?   
 
4.3. Reporting on Failure: Successful IT to Delivering IT-Enabled Change   
 
The McCartney Report opened the floodgates for a number of other reports, published 
by reputable bodies and appearing at the rate of one or two a year.  Like McCartney, 
their purpose was to discover why projects fail and to identify actions to improve the 
chances of success.  Understanding what has worked previously and what has not, as 
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well as identifying residual problems is key to evolving a more effective approach.  
Therefore, in this section, each of the nine selected reports is overviewed in terms of 
provenance, purpose, evidence and content, whilst an analysis is carried out of how it 
compares or contrasts with McCartney in terms of the themes that are tackled.  
  
4.3.1.  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD):  The 
Hidden Threat to E-Government: Avoiding Large Government IT Failures, 2001 
 
The OECD provides a focus for those countries committed to democracy and the 
market economy as a means of supporting sustainable growth.  This report takes an 
international and cross-cultural view, providing an interesting contrast to McCartney’s 
national focus.  It resulted from concerns about the ability of governments around the 
world to manage IT projects, posing a serious threat to the implementation of e-
Government with its potential efficiency savings.  Its overarching message is that:  
 
The general lesson is not that governments should not take any risks; rather, 
governments must identify risk, determine which risks they are willing to take, 
and manage the relevant risk within appropriate governance structures.73 
 
The report is divided into eight themes with one key recommendation for each.  These 
are shown at Table 4.6, along with the highlights of the report, annotated with 
McCartney’s section headings in order to compare and contrast the content.  The 
underpinning evidence was derived from analysis of selected reports together with a 
workshop involving representatives from 17 countries. 
 
The focus on risk in this report sends a very different message to McCartney’s 
insistence on IT-enabled change projects.   It also places far more emphasis on the 
public sector context, seen as making project management more complex, challenging 
and, therefore, more risky.  This issue of context is considered to some extent in 
McCartney (Sections 5, 8 and 9) but is not seen as a major contributory factor to IT 
project failure.  In the first section of the OECD report, three key areas relating to the 
public sector context are discussed, along with a concern that civil servants and 
politicians are held accountable for projects over which they may have had very little 
influence.  The second section, ‘Dolphins, Not Whales’, relates to McCartney’s  
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Table 4.6. OECD: The Hidden Threat to e-Government 
 
Theme and Recommendation 
 
 
Content  
Face Governance Facts 
(Leadership and Responsibility) 
Establish appropriate 
governance structures 
• Policy change can result in major changes in IT. 
• Rapid initiation of legislation makes it difficult to develop and 
implement supporting IT. 
• Public sector standards of accountability and transparency mean 
that failure is likely to be widely publicised. 
Dolphins not Whales 
(Modular and Incremental 
Development) 
Think small 
• Public sector budgeting methods encourage large projects; 
smaller projects are less likely to command the required attention 
during budget negotiations. 
• Large projects are seen as more politically advantageous, 
providing indisputable evidence of political action. 
• Government is very big business due to its customer base and the 
extent of its services, so has to embark on large IT projects.   
Avoid Emerging Technologies 
Use known technologies 
• May enable IT to be implemented without making radical 
changes to business processes.   
• Leading edge technology is more prone to failure: the promise of 
increased benefits brings its own risk.   
• Use well-proven approaches and standard software: COTS rather 
than bespoke.   
• If new technology is unavoidable, then test it before contract 
award in order to identify, assess and manage the associated 
risks.   
Identify and Manage Risks 
(Risk Management) 
Identify and manage risk 
Ensure compliance with best 
practices for project 
management 
• Many governments have well-developed guidelines and practices 
on managing risk but poor compliance.   
• Use independent reviews at key stages of a project.  
Strengthen Leadership and 
Accountability, and Focus on 
Business Change 
(Leadership and Responsibility; 
Business Change) 
Hold business managers 
accountable 
• The IT project as business project.  
• The need for a single senior official with overarching and final 
responsibility.   
• If IT is critical to the public sector, then this must be reflected in 
how it is managed.   
Manage Knowledge and 
Human Resources 
(People and Skills) 
Recruit and retain talent 
Prudently manage knowledge 
• The lack of IT skills in the public sector. 
• The difficulty in recruiting well qualified talent due to lower 
wages, loss of prestige and the mundane duties associated with 
public sector service.   
Manage External Providers 
(Procurement and Supplier 
Relations) 
Establish environments of 
trust with private vendors 
• Outsourcing IT provision may not be the solution to the skills 
deficit as public servants are likely to also lack the skills to 
manage the processes of procurement, development and 
implementation.   
• The different cultures between government and supplier and their 
mutual scepticism about capabilities and honesty.   
Involve End-Users 
(People and Skills) 
Involve end users 
• The impact on people and their jobs requires a comprehensive 
strategy for managing change, communication, consultation and 
participation in order to build ownership and commitment.   
Source: OECD, The Hidden Threat to E-Government: Avoiding Large Government IT Failures, 
OECD Public Management Policy Brief, PUMA Policy Brief No 8, March 2001, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/12/1901677.pdf, downloaded 24th November 2010 
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Modular and Incremental Development theme.  The third section urges the avoidance 
of emerging technologies, which the public sector has a tendency to prefer as they 
promise better solutions and, potentially, more innovative possibilities for business 
change, as discussed in Chapter Two.  This leads to the fourth section, which concerns 
the identification and management of that risk.  The OECD notes that many 
governments have well-developed guidelines and practices but poor compliance, a 
problem also highlighted in the McCartney Report.  Following the McCartney lead, it 
highlights the utility of independent reviews at key stages of a project but only “if 
project management deals promptly and thoroughly with the issues raised”.74   
 
The section entitled ‘Strengthen Leadership and Accountability, and Focus on 
Business Change’ confirms McCartney’s view of the IT project as business project 
and, therefore, the need for a single senior official with overarching and final 
responsibility, McCartney’s SRO.  If IT is critical to the public sector, then this must 
be reflected in how it is managed and failure to do so may be due to the lack of IT 
skills in the public sector, reinforcing McCartney’s view.  This is discussed in 
‘Manage Knowledge and Human Resources’, while the seventh section, ‘Manage 
External Providers’, notes that outsourcing IT provision may not be the solution to the 
skills deficit as public servants also lack the skills to manage the processes of 
procurement, development and implementation.  This creates a so-called ‘asymmetric 
relationship’ between government and the supplier, exacerbated by the different 
cultures and their mutual scepticism about capabilities and honesty.   
 
Another key difference with the McCartney report is the emphasis on the end-user and 
the need for stakeholder management, which is covered in Section Eight, Involve 
End-Users.  By and large, McCartney is focused on the project team and its 
capabilities, while the OECD highlights the wider impact on people and their jobs.   It 
notes the need for a comprehensive strategy for managing change, communication, 
consultation and participation in order to build ownership and commitment.   
 
Overall, the OECD highlights and reinforces many of the themes identified in the 
McCartney Report, demonstrating that these apply internationally and not just in the 
UK.  Its main focus is risk and it urges governments to learn how to manage that risk, 
rather than avoiding it, reinforcing the need for the right competence and capacity 
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within the public sector and underlining McCartney’s concern with People and Skills.  
However, in addition to this, the concern that permeates the OECD Report is the 
public sector context and how that brings an additional layer of complexity, as 
discussed in Chapter One, and how increased complexity brings risk.   
 
4.3.2. Intellect: Getting IT Right for Government, 2002 
 
Intellect represents 1000 companies in the UK IT, Telecommunications and 
Electronics industries.  It published two reports in relation to IT project failure in 2002 
and 2003.  This first is closely linked to the McCartney Report with the purpose of 
presenting the supplier view.  It is the work of a group of key public sector suppliers, 
based on data gathered via a survey and 30 relevant publications.  It covers three key 
areas: managing business change programmes, the government context and making 
government projects successful.   
 
The discussion concerning the management of business change reinforces 
McCartney’s headline message and argues for a shift in focus from technology to the 
wider government organisation and its need for better services, improved efficiency 
and the implementation of policy.  Projects need to be embedded in their 
organisations, receiving support from all levels and involving everyone affected by 
them.  In terms of the government context, the report calls for mandatory adoption of 
best practice, pointing to the plethora of excellent guidelines and procedures covering 
every aspect of IT procurement.  This is supported by a list of lessons learned 
provided by the suppliers, derived from a wide range of projects.  They highlight the 
need for project planning, identification of risks, managing the contract, an improved 
supplier attitude, controlling change, improving supplier relationships, managing the 
project team, testing and acceptance, improved project design and strategies for user 
involvement.   
 
This report pays particular attention to the contract, including the need for an 
accurately specified contract requirement capable of anticipating change and 
managing change.  In large projects, this is linked to the need for a partnering 
relationship with the contractor, which means working closely together, good 
communications and the ability to share both risks and reward.  The report also notes 
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the link between stakeholder involvement and an empowered champion at senior level 
showing leadership and commitment.  Change needs to be controlled with the 
business focused on realistic user expectations.  If users are involved throughout the 
project with clear communication between users, customer and supplier, then system 
acceptance is more likely.   
 
The lack of project management skills in government impacts negatively on business 
change programmes.  The project team must be competent, professional and stable 
with relevant experience of appropriate tools and methodologies.  The report 
highlights the need to acquire these skills and to create a career path for experienced 
specialists.  In addition, the team needs a sound motivation to succeed and needs to be 
led by a strong, experienced project manager who appreciates the business drivers and 
has the right level of authority.  In line with McCartney, the report suggests the need 
for gateway reviews but only if they have the right level of governance.  Major 
projects should be split into stages with each delivering value.  Ideally, a core 
capability should be delivered first, providing the foundation for other business 
functionality.  This modular approach should be matched by an incremental payment 
scheme agreed by both parties.  However, the report acknowledges that it is 
sometimes cheaper to go for COTS and to redesign business processes to suit.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this study and picking up on the work of the OECD, 
the third chapter of this report discusses the uniqueness of the public sector business 
environment, producing the list shown at Table 4.7, reproduced from Chapter Two.  It 
notes that responsibility, accountability and authority for government projects is often 
split between individuals and groups, making strong leadership difficult and creating a 
culture where the emphasis is on avoiding blame if things go wrong, rather than 
getting things right.  IT suppliers need to recognise the constraints and drivers of the 
civil service. In turn, government should adapt its culture and processes if they are 
creating barriers.  The report points to a culture of risk aversion, leading to rigid 
management of suppliers which restricts their ability to bring their full capabilities to 
bear and creates unnecessary tensions, preventing openness.  In turn, IT suppliers can 
be over-optimistic in planning major programmes and may have false expectations.   
The report calls for the negative perceptions between government and industry to be 
broken down.  
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Table 4.7. Private and Public Sector Projects Compared 
 
Successful Private Sector Projects 
 
 
Successful Public Sector Projects 
Focused on measurable financial and service 
outcomes 
Multiple aims so hard to measure 
Business driven by competition Generally not in competition with other projects 
Often not visible to the public or shareholders Highly visible to the public and the media 
Less constrained by legislation and regulations Constrained by UK and EU legislation 
Open to risk taking Managed in a risk averse culture 
Designed to limit damage when they are in 
difficulty 
Difficult to adapt to change because of scale and 
complexity 
 Likely to interact with other departments 
Source: Intellect, Getting IT Right for Government, (London, HMSO, 2000). 
 
In comparison with McCartney and the OECD, there are different emphases here but 
also some similarities.  Intellect puts more emphasis on the supplier relationship and 
the different cultures between private and public sector.  Again, the view is much 
wider than McCartney’s, looking at the organisational factors and beyond, not just at 
the project.  However, it reinforces all of McCartney’s section headings and expands 
on many of his ideas. 
 
4.3.3. Office of Government Commerce (OGC): Common Causes of Project 
Failure, 2002 
 
Rather than being specifically about IT project management, this is a general report 
on project management in government.  As such, it technically breaks the rules for 
inclusion in this study.  However, it was published by the OGC, which had taken over 
responsibility for McCartney’s recommendations in 2001.  It identifies the common 
causes of project failure, which had ostensibly been done by McCartney two years 
previously, and then links them to key questions for project managers and SROs, 
designed to test the viability of their projects.  It is, therefore, an important document. 
There is no explanation of the derivation of the eight common causes identified but 
given that they were agreed with the NAO, it is likely that they are based on the 
findings of the many NAO reports on project failure.  They are shown at Table 4.8 
with the associated questions, both linked to McCartney’s themes in order to aid 
analysis.  The report highlights the importance of not only delivering business benefits 
but also aligning those benefits across other related projects  (Cross Cutting 
Initiatives) to create greater consistency and coherence.  
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Table 4.8. OGC: Common Causes of Project Failure 
1. Lack of clear links between the project and 
the organisation’s key strategic priorities, 
including agreed measures of success  
 
     (Benefits Realisation) 
Do we know how the priority of this project compares and aligns with our other delivery and operational activities? 
(Cross-Cutting Initiatives) 
Have we defined the CSFs for the project? (Benefits Realisation) 
Have the CSFs been agreed with suppliers and key stakeholders? (Benefits Realisation/Procurement and Supplier 
Relations/Leadership and Responsibility) 
Do we have a clear project plan that covers the full period of the planned delivery and all business change required, and 
indicates the means of benefits realisation? (Project Management/Business Change/Benefits Realisation) 
Is the project founded upon realistic timescales, taking account of statutory lead times, and showing critical dependencies 
such that any delays can be handled? (Project Management) 
Are the lessons learned from relevant projects being applied? (Learning Lessons) 
Has an analysis been undertaken of the effects of any slippage in time, cost, scope or quality? (Project Management; Risk 
Management) 
2. Lack of clear senior management and 
Ministerial ownership and leadership  
 
     (Leadership and Responsibility) 
Does the project management team have a clear view of the interdependencies between projects, the benefits and the 
criteria against which success will be judged? (Cross-Cutting Initiatives/Benefits Realisation) 
If the project traverses organisational boundaries, are there clear governance arrangements to ensure sustainable 
alignment with the business objectives of all organisations involved? (Cross-Cutting Initiatives/Leadership and 
Responsibility/Benefits Realisation) 
Are all proposed commitments and announcements first checked for delivery implications? (Leadership and 
Responsibility) 
Are decisions taken early, decisively and adhered to, in order to facilitate successful delivery? (Leadership and 
Responsibility) 
Does the project have the necessary approval to proceed from its nominated Minister either directly or through delegated 
authority to a designated Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)? (Leadership and Responsibility) 
Does the SRO have the ability, responsibility and authority to ensure that the business change and business benefits are 
delivered? ) (Leadership and Responsibility/Business Change/ Benefits Realisation) 
Does the SRO have a suitable track record of delivery? Where necessary, is this being optimised through training? 
(Leadership and Responsibility/People and Skills) 
3. Lack of effective engagement with 
stakeholders  
 
(People and Skills) 
Have we identified the right stakeholders? (People and Skills) 
Have we, as intelligent customers, identified the rationale for doing so (e.g. the why, the what, 
the who, the where, the when and the how)? (People and Skills) 
Have we secured a common understanding and agreement of stakeholder requirements? (Project Management) 
Does the business case take account of the views of all stakeholders including users? (People and Skills/Benefits 
Realisation) 
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Do we understand how we will manage stakeholders (e.g. ensure buy-in, overcome resistance to change, allocate risk to 
the party best able to manage it)? (People and Skills; Risk Management) 
Has sufficient account been taken of the subsisting organisational culture? (People and Skills/Business Change) 
Whilst ensuring that there is clear accountability, how can we resolve any conflicting priorities? (Leadership and 
Responsibility/Project Management) 
4. Lack of skills and proven approach to 
project management and risk management  
 
(Project Management/Risk Management) 
Is there a skilled and experienced project team with clearly defined roles and responsibilities? If not, is there access to 
expertise, which can benefit those fulfilling the requisite roles? (Project Management/People and Skills) 
Are the major risks identified, weighted and treated by the SRO, the Director and Project Manager and/or project team? 
(Leadership and Responsibility/Risk Management) 
Has sufficient resourcing, financial and otherwise, been allocated to the project, including an allowance for risk? (Project 
Management/Risk Management) 
Do we have adequate approaches for estimating, monitoring and controlling the total expenditure on projects? (Project 
Management) 
 Do we have effective systems for measuring and tracking the realisation of benefits in the business case? (Project 
Management/Benefits Realisation) 
Are the governance arrangements robust enough to ensure that "bad news" is not filtered out of progress reports to senior 
managers? (Leadership and Responsibility/Risk Management) 
If external consultants are used, are they accountable and committed to help ensure successful and timely delivery? 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
5.  Too little attention to breaking development 
and implementation into manageable steps  
 
(Modular and Incremental Development) 
Has the approach been tested to ensure it is not 'big-bang' (e.g. in IT-enabled projects)? (Modular and Incremental 
Development) 
Has sufficient time been built-in to allow for planning applications in Property & Construction projects for example? 
Have we done our best to keep delivery timescales short so that change during development is avoided? (Project 
Management/Risk Management) 
Have enough review points been built-in so that the project can be stopped, if changing circumstances mean that the 
business benefits are no longer achievable or no longer represent Value for Money (VfM)? (Project Management) 
Is there a business continuity plan in the event of the project delivering late or failing to deliver at all? (Risk Management) 
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5. Evaluation of proposals driven by initial 
price rather than long-term VfM (especially 
securing delivery of business benefits)  
 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Is the evaluation based on whole-life VfM, taking account of capital, maintenance and service costs? (Project 
Management) 
Do we have a proposed evaluation approach that allows us to balance financial factors against quality and security of 
delivery? (Benefits Realisation/Risk Management) 
Does the evaluation approach take account of business criticality and affordability? (Benefits Realisation/Risk 
Management) 
Is the evaluation approach business driven? (Benefits Realisation) 
6. Lack of understanding of, and contact with 
the supply industry at senior levels in the 
organisation  
 
(Procurement and Supplier 
Relations/Leadership and Responsibility) 
Have we tested that the supply industry understands our approach and agrees that it is achievable? (Procurement and 
Supplier Relations) 
Have we asked suppliers to state any assumptions they are making against their proposals? (Procurement and Supplier 
Relations) 
Have we checked that the project will attract sufficient competitive interest? Are senior management sufficiently engaged 
with the industry to be able to assess supply-side risks? (Procurement and Supplier Relations/Leadership and 
Responsibility/Risk Management) 
Do we have a clear strategy for engaging with the industry or are we making sourcing decisions on a piecemeal basis? 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Are the processes in place to ensure that all parties have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and a 
shared understanding of desired outcomes, key terms and deadlines? (Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Do we understand the dynamics of industry to determine whether our acquisition requirements can be met, given 
potentially competing pressures in other sectors of the economy? (Procurement and Supplier Relations; People and 
Skills) 
7. Lack of effective project team integration 
between clients, the supplier team and the 
supply chain  
 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Has a market evaluation been undertaken to test market responsiveness to the requirements being sought? (Procurement 
and Supplier Relations) 
Are the procurement routes that allow integration of the project team being used? (Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Is there early supplier involvement to help determine and validate what outputs and outcomes are sought for the project? 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations/Benefits Realisation) 
Has a shared risk register been established? (Procurement and Supplier Relations/Risk Management) 
Have arrangements for sharing efficiency gains throughout the supply team been established? (Procurement and Supplier 
Relations) 
Source: Author 
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The resulting questions focus on the process for doing this along with the competence 
and capacity of the project team, asking about some of the basic skills of project 
management, such as setting and agreeing the CSFs, having a clear and realistic plan 
that delivers the desired benefits and being aware of how to counteract any constraints 
in terms of time, cost or scope.  The second cause of failure looks at Leadership and 
Responsibility, again picking up on Cross Cutting Initiatives and Benefits Realisation.  
The questions consider the interdependencies between projects and benefits, but also 
the clarity and perception of the CSFs, governance arrangements for cross-cutting 
initiatives, decision making, approval for projects from senior personnel and the 
inevitable requirement for skills.  The basic steps of stakeholder management are 
detailed: identifying, engaging and managing the stakeholders, having a clear 
rationale for the project, capturing requirements and taking organisational culture into 
account.  This was discussed explicitly in the OECD report but only implicitly in 
McCartney.   
 
However, there is clear reflection of McCartney’s sections on Project Management 
and Risk Management.  The questions concern the competence and capacity of the 
commissioning organisation but also of any external consultants, highlighting the 
need for risk and project management processes, including governance arrangements, 
and the requirement for sufficient resources, budget control and benefits certainty.  
McCartney’s comments on the scalability and flexibility of projects are also picked 
up, identifying the need to work in manageable steps, reinforced with questions about 
keeping delivery timescales short, having sufficient review points and a business 
continuity plan.   
 
The sixth cause of failure is Procurement and Supplier Relations although the focus of 
this section is Value for Money (VfM), which is not a high profile area in the 
McCartney report.  The project should offer the optimum economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency in using the required resources to ensure delivery.  The questions concern 
Project Management, Risk Management and Benefits Realisation, the consideration of 
the whole-life VfM of the project, the requirement for a means to balance financial 
factors against quality and security of delivery, and the need for a business driven 
evaluation.  Suppliers need to understand the project approach being adopted in order 
to critique it.  There also has to be sufficient competitive interest.  Senior management 
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on both the supply and demand side need to be engaged and there should be a clear 
strategy for engaging with industry.  Both client and supplier need to understand their 
roles and responsibilities as well as sharing understanding of the desired outcomes.  
Finally, the contractor should consider whether the acquisition requirements are 
realistic.  The focus in this final section remains the relationship between supplier and 
contractor, again clearly picking up on one of McCartney’s sections.  The questions 
are about market evaluations, early supplier involvement, shared risk registers and 
shared efficiency gains. 
 
Following the list of causes and questions in the Report is a note that projects should 
not be allowed to proceed if the answers to any of these questions are unsatisfactory, 
endorsing McCartney’s Leadership and Responsibility theme.  The emphasis in this 
report is shared between Procurement and Supplier Relations, Benefits Realisation, 
Leadership and Responsibility, Risk Management and Project Management.  Overall, 
it a useful aide memoire for some of the McCartney themes for those involved in a 
public sector IT project but also picks up more clearly on other key issues, such as 
stakeholder management and VfM. 
 
4.3.4. Intellect: IT Supplier Code of Best Practice, 2003 
 
Intellect’s 2003 report encourages a more mature acquisition and delivery 
environment to give the customer a greater certainty of success and better value, and 
the supplier a more successful and sustainable business for a fair rate of return.  It sets 
out best practice to improve the professionalism of suppliers as defined by the Senior 
IT Forum, a joint initiative between OGC and Intellect.  This Forum was set up 
following the publication of the McCartney Report in order to bring together 
managers from both government and industry.75  The basis for this description of best 
practice is vague, apparently based on discussions with key customers and a review of 
suppliers.  However, it reinforces much of the OGC’s guidance and is complementary 
to the Government Procurement Code of Good Practice for Customers and Suppliers, 
produced by OGC, which also sets out core values and behaviour within central 
government’s supply chain.76  The report makes ten commitments, as shown at Table 
4.9, again interpreted using McCartney’s themes, which are emboldened. 
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Table 4.9. Intellect: Supplier Code of Best Practice 
Commitment Theme Commitment Promise 
1.  Customer-Supplier relationship               
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
 
We will strive to build and maintain an effective 
relationship with the Customer, founded on mutual trust 
and openness, with a clear understanding of each 
other’s goals and interests.                                 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
2.  Understanding the requirement                      
(Benefits Realisation) 
We will make every reasonable effort to ensure we 
develop and agree with the Customer a full and robust 
understanding of the requirement and its broader 
business context as a firm foundation for our proposals.  
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
(Benefits Realisation) 
3.  Constructive challenge                            
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
We will be ready to offer constructive challenge 
whenever we believe improvements could usefully be 
made to the shaping or delivery of a programme, with 
the aim of ensuring an improved solution. 
(Project Management) 
(Benefits Realisation) 
4.  Confidence in delivery                                     
(Benefits Realisation) 
We will only bid what we believe we can deliver with a 
high degree of confidence and on business models that 
can be sustained for the planned life of the programme. 
(Benefits Realisation) 
(People and Skills) 
5.  Assumptions and implications                          
(Project Management) 
 
We will declare all relevant assumptions that we make 
during the course of a programme (and make clear their 
implications) in particular those that relate to 
information or services provided by the Customer. 
(Project Management) 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
6.  Programme management                                  
(Project Management) 
We will ensure that all aspects of the programme are 
managed to a high degree of professionalism, using an 
agreed methodology and, wherever appropriate, with a 
clear focus on the delivery of business benefits. 
(Project Management) 
(Benefits Realisation) 
(People and Skills) 
7.  Risk management                                                    
(Risk Management) 
We will rigorously identify, analyse and manage risks 
and we will seek to agree solutions with the Customer 
that offer the best ownership and risk mitigation 
strategy. 
(Risk Management) 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
8.  Supply chain management                           
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
We will provide sufficient transparency throughout the 
supply chain that subcontractors can shape their 
offerings and manage their work appropriately and the 
Customer has suitable visibility at all levels. 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
9.  Management and deployment of skilled resource 
(People and Skills) 
We will only nominate individuals for specific roles or 
as team members whom we judge to have the necessary 
authority, skills and experience and are expected to be 
available. Their contribution to Customer satisfaction 
and successful programme delivery will be encouraged 
and recognised. 
(People and Skills) 
10.  Individual skills and professionalism                   
(People and Skills) 
We will encourage our staff to acquire and maintain 
appropriate professional standards and individual 
competencies. We will work towards a common and 
agreed framework for specific roles and associated 
competencies. 
(People and Skills) 
Source: Intellect, IT Supplier Code of Best Practice, (London, Intellect, 2003), page 5. 
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During the acquisition phase, suppliers are expected to show customers how they 
would put these ten commitments into practice, although they have no contractual or 
legal status.  Suppliers are simply ‘invited’ to adopt the Code.  It is also noted that the 
Code will be updated as procurement trends evolve, but there is no evidence of this 
having happened to date.  The report emphasises the need for a shared understanding 
between supplier and contractor, again reinforcing McCartney’s view.  It encourages 
openness and communication in order to achieve this understanding, along with the 
need for strong leadership on both the supplier and the contractor side.  The role of 
SRIE (Senior Responsible Industry Executive) is established to work alongside the 
SRO, delivering the requisite authority and top-level support.  Skills, authority and 
experience are also important here in terms of project and programme management, 
risk management and in understanding the benefits that are deliverable. 
 
4.3.5. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST): Government IT 
Projects, 2003 
 
Working on behalf of both Houses of Parliament, POST carries out independent and 
apolitical examinations of public policy issues related to science and technology.  This 
particular report analyses why some government IT projects fail, the measures put 
into place to tackle the identified problems and the effectiveness of those measures.  It 
divides its findings into three areas: government issues, technology issues and project 
issues.  Therefore, unlike McCartney but aligned with the OECD, it places a great 
deal of emphasis on the public sector context and its effect on projects.  Government 
issues are identified as accountability, publicity and the political environment, not 
dissimilar to the OECD report.  The public sector is contrasted with the private sector, 
particularly in terms of public scrutiny by bodies such as the NAO and the PAC, 
which, it suggests, can lead to a risk-averse culture.  Government projects are often 
announced early, without full consideration of the delivery implications.  Policy can 
alter rapidly leading to IT changes, while relevant legislation may not be passed by 
Parliament until just before implementation, creating the potential for last minute 
changes to requirements.   
 
In terms of technology issues, rapidly changing technology, user requirements, 
complexity, oversight, interoperability and limited skills are identified.  The lack of 
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skills, a recurring theme throughout these reports, results in an inability to scrutinise 
the supplier’s offerings.  The rate of technology change may result in projects being 
obsolete before they start, despite the tendency to prefer leading edge technology, 
which is, by necessity, bespoke and so carries greater risk than COTS.  User 
requirements are often not clear at the start and the simplest of changes may have 
fundamental effects on time, cost and the system.  The complexity of a project may 
not be obvious until after it has started.  Skill is required to manage that complexity 
and the associated risk, while it is difficult for non-technical management to judge the 
quality or completeness of software between award of contract and delivery.  IT 
projects are likely to interface with other systems, which may also be changing.  
Therefore, interaction is often a major issue.  Finally, the section on project issues 
concerns the need for: a business case to ensure projects deliver benefits; leadership 
and senior management commitment; the involvement of users at all stages of the 
project; good relationships between government and suppliers; and effective project 
management and risk management.   
 
Overall, this report reiterates McCartney’s call for IT-enabled change with the 
business case a critical tool in changing this focus.  Following McCartney’s lead, it 
highlights the need for senior management and Ministers to show leadership and 
commitment.  However, unlike McCartney, it goes on to emphasise the users in terms 
of determining their initial requirements, building their ownership to reduce resistance 
to change and ensuring that they receive adequate training in the use of the finished 
product.  As in the McCartney Report, competence and capacity are key features.  To 
be an intelligent client, government requires the skills to manage suppliers.  Project 
management also requires skills.  The POST report confirms McCartney’s modular 
and incremental view but notes that departments often have very large systems, which 
may need to be redeveloped at short notice due to policy changes.  It also reinforces 
the OECD view that funding might be more readily available for large, high profile 
projects.  Finally, it identifies a range of initiatives that stem from the McCartney 
report, although this is not made explicit: the Gateway Reviews, the SRO, the Senior 
IT Forum, the Programme and Project Management specialism and Centres of 
Excellence.  At the time of publication, it was noted that it was still too soon to 
measure the effect of these initiatives; the test would be the outcome of the large-scale 
IT projects initiated around that time, which included DII. 
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4.3.6.  House of Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions: Department 
for Work and Pensions Management of Information Technology Projects: Making 
IT Deliver for DWP Customers, 2004 
 
In 2004, the Select Committee on Work and Pensions published its substantial report 
on IT failure based on an examination of the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP), which was undertaking a massive modernisation programme dependent on 
IT.  The aim of this report was, therefore, to examine the DWP’s management of 
previous IT projects.  At the time, it had some of the largest IT systems in the world: 
35 major systems for 26 million customers.77  The two part inquiry was launched in 
November 2003 to examine the principles of best practice in the areas of procurement 
and administration of IT projects in the public sector and, secondly, to undertake a 
case study of the Child Support Agency (CSA).  While the focus was on issues 
internal to DWP, this report is recognised as being one of the most detailed and 
penetrating to emerge during this period with 36 recommendations, many of a general 
nature and many picking up on the issues identified by McCartney four years 
previously.78  The key findings are that the vast amount of information on best 
practice results in only patchy compliance and that, while the OGC has had an 
influence on best practice, its recommendations are optional and it needs greater 
powers of enforcement.  Overall, there was an identified need to improve the 
accountability and transparency of government.  With the necessary standards and 
methodologies already in the public domain, the issue is compliance.  According to 
the Select Committee, greater openness will improve the success rate and it joined the 
calls for publication of the Gateway Reviews along with business cases and 
independent audits.   
 
The first part of the report introduces the issues surrounding IT project failure then, in 
Section 2, it goes on to consider best practice, highlighting the need to simplify policy 
to enable easier implementation; avoid unrealistic deadlines and engage in early 
discussions to avoid unworkable projects; to staff and manage the cultural changes 
needed to introduce new ways of working; to use COTS; to break large IT changes 
into a number of smaller projects; and to have strong contingency planning for when 
things go wrong, including abandoning failing projects.  It echoes the OECD and 
POST reports in the first two areas by identifying factors specific to the public sector 
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but goes on to reinforce McCartney’s emphasis on better relations with suppliers to 
encourage more constructive discussion, staffing and change management issues, 
COTS, modular and incremental change, and improved risk management.  There is 
more emphasis on managing change than in the McCartney Report: simply imposing 
a system on end users greatly increases the risk of failure.   
 
In Section 3, the report considers DWP and Suppliers, reinforcing McCartney’s focus 
on Procurement and Supplier Relations.  Much of this discussion is focused on the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which was quietly dropped as a procurement solution 
for IT in July 2003 because it was deemed difficult to express long term IT 
requirements in a contract as technology changes rapidly and as IT is closely linked to 
operational needs.  It is also difficult to substitute suppliers if a contractor fails to 
meet obligations, particularly given the limited IT marketplace for government.  
Finally, the life of a PFI IT contract is relatively short (around 10 years) but even 
during this period the contractor has to replace assets.79  However, the report goes on 
to discuss the need for greater competition in the market place for government IT 
projects as there are very few suppliers and, in the case of DWP, one is dominant, 
EDS (now HP).80 The second largest IT supplier in the world, EDS held 54% of the 
central government IT market at that time.81  The report notes that government 
procurement processes discourage smaller suppliers from bidding.   
 
Section 4 highlights Possible Ways of Improving Success.  It begins by noting the 
lack of adherence to known best practice and the fact that so little of the guidance is 
obligatory, although it does highlight the six mandatory actions agreed by the Cabinet 
Office in 2003.  This refers to DAO(GEN)01/03, which was a letter from the Treasury 
Officer of Accounts to departmental Accounting Officers.82  OGC procedures were 
expanded beyond IT projects to all acquisition-based projects and required 
Accounting Officers: to provide assurance that projects do not suffer from the OGC’s 
common causes of failure; to mandate no big bang implementations; to make no 
announcements about IT projects until risk analysis has been undertaken; to prioritise 
all projects as mission critical, highly desirable and desirable; and to appoint a 
responsible Minister, SRO and Project Manager with good, relevant track records for 
each project.  Following on from this notion of mandating, the DWP Report discusses 
the idea of bringing in legislation to force compliance, along the lines of the Clinger-
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Cohen Act, advising the OGC to undertake a review into the likely effect of 
implementing a similar statutory framework here.83  From there, the report moves into 
a detailed examination of the CSA. 
 
4.3.7. National Audit Office (NAO):  Improving IT Procurement, 2004 
 
This report by the NAO was based on its usual rigorous methodology, including a 
literature review, desk research and interviews.  The results of this data collection 
were then tested against five case studies of major IT projects.  The purpose of the 
report was to assess the impact of the OGC’s work in helping departments improve 
their IT procurement.  It makes eight recommendations on how the OGC might make 
further improvements, which are paraphrased at Table 4.10 and assigned McCartney 
themes.  The overarching conclusion, reinforcing the findings of the literature review, 
is that many of the problems of IT projects are not about the technology but about 
understanding the business processes and determining the requirements along with the 
selection and skills of the staff who operate the new arrangements.  Therefore, as 
evidenced by the recommendations, the key themes here, in McCartney terms, are 
People and Skills and Learning Lessons. 
 
The report identifies three essential requirements that need to be in place for projects 
to be successful.  The first is the rigorous challenge and scrutiny of projects at each 
stage in their lifecycle.  The evidence indicates that the Gateway Review process is 
improving the procurement of IT but that projects enter the process too late and exit 
too early.  The second requirement is for highly skilled and capable project managers.  
Awareness and application of best practice needs to be strengthened as lack of skills 
and experience presents a major risk to IT projects.  The final requirement is effective 
engagement with suppliers.  There needs to be a clear understanding of the respective 
positions and sharing of responsibilities, risks and benefits.  The report suggests that 
different procurement routes would diversify the supplier base. However, the 
overarching view of the report is that some of the common causes of failure have been 
successfully tackled but, while the resulting processes are increasing the likelihood of 
success, more remains to be done. 
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Table 4.10. NAO: Improving IT Procurement 
Recommendation McCartney Theme 
1.  Regular and sustained engagement of 
departmental and agency boards with the Gateway 
Review process and the performance of their 
projects and programmes should be routine 
agenda items 
Learning Lessons 
2.  Create a strategy to change the behaviour of 
departments and agencies, based on a clear 
understanding of clients’ needs, experience and 
capabilities 
People and Skills 
3.  Evaluate, monitor and assess the impact of 
other activities, such as Centres of Excellence and 
the Successful Delivery Skills Programme 
People and Skills 
4.  Centres of Excellence should provide advice to 
SROs on best practice guidance relevant to their 
Gateway Review recommendations 
Learning Lessons 
5.  Departments should ensure that their Centres 
of Excellence should align their tools and 
guidance with those of the OGC and disseminate 
these to project teams 
People and Skills 
6.  Departments need to set in place arrangements 
to develop a cadre of experienced programme and 
project managers 
People and Skills 
7.  The OGC, departments and agencies need to 
work together to ensure that initiatives result in a 
step change in the management of major IT-
enabled projects 
Learning Lessons 
8.  Department and Agency Boards need to 
exercise clear leadership and commitment to 
make certain guidance is followed, skills are 
developed and maintained, risks properly 
identified and managed and the rigour of the 
Gateway process becomes part of departmental 
thinking 
Leadership and Responsibility 
Source: National Audit Office, Improving IT Procurement, (London, HMSO, 2004) 
 
4.3.8. Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) and the British Computer 
Society (BCS): The Challenges of Complex IT Projects, 2004 
 
In support of the distinction between general projects and IT projects in the literature 
review, this study by the Royal Academy of Engineering and the British Computer 
Society seeks to improve understanding about how complex IT projects differ from 
other engineering projects, with a view to identifying ways to achieve successful 
delivery.  The findings and recommendations are derived from an extensive body of 
evidence, collected in both written and oral form from more than 70 individuals, 
including senior directors, managers, project managers and software engineers from 
the public and private sectors, as well as academic experts.  The report is divided into 
three main sections.  The first addresses possible reasons for failure by comparing the 
principles and practice of software engineering and IT projects with those of other 
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branches of engineering.  The second part provides guidance on best practice for 
people involved in commissioning, designing and managing IT projects. The third 
part summarises the findings and makes seven recommendations, as shown at Table 
4.11. 
 
Table 4.11. RAEng/BCS: The Challenges of Complex IT Projects 
Findings Recommendations 
Professionalism 
It is time for the IT industry to 
recognise collectively the engineering 
content of their work and to embrace 
the discipline and professionalism 
associated with traditional branches of 
engineering 
(People and Skills) 
(a) Customers ensure that all senior IT practitioners involved in 
the design and delivery of high consequence systems have 
attained Chartered status and maintain their technical currency 
through Continuing Professional Development (CPD); 
(b) The OGC, together with the Professional Institutions, assess 
means of enforcing the registration, and maintenance of 
professional competence through CPD, of senior practitioners 
working on high consequence systems; 
(c) The Professional Institutions work together with the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) to promote awareness of the benefits of 
employing IT practitioners with Chartered status and suppliers 
who have adopted the Intellect Code of Best Practice. 
Education 
(People and Skills) 
(a) Intellect take a lead in forming links between companies, 
government departments and universities to promote a greater 
applications focus in undergraduate courses; 
(b) The BCS and Institute of Electrical Engineers (IEE) produce 
a model syllabus or other criteria to apply in assessing and 
accrediting undergraduate courses to encourage a move towards 
courses with a stronger engineering emphasis; 
(c) Management schools ensure that IT is a core module of 
future Masters in Business Administration (MBA) courses. 
Project Management 
(People and Skills) 
(a) Management schools collaborate with computer science and 
engineering departments, as well as the project management 
Professional Bodies, to develop courses which specifically 
address IT project management; 
(b) Management schools ensure that project management is a 
core module of future MBA courses. 
Risk Management 
(Risk Management) 
The RAEng produce guidance to address risks of projects in 
such a form that it can be used for corporate governance in the 
framework provided by the Turnbull Report. 
Systems Architects 
(People and Skills) 
The Professional Bodies work together with the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) to explore ways to 
identify and develop the skills of people with the potential to 
become systems architects. 
UK Software Engineering Institute 
(People and Skills) 
Government, with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
taking the lead, jointly with Industry to establish a UK Software 
Engineering Institute for research, advice and training to 
promote best practice in software engineering and IT project 
management. 
UK Complex IT Systems Research 
Programme 
(People and Skills) 
The DTI and EPSRC establish a UK research programme on 
complex IT systems to address the design, development, 
evolution and assessment of complex, distributed IT systems. 
Source: Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng) and the British Computer Society (BCS): The 
Challenges of Complex IT Projects, (London, BCS, 2004). 
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The reason for the failure to implement best practice is the lack of collective 
professionalism in the IT industry, along with a lack of education and training of both 
customer and supplier staff at all levels, with poor project management, risk 
management and understanding of systems architecture.  The first three 
recommendations concern the need to improve competence and capacity.  In addition, 
there are recommendations about the need for basic research into the design, 
development, evolution and assessment of complex, distributed IT systems.  As would 
be expected from institutions such as these, the emphasis in this report is on People 
and Skills, echoing concerns that appeared in McCartney in 2000 and that have 
appeared consistently in reports ever since. 
 
4.3.9. National Audit Office (NAO):  Delivering Successful IT-Enabled Business 
Change, 2006 
 
The purpose of the NAO’s 2006 report is essentially to identify CSFs.  Based on an 
analysis of 24 case studies from the public and private sectors in the UK and overseas, 
it seeks the factors underlying their success with a view to learning lessons that can be 
transferred to future projects.84  It highlights three key CSFs: the level of engagement 
by senior decision makers of the organisation undertaking the IT project (Leadership 
and Responsibility); the organisation’s understanding of what they need to do to be an 
‘intelligent client’ (People and Skills) and the organisation’s understanding of the 
importance of identifying the benefits of the project at the outset and knowing how to 
manage the project in order to deliver those benefits (Benefits Realisation).85  
 
From these three factors stem nine key questions, shown at Table 4.12, which the 
NAO recommends departments should answer satisfactorily before embarking on an 
IT project.  The NAO states its hope that “this report will assist government 
departments and other public bodies to improve their capacity to bring about 
successful IT-enabled change”.86  This reiterates the emphasis in the other general 
reports on the need for improved competence and capacity, providing the right people 
with the right skills.   
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Table 4.12. Nine Key Questions for Departments Embarking on IT-enabled 
Business Change 
Ensuring Senior Level Engagement 
Question Key success Factor 
Q1: Is the Board able to make informed 
judgements about the department’s capacity to 
manage change? 
(Business Change) 
Mechanisms to prioritise the programme and 
project portfolio in line with business objectives 
 
(Business Change) 
Q2: Does the department have in place a decision-
making structure that will ensure strong and 
effective leadership of the IT-enabled business 
change? 
(Leadership and Responsibility) 
A clear decision making structure with agreed 
lines of accountability so that the right decisions 
are made swiftly and in line with business strategy 
 
(Leadership and Responsibility) 
Q3: What incentives exist to drive performance? 
 
 
(Business Change) 
Senior management who demonstrate 
commitment to the change 
(Business Change/Leadership and 
Responsibility) 
Acting as an Intelligent Client 
Question Key success Factor 
Q4: Does the department have the necessary 
programme management skills? 
(Project Management/People and Skills) 
Building capacity and capability 
 
(People and Skills) 
Q5: What is the natural division of duties between 
the Programme and Project Management Centre 
of Excellence and the Chief Information Officer? 
(Leadership and Responsibility) 
Building capacity and capability 
 
 
(People and Skills) 
Q6: How will the department establish and 
promote an open and constructive relationship 
with suppliers? 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Creating constructive relationships with suppliers 
 
 
(Procurement and Supplier Relations) 
Q7: How clear is the department about the 
business process that it is seeking to change or 
develop? 
(Business Change) 
Designing and managing the business change 
 
 
(Business Change) 
Q8: Does the technology exist to deliver the 
change? 
(Risk Management) 
Managing the risks of the IT solution 
 
(Risk Management) 
Realising the Benefits of Change 
Q9: Beyond immediate technical success, how 
will wider benefits be secured? 
 
(Benefits Realisation) 
Selling the benefits to users and winning the 
support of wider stakeholders 
Optimising the benefits 
(Benefits Realisation/People and Skills) 
Source: National Audit Office, Delivering Successful IT Enabled Business Change, HC 33-1, 
Session 2006-2007, (London, HMSO, 2006), pages 15-19. 
 
It is evident from this examination of the ten key reports on government IT project 
failure that appeared between 2000 and 2006 that McCartney’s ten themes have been 
reiterated and confirmed.  However, it also shows the need for greater clarity in terms 
of the expression of these CSFs by trying to succinctly capture the essence of the 
issues identified in these reports.  Before doing this, the discussion turns to the reports 
on infrastructure projects to examine whether these same factors recur or whether 
there are any additional CSFs that are specific to this particular type of project. 
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4.4. Information Infrastructure Projects: the Same Difference? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, there are questions about whether all projects are the 
same or whether there are different types.  According to McFarlan, the size and 
structure of the project can impact on the level of risk confronted. 87  By their nature, 
information infrastructure projects are mega-projects, providing the hardware and 
software that underpins the entire workings of the organisation.  There was no 
mention of CSFs in relation to information infrastructure projects in the literature.  
However, analysis of this area was considered critical to determining whether such 
projects differ from other IT projects and, therefore, whether they have different 
CSFs.  A third level of analysis was undertaken, which was based on secondary data 
derived from reports on infrastructure projects.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the information infrastructure reports were selected on 
the basis of four criteria.  The projects had to be public sector infrastructure projects, 
rather than private sector.  They had to be complex mega-projects comparable to DII 
and to have been carried out by a government auditing body.  Finally, they had to give 
sufficient detail to allow a full analysis.  The five selected reports fell within the same 
timescales as the general IT project reports, although this was not considered 
essential.  The reports are partial and most often undertaken after the event.  However, 
each reflects a particular viewpoint and reveals the essence of the problem as 
perceived by the investigating body (the relevant Audit Office).  These factors were 
considered to be comparable across all the reports.  Therefore, it was not considered 
necessary or practicable to supplement this information with additional research.  The 
main aim was to identify if anything is different about infrastructure projects and their 
CSFs.  The full findings are presented in chronological order at Appendix 4 with a 
short background to each, followed by the aim of the project, a brief chronology and, 
finally, an analysis of the CSFs in each using McCartney’s ten sections as a 
framework.  A shortened version is presented here at Table 4.13.
  4-44 
Table 4.13. Information Infrastructure Projects 
 The Implementation of the 
National Probation Service 
Information Systems 
Strategy (Home Office), 
NAO 2001 
New IT Systems for 
Magistrates’ Courts: the 
Libra Project, NAO 2003 
Delivering Digital 
Tactical 
Communications 
through the Bowman 
Combat Infrastructure 
Programme (CIP) 
(Ministry of Defence), 
NAO 2006 
The National 
Programme for IT in 
the NHS (Department 
of Health), NAO 2006 
Information 
Technology: DoD 
Needs to Ensure that 
Navy Marine Corps 
Intranet Program is 
Meeting Goals and 
Satisfying Customers, 
GAO 2006 
Project Aim To provide a national 
information infrastructure and 
a Case Recording and 
Management System 
(CRAMS) across all of the 
probation services in England 
and Wales. 
To provide a national IT 
infrastructure with links to 
other criminal justice agencies 
and a standard national 
application to support court 
work. 
To improve military 
communications; to 
enable faster planning; 
and to allow 
communication across the 
armed forces. 
To reform information 
use; to improve services 
and the quality of care; 
and to provide direction 
for IT development and 
the use of advanced IT. 
To provide information 
superiority and to foster 
innovative ways of 
operating through an 
interoperable and shared 
network.   
CSFs      
Business Change      
Leadership and 
Responsibility 
 
  
  
Project Management   
 
 
  
Risk Management      
Modular and 
Incremental 
Development 
     
Benefit Realisation      
Procurement and 
Supplier Relations 
  
 
   
Cross-Cutting 
Initiatives 
     
People and Skills      
Learning Lessons      
Source: Author 
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These reports give a single perspective on these projects and scrutiny of the literature 
reveals that different views exist about the extent of success.  For example, the PAC 
queried the “almost universally positive tone” of the NAO report on the NHS’s 
National Programme for IT.88  There were suggestions that criticism appearing in an 
early draft was deleted from the final report.89  A more recent report by the PAC on 
Bowman has been overwhelmingly critical of the entire programme and its 
procurement.90  However, the main aim in scrutinising these reports was to identify 
whether there is anything different about infrastructure projects and it appears from 
the evidence above that there is not.  The issues that were identified clearly fit into 
McCartney’s ten themes, as demonstrated above, and there was nothing that appeared 
to be particular to this type of project.   
 
The themes used to scrutinise all of these reports, both general and infrastructure, 
were derived from the section headings used in McCartney’s original report and the 
issues highlighted fitted these ten themes.  There is evidence of poor project 
management across all five reports.  NPSISS did not embed project management 
methods and they fell into disuse while Libra saw the project requirements changed. 
The Bowman project managers had to cope with complexity and change as well as the 
iron triangle of cost, time and scope, while there were problems with project planning 
in both the National Programme for IT and the NMCI Program.  All five projects 
struggled with Procurement and Supplier Relations and People and Skills.  For 
example, Libra had only one bidder and, therefore, no competitive tension, a point 
highlighted by the OGC in its Common Causes of Project Failure.  Across all 
projects, there were issues with frequent changes in the project team, relevant skills 
and stakeholder engagement.  Business change appears as less of an issue and there is 
little reference to the need to learn lessons.  Overall, however, it is evident that the 
same themes emerge and, more importantly, no different themes are identified. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.1, McCartney’s themes are very general i.e. Project 
Management and Risk Management, but lead to highly specific recommendations.  As 
can be seen from the above discussion of IT projects, there are a number of detailed 
issues that emerge from the above reports.  Therefore, they require further refinement 
in order to capture the essence of the ‘few key areas where things must go right’, so 
  4-46
providing a more meaningful and more useful list of CSFs with which to scrutinise 
the DII Programme.   
 
4.5. Capturing the Essence: CSFs Synthesised 
  
As described above, the themes identified in the fourteen reports were refined through 
an iterative process of relational analysis.  Each of the meaning units for each report 
was categorised according to McCartney’s original themes.  The themes were then 
comparing to the meaning units in order to determine a more exact definition, as 
shown at Table 4.14, repeated from Chapter 3.  For example, one meaning unit  
 
Table 4.14. Content Analysis Process: McCartney Report 
Meaning Unit Theme CSF 
IT has to fit closely with the new 
working practices 
Benefits Realisation Benefits Certainty 
A clear vision of the context in 
which IT is being implemented 
Business Change Benefits Certainty 
Think in terms of change 
management projects rather than IT 
projects 
Business Change Clarity and Perception 
Improve the delivery of the projects 
themselves 
Business Change Complexity Management 
Deliver improvements to the way 
they do business 
Project Management Constraints Certainty 
Take an overall view of the whole 
change process 
Benefits Realisation Benefits Certainty 
Integration (whole change process) 
is a vital, and ongoing, management 
task 
Business Change Complexity Management 
Achieving integration of all the 
aspects of change requires effective 
leadership 
Leadership and Responsibility Consistency and Coherence 
Responsibility for the delivery of a 
project or programme falls to an 
individual 
Leadership and Responsibility Consistency and Coherence 
Good leadership Leadership and Responsibility Competence and Capacity 
Clear responsibility for IT-based 
change programmes and projects 
Leadership and Responsibility 
Clarity and Perception 
A Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) 
and a description of the SRO Role 
Leadership and Responsibility 
Clarity and Perception 
People in place who have the ability 
to deliver 
Leadership and Responsibility Clarity and Perception 
Highly skilled and experienced 
managers are vital to success 
People and Skills Competence and Capacity 
Improve project management across 
Government 
People and Skills Competence and Capacity 
Matching project managers to 
projects 
Project Management Constraints Certainty 
Increasing (project management) 
skills and awareness 
Project Management Competence and Capacity 
Source: Author 
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extracted from the McCartney Report was “Single identified individuals should 
ensure that the project or programme maintains its business focus”.  This was 
categorised under McCartney’s theme of Leadership and Responsibility.  However, 
more precisely, it was seen to concern the clarity of the rationale, scope and scale of 
the project and shared understanding by key stakeholders across the broad 
communities involved.  Therefore, it was categorised as Clarity and Perception.  This 
was then tested against other meaning units in other reports.  For example, in the 
RAEng/BCS Report, the following meaning unit was also seen to fit into this category 
rather than the broader Leadership and Responsibility: “senior management needs to 
attempt to create a receptive context for the project”.  The focus is on general 
understanding about the project and promulgating understanding, rather than specific 
leadership issues.  In the NAO 2006 report, the following was also considered to be 
about Clarity and Perception rather than Leadership and Responsibility: “The level of 
engagement by senior decision makers of the organisations concerned”.  The issue 
was not how much time and effort these senior decision makers put into the project 
but rather the extent to which they understood the project’s purpose and were willing 
to broadcast that understanding across the organisation or context.   
 
Therefore, the aim of this exercise was to build CSFs that encapsulate the activity, 
rather than simply offer a broad theme.  This means that, rather than specifying 
Procurement and Supplier Relations, the aim was to capture the required behaviour 
and skills, as well as the underlying issues.  For example, under this heading, 
McCartney highlights that “Government’s policy is to ensure VfM in procurement 
through competition”, which is concerned with delivering value, rather than relations 
between customer and supplier.  The fact that there are such relations within a project 
context is seen as self-evident, the issue is to identify what needs to be done in terms 
of good performance and to determine how to make things go right.  This process led 
to the identification of twelve CSFs, which are shown below at Table 4.15, along with 
a clear definition. 
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Table 4.15. Identified CSFs 
Affordability 
An assessment of whether proposals can be paid for in terms of resources, cash-flows and funding 
Alternatives Certainty 
Consideration of alternative approaches capable of fulfilling the objectives creates project confidence 
and commitment with the key stakeholders i.e. Do Nothing, Do minimum, Defer, Outsource, 
Consolidate 
Benefits Certainty 
Clear identification and definition of the business need for the project and the required performance 
improvement outcomes along with how these will be managed in terms of measures, owners, targets 
and strategic alignment 
Change Readiness 
The current state of the organisations involved in the project and their perceived ability to absorb, 
adapt to, and assimilate change 
Clarity and Perception 
Clarity of the rationale, scope and scale of the project and shared understanding by key stakeholders 
across broad communities involved 
Competence and Capacity 
The requirement for individuals associated with the project to be able to properly perform specific jobs 
through a combination of knowledge, skills and behaviour, along with the capacity, in terms of the 
availability of the right people with the right skills, to execute and effectively deliver the option 
Complexity Management 
The level of likely risk and the scale, novelty, diversity, interdependency and volatility of a project 
Consistency and Coherence 
Integration of the selected option with established systems, processes and policies 
Constraints Certainty 
An estimate of costs, resource requirements and timescales along with project planning, design and 
implementation 
Scalability and Flexibility 
Consideration of the versatility of a future option and its anticipated survivability in a future and 
unpredictable environment, requiring an understanding of the scalability (both up and down) and of 
the degree of flexibility 
Stakeholder Management 
The systematic identification, analysis and planning of actions to communicate with, negotiate with and 
influence all those who have an interest or role in the project or those who are impacted by the project. 
Value for Money  
The project offers the optimum economy, effectiveness and efficiency in delivering the product along 
with a qualitative and quantitative judgement over the manner in which resources are utilised and 
managed and any reputational risk that has ensued to both public sector and supplier 
Source: Author 
 
These twelve CSFs were derived from McCartney and then examined across all ten 
general project reports to determine the number of times that they appeared and, 
therefore, their weighting or emphasis, as shown at Figure 4.4.  This demonstrates an 
overwhelming emphasis on Competence and Capacity, the need for people who can 
properly perform specific jobs through a combination of knowledge, skills and 
behaviour as well as the need for the right people with the right skills to be available 
in the right numbers.  Second to this is the need to be able to manage complexity, 
assessing the level of likely risk and dealing with the scale, novelty, diversity, 
interdependency and volatility of a project.  Next in importance is Clarity and  
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Figure 4.4: All General IT Reports: CSFs: Weightings 
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Perception, which describes the shared understanding of the rationale, scope and scale 
of the project by key stakeholders across the broad communities involved.  Finally, 
Benefits Certainty also stands out: clear identification and definition of the business 
need for the project and the required performance improvement outcomes along with 
how those will be measured. 
 
How then does this compare with the infrastructure reports?  The same weighting 
process was carried out and is shown at Figure 4.5.  This shows a much greater 
emphasis on Complexity Management but also highlights the need for Constraints 
Certainty, the ability to manage the project in terms of estimating costs, resource 
requirements and timescales using project planning, design and implementation.  
Scalability and Flexibility is also important, whether the project will scale up or down 
and whether it is sufficiently flexible and versatile.  These things are likely to impact 
on its survivability in a future unpredictable environment.  Stakeholder Management 
features highly here too.  This is the need to identify, analyse and plan actions to 
communicate with, negotiate with and influence all those with an interest or role in 
the project or those who are impacted by it.  Further down the weighting scale are 
Affordability, whether the resources, cash flows and funding are available, and  
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Figure 4.5: All Infrastructure Reports: CSFs: Weightings 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Value for Money
Stakeholder Management
Scalability and Flexibility
Constraints Certainty
Consistency and Coherence
Complexity Management
Competence and Capacity
Clarity and Perception
Change Readiness
Benefits Certainty
Alternatives Certainty
Affordability
ID
E
N
TI
FI
E
D
 
CS
Fs
WEIGHTING (OCCURRENCES IN TEXT)
 
Source: Author 
 
Benefits Certainty.  Therefore, while both sets of reports confirm the identified CSFs, 
this analysis shows that they are weighted differently in terms of importance.  This 
suggests that there may be different lessons for different types of project, going some 
way to answering the second of the three subsidiary research questions, which asks 
whether lessons learned have been differentiated by type of project.  This was not 
directly proved in the literature review. 
 
The first subsidiary research question asks whether the lessons learned from previous 
complex IT projects in government are correct and comprehensively considered.  This 
requires a point of comparison, which in this case is the academic literature.  In 
Chapter Two, Fortune and White’s list of CSFs, identified from the generic 
management literature in 2006 was used as a point of comparison for the IT project 
management CSFs.  The two combined is used as a point of comparison for the CSFs 
identified as a result of the content analysis of the ten reports selected for scrutiny.  
This is shown at Table 4.16.  
 
Although there is no read across, there is sufficient evidence of a match between the 
CSFs identified in the selected reports and those identified in the literature.  This 
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Table 4.16. Verifying the Identified CSFs 
 
Literature Review: CSFs 
 
Reports: CSFs 
 
Support from senior management 
 
(Fortune and White: 39 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 26 citations) 
Clarity and Perception 
 
 
Clear realistic objectives 
 
(Fortune and White: 31 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 31 citations) 
Alternatives Certainty 
Benefits Certainty 
Clarity and Perception  
Strong detailed plan kept up-to-date 
 
(Fortune and White: 29 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 11 citations) 
Alternatives Certainty 
Benefits Certainty 
Constraints Certainty 
Good communication/feedback 
 
(Fortune and White: 27 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 10 citations) 
Clarity and Perception 
Stakeholder Management 
User/client involvement 
(Fortune and White: 24 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 32 citations) 
Clarity and Perception 
Stakeholder Management  
Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient staff/team 
 
(Fortune and White: 20 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 25 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
 
Effective change management 
(Fortune and White: 19 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 5 citations) 
Change Readiness 
Competent project manager 
(Fortune and White: 19 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 9 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
 
 
Strong business case/sound basis for project 
(Fortune and White: 16 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 6 citations) 
Benefits Certainty 
Clarity and Perception 
Sufficient/well allocated resources 
(Fortune and White: 16 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 13 citations) 
Affordability 
Value for Money 
Good leadership 
(Fortune and White:15 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 6 citations) 
Clarity and Perception 
Proven/familiar technology 
(Fortune and White: 14 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 15 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
Realistic schedule 
(Fortune and White: 14 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 6 citations) 
Constraints Certainty 
Risks addressed/assessed/managed 
(Fortune and White: 13 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 1 citation) 
Complexity Management 
Project sponsor/champion 
(Fortune and White: 12 citations) 
Clarity and Perception 
Effective monitoring/control 
(Fortune and White:12 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 9 citations) 
Benefits Certainty 
Constraints Certainty 
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Literature Review: CSFs 
 
Reports: CSFs 
 
Adequate budget 
(Fortune and White: 10 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 8 citations) 
Affordability 
Organisational adaptation/culture/structure 
(Fortune and White: 10 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 19 citations) 
Change Readiness 
Consistency and Coherence  
Scalability and Flexibility 
Good performance by 
suppliers/contractors/consultants 
(Fortune and White: 10 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 12 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
Planned close down/review/acceptance of 
possible failure 
(Fortune and White: 9 citations) 
Alternatives Certainty 
Training provision 
(Fortune and White: 7 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 9 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
Political stability 
(Fortune and White: 6 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 4 citations) 
Consistency and Coherence 
Correct choice/past experience of project 
management methodology/tools 
(Fortune and White: 6 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 10 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
Environmental influences 
(Fortune and White: 6 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 9 citations) 
Complexity Management 
Past experience (learning from) 
(Fortune and White: 5 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 2 citations) 
Competence and Capacity 
Project size (large)/level of complexity 
(high)/number of people involved (too 
many)/duration (over three years) 
(Fortune and White: 4 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 14 citations) 
Change Readiness 
Complexity Management 
Scalability and Flexibility 
Different viewpoints (appreciating) 
(Fortune and White: 3 citations) 
(IT Project Management Literature: 10 citations) 
Consistency and Coherence 
Stakeholder Management  
Technology 
(IT Project Management Literature: 6 citations) 
Complexity Management 
 
Source: Author 
 
confirms that the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government 
are correct and comprehensively considered and so answers the first subsidiary 
research question. 
 
4.6.  Summary 
  
This chapter, along with the literature review presented in Chapter Two, demonstrates 
that there is a wealth of solid advice and theory on the subject of project success and 
failure.  In 2000, McCartney produced his authoritative report detailing why 
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government IT projects fail, which was followed by a number of reports that have 
both confirmed and redefined his themes.  The attempt to follow the trail of 
McCartney’s Recommendations demonstrated that, while some of his policies were 
rapidly enacted, enthusiasm appeared to wane over time as they changed hands, 
became increasingly diluted and were then overtaken by subsequent initiatives.  This 
makes it difficult to identify whether all of his recommendations were ultimately put 
into practice, but is illuminating in terms of the implementation of policy in the public 
sector.  It demonstrates that policy recommendations are simply that: suggested 
courses of action, rather than mandated regulations.  This is a theme that recurs in the 
subsequent reports, raising questions about the fact that government departments and 
agencies cannot be made to comply with these CSFs, that there is no government 
body that has that level of authority or governance.  This makes the idea of legislation 
to force compliance unlikely, with the outcomes of the Clinger-Cohen Act in the US 
suggesting that it may not be the answer. 
 
McCartney’s principal legacies are the SRO appointment and Gateway Reviews but 
the report also raised issues of skills and knowledge in government, initiating a 
number of mechanisms to improve this situation.  In addition, it highlighted the 
importance of delivering benefits, initiating smaller more manageable projects and 
improving relations with suppliers.  Whilst the other reports that were analysed for 
this study were shown to have generally followed McCartney’s lead in terms of the 
CSFs that they identify, they each have a slightly different flavour and emphasis.  The 
OECD report focuses on risk but sees that arising from the government context, which 
is considered to make projects more complex, along with policy change, new 
legislation and levels of scrutiny.  It also focuses on the end user.  Intellect takes the 
supplier view and in its first report considers contract management in the public sector 
context.  The OGC, the second NAO report and the second Intellect report attempt to 
provide mechanisms to make the lessons from McCartney more practical and 
applicable.  POST raises the issue of technology, while the DWP is concerned with 
governance.  The NAO assesses the work of the OGC, whilst the RAEng and BCS are 
concerned with skills and complex projects.  Three key themes emerge from this 
analysis:  
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1. Knowledge, understanding and skills are a major issue in the government 
context and underpin a range of the other identified CSFs. 
2. Governance is critical.  These reports demonstrate the arguments made in the 
introduction to this chapter: the means to success are known; the issue is 
compliance with those means. 
3. The contract needs to be managed, again raising questions about skills, and the 
relationship with the supplier, given a clash of cultures. 
 
It is evident that the lessons are there for the learning and that the CSFs have been 
identified in the government reports and confirmed through comparison with the 
academic literature as being correct and comprehensively considered.  The next stage 
of this study is to assess whether they have been used and, if so, whether they have 
improved the performance of subsequent complex IT projects in government.  These 
issues will be examined through a detailed case study of the MoD’s DII Programme.  
The contextual setting for this project and the surrounding business processes are 
examined in Chapter Five, while the extent to which the CSFs have been understood 
and applied, and to what effect, is analysed in Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Five 
Defence Information Infrastructure Programme:  
Context, Setting and Process 
 
 
5.1.  The Case Study Context 
 
Having identified the Critical Success Factors (CSFs), the next stage of this study is to 
determine whether they have been understood and applied in practice and, if so, to what 
effect.  As discussed in Chapter Three, case study was selected as the most relevant and 
viable research methodology, defined by Yin as: 
 
…an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.1 
 
 
Yin’s emphasis on the unclear boundaries between phenomenon and context fits well 
with the research question and with the causal analysis, which asks whether the 
phenomenon under investigation, the identified CSFs, has resulted in improved 
performance with regard to the Information Technology (IT) project under scrutiny.  This 
chapter begins the analysis of this case study, the Defence Information Infrastructure 
(DII) Programme, an IT mega-project initiated by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 
2000 and continuing to date.  The examination is based on primary data collected via the 
interview process discussed in Chapter Three and secondary data, particularly reports.  
This case study begins with an examination of the context in which the DII Programme is 
being developed and implemented, closely following the logic described by the 
Conceptual Framework, shown again at Figure 5.1. 
 
IT projects within both public and private sectors operate within the constraints of the 
‘Business Process’ and ‘Organisational Setting’, both of which impact on the ‘Technical 
Solution’.  However, a government IT project faces additional complexity as a result of   
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Figure 5.1. Conceptual Framework: the DII Case Study: Context 
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the ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’.  A series of factors within this context 
restrict action, such as the law, civil service rules, and public and parliamentary scrutiny. 
In addition, these projects are subject to the short-term political framework that directs 
policy-making.2  Policy is designed to translate “political priorities and principles into 
courses of action to deliver designed changes”.3  Therefore, this layer controls the 
Organisational Setting, Business Process and, ultimately, any proposed Technical 
Solution.  As quoted in Chapter Two, Mitev argues that the “larger social and political 
processes through which the interests of different social groups interact with one another 
and with the technology” need to be investigated in any examination of an IT project.4  
She also highlights Belassi and Tukel’s view of the importance of interrelationships 
between factors.  Therefore, it is the outer three layers that will be considered in this 
chapter, unpeeling the complexity surrounding a government IT project in order to 
understand the impact of those layers as they interact across their boundaries.  The 
chapter structure follows the route highlighted in the Conceptual Framework diagram, 
beginning with a discussion of the ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’ before 
moving to the ‘Organisational Setting’ and the ‘Business Process’. 
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5.2. Programme, Policy and Political Context 
 
This section begins by considering the policy that translates politics into programmes or 
courses of action, examining how the political climate has broadly changed in the past 
decades before assessing recent policy to improve procurement and project management 
in government.  Since the end of the Second World War, successive governments have 
worked at reforming the public sector by increasing or decreasing the civil service, 
centralising or decentralising control, or creating new kinds of relationships between the 
public and private sectors.5  The term ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) was coined in 
the 1980s to describe this philosophy of modernising government by applying business 
tools and techniques to achieve improved efficiency and control.6  NPM is strongly 
associated with the rising public sector interest in project management due to the need to 
cut costs and improve operations.7  Whilst the political emphasis of these reforms has 
shifted over time, there has been a general move from monopoly state provision to a 
public service economy that collaborates with the private and voluntary sectors.8  This 
has been driven by the adoption of private sector management methods, the privatisation 
of services and functions, and the introduction of complex partnerships.9  A range of 
initiatives has resulted, such as Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the 1980s;10 the 
New Management Strategy of the late 1980s;11 Market Testing in the 1990s;12 the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) introduced by the Conservatives in 1992 and the creation of 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) by the subsequent Labour administration;13 and the rise 
of the public services industry, using external providers to deliver public services, a 
policy that has accelerated rapidly since the 1980s.14   
 
It is the policies and reforms of the Labour Government, in power between 1997 and 
2010, which have affected the DII Programme to date, resulting in a shift to modern 
practice, but essentially based on incremental developments from previous reforms.15  
The modernisation agenda is set to continue under the Coalition Government.16  For 
Labour, IT was seen as a critical means of modernising public services, expressed in two 
guiding white papers: Modernising Government published in 1999 and Transformational 
Government Enabled by Technology in 2005.  Modernising Government made a key 
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commitment to information age government, implying the need for improved skills, 
whilst Transformational Government emphasised the importance of IT to the delivery of 
services and shared services, explicitly highlighting the need for increased 
professionalism in the planning, delivery, management and governance of IT-enabled 
change.17  These policies resulted in massive investment in IT, coinciding with 
recognition of the parlous state of major government IT projects, as discussed in Chapter 
Four.18   
 
The substance of the McCartney Report was the recognition of the need for much higher 
levels of competence and capacity in government.  This stance was reinforced in 
subsequent reports on IT failure but also dominates a series of related reports on 
improving the management of government procurement, particularly in relation to the 
purchase of goods and services, ranging from commodities to major IT and construction 
projects.  A selection of these initiatives is considered here, viewed largely through the 
lens of the National Audit Office (NAO), the independent, statutory authority that 
examines the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government.  Reference is also 
made to documents from other sources where relevant.  The NAO reports track 
government action over time, using a consistent methodology and providing a coherent 
commentary on the effect of government policy.  They are discussed chronologically but 
threads are followed through where necessary for the sake of a more logical discussion. 
 
Just prior to McCartney, Gershon’s 1999 Review of Civil Procurement in Central 
Government found a lack of skills and common processes for managing large, complex 
procurements and suppliers.19  His recommendation that government procurement should 
be centralised resulted in the creation of the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) in 
2000 and he became its first Chief Executive (CE).  The Efficiency Reforms of 2004 
extended the OGC’s remit to the MoD, initially excluded, and to the wider public 
sector.20  However, with no direct authority, it could only promulgate best practice 
through guidance and advice.21  As discussed in Chapter Four, its key initiatives came 
from the McCartney Report: Gateway Reviews; Centres of Excellence; the Successful 
Delivery Toolkit; and the Programme and Project Management Specialism and 
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Successful Delivery Skills Programme to improve skills in government.22  In 2007, it was 
reduced in size by about half and its brief again curtailed to just central government, 
while its power to intervene was increased.23  It can now set procurement standards for 
departments; monitor their performance through procurement capability reviews; and 
demand collaboration in buying common goods and services.24   
 
In 2002, the NAO released its Better Public Services through e-Government report, 
highlighting government’s inability to deliver IT projects to intended cost, time and 
quality standards.  It noted the need for strong leadership and high quality staff.  In 2003, 
this was reiterated in Managing Resources to Deliver Better Public Services, which urged 
departments to make use of the OGC’s resources while praising the Government’s 
introduction of three-year budgets, greater flexibility to carry funds forward and 
commercial style budgeting and accounting.25  The NAO re-examined resource 
management in 2008 with Managing Financial Resources to Deliver Better Public 
Services.  Its focus remained on skills, governance and compliance as, despite the 
Treasury’s requirement for all departments to have a professionally qualified Finance 
Director on their Board by December 2006, six had failed to do so.  This included the 
MoD, although it was in the process of recruiting.26  None of the Permanent Secretaries 
held a professional finance qualification.27  This lack of financial skills, particularly 
amongst budget holders, was seen as one of the most significant barriers to improving 
financial resource management across government.   
 
Back in 2003, the OGC’s Making a Difference: Reducing Bureaucracy in Central Civil 
Government Procurement repeated the call for greater use of OGC resources, along with 
the need to improve leadership, decision-making, commercial skills and project 
management.28  It also criticised the bureaucratic procurement process, seen as a deterrent 
to many potential suppliers, and urged departments to share more information with 
suppliers earlier in the process.  In 2004, the NAO considered the impact of the OGC in 
Improving Procurement, arguing again for wider acceptance and application of its advice; 
regular consideration of procurement performance at board level; and finding ways to 
allow smaller businesses to compete.29  It also highlighted the need to improve 
procurement capability by raising commercial awareness; more proactive management of 
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suppliers; managing the risk of too few suppliers for key commodities; developing 
procurement expertise; and better targeting of Value for Money (VfM).  In 2004, the 
NAO returned to its scrutiny of the OGC with Improving IT procurement: the Impact of 
the Office of Government Commerce’s Initiatives on Departments and Suppliers in the 
Delivery of Major IT-Enabled Projects.30  It concluded positively: structures were in 
place to minimise the risk of IT failure and the behaviour of both government and 
suppliers was changing.  This examination of the OGC was repeated in 2005 by the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC).31  It praised the Gateway 
Reviews for increasing scrutiny and highlighting potential risks but noted that they were 
not being taken seriously by all departments, as discussed in Chapter Four.  The key 
theme of the report was the variable use of OGC resources and, as a result, it called for 
more stringent means of enforcing good practice.   
 
In December 2006, central government spent around £1.8 billion on consultancy services, 
largely to support IT and project management.  With its report on Central Government’s 
Use of Consultants, the NAO highlighted the need to improve VfM.32  Departments 
should collect adequate information to improve decisions on the use of consultants then 
actively engage with the major consulting firms to understand how they work.  It 
suggested using internal staff where possible; using different methods of payment, such 
as fixed price or incentivised contracts; and building greater commitment from 
consultants to making projects a success.  It reiterated the OGC’s 2002 Making a 
Difference report, encouraging departments to engage with the market earlier, enabling 
consultants to gain a better understanding of the requirement.  The NAO returned to the 
subject of consultancy in 2010 with its Central Government’s Use of Consultants and 
Interims report.33  It found that only limited progress had been made since 2006 and, 
although spending on consultancy and interims had dropped to £1 billion, there was still 
no evidence of VfM.34  This, it believed, was due to the inability to manage consultants 
effectively.  In addition, departments were not always following best practice nor were 
they assessing the performance of consultants. 
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As a result of the Treasury’s Transforming Government Procurement in 2007, the CE of 
the OGC became the professional head of Government Procurement Services (GPS) and 
departmental reviews were initiated to ensure standards were being met and VfM 
delivered.35  The aim of the Capability Review Programme was to ensure that the civil 
service leadership has the knowledge and skills to develop and deliver departmental 
strategies, and to provide assurance of future delivery.36  The NAO reviewed the 
Programme in 2009 and concluded that there had been no improvement in the delivery of 
public services, despite the fact that capability weakness featured prominently as part of 
board business.37  The other initiative established by Transforming Government 
Procurement was the Major Projects Review, the scrutiny of major central government 
projects by a panel of government commercial experts, designed to assess the certainty of 
benefits delivery, affordability and VfM, defined as the “optimum combination of whole-
life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the users’ requirement”.38  Unlike the 
Gateway Reviews, this Group has the power to stop a procurement project, although 
there is no evidence of it having done so.39 
The NAO reported in 2008 on Central Government’s Management of Service Contracts, 
including IT, security, catering and cleaning.40  It found examples of good senior level 
engagement with suppliers, benchmarking and joint working between government 
organisations and suppliers, but a failure to prioritise contract management or to allocate 
appropriate skills and resources to it.  Risk management processes were poor, there were 
weaknesses in key performance indicators and limited use of financial incentives to 
improve supplier performance.  It estimated that improved contract management could 
save up to £290 million a year, as well as improving the quality of service provision.41  
As a result, the NAO, in association with the OGC, produced a framework for good 
practice in contract management.42 
In April 2009, the Treasury’s Operational Efficiency Programme highlighted the need for 
greater governance of IT-enabled change projects; the strengthening of the Gateway 
process by introducing a ‘starting gate’; the implementation of portfolio management 
processes, greater standardisation and simplification of IT across the public sector; and 
the development of internal IT capability.43  At the same time, the OGC issued a Joint 
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Statement of Intent for IT Programmes and Projects (JSI) as part of its Programme and 
Project Delivery initiative.44  It noted that a range of factors might cause an IT project to 
stray from its original objectives, including global or national events, new policies or 
deliberate changes to requirements.  These changes often result in the charge of failure, 
even if they have been formally approved.  In addition, poor practice and unhelpful 
behaviour by both contractor and supplier were seen as a source of problems.  The JSI 
develops a shared contractor and supplier view of the intended benefits of an IT project 
by adopting seven key principles: 
 
1. Appropriate governance; 
2. Open dialogue and positive behaviours; 
3. Using best practice; 
4. Focus on business outcomes; 
5. Appropriate change management; 
6. Objective measurement of success; and 
7. Appropriate interventions. 
 
The result of this process should be an unambiguous definition of success or failure and a 
mechanism for monitoring how successfully client and supplier have adopted and 
delivered good practice.  It provides a cross-government mechanism for measuring 
project outcomes to promote success and to avoid allegations of project failure. 
In November 2009, the NAO released Commercial Skills for Complex Government 
Projects.   Significant weaknesses in commercial skills and expertise meant that the VfM 
of 43 major government projects worth around £200 billion was at risk.45  As the private 
sector takes on more responsibility for the delivery of public services, government staff 
need the necessary skills and experience to interact with their suppliers.  However, a 2009 
review by the OGC found that 44% of Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) of major 
projects had no substantial commercial experience.46  The biggest skills gaps were in 
contract management, commissioning and managing advisers; risk identification and 
management; and business acumen, all of which were generally being provided by 
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interim staff, consultants or specialist advisers.  The NAO argued that over-reliance on 
temporary staff could lead to higher project costs and loss of knowledge.  Reportedly, a 
majority of departmental commercial directors believed that the establishment of the 
OGC had done little to address these skills gaps.   
Overall, these reports show a political intent to improve government procurement in a 
period that has seen a concerted move to e-government and greater reliance on IT; private 
provision rather than government provision of skills, resources and services; and a greater 
requirement for the capability and competence to manage these policies at a time of 
decreasing funding.  With the same issues highlighted in report after report, it seems that 
government departments and agencies have failed in these endeavours to date.  The issues 
that have been identified can be broadly categorised into four themes, as shown at Figure 
5.2.  Whilst not to scale, the block size of each theme indicates its emphasis throughout  
 
Figure 5.2. Improving Government Procurement: Key Themes 
1998 2010
Consistency and Coherence
Contract/Supplier Management
Competence and Capacity
Value for Money
2002 20062004 2008
 
Source: Author 
 
these reports with its length indicating its recurrence over time.  Three of these themes 
align directly with three of the CSFs identified in Chapter Four.  ‘Consistency and 
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Coherence’ describes the need for common practices and processes along with 
compliance with best practice.  ‘Competence and Capacity’ identifies the need for a range 
of skills, including commercial management, financial management, project 
management, risk management and IT capability.  An emphasis on providing ‘VfM’ 
through procurement begins to emerge in 2004.  Whilst it is the smallest of the blocks, it 
is one that has undoubtedly increased in importance since the financial crisis began in 
2007.  Whilst related to the need for improved skills, there is a clear emergence of the 
need for improved ‘Contract/Supplier Management’ in terms of improved oversight, 
relationships, incentives and assessment in managing the contractual relationship with the 
supplier. 
 
The view that there has been limited improvement in practice is reinforced by the 
repeated calls for central government departments to make better use of the support 
provided by the OGC.  This suggests not only a lack of compliance but also a lack of 
governance and authority to ensure compliance.  These points have been picked up 
recently by the NAO in two reports, Helping Government to Learn and Assurance for 
High Risk Projects.  The first highlights the lack of priority given to learning in 
government departments and across government with no effective tools for capturing and 
sharing it, whilst high staff turnover leads to a loss of knowledge.47  In addition, no time 
is allocated to the capture of lessons within projects.  The Head of the NAO noted that: 
 
…projects and programmes are more likely to succeed and keep to time and 
budget where lessons have been learned and experience shared…Getting better at 
learning from the past will help government secure better VfM in the future. 
 
In June 2010, the second report was published in the wake of the newly elected 
Government.  It recommends a central, mandatory system of assurance in government 
and argues that high-risk public sector projects, which are frequently large scale, 
innovative and rely on complex relationships between diverse stakeholders, present a 
level of risk that no commercial organisation would consider.  Whilst recognising the 
positive impacts of  the OGC Gateway Reviews and the Major Project Review Group, the 
lack of an integrated system is limiting further improvements.  A new assurance system 
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should trigger further interventions where necessary; provide the ability to plan and 
resource assurance activity; systematically propagate lessons learned; and minimise the 
burden placed on projects. 
 
These two reports capture the essence of the problem with two cross-cutting themes, as 
shown at Figure 5.3, ‘Learning’ and ‘Governance’.  The latter term is used in preference 
to ‘Assurance’ as it more clearly demonstrates the need for much stronger authority in 
terms of directed, required compliance with policy rather than simply guarantees of 
adherence.  This emphasis on compliance reinforces the discussion in Chapter Four, 
Section 4.2.4, about the lack of governance in government and the need to  
 
Figure 5.3. Improving Government Procurement: Cross-Cutting Themes 
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ensure that the political priorities and principles that emerge from the ‘Programme, 
Policy and Political Context’ are translated into “courses of action to deliver designed 
changes” within the ‘Organisational Setting’, which then filter through to the ‘Business 
Process’.48  However, the evidence here, relating to what government does and what it 
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needs to do, suggests a chasm between policy and process, which may well be having an 
impact on performance.  In order to examine this further, the lens narrows to consider the 
next layer surrounding DII, the ‘Organisational Setting’, the MoD. 
  
5.3.  Organisational Setting 
 
This section examines how the ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’ has been 
translated within the ‘Organisational Setting’ of the MoD, which is one of the largest and 
most diverse of the Departments of State, described by the NAO as “a complex 
Department”.49  Like any large organisation, it has multiple organisational layers, a great 
variety of stakeholders and a wide range of activities, making any planned organisational 
change and, therefore, any IT development and implementation, potentially 
problematic.50  In order to understand this setting, this discussion begins by describing 
the MoD’s structure and organisation before examining its recognised problems with 
procurement, which are then related back to the issues identified in the ‘Programme, 
Policy and Political Context’. 
 
5.3.1. Ministry of Defence: Structure and Organisation 
 
Uniquely, the MoD is both a State Department and a military headquarters, led by both a 
military officer and a civil servant.51  The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the 
professional head of the Armed Forces, is responsible for military capability and 
operations, whilst the Accounting Officer, the Permanent Secretary (PS), manages the 
Department and oversees the use of public funds.52  The Department provides military 
capability through ‘force elements’ (ships, aircraft etc.).53  These are provided with a 
range of facilities that accord to a framework called the Defence Lines of Development 
(DLoD), shown at Figure 5.4, covering eight critical aspects to be addressed as the force 
elements move from planning to operations: training, equipment, personnel, logistics, 
information, infrastructure, concepts and doctrine, and organisation.  This capability is 
identified and procured within the resources allocated by the Treasury and in accordance  
with Defence policy.  Defence strategy filters through a number of stages to the Defence 
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Figure 5.4. Defence Lines of Development (DLoD) 
Threat
Capability
Joint Capability 
Packages
Coalition 
Contribution
Physical 
Environment
Force Elements
Training Concepts & Doctrine
LogisticsInformation
InfrastructurePersonnel
OrganisationEquipment
 
Source: Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, ‘What is Through Life Capability Management?’ 
Acquisition Operating Framework, December 2010, 
http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/operational/business/capabilitymanagement/capabilitymanageme
nt_whatis.htm, downloaded 14th January 2011. 
 
Plan, which allocates objectives to sub-strategy owners, the Top Level Budget holders 
(TLBs), Process Owners and SROs.54  The TLBs control operating costs and have 
delegated authority in a range of areas, including finance, personnel and commercial.  
They operate to Short-Term Plans (STPs), spanning a four-year period and covering the 
operating costs of Defence. 
 
In 2010, the MoD had an allocated budget of £36.9 billion in Total Departmental 
Expenditure Limit (Total DEL).55  It has personnel deployed across the globe, 
responsibility for a range of different bodies, including agencies, trading funds, museums 
and a large and varied estate.  Its assets include £82.4 billion of land, equipment and 
buildings and £6.2 billion of stocks.56  As a Government department spending large 
amounts of taxpayers’ money, it operates within the public expenditure planning, control 
and accountability framework.57  However, despite these checks and balances and despite 
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its remit to procure within allocated resources, the MoD has a poor record of delivering 
complex technology projects to time and cost. 
 
5.3.2. Defence Procurement: a ‘Conspiracy of Optimism’? 
 
The rising costs of Defence equipment set against a diminishing budget were discussed in 
Chapter One.  In 2003, Hartley estimated that, between 1990 and 2000, real Defence 
spending in the UK had fallen by some 23%,58 while equipment costs rose by some 10% 
per annum in real terms, a doubling of costs every 7.25 years.59  More recently, there has 
been a debate over the realities of this equipment inflation with Kirkpatrick arguing for 
its existence,60 whilst Chalmers argues against.61  It is not within the scope of this study 
to enter this debate but there is evidence that Defence procurement is not operating 
effectively within the public expenditure planning, control and accountability framework.   
 
Kirkpatrick notes the likelihood of variation in the cost of military equipment as it moves 
through the stages of the procurement process, the so-called CADMID cycle.62  
CADMID describes the acquisition lifecycle from the initial identification of a gap in 
capability to the delivery, use and, ultimately, disposal of that capability, as shown at 
Figure 5.5.  Similar to the Gateway Review Process identified in the McCartney Report 
and discussed in Chapter Four, there are two main approval points (Gates) required at key 
stages in this cycle.  Kirkpatrick observes the tendency for whole-life costs to increase as 
the project moves through this cycle.  Set alongside the overly optimistic initial forecasts, 
the result is spiraling, potentially uncontrollable, costs.63   
 
Sir Peter Spencer, Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) between 2003 and 2007, 
described Defence procurement as a ‘conspiracy of optimism’ with its tendency to ignore 
potential risks, such as cost increases.64  His view is confirmed by the NAO’s annual 
review of the MoD, the Major Projects Report, which assesses the 20 highest value 
equipment procurement projects in the Demonstration and Manufacturing phases of the 
CADMID cycle and the ten largest projects in the Assessment phase.65   Over the years,  
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Figure 5.5. The CADMID Cycle 
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Source: Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Defence Acquisition High Level Blueprint, (London, 
HMSO, October 2008), page 13, 
http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/downloads/Defence_Acquisition_Blueprint.pdf, downloaded 10th 
January 2011. 
 
this annual scrutiny has resulted in harsh criticism of the MoD for its time and cost 
overruns.  Kirkpatrick, one of the few to critique the NAO’s accounting process, suggests 
that selecting the most complex and expensive projects produces an unrepresentative 
sample of the MoD’s total acquisition programme.66  However, he concurs with the 
NAO’s assertions that the MoD consistently underestimates technical risks and their 
consequences, whilst being over-optimistic about forecast costs, suggesting a serious 
deficiency in project management skills.  He also notes that it undertakes inadequate 
preparatory work resulting in cost overruns and delays later on; ignores or underestimates 
risks, giving a delusion of accuracy in approved budgets and schedules; and sometimes 
ignores the financial and operational penalties of delay.67 
In 2009, the NAO found a shortfall of between £6 billion and £36 billion in the MoD’s 
allocated budget and planned expenditure.68  The inevitable conclusion was that the cost 
of the major procurement programme was no longer affordable.69  The spotlight is now 
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firmly on the MoD and its budget management.  On 19th October 2010, the Prime 
Minister presented the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), noting that the 
“£38 billion black hole in the future Defence plans (was) bigger than the entire annual 
Defence budget of £33 billion”.  He described the MoD as “too big, too inefficient and 
too over-spent”, requiring it to become “smaller, smarter, and more responsible in its 
spending”.70 
The MoD has responded to these continued criticisms with a series of proposed actions 
from both within and outside Defence over the past twelve years, the most influential of 
which are shown in greater detail at Appendix 5.  They include the move to Smart 
Acquisition, which set in train guiding principles for the procurement process: a whole-
life approach; Integrated Project Teams (IPTs); better relations with industry; increased 
investment early in the project; effective trade-off between cost, time and performance; 
new procurement approaches; and a streamlined process for project approvals.  Alongside 
this, there have been numerous NAO analyses to improve Defence projects, identifying 
the need for better relations with industry; clear responsibility and lines of authority; 
improved project management, commercial management and risk management skills; a 
focus on project delivery; and learning from experience.  The wide ranging ‘Haddon-
Cave Report’ on the mid-air fire on Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan considered not only 
airworthiness but also the Defence context and environment, highlighting problems with 
the competence and capacity of both the MoD and the supplier, the effects of a sustained 
period of organisational change and poor procurement practices.71  Finally, the NAO’s 
Strategic Financial Management of the Defence Budget highlighted the need for better 
financial controls, the rebalancing of the financial programme and improved skills.72   
The themes within the MoD reports repeat those that appeared within government policy, 
discussed above, suggesting a lack of response at the operational level.  They stress the 
need to manage the complexity of Defence procurement, requiring a range of skills, 
including project management, risk management, contract management, along with the 
need for financial and technical skills.  Issues with supplier relationships are highlighted, 
particularly in terms of trust, transparency and communication.  Governance and 
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authority also need to be improved.  Other key areas are poor estimations regarding the 
affordability of procurement projects and the VfM that they deliver. 
 
Not only do these reports identify similar themes, they also repeat the six broad themes 
identified in Section 5.2 as well as the more specific CSFs identified in the analysis of 
government reports on IT project failure in Chapter Four.  Their recommendations can be 
fitted into the twelve categories stemming from that analysis, as shown at Appendix 5.  
As discussed above, the Government sets policy, designed to translate “political priorities 
and principles into courses of action to deliver designed changes”.73  In response, the 
MoD translates that policy to its own context, designed to deliver change in practice.  The 
examination of the ‘Programme, Policy and Political Context’ suggests an overarching 
lack of governance and authority to ensure compliance with best practice and an apparent 
inability to learn the lessons.  This overview of the ‘Organisational Setting’ shows a 
department with strong governance structures and strong drivers for change.  However, 
the organisational setting for the Technical Solution is one of continued problems.  This 
suggests that neither government nor MoD policy is having any impact on practice.  The 
literature review raised the issue of the difficulty of learning from past experience with 
organisations allowing dysfunctional patterns of behaviour to continue over long periods 
of time and a persistent pattern of reliance on the same processes with apparent disregard 
for their failure to deliver.74  This is further tested as the lens narrows to an examination 
of the ‘Business Process’ and the focus moves from Defence procurement in general to 
the activities surrounding the procurement of IT for the MoD. 
 
5.4. Business Process 
 
Information is one of the DLoDs, as shown at Figure 5.3 above, and is, therefore, a key 
aspect of military capability.  This is confirmed by the most recent MoD Information 
Strategy (MODIS), published in 2009, which sets out to transform the use and 
management of information in Defence and, in doing so, outlines a Vision for Defence 
information:  
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Agile exploitation of our information capabilities to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency on operations and in support areas through access to, and sharing of, 
timely, accurate and trusted information.75   
 
MODIS is a sub-strategy of the overarching Strategy for Defence76 and, as such, it is part 
of the delivery mechanism for that Strategy.  It demonstrates that information is vital to 
all aspects of Defence from front-line operations to support activities and highlights the 
strategic drivers for this, which include the increase in coalition and expeditionary 
operations, the emergence of cyber warfare and meeting the agenda set by government.77  
However, in sharp contrast to this emphasis on the value of information, MODIS also 
acknowledges that “progress with Information Management and Information Exploitation 
in Defence has been somewhat patchy”.78  The current state and desired state of Defence 
information, as defined in MODIS, is shown at Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6. Defence Information Strategy 
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Source: Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, MoD Information Strategy, (London, MoD, 2009). 
 
The ‘Current State’ indicates an inability to manage and share information in order to 
meet the vision, while the ‘Future State’ recognises the need for increased integration and 
the ability to share information both within the MoD and armed services and with Other 
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Government Departments (OGDs), allies and other stakeholders, such as industry.79  This 
future state is based on four Guiding Principles, shown at Figure 5.7, which reaffirm the 
importance of information to Defence, the need for an organisation-wide approach along 
with the necessary skills and strong governance to manage it to best effect.  This clearly 
demonstrates the requirement for a common platform to enable communication, 
collaboration and joint working.   
 
While the required output is clear, the necessary process to deliver that output has been 
lacking.  Davenport defines a business process as:  
 
A structured, measured set of activities designed to produce a specific output for a 
particular customer or market…a specific ordering of work activities across time 
and space, with a beginning and an end, and clearly defined inputs and outputs: a 
structure for action.80 
 
In this instance, the ‘specific output’ is managed information and ‘the structured, 
measured set of activities’ relates to the business process for delivering that information.  
Therefore, in moving through the layers of government towards an examination of the 
‘Technical Solution’, the ‘Business Process’ is taken to be the activities that have been 
put in place to deliver information, a key capability, to Defence.  Nowadays, of course, 
both information management and its exploitation rely heavily on IT.  In 2010, therefore, 
the Defence Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) Strategy was 
published, outlining a single direction for Defence and underpinning all of the Defence 
sub-strategies, including MODIS.81  This notes that Defence was spending 4% of its 
operating costs on IT in 2010, and that “by delivering more efficient and effective ICT 
services this 4% can significantly improve how the remaining 96% is utilised to deliver 
Defence outputs”.82  However, given the situation with procurement generally, does the 
MoD have the business process in place to deliver more efficient and effective IT and, 
therefore, to exploit its information?  In considering this question, this section examines 
the ‘Current State’, as described in Figure 5.6, identifying some of the factors behind the 
decision to move to a single information infrastructure, before going on to consider the 
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business processes that have been put in place to deliver the ‘Future State’, in part 
through the DII Programme.   
 
5.4.1. Defence Information: the Current State 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the 1999 Modernising Government white paper, reinforced 
by Transforming Government in 2005, drove the move towards information age 
government, aiming to take the UK to the next level of e-government maturity, re-
engineering back office services and incorporating information systems.  In the MoD, 
Modernising Government was translated into Modernising Defence, aiming to integrate 
Defence more closely with other government departments, increase coherence in systems 
and procedures, and implement innovative changes in working practices and business 
solutions.83  The MoD tasked five project groups to translate the five key commitments 
detailed in Modernising Government to Defence.84  The organisation originally assigned 
to the information age commitment was later replaced with the Department of the 
Director General Information (DG Info), which was created to fill a gap in the MoD’s 
organisational structure with an overarching and corporate strategy for information.85  
However, it became increasingly evident that, somewhat ironically, Defence was being 
prevented from meeting that information age government agenda, from setting a 
corporate strategy and, therefore, from fully exploiting its information resources due to 
the state of its IT infrastructure.   
 
The chaotic situation of Defence IT was largely a result of the Government’s adoption of 
the New Management Strategy in the late 1980s, designed to align accountability with 
delegated financial and management responsibilities.  In the MoD, this meant that there 
was very limited allocation of money for IT.  Responsibility for spend on ‘non-
operational’ IT funding was delegated to the TLBs without any initial strategy, opening 
the way for a decade of random and uncontrolled spending with no mechanism for 
tracking overall expenditure.  Many of these senior managers, it is suggested, viewed IT 
as an unnecessary luxury so that much of the IT procurement resulted from end-of-year 
spend to balance the books, rather than being a planned process.86  This also meant that 
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there was often no finance for ongoing support.  For example, 150 PCs were reportedly 
stacked in a warehouse for 18 months because funds were available to buy them at the 
end of the financial year but there was then no money left to install them.87   
 
While some larger, more centralised information systems were developed during this 
time, such as Corporate Headquarters Office Technology System (CHOTS), Unicom (the 
Army Unit Computer system), ISIS (the Army Secret infrastructure) and NavyNet, they 
each had a different approval process: the Investment Appraisal Board (IAB) formally 
approved CHOTS, other systems were approved at TLB level whilst there is no evidence 
of others having undergone any form of official approval at all.  Similarly, each had 
different procurement arrangements: the system and service for CHOTS was outsourced, 
while the Royal Signals and Civil Service dealt with ISIS in-house.  Within all this, there 
was considerable obsolescence, variable technology, variable service levels and patchy 
security.  With no centralised view of Defence IT, the MoD struggled to integrate these 
multiple applications, a situation that severely hampered information sharing.  This 
confirms the findings of Hackney and McBride, discussed in Chapter Two, that the 
cultural decentralisation of IT projects causes the proliferation of unlinked systems with 
operational factors overriding the need for management information from these systems 
and, ultimately, sub-cultural barriers being reinforced as a result of system 
incompatibility.88 
 
The need for change was brought into sharp focus in 2000 when the Defence 
Procurement Agency (DPA) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) were formed 
as a result of the 1998 SDR and Smart Acquisition initiative and, not surprisingly, the 
two organisations wanted to share information, both internally and with industry.89  In 
addition, there was a need to re-compete the contract for CHOTS, which was procured in 
1991 to provide one of the few means for personnel to communicate securely at 24 
Headquarter locations and more than 200 overseas locations.90  DLO had absorbed a 
number of single service organisations and, as a result, had inherited a significant number 
of information systems.  In accordance with the general picture of Defence IT at that 
time, the single services had developed bespoke systems to manage their own specific 
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inventories and logistics chains.  Not only was information sharing inadequate, there was 
no centralised view, making asset and configuration management difficult.  Grappling 
with the large number of bespoke IT systems was a challenge for the DLO, delaying 
some of its overarching projects while attempts were made to convert these highly 
fragmented systems into a coherent whole.91  It was evident that these systems could not 
meet the challenges required of the 21st Century MoD and armed services.   
 
In 2000, the DLO initiated a major change programme, including a set of IT projects: the 
Defence Stores Management Solution (DSMS) to replace and modernise the separate 
warehouse and inventory functions held by the three services, giving a single view of the 
Defence inventory and allowing stock reductions and related savings; Delivering the 
Requirement for Unit Materiel Management (DRUMM) to improve management of 
engineering activity and provide visibility of the technical status of assets for Army 
Units; and In-Transit Visibility (ITV) to replace the legacy consignment tracking systems 
and provide an in-theatre stock management function.  All three were subsequently 
cancelled, as discussed in Chapter One.  In 2002 and 2003, the DLO established 
successor projects, designed to follow an incremental approach in accordance with 
McCartney’s recommendations.  These included Management of Materiel in Transit 
(MMiT), which succeeded ITV; Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI), 
which followed some aspects of DSMS and ITV; and the Joint Asset Management and 
Equipment Support (JAMES) series of projects, which built on the DRUMM 
requirement.   
 
This was a timely decision.  In 2003, the NAO reported on Operation Telic, the 
codename for British operations in Iraq, which had begun earlier that year.  It found that 
the means of tracking supplies was ineffective and inefficient, raising questions about the 
ability of the logistics systems to meet operational needs.92  By and large, this was a 
reiteration of the problems that the DLO had itself identified in 2000 but failed to rectify 
with DSMS, DRUMM and ITV.  There is little detailed information on the three 
successor projects in the public domain.  The available evidence suggests that they are 
nearing delivery but that their development and implementation has not run smoothly. 
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In order to counteract the anarchy in Defence IT and to provide a focus, the tri-service 
Defence Communications Service Agency (DCSA) was formed in 1998.  Its purpose was 
“to maximise Defence operational effectiveness and business efficiency through the 
delivery of integrated information solutions”.  DCSA identified the need for a coherent 
network; secure, integrated information services leading to coherent information; 
organisational autonomy of its infrastructure; and efficiencies through economies of 
scale. 
 
Its focus on a coherent network was reinforced with the creation of the Defence Change 
Programme (DCP) in 2002.  Led by the Secretary of State, this brought together the top 
40 Defence change initiatives into a consistent programme aligned to the MoD’s strategic 
priorities.93  The original components of the DCP included the heavily IT-based Head 
Office Modern Environment (HOME) project; the Improved Budgeting and Planning 
Process, resulting in resource based accounting and output costing; the transformation of 
human resource management through the use of the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) 
system for forces staff and the Human Resource Management System (HRMS) for MoD 
civil servants; Modernising Estates Delivery, which was aimed at improving the 
condition and use of the MoD estate; and the first Defence Information Strategy, which 
included the requirement for DII. A single information infrastructure was, therefore, both 
a component of the DCP and also critical to its delivery, enabling 12 of the key 
programmes, including JPA and HOME.94   
 
There were, therefore, a number of drivers for the MoD to establish an infrastructure that 
would enable its valuable information to be shared across its business and battlespace.  
The benefits drivers can be divided into indirect (enablers) and direct (cost savings and 
more capability).  Indirect benefits include a range of military capability and Defence 
modernisation drivers, such as JPA and HRMS.  The direct benefit is increased capability 
in terms of improved information handling and improved resilience.  Ultimately, DII 
should provide increased capability at reduced cost and improved VfM due to the 
economies of scale resulting from working on a single, large infrastructure rather than 
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myriad smaller systems.  It will integrate with battlefield systems and support systems to 
improve intelligence collection, analysis and decision-making as well as providing core 
systems and common desktop services, thereby moving Defence information towards its 
required future state as envisaged by the Networked Enabled Capability (NEC) vision 
and strategy.   
 
5.4.2. Defence Information: Achieving the Future State 
 
DII is an ambitious project, one of the largest IT projects in the UK and set to deliver 
financial benefits of £1.6 billion on completion.95  How then has the MoD gone about 
setting up the business process to deliver this infrastructure?   This section begins by 
describing the creation of the DII Integrated Project Team (IPT), which later became the 
DII Group.  It then goes on to discuss its decisions regarding the Technical Solution, 
whether it identified the project type, how it would be delivered, how it would be 
resourced and the structure of governance.  The procurement process is then examined.   
 
The DII IPT was formally established in 2000 under the auspices of the DCSA, now the 
Information Systems and Services (ISS) cluster, which is part of the Defence Equipment 
and Support (DE&S) organisation, formed in 2007 from the merger of the DPA and the 
DLO.   The DFN (Defence Fixed Network) IPT was set up alongside it to provide Wide 
Area Networks (WANs), a project largely based on a PFI contract with BT.   Although a 
separate commercial arrangement, it provides the means to connect the 2000 sites to 
DII.96  Officially, the principal ‘customer’ for DII is the Director (Information 
Superiority) (D(IS)), who has now taken over from the MoD’s Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) (formerly Director General Information (DG Info)) as the SRO for DII.  However, 
the ultimate customers are the 300,000 military and civil service end users who will 
receive DII accounts, giving them access to around 1000 applications via 150,000 
terminals at all UK overseas sites, on maritime platforms, at deployed Headquarters 
(HQs) and from other remote locations.97  Around 150,000 of these are infrequent, 
occasional users and, therefore, do not need their own terminal but do require an account 
for access.   
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DII will provide core systems and common desktop services at a quality appropriate to 
the individual’s operational or business requirements and at all classification levels from 
UNCLASSIFIED to TOP SECRET, as shown at Figure 5.7.98  It delivers corporate 
applications, such as JPA, but does not develop or procure them.99  Underpinned by 240  
 
Figure 5.7. DII Coverage 
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Source: Oldnall, M., ‘Defence Information Infrastructure’, Presentation to Masters in Defence 
Administration Course, (Shrivenham, Defence Academy, May 2006). 
 
 
individual infrastructures, DII will connect as many systems as possible, including 
Bowman battlefield radios and Skynet, a secure satellite communications system.100   As 
discussed above, it also needs to connect with NATO forces, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), other Government departments, US forces and the Internet.101   
 
The first IPT Leader (IPTL) joined DCSA in February 2000, remaining in post until his 
retirement in 2008 but continuing on contract as an advisor.  He spent his first eight 
months planning the incorporation of existing infrastructure and Business Units into DII 
before the IPT was formally established in October 2000 with the transfer of CHOTS and 
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the NavyNet systems along with associated members of staff.  He describes this as a 
frustrating time.  Perceived as a threat by the IT owners, he had little senior management 
support and no budget.  However, this situation began to improve with the appointment 
of a new Second Permanent Under Secretary for State (2nd PUS), who clearly saw the 
benefits of a single information infrastructure.  His support was reinforced by the then 
Chief Executive of the DCSA and the project was given further impetus by the potential 
demise of CHOTS and the need to equip the refurbished MoD headquarters building in 
Whitehall.   The focus then moved to setting up the DII organisation, its objectives and 
processes, developing its vision (‘one information infrastructure) and its mission (‘to 
deliver to Defence a secure and coherent information infrastructure at minimum whole 
life cost whilst maintaining continuity of service’).  These were recently revised in the 
light of the latest strategic environment.  The vision is now: ‘the trusted partners of 
choice for the delivery and integration of information services; enabling the 
transformation of Defence and secure Government effectiveness through the delivery of: 
One Information Infrastructure’.102  Key to this vision is the aspiration to have a trusted 
partner, noting the need for an enduring dependency between buyer and supplier, which 
requires a long-term relationship based on trust and clear understanding of the business 
imperatives. 103  Both factors were identified in government and MoD policy, discussed 
above.  This translates into the following mission: ‘To develop and deliver secure and 
coherent information services, at minimum whole life cost, in order to enable the Defence 
Change Portfolio, and Equipment Capability Plans and to achieve the aims of Network 
Enabled Capability’.104 
 
For this to work, the IPT needed to get control of the right people, the legacy systems and 
infrastructure, and the necessary funding.105  In 2001, the Defence Management Board 
(DMB), now the Defence Board (DB), decided that all information infrastructure and 
legacy systems should be transferred to the IPT along with additional staff and related 
finance, although new applications would be delivered separately to keep risks 
manageable and to increase flexibility.106  Separating the two would also make it easier to 
load applications onto the infrastructure in the deployed space or to change applications 
in the event of new software provision.  It was also decided that there would be a strict 
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governance process with an authorised list of applications, overseen by the MoD CIO.  
With the creation of Information Systems and Services (ISS) in 2007, the DII IPT 
transformed into the DII Group with the IPTL becoming the DII Head.  It also took on 
responsibility for other information infrastructures, such as the Joint Operations 
Command System (JOCS) and the Royal Navy Command Support System (RNCSS), 
which were scheduled to migrate to DII in due course.   
 
Having gained responsibility for introducing and upgrading new capability, the next stage 
for the Group was to decide how to deliver and maintain that new capability.107  Studies 
demonstrated that outsourcing to a private sector Delivery Provider (DP) would be more 
cost effective than an in-house development.  A single contract would cover the 
development, installation, maintenance and user support of the infrastructure, creation of 
a network of data centres to store information, provision of two large call centres to 
provide resilient service management and support to users.  The DP would also take 
responsibility for the remaining legacy systems in each increment prior to migration to 
DII.  It was acknowledged that the MoD lacked the skills and capacity to do this.108  
Transferring systems to the DP meant transferring relevant people under TUPE (Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)).109  However, some technical staff and 
resources would be retained in-house to ensure operational capability.110  The necessary 
end-user requirements were captured in the User Requirement Document (URD) and 
translated by the IPT into the set of services to support future operations and captured in a 
Service Requirements Document (SRD).   
 
It was evident that the DII Group needed more staff at this stage.  They lacked the 
necessary breadth of knowledge and needed high-level commercial support and legal 
advice.  Therefore, they sought independent external assistance and the contract was 
awarded to PA Consulting Group.111  They worked together on the DII contract with a 
view to letting it within 18 months, although it actually took 20 months.  They developed 
a model based on the SRD that enabled comparisons to be made of variable numbers of 
users, sites and service levels against the options of in-house and external service 
delivery.  The likely costs of the different procurement options were then evaluated, 
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providing a sound basis for the resulting procurement strategy and Main Gate business 
case.  The outcome was the decision to seek a service-based, PPP contract with the MoD 
paying on the basis of delivery to the desktop by the DP, while keeping the assets under 
MoD ownership, as required by accounting rules and to enable another organisation to 
take over should the DP fail.112     
 
The forecasted cost was £5.8 billion over ten years, although the full cost of the deployed 
and TOP SECRET capabilities was unknown at that stage.113  Unusually for MoD 
procurement, a contingency fund of £528 million was included, suggesting awareness of 
the inherent risks with such an extensive, complex project.114  Programme funding of 
£6.2 billion was identified at contract letting, which provided additional flexibility, 
allowing for changes to implementation plans, cost and scope increases, and changes to 
forecast funding.  In 2008, the NAO reported a forecast cost of just over £7 billion, 
including the deployed and TOP SECRET capabilities and dependent programmes.115   
 
Having identified the means of delivery and the costs, the next problem was to find the 
funds.  At this point, no money was allocated to this project but, in taking over the 
existing information infrastructures, funding previously held by the TLBs was transferred 
to the DII Group.  However, as discussed, these systems had been run on a shoestring 
and, while the funding covered maintenance costs, it was insufficient to pay for updated 
technology or replacement systems.  After much discussion, the MoD and the Treasury 
provided additional financial resources from the Defence Modernisation Fund (DMF) in 
2003.  This gave the DII Group a single budget of £450 million per annum for ten years 
and simplified the financial management. 
 
It was envisaged that work would not start on the new infrastructure before Financial 
Year (FY) 2004/5 as time was needed to prepare for the competitive contract.  In line 
with academic thinking, discussed in Chapter Two, and the recommendations of the 
reports, discussed in Chapter Four, the project was broken into modular phases or 
increments, rather than taking a ‘big bang’ approach: DII (Current) to support and 
maintain existing systems; DII (Convergent) to ensure that all resources on the 
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information infrastructure worked towards the future requirement; and DII (Future), 
known as DII(F), the contract to deliver the single information infrastructure.  During DII 
(Current), the Group managed the services being provided by MoD staff and used 
existing commercial arrangements to manage any services being provided by contractors.  
They also worked on harmonising service procedures and rationalising applications, 
reducing them from over 6,000 to around 600.  Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and 
Domain Name Systems (DNS) were standardised to reduce problems with 
interconnections, so providing a sound foundation for the introduction of DII(F). 
 
Life did not stand still during this pre-contract phase and there was an ongoing 
requirement for the replacement of legacy systems and new IT investment.  The DII 
(Convergent) project ensured that any expenditure fitted with the DII(F) strategy.  In 
maintaining this plan, the DII Group had strong support from the 2nd PUS.  In 2002, he 
wrote to remind all Senior Finance Officers: 
 
…of the importance of scrutiny and consultation with the DII team before further 
IT commitments, including applications, are made in your respective areas within 
your TLB’s delegation.  Convergence towards DII can no longer be considered 
optional – we need to ensure that every £1 spent on IT gives us the maximum 
return, consistent with the DII’s objectives.116 
 
A number of major site developments resulted from the DCP.  FY2003/4 saw the move 
back into the refurbished Head Office Building in London (the HOME Project) and the 
new builds at Andover and Portsmouth, while a number of other sites, including High 
Wycombe and Northwood, were restructured.  These new buildings were all furnished 
with DII (Convergent) rather than refitting legacy systems, providing a common platform 
of key business software, access to user data, internal and external communication, 
collaborative working, an Electronic Document and Record Management System 
(EDRMS) and a platform for the introduction of modern technology.117   
 
The third project area was DII(F), the new, competitive ten year contract to replace 
current and convergent DII with a single architecture.  Again, in line with scholarly and 
policy thinking, the plan was to deliver DII(F) in three increments.  Each increment was 
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driven by the benefits realisation model and described the number of terminals (User 
Access Devices or UADs) and user accounts to be implemented at that stage.  The 
original three increments were later sub-divided into seven, but have since been reduced 
to five, as shown at Table 5.1, as Increments 3b and 3c are currently on hold due to lack 
of funds.   
 
Table 5.1. DII(F) Incremental Development 
 Increment 1 Increment 2a Increment 
2b 
(Alamein, 
Blenheim 
and 
Cambrai) 
Increment 
2c 
Increment 3a 
Scope Fixed DII: Royal Navy 
(RN) Vessels; 
RESTRICTED/SECRET; 
Managed service for 
DII/legacy systems 
Fixed DII 
infrastructure 
replacing legacy systems 
with DII 
(RESTRICTED/SECRET)  
Deployable 
systems and 
services at 
SECRET 
levels 
Above 
SECRET to 
support key 
operations 
and 
intelligence 
users.   
Remaining 
fixed MoD 
sites operating 
at 
RESTRICTED 
and SECRET 
Contract 
Award  
March 
2005 
December 
2006 
September 
2007 
January 
2009 
January 2010 
Number 
of 
UADs 
including 
DII(C) 
(18,500) 
72,000 (69,200 after the 
Medium 
Term Work 
Strands) (62,800 
excluding 
maritime rollout) 
44,000 3,332 
1,608 to be 
deployed 
 42,000 UADs  
Number 
of  
Users 
201,500 
(195,100 after 
the Medium Term Work 
Strands) 
57,500 Undefined  60,000 
Number 
of Sites 
680 locations, plus 
RN vessels 
660 locations 78 different 
HQs plus 
RN vessels 
  
Adapted from: Great Britain, National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Defence Information 
Infrastructure, (London, HMSO, 2008), http://www.nao.org.uk/whats_new/0708/0708788.aspx, 
downloaded 29th January 2011. 
 
The implementation is further broken down into the desktop capability being delivered, 
which is described as Release 1 (basic core functionality necessary for most enabled 
benefits) and Release 2 (full functionality, mainly required to realise the direct, additional 
capability and benefits), shown at Table 5.2.  This was later split into 2a and 2b, but is 
now described by three project names: Alamein, Blenheim and Cambrai.  Increments 1, 
2a and 3a are Release 1 implementations.  Increment 2b is implementation to fixed and 
deployed sites and 2c is Above SECRET.  Increments 3b and 3c are like 2b and 2c but 
include the remaining sites, which are mainly Royal Air Force (RAF).  Therefore, the 
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RAF is receiving most of the required basic capability but there is no funding for the 
remainder at this stage.   
 
Table 5.2. Release 1 and Release 2 Core Software Functionality 
 
Type of Software 
 
 
Key Elements of Release 1 
 
Key Elements of Release 2 
 
Software that the MoD needs to 
conduct its business, including office 
automation, web-browsing and 
electronic document and records 
management. 
 
Standard office tools, including word 
processing, internet and e-mail 
access, and standard file storage 
 
Desktops and laptops supported 
 
Access to a contractually agreed list 
of applications 
 
Electronic Document and Records 
Management Services (EDRMS) 
 
Collaborative tools 
 
A new MoD-wide personnel 
directory 
 
An enterprise-wide search capability 
 
Scanning services 
 
Remote access to MoD intranet for 
laptop users 
 
 
Software needed to monitor the 
system and to deliver the managed 
‘end-to-end’ service.  This includes 
software to measure Key 
Performance Indicators and online 
catalogues to allow users to order 
additional services or changes to their 
existing IT environment. 
 
Software tools to allow the helpdesk 
to manage contacts, user 
configurations and change requests   
 
Software to track resolution and to 
monitor customer satisfaction 
 
Tools to measure a contractually 
agreed subset of the Performance 
Indicators and Key Performance 
Indicators 
 
Pairs of data centres holding back-up 
copies of all data to ensure service 
continuity 
 
 
Tools to measure all of the 
Performance Indicators and Key 
Performance Indicators 
 
Web and application hosting services 
 
Software that is required to make the 
system secure from external attack 
and to ensure that material classified 
as RESTRICTED and SECRET can 
be handled safely. 
 
Discrete systems that can safely 
handle material classified as 
RESTRICTED and SECRET 
 
Identification, authentication and 
authorisation services, including, for 
instance, password protection 
Vulnerability testing and audit 
 
Basic Grade Messaging 
 
Public Key Infrastructure services 
supporting additional security such as 
signing and encryption 
 
A domain that can handle material 
classified as Confidential and provide 
access to the Government-wide XGSI 
domain 
 
Full business continuity support 
 
Medium and High Grade Messaging 
 
Source: Great Britain, House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, Defence Information 
Infrastructure: First Report of Session 2008-09, HC100, (London, HMSO, 2009). 
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The plan was to select the DP on its ability to deliver the complete ten-year requirement 
but with the MoD only committing to Increment 1 initially.  Once successfully delivered, 
it would then obtain Investment Appraisal Board (IAB) approval to contract for further 
increments.118  This process is essentially a contract amendment from the original 
contract and each increment requires a separate assessment phase and a separate Best and 
Final Offer (BAFO) submission from the DP.  This was seen as a way of retaining 
control over the supplier’s performance and protecting against failure.119  It also allowed 
the MoD to review its requirements on a regular basis, enabling it to maintain 
technological currency and adapt to any changes in its operational and business needs, 
whilst ensuring continued VfM.120  The contract was also structured in this way so that 
the consortium could recoup most of its investment in the Programme through 
performance-based payments, charging for both terminals and for user accounts.  
Different charges apply to different user types based on their usage, security 
requirements, location and level of support.  There is a flat payment for Release 1 and a 
sliding scale of charges for Release 2.  There is also a service charge for hosting 
applications and other services from the DII catalogue.   
 
Before the contract was awarded, the DII Group re-structured to set up an internally 
agreed organisation and processes so that the DP could be accommodated immediately 
the contract was signed.121  A DII Operating Model was created, shown at Figure 5.8, 
which included existing responsibilities, such as support of legacy contracts and services, 
as well as the negotiation, implementation and ongoing support for the DII(F) contract 
and service.  The IPT customers are shown on the left, MoD corporate bodies on top and 
the DP and legacy suppliers on the right.  A significant portion of service management 
rests with the supplier, but is assured by the DII Group.  Service delivery and 
management is based on the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), 
which is a set of concepts and practices for IT services management, development and 
operations provided by the OGC.  Support and management of legacy services remains a 
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Figure 5.8. DII Operating Model, 2005 
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Source: Quick, B., (2009), Unpublished Paper on the History of DII.   
 
Delivery function.  With this major change, the Group re-organised around functions, 
rather than legacy systems, as shown at Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3. DII: Functions 
Business & 
Finance 
Management 
Contract & 
Commercial 
Project 
Engineering 
Programme Delivery Service Assurance 
Strategic Planning Procurement & 
Acquisition 
Service Development Programme Planning, 
Processes & Governance 
Performance 
Management 
IPT Structure & 
Processes 
Supplier/Corporate 
Relationships 
Technical Assurance Implementation Service Change 
Management 
Information & 
Knowledge 
Management 
Legal/Contractual Engineering 
Management – Non-
Data Processing 
Systems 
Programme Operations Performance 
Improvement 
Financial 
Management 
 Application Integration DII(F) Increment 1 
Transition & Migration 
Management 
Systems Operations 
Secretariat & Office 
Management 
 Local Identity 
Assurance/Identity 
Assurance 
Legacy Programme 
Management 
Local Performance 
Measurement 
Personnel Support   Increment 2/3 Assessment Local Service Change 
Management 
Local Business 
Management 
Activities 
    
Source: Quick, B., (2009), Unpublished Paper on the History of DII. 
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The Business and Finance Management, Project Engineering, Contract and Commercial, 
and Service Assurance elements of the structure had existed previously and Programme 
Delivery incorporated the other functions.  Based on these functions, the revised 
organisational structure was initiated in early 2005 and is shown at Figure 5.9.   
 
Figure 5.9. DII IPT Organisational Structure 
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Source: Quick, B., (2009), Unpublished Paper on the History of DII. 
 
The number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff was stated in STP04, as shown at Table 
5.4.  These numbers were adjusted to reflect transfers in and out and so are based on a 
common baseline.   
 
Table 5.4. DII Manpower Numbers (Envisaged) 2004 
 FY 05/06 FY 06/07 FY 07/08 FY 08/09 
STP 05 671.5 653 647 611.5 
Source: Quick, B., (2009), Unpublished Paper on the History of DII. 
 
It was estimated that around 400-450 staff would retain oversight of service delivery and 
manage change, thereby operating as a so-called ‘intelligent customer’.  Therefore, a plan 
was put in place to reduce staff numbers but to replace them with Technical Support 
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contractors, giving the savings shown at Table 5.5.  These numbers were fed through the 
Planning Round for 2008, resulting in a lower baseline position than originally envisaged.  
 
Table 5.5. DII Manpower Numbers (Actual) 2004 
 FY 05/06 FY 06/07 FY 07/08 FY 08/09 
Actual 579 557 559 565 
Reductions 
(against STP05) 
 
92.5 
 
96 
 
88 
 
46.5 
Source: Quick, B., (2009), Unpublished Paper on the History of DII. 
 
Under the plans for the creation of the ISS cluster, the numbers continued to decrease 
through reductions and transfers to other ISS Business Units. 
 
The operations of the DII Group are complex.  Unlike other procurement teams, it is not 
simply focused on one piece of equipment and it will continue to manage the contract and 
to operate DII(F) throughout both the project and product lifecycle.  This is different 
from most major equipment procurement where the equipment is handed over and 
managed by an in-service team following its development and manufacture.  Therefore, 
the DII Group was expected to have a long term and extended involvement with the 
system.  To some extent, this explains the rationale behind the planned size and structure 
of the Group.122  
 
The creation of the ISS cluster in 2007 resulted in a series of changes to the Group.  
Following the contract award and the increase in Urgent Operational Requirements 
(UORs), which describes the allocation of extra money from the Treasury to provide 
rapid equipment provision, a Battlespace Group was formed in January 2008.  This was 
given responsibility for Deployed and Maritime Systems, Above SECRET Systems and 
UORs.  The resulting top-level organisation structure is shown at Figure 5.10.   It remains 
very flat with eleven deputy heads looking after different disciplines and reporting 
directly to the Head of DII while the Executive Officer acts as a programme manager, 
keeping oversight of the various functions within the organisation.  Then, in 2008, an 
Enterprise Management function was created to provide both the DII and the Defence 
Cryptosecurity Authority (DCA) Groups with Financial and Commercial support as well 
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as covering the Requirements, Programmes, Finance, Commercial and Business 
Management groups.  This generated efficiencies but also provides specialist functional  
 
Figure 5.10. DII Group Organisation 
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Source: Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment and Support, Information Systems 
and Services, Defence Information Infrastructure: Joint Business Plan 2009-2010, (London, HMSO, 
2009), page 27. 
 
expertise to DCA in Finance and Commercial.  Further work has been undertaken to 
identify other functions common to both Groups and place them within the Enterprise 
Management Group.  Finally, the DII Programme Delivery staff within the regions 
became ISS staff.    
 
Having acquired the necessary resources in terms of finance and staff, the DII Group also 
required a governance structure for the Programme with clear lines of authority and 
responsibility.  As shown at Figure 5.11, the Chief Executive (CE) of ATLAS and 2nd 
PUS meet regularly as do the Partnering Board and Joint User Working Group, which is 
chaired by the Programme Director, as SRO, and addresses issues raised by the user 
community.  Many of the internal stakeholders sit on the Programme Board, which meets 
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quarterly or more frequently, if necessary.  The Executive Review was established in 
2007 and meets monthly.  Its purpose is to strengthen oversight by senior members of the  
 
Figure 5.11. The High Level Governance Structure of DII 
Second Permanent Under Secretary
Head of EDS (HP) (as required)
Programme Board (Quarterly)
Executive Review (Monthly)
Executive Board (Bi-Monthly)
Joint User Working Group 
(Monthly)
Partnering Board       
(Monthly)
 
Source: Great Britain, National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Defence Information 
Infrastructure, (London, HMSO, 2008), page 16. 
 
DII Programme from both the MoD and ATLAS.  Finally, there is an Executive Board of 
Directors, Brigadiers and 1-Star equivalent staff, which meets more frequently, as 
necessary.  The Director of Equipment Capability for Command, Control and 
Information Infrastructure (DEC CCII), the internal expert on using IT on deployments, 
is a full member of the relevant boards, formal sponsor of the programme and owner of 
the URD.  This governance structure includes all of the important stakeholders, such as 
representatives of the three services and other TLBs.  However, interestingly, the 
diagram, taken from the NAO report on DII, suggests only a downward flow through the 
Boards, rather than a two-way interaction.   
 
The Procurement Strategy for DII is based on the principles of Smart Acquisition, 
detailed at Appendix 5.  In response to the requirement for innovative acquisition, it was 
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decided that the procurement process would be incremental, as discussed above, and that 
the DP would take the form of a consortium.  Contracting for a group of suppliers rather 
than a single supplier and requiring them to shadow one another would provide security 
and continuity of supply.123  It was also decided that, rather than local procurement 
officers purchasing the hardware and software, the DP would select and supply on behalf 
of the MoD.  In addition, legacy systems, along with existing PFI contracts, would be 
brought under DP management.  This centralised procurement and control was seen as an 
essential step in achieving coherence across the MoD.  The DP would also manage the 
network and its systems, providing a single helpdesk for fault resolution, rather than the 
50 individual IT helpdesks for the MoD user community that existed at that time.124  
Payment would be for performance.  Each service would have a linked Key Performance 
Indicator (KPI) to ensure the right level of performance, which would be defined in a 
service-based PPP contract.  Mandated by the OGC for complex programmes, PPP is 
considered to minimise risk and volatility.125  This Consortium arrangement gives 
diversity, depth and resilience.  However, it also creates additional complexity and 
challenges, which are likely to impinge on the operation of the Programme. 
 
The Initial Gate Business Case was approved in July 2002 and the project entered the 
Assessment phase of the CADMID cycle, shown previously at Figure 5.5.  The 
Procurement Strategy received Ministerial approval at the end of March 2003 and 
expressions of interest were invited.  Of the ten received, four were shortlisted with lead 
suppliers shown in bold:  
 
ACTUS  IBM, BAE Systems, Computer Centre, Steria, NTL, Echelon 
ATLAS  EDS, Fujitsu, EADS, General Dynamics, LogicaCMG 
Radii   CSC, BT, CGEY, Thales E-Security 
Lockheed Martin Lockheed Martin, Deloitte Consulting, Hewlett Packard (HP), 
Qinetiq, SAIC, Unisys.126   
 
Detailed negotiations were held with the preferred bidders in September 2003 and Main 
Gate approval was reached in the third quarter of 2004 when final offers were requested 
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from ATLAS and Radii.127  Unusually, the DII Group then developed a partnership with 
both, negotiating two separate contracts to expedite the move from announcing the 
preferred bidder to contract signature and to remove the instability created during final 
contract negotiations.128  The plan was to gain approval and funding from the MoD in 
October 2004 for contract signature in December 2004.   However, the decision was 
taken to extend the negotiations in order to present a stronger business case.  This was a 
costly decision as, by that stage, spending for industry was at the level of about £2 
million per month per consortium and spending for the DII Group was about £1 
million.129  As a result, the MoD did not approve the DII Programme until 1 March 2005.  
The contract was let to the ATLAS Consortium three weeks later with Hewlett Packard 
(HP) and IBM in minor roles.  At the PAC hearing following the NAO report in 2008, 
there seemed to be some confusion about IBM’s role, with the Secretary of State unaware 
of their involvement and the CIO claiming their involvement in a consultancy capacity 
during the early days.   
 
The delay in letting the contract meant the scheduled three-month start-up phase was lost.  
However, the Group decided against revising the timetable as elements of the DCP, 
particularly the implementation of JPA, were dependent on the implementation of DII.  
Conversely, DII was set to claim around £180 million in financial benefits as a result of 
the JPA implementation, making its delivery imperative.130  With the cost models written 
on the basis of supporting the DCP, any delays would necessitate rewriting them.  It was 
for these reasons that everyone was keen to keep to the original timeline.  ATLAS agreed 
that it would be able to find premises and staff in time to begin work within the 
timeframe although, given the competitive procurement in which it was working, it was 
difficult to refuse to co-operate.131  Based on previous experience, ATLAS believed that 
it could achieve the implementation dates without a start-up period.132  However, this put 
the project three months behind from the start of the contract and it remained in catch-up 
mode from that point.133   
 
As a result of the pre-contract preparation discussed above, the first members of ATLAS 
began work with the DII Group within two days of the contract being signed, setting up 
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common plans and processes.134  However, ATLAS still needed to employ and build up 
its team.  It took until August 2005 for it to reach a complement of 800 trained personnel 
with security clearance in place, only five months before the first DII(F) terminals were 
to be installed.  In the first six months, the Group and ATLAS worked together to ensure 
that key milestones were delivered on time.  Legacy computer systems were transferred 
to ATLAS and the helpdesk was opened in November 2005, two months later than 
planned.  The rollout of DII(F) was due to start in early 2006, which meant that 
preparations had to begin as soon as the contract was let with sites being prepared to 
receive new hardware, and software having to be designed.  However, the lack of a start-
up period had given little opportunity for MoD site preparation, to agree ways of working 
or to pilot implementation processes.  The outcomes of this are discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Six. 
The appointment of EDS as lead supplier was controversial.135  A US company, EDS 
arrived in the UK in 1984, and held a 54% share of the market for central government IT 
projects by 2003.136  However, its history with government was chequered, suffering 
much criticism over its high profile failures, most notably the Child Support Agency.137  
In 2002, it was reportedly “haemorrhaging money” after losing a reported £900 million 
working on the Affinity programme to modernise IT systems in the Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP).138  The ambitious project to run the US Navy’s Intranet services, 
the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), discussed in Chapter Four, was considered to 
be successful, but the company struggled to gain any financial reward from the work.139  
Its contract to provide NHS email under the National Programme for IT was terminated 
in 2004.140  In November 2005, it was involved in ‘complex’ negotiations with the 
government over the tax credit system failure, described by the PAC as ‘disastrous’.141  
That same year, it paid HM Revenue and Customs compensation of £71.25 million and 
came close to litigation.142  In February 2005, just before the MoD awarded the contract, 
it was revealed through a Freedom of Information request that Whitehall had reported 
four times on EDS’s activities over the previous three years.143  Following due process, 
once the NAO had published its report on DII in 2008, the PAC held its hearing.  The 
MoD was scrutinised over this decision but maintained that the contract had been won in 
 5-41 
open competition and described the relationship that it had with ATLAS as something of 
a model.  Its experience of working with EDS did not confirm the reports of its poor 
performance on other projects. 
In May 2008, HP bought EDS for $13.9 billion dollars, doubling its services business to 
$38 billion a year and 210,000 employees, and putting it in a strong market position 
behind IBM.144  HP covers all aspects of IT from design, manufacturing, selling and 
services to banking.  Although it was the only major IT company to cover every aspect of 
IT outsourcing, it was weak in the service industry, an area where EDS had strengths.  
Therefore, EDS became a business group within HP, cutting its workforce and evolving 
into HP Enterprise Services in 2009.145  HP’s Defence and Security arm now runs six 
major contracts, although DII dwarfs the others in terms of its size and revenue base.146  
Therefore, EDS fitted the HP portfolio and the two companies dovetailed, rather than 
merged. 
The overall process to set up the DII Programme took two years from initial invitation to 
contract award, an impressive achievement for a project of this scale and complexity.147  
During this time, the project went through the OGC Gateway review process and was 
rated amber at its Initial Review in 2003 with a recommendation to create more detailed 
implementation plans.148  The Gateway Three Review was held in 2004 and DII was 
rated in the top 10 per cent of public sector IT projects, although more work was required 
on its benefits plan.149  The project was also reviewed in the NAO’s 2003 Major Projects 
Report, which heavily criticised the MoD for underestimating risks and for time 
slippage.150  In accordance with the contract requirement, ATLAS organised its 
workloads to minimise the risk of both failure and delay.151  Fujitsu shadows EDS, while 
EADS, General Dynamics and Logica cover for one another, as shown at Table 5.6.152   
 
The legacy systems are transferred to ATLAS about four months after the contract is 
awarded for the increment in which they will be replaced.  This allows for detailed 
planning and ensures that there is appropriate consultation with the Trades Unions prior 
to the transfer of support staff under TUPE provisions. Some legacy systems, such as 
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Table 5.6. ATLAS Consortium: Members and Role 
Consortium Member Role 
EDS (now HP) Prime Contract Management, Programme 
Management, 
Design, Roll-out and Service Management of DII(F) 
IT Infrastructure 
Fujitsu Design, rollout and service management of DII(F) 
IT infrastructure, programme management and risk 
sharing, backup to EDS as prime 
EADS/Cogent 
(now Cassidian) 
Network communications, security, service 
management and deployed services 
General Dynamics Network communications, deployed services, 
training services 
Logica CMG Security, core EDRM, collaboration applications, 
legacy applications migration, risk management, 
management of change, training  
Others, including Dell, HP, IBM, EMC2, Cisco 
Systems, Microsoft, Fujitsu/Siemens 
Capability partners 
Source: Oldnall, M., ‘Defence Information Infrastructure’, Presentation to Masters in Defence 
Administration Course, (Shrivenham, Defence Academy, May 2006). 
 
NavyAdmin and NavyNet, are split across all increments due to their size and 
complexity, and to best support the delivery of benefits.153 Where systems have to be 
outsourced, the original contractor continues to manage the system but is paid by ATLAS 
rather than directly by the DII Group.  ATLAS receives a 5% corporate overhead fee for 
this service, considered to be an acceptable price to pay for the reduction in risk gained 
by having a single supplier for both the legacy and new system at the point of 
migration.154 
 
This review of the Business Process for contracting and operating DII has shown that 
information is considered a key aspect of military capability and that the MoD has 
undertaken clear strategic planning in order to deliver that information.  However, 
translating that strategy into operational effect has been hindered by the state of the 
legacy Defence information infrastructure, which made it difficult to manage or share 
information.  The identified means to rectify that situation was the move to a future state 
through the DII Programme.  This discussion has charted the creation of the DII Group 
and the associated processes and structures, designed to deliver that solution.  With a 
clear vision and mission in place, the Group has ensured top-level support and made 
moves to acquire control of the necessary systems, people and funding.  It has apparently 
followed many of the ‘rules’ identified in the literature review and the reports.  The next 
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phase of this research is, therefore, to examine whether this has had the desired effect.  
Have the identified CSFs been understood and applied to the DII Programme? 
 
5.5. Summary  
 
This chapter has unpeeled the layers of complexity surrounding the Technical Solution, 
examining the Programme, Policy and Political Context, the Organisational Setting and 
the Business Process.  The overview of the wider government context showed the 
collision of two policies, greater reliance on IT as a means of delivering government 
services and the move to outsourcing, resulting from the adoption of business tools and 
techniques as a means of improving efficiency and control.  This has resulted in a number 
of initiatives to provide more effective government procurement and project 
management.  Four key themes arose from this discussion, three relating to CSFs 
identified previously: the need for common practices and processes along with some 
means of ensuring compliance (Consistency and Coherence); the need for an 
improvement in government’s skills and knowledge in the areas of commercial 
management, financial management, project and risk management, and IT capability 
(Competence and Capacity); ensuring economy, efficiency and effectiveness in terms of 
both procurement and project management (Value for Money); and a much greater 
emphasis on the need to manage contracts, rather than simply letting them and handing 
over responsibility to the supplier.  These are potentially undeliverable without also 
tackling the two overarching themes: the need for increased governance, much stronger 
authority in terms of directed and required compliance, and the lack of priority given to 
the learning of lessons in government.  
 
These themes were followed through to the next layer, Organisational Setting, which 
examined how the MoD translates government policy into action in order to deliver 
changes in practice within its own specific context.  The description of the structure and 
organisation of the MoD shows a department with strong lines of authority and strong 
drivers for change.  On the face of it, its systems are well considered, logical and should 
be the basis of a successful organisation operating within the boundaries of public 
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expenditure planning, control and accountability.  However, it is an organisational setting 
that is currently suffering serious problems with its procurement and project 
management.  There is an apparent interaction across the boundaries of the Programme, 
Policy and Political Context and the Organisational Setting.  However, whilst the number 
of reports being published by the MoD provides evidence of that policy being translated 
to the Defence context, there is little evidence that it is then having an impact on the 
‘Business Process’. 
 
The final stage of the discussion, therefore, examined the background to the setting up of 
the DII Programme, driven by an urgent need to improve the state of Defence 
information.  It then described the creation of the DII Group, designing its structure and 
processes to deliver a single information infrastructure for Defence and, finally, discussed 
the setting up and letting of the contract to a DP in the form of the ATLAS Consortium.  
Ostensibly, the DII Group appears to have understood and applied many of the CSFs 
identified in Chapter Four.  There were efforts to gain the necessary funding 
(Affordability); consideration of how it was going to fulfil the need for an infrastructure 
(Alternatives Certainty); clarity around the business need for the project (Benefits 
Certainty) and the need for the organisation to change (Change Readiness); shared 
understanding by key stakeholders (Clarity and Perception); the right people with the 
right skills (Competence and Capacity); tactics to manage risk (Complexity 
Management); a desired integration of established systems (Consistency and Coherence); 
awareness of cost, time and scope (Constraints Certainty); the adoption of a modular and 
incremental approach (Scalability and Flexibility); recognition of the need to 
communicate with stakeholders (Stakeholder Management); and the need to run the 
project economically and efficiently (Value for Money).  In order to ascertain whether 
these assumptions are correct, Chapter Six examines the Technical Solution.   
 
Despite the above assertion that the activity undertaken at the Programme, Policy and 
Political Context and the Organisational Setting layers has had little effect on the 
Business Process, this initial examination of the DII Programme suggests that there has 
been sound planning to provide a good basis for a successful outcome.  Therefore, the 
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next stage of this research is to examine what happened next and whether this successful 
outcome has been achieved.  It does this by analysing the Technical Solution, considering 
the development and implementation of the hardware and software.  It then goes on to 
explore the understanding and application of the identified CSFs in greater detail before 
analysing their impact on the management and performance of the DII Programme. 
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Chapter Six 
Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme:  
Impact of Identified CSFs 
 
 
6.1.  Investigating the Impact 
 
Chapter Five examined the context of this project, highlighting government policy on 
project management and procurement, describing how this has filtered into the 
Organisational Setting of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) with regard to equipment and 
Information Technology (IT) procurement, and then examining how this has impacted on 
the Business Process for the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme.  Over 
time, governments of all persuasions in the UK have moved to greater reliance on IT with 
increased outsourcing of their business requirements to the private sector.  This has not 
been without its problems and, as a result, there have been a number of government 
initiatives requiring greater Consistency and Coherence, Competence and Capacity, 
Value for Money and improved contract management.  However, overarching these is the 
need for greater governance to ensure that these initiatives become reality along with 
effective tools to capture and share learning across government.  There have been a 
number of MoD reports that have translated the resulting government policy to the 
Defence setting to ensure that it becomes embedded into practice.  However, the ongoing 
problems with the MoD’s major projects raise questions about the effectiveness of this 
process.  The scale and value of the DII Programme puts it at the crux of the demand for 
improved MoD procurement on the one hand and the drive to reduce the number of IT 
project failures in government on the other.  The overview of how it was set up, 
structured and contracted, which was presented in Chapter Five, suggests that many of 
the CSFs identified from the major reports scrutinised in Chapter Four have been 
understood and applied.  However, as a complex IT mega-project operating in a highly 
uncertain environment, how has the Programme fared since the contract was let? 
 
This chapter presents the second stage of this case study, which sets out to investigate the 
impact of the identified CSFs.  It begins by focusing on the central core of the Conceptual 
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Framework, the ‘Technical Solution’, the IT project under review.  Having highlighted 
some of the key issues surrounding project type and the technical development and 
implementation of DII, it then investigates the ‘Understanding’ and ‘Application’ of the 
identified CSFs before finally considering their impact.  The structure closely follows the 
logic described by the Conceptual Framework, shown again at Figure 6.1 with the 
elements under review in this chapter highlighted.    
 
Figure 6.1. Conceptual Framework: the DII Case Study: Impact of CSFs 
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The process of data collection for this analysis is described in Chapter Three and was 
based on 23 interviews, 17 with ATLAS and DII Group representatives and five with 
representatives of the wider government context.  Whilst also making use of secondary 
data, it is recognised that this is by no means a full account of this large, complex project 
and only those incidents considered critical to this study are reported here.  The purpose 
of the interview questions was to encourage discussion rather than elicit quantitative data.  
Therefore, no statistical analysis has been applied to the resulting data and the graphs are 
intended to be generally representative of the views expressed, rather than exact 
quantifications.   
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6.2.  Technical Solution 
 
Brown observed that IT mega-projects in government often ignore the needs of their 
users and opt for leading edge technology.1  However, DII has not followed this route and 
is now delivering significant benefits simply by providing around 90% of users with 
access to Microsoft Office, e-mail and a web browser, at security levels ranging from 
UNCLASSIFIED to RESTRICTED, available at standard office hours in UK and 
overseas locations, with access to specialist applications as necessary.2  Therefore, it is 
using relatively mature technology and aiming for achievable goals.3  The major 
technical challenge is the environment into which it is being implemented, particularly 
the maritime and deployed spaces, and the rationalisation of existing infrastructure and 
applications.4  Brown has also noted that government IT projects suffer from the speed of 
technological change.5  With the normal lifecycle for desktop services being around three 
to four years and an IT half-life of around 18 months, this presents a risk to the DII 
Programme.6  The Institute for Government recently recognised the difficulties that the 
traditional project lifecycle presents in terms of keeping pace with rapid technology 
changes given its pre-defined specifications and pre-determined timescales.7  The 
Government discontinued PFI for IT projects, recognising that the cost of replacing assets 
during the average ten-year contract eroded the supplier’s profit margin.8  In addition, 
meeting the requirements of a contract defined ten years ago makes it likely that the 
delivered product will be based on out-dated technology even with planned refreshes.9  
Operating within the realm of a ten-year contract, the DII Programme, therefore, needs to 
be managed through life, including the necessary technology updates.10  However, at 
present, the main concern for ATLAS is the delivery of current capability: the 
development of the requisite software and the implementation of both hardware and 
software.  Before examining this, the issue of project type is assessed, whether DII was 
categorised in this way and into which category the Programme fits. 
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6.2.1. Project Type 
 
The issue of project type was discussed during the literature review.  Pinto and Covin 
found that CSFs vary according to project type.11  IT projects can be clearly differentiated 
from other types of project, largely due to the complexity of their product.  McFarlan12 
and later Ward and Griffiths13 extended this thinking to identify types of IT projects, 
noting that different IT projects add value to an organisation in different ways and, 
therefore, are likely to require different management approaches and, therefore, different 
CSFs.14  Identifying and understanding the project type informs the management, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of value being delivered to the organisation.  Ward and Griffiths 
devised a portfolio model, shown again at Figure 6.2, classifying projects as Strategic, 
Key Operational, High Potential or Support.  They argue that the first stage in any IT 
project should be to understand the type of project that needs to be managed and then to 
identify the relevant CSFs.   
 
Figure 6.2. Project Type Classifications 
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Source: Ward, J. and Griffiths, P., Strategic Planning for Information Systems, (Chichester, Wiley, 
1996), page 364. 
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Although the utility of this process was recognised, the interviewees were unfamiliar with 
this model and did not know whether the project had been classified in this way.  When 
asked to classify DII according to these types, there was no real consensus but the most 
frequent suggestions were either Strategic, as it links the business of Defence to military 
effect, or Key Operational, as it is about the efficient operation of the MoD.  Based on 
Ward and Griffiths’ explanation, it fits most sensibly into Strategic, as shown at Table 
6.1.  This demonstrates that DII is providing information, both internal and external,  
 
Table 6.1. Strategic IT Project Type 
Typical Strategic Information Requirements DII Information Requirements 
Access to new information about markets, 
customers, competitors, suppliers or other external 
bodies, to improve competitiveness 
Exploit information as a strategic asset in support of 
Defence outcomes; the key enabler of the 
change Programmes that are transforming 
the MoD and the wider Defence community. 
Establishment of electronic links with external 
bodies, to speed up and improve communications 
Support the sharing of information with Allies and 
other external parties, including other government 
departments 
Access to external information to gain intelligence Access to the Internet 
Restructured existing information in order to meet 
the CSFs of the business  
Access to secure information and services with 
protection from attack and misuse 
Capability to integrate and utilise multimedia data Capability to integrate and utilise multimedia data 
Very fast access to integrated information so that 
visibility is provided from end to end of the key 
processes and information based services can be 
delivered effectively throughout the processes  
Appropriate access from any appropriate location; 
allow users to collaborate interactively; guaranteed 
levels of availability and continuity of operational 
and business services 
Access and filtering mechanisms for unstructured 
information to satisfy executive information needs 
relating to critical business issues 
Facilitate the electronic management of information 
and records to meet the Freedom of Information Act 
and government targets on electronic public records 
Performance measures to monitor progress on 
strategic factors 
A quantifiable service to the user community; 
delivering capability to meet the business needs and 
benefits 
Modelling data to perform ‘what if’ analysis on 
critical business issues 
Delivering information management  
Better information about staff to enable more 
effective use of the human resource 
Delivery of corporate applications, such as JPA 
Source: Adapted from Ward, J. and Griffiths, P., Strategic Planning for Information Systems, (Wiley, 
Chichester, 1996), page 365 and DII, Frequently Asked Questions: Finance and Funding, (DII, 
Corsham, n.d.). 
 
 
which is critical to strategic business initiatives and associated with business drivers, 
objectives or measures of success.  This type of information requires a flexible system 
that can be adapted as business needs evolve.  It also assists the organisation in gaining 
sustainable competitive advantage or, in MoD terms, best value and operational 
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capability.  Therefore, having clearly identified the type of project and understood the 
value that it is delivering to the organisation, the discussion now turns to the provision of 
the Technical Solution, looking first at the software development and then the 
implementation of both the software and hardware.  
 
6.2.2.  Software Development 
 
Although largely available with DII(Convergent), it was decided by ATLAS to redesign 
the required software to deliver, monitor and manage the DII(F) service, security 
requirements and data centres, and to provide access to other software programs.  The 
National Audit Office (NAO) described this process as being of “a low technical risk”.15  
Before each implementation, ATLAS integrates and enables the relevant applications.  
EDS (now HP), the lead supplier for the ATLAS Consortium, ran the infrastructure 
project at the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), an experience which provided a 
template for DII(F).  Software development took four months at DWP and was extended 
to twelve months for DII(F), based on standard software engineering practice: a statement 
of requirement, high-level then low-level designs, and a series of tests and trials to 
produce usable outputs.  At each stage, the DII Group Engineering team undertook 
assurance, checking for over-engineering, Value for Money (VfM) and conformity to 
MoD policy and regulations, particularly security.  However, ATLAS had underestimated 
the technical difficulty of making each application compatible with DII along with the 
required manpower, resulting in poor quality designs, a high rejection rate and, therefore, 
increased scrutiny.16  The core applications for DII(F) were due to be delivered in two 
stages: Release 1 in December 2005 and Release 2 in June 2006.  These were delayed 
with most of the applications for the RESTRICTED element of Release 1 delivered about 
18 months late.17  Release 2 is yet to appear in full.   
 
However, the biggest challenge in terms of the software development was the MoD’s 
strict security accreditation process, undertaken by its independent accreditation 
authority.18  ATLAS had difficulty in finding sufficient suitably skilled staff to develop 
software within these constraints.  Their problems were further exacerbated by the 
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publication of the so-called Burton Report in 2008, Report into the Loss of MoD Personal 
Data, a highly critical review of the MoD’s information security procedures, which 
caused a clampdown on security requirements.19  As a result, it took two years longer 
than planned to develop a version of DII(F) that was able to handle SECRET material.20  
This relates back to the observations about ‘political hyperactivism’ that were discussed 
in Chapter Two, demonstrating that changes in policy can cause critical problems, 
particularly to an IT system under development.   
 
The delays to the software development resulted in DII(F) being implemented without 
some essential business applications, meaning that some users had to work on two 
systems, extending the cost of retaining their legacy systems.  Contractually, users would 
only be moved to DII(F) if it gave them increased capability.  However, the failure to 
provide Release 2 and full functionality meant that DII(F) could not match the capability 
provided by DII(Convergent) at Main Building, the Royal Navy (RN) Headquarters (HQ) 
and the Royal Air Force (RAF) HQ.  Therefore, all three HQs had to be provided with 
additional data storage at a cost of £1.3 million.21  Rather than receiving full functionality 
in one delivery, software is being released in batches with significant delays.  Release 2, 
the full functionality, including the Electronic Document and Records Management 
Service (EDRMS), has been broken into smaller work packages with the final one due in 
2013, seven years late.22  This will deliver the final major indirect benefits, the IT-
enabled change, that Defence requires.  However, the delay means that it will deliver 
only two years of benefit, rather than the nine years originally envisaged, raising 
significant questions about its VfM.   
 
In 2008, ATLAS formed teams to work on each software release, enabling multiple 
streams of work, with new protocols agreed for the design and review cycle.23  The DII 
Group dedicated more resources to the assurance process, whilst also agreeing test and 
trial criteria explicitly at the beginning of each design cycle.24  The Programme is 
currently working on ‘DII Optimisation’, a business transformation initiative, which will 
result in joint production of every design and reduced costs to both the MoD and 
ATLAS.25  Over time, therefore, lessons have been learned and put into practice.  In 
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terms of the Technical Solution, one interviewee described DII as a “simple technology 
project, the only issue is scale”. 26  Ironically, the perceived simplicity of the technology 
has proved more complex than anticipated.  How then has the DII Programme coped with 
the issue of scale? 
 
6.2.2.  DII(F) Implementation 
 
As with the software development, the implementation of DII(F) was considered 
relatively straightforward.  Again, based on experience at DWP, ATLAS proposed a 
Fixed Rollout Methodology: a generic 38-week plan applied at every site irrespective of 
size, complexity or condition.27  This had proved to be consistent and efficient, delivering 
the DWP infrastructure ahead of schedule.28  It also required minimal oversight, so 
reducing the requirement for project managers.29  As part of the contract preparation, the 
DII Group and ATLAS surveyed around 50 sites to estimate IT provision, but without 
taking into account the physical condition of the land or buildings.  Therefore, the Group 
made assumptions that existing infrastructure, such as network switches, cabling and 
ducting, could be reused and that there would be suitable space available to house the 
network and server equipment.  The Group also assumed that site plans and statutory 
Health and Safety documentation, such as asbestos and power supply surveys, would be 
up-to-date and available.  Given this, they had little contact with Defence Estates, the 
body responsible for MoD-owned land and property.  At DWP, it had taken six months to 
plan the implementation at fairly standard sites with uniform infrastructure and good 
quality communications.30  However, given the size and complexity of MoD sites, this 
planning period was extended to twelve months with eighteen months allocated to the 
implementation with no prior pilot testing.  In reality, it took around eighteen months to 
set up the engineering, while the installation continues to date.   
 
Twelve weeks before implementation, a survey was carried out to assess requirements at 
each site.  To assist this, the Second Permanent Under Secretary for State (2nd PUS) 
demanded that change across Defence should be minimised with no further changes once 
the site surveys had been completed.31  Despite this, users at many sites continued to 
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make changes, delaying implementation further.  More critically, and unlike DWP, the 
MoD sites proved to be very diverse, ranging from infrequently used TA buildings to 
Main Building in London.32  Some of the buildings are in a decrepit state with limited 
functionality, whilst some are privately rented.  There were also some very idiosyncratic 
problems: asbestos and unexploded devices had to be removed from a number of sites33; 
Craigiehall, the HQ of the 2nd Division of the Army, was listed and so trunking could not 
be used;34 planning permission had to be sought to put cabling through a listed lawn at 
the Cavalry barracks.35  Substantial work had to be undertaken at a number of sites to 
bring them to the minimum standard required for implementation.  ATLAS had to re-do 
virtually every single survey and around half of the designs.36   
 
Changes to the implementation plans resulted in an increase in the number of terminals 
scheduled for delivery in the first two months.  However, ATLAS had only employed a 
small number of basic project managers, each responsible for up to 30 sites, making a 
flexible response to delays impossible.  The contract required 62,800 terminals to be 
installed by the end of July 2007, which meant that between 6,000 and 7,000 terminals 
had to be installed each month, an unachievable target as resources became increasingly 
stretched.37  Only 29,000 had been delivered by the end of April 2008.38  This meant that 
legacy systems had to be maintained, causing further cost and an 18-month delay to 
Increment 1.39  These additional costs were shared with the DII Group, which used some 
of its contingency fund, although the service contract meant that ATLAS could only 
charge if it were able to prove expense over and above the agreed fixed price or that the 
delays were caused by the MoD.40   However, the major loss was time, proving critical to 
the delivery of the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system, which depended on the 
installation of DII(F).41  Therefore, during 2006 and 2007, installation was focused on 
those sites awaiting JPA.  In some cases, additional legacy terminals were added at an 
additional cost of around £12 million.42  Ultimately, the implementation date for JPA was 
delayed by four months, although this was partly due to JPA application delays.43    
 
As with the software development, learning took place.  The Fixed Methodology was 
discarded and the so-called Decision Point Process, based on gates and stages, was 
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adopted instead.44  Now, both the DII Group and ATLAS carry out the surveys with the 
ATLAS project managers undertaking the detailed preparatory work.  Meetings are held 
regularly with key stakeholders, including Defence Estates, BT and local planning 
bodies.  The overall quality of the survey and associated design work has improved.  
Realistic assessments are made about how long preparatory work will take, which 
dictates the order of site implementation.  The new process was implemented in 2007 
with significant improvements and is now working to plan, producing positive statistics 
with 240,000 of the 300,000 accounts rolled out to date.45    
 
Despite these improvements, further difficulties have been encountered.  For example, 
the largest implementation to date has been at Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), 
Abbeywood near Bristol.  The plan to install software remotely proved too slow and so a 
locally managed build room had to be set up where software was installed from compact 
discs.  When the system went live, an unanticipated number of users experienced 
problems, overwhelming the ATLAS support staff and necessitating a rapid recruitment 
drive.  Since this implementation, the business that is carried out at Abbeywood has 
evolved in response to changing MoD requirements, which means that the site now has a 
fundamentally different purpose.  ATLAS originally installed 7,000 terminals, but the 
ongoing business change has doubled the number of people now working on that site.46  
Making provision for them on DII(F) entails not just moving terminals, but also moving 
data, ensuring access to applications and installing additional network rooms.  Therefore, 
the continued flux in Defence creates additional work and cost. 
 
To date, ATLAS has made two attempts to roll out DII to Cyprus.  The first was based on 
an assumption that the network between the UK and Cyprus was suitable for the job.  In 
order to expedite the contract, the state and capacity of the cable connection with Cyprus 
had been estimated by the MoD, ignoring the fact that the bandwidth is shared with other 
services.47  ATLAS then designed their solution based on the estimate.  When the 
solution failed, the MoD argued that ATLAS should have acted as an intelligent supplier 
and questioned the assumption.48  However, ATLAS claimed that they had been unaware 
of any obvious discrepancy and so had simply accepted the requirement.49  Ultimately, 
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there has been legal intervention to resolve this debate and implementation in Cyprus has 
yet to happen.50   
 
As the implementation moves to the deployed maritime environment, a whole raft of new 
problems is emerging.  Rather than relying on the helpdesk, service support for DII(F) is 
obtained from Military Service Providers (MSPs) on board the ships.  This raises issues 
about how to measure this service.  In the fixed environment, the Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) measure the service provided by ATLAS: the speed with which it 
responds to calls, user satisfaction with the response and so on.  However, it is likely that 
operational matters will take precedence over problems with DII(F) on board ship, 
meaning that the resolution process is likely to experience delays.51  There is some 
concern that the number of challenges yet to be confronted in the deployed space will 
present more issues for the Programme as implementation proceeds. 
 
Overall, the core elements of the Technical Solution, the software development and 
implementation process, have proved problematic.  However, over time, problems have 
been dealt with and solutions have been found.  Unfortunately, this has not prevented an 
impact on the time and cost of the project and, potentially, on its scope.  The next stage of 
this chapter is to consider whether these problems have occurred because the identified 
CSFs have been neither understood nor applied, or whether they have been both 
understood and applied, but have had little impact.  
 
6.3.  Understanding and Application 
 
Interviews were conducted with a sample of personnel from the DII Programme, who 
were asked to assess whether lessons had been sought and learned.  The issue of learning 
lessons was identified in Chapter Five and has recently become a critical government 
initiative.  Interviewees were asked if they recognised the reports on IT failure used in 
this study before being asked about lessons learned from other IT mega-projects.  They 
were then asked to gauge their level of understanding of these CSFs, whether they 
thought that they had been applied within the Programme and, if so, to what effect.   
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6.3.1. Lessons Learned? 
 
The literature review identified that learning from past experience can substantially 
improve the chance of success.52  Therefore, the purpose was to identify whether learning 
from past experience has taken place and, if so, how beneficial it has proved to be.  About 
half of the DII Group interviewees were aware of the reports identified in Chapter Four, 
particularly the key government material (McCartney, the OGC and NAO reports) with 
less awareness on the ATLAS side.  While some of the DII Group knew about the DWP 
report before the contract was let, most had learned about it through the application of its 
lessons to DII.  Interestingly, only one ATLAS interviewee recognised it.  Although not 
everyone recognised all of the report titles, it was pointed out that their lessons are 
integrated within, and disseminated through, MoD policy and resulting processes, such as 
the Acquisition Operating Framework (AOF), thereby impacting on operations.53  There 
is also considerable oversight and assessment of the DII Programme by a variety of 
bodies, cognisant of the CSFs identified in these reports and assessing on this basis, 
which has greatly increased awareness within the Programme.54  It was apparent from 
these discussions that little could be deduced from the low recognition of the original 
source documents as the CSFs were highly likely to have permeated the project by other 
means.   
 
It was evident that the message about ‘IT-enabled change’, first proffered by the 
McCartney report and later picked up by the NAO, has permeated thinking within this IT 
project but that people are still grappling with its meaning.  The general view was that 
changing IT does not deliver business change.  The two have to be dealt with separately, 
otherwise the IT project becomes mired in the business change and both will fail.  The 
focus of the DII Programme is the infrastructure delivery and, as such, it is considered 
simply the bearer or enabler of the organisational and cultural change that will result from 
the Defence Change Programme (DCP).  However, many of the interviewees felt that the 
DII Programme often appears to be taking both infrastructure delivery and change 
delivery roles.55   
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It was evident that a great deal of effort had gone into examining the processes and 
outcomes of similar projects during the Planning phase, most notably the Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the DWP (both supplied by EDS), the Bowman Combat 
Infrastructure Programme (CIP), the DFTS (Defence Fixed Telecommunications System) 
and the NHS National Programme for IT.  Some interviewees stressed the importance of 
this benchmarking process in working out how to do things and not repeating previous 
mistakes.56  NMCI became the main point of comparison.  One of the key lessons from 
both NMCI and DWP was to keep applications separate from infrastructure.57  The DII 
Programme had to deal with over 10,000 applications and it would have been impossible 
to do this at the same time as developing the infrastructure.58  Another lesson was to 
consolidate applications.  There were around 6000 in the MoD, reduced to 600 before the 
contract was let.59  The NHS National Programme for IT was tracked throughout the 
contract phase for DII.  The Group concluded that it was too complex and over-ambitious 
with no central, overarching view.60  It also highlighted the dangers of failing to engage 
with key stakeholders.  This latter was taken as a major lesson by the DII Group, 
particularly in terms of its relationship with the Top Level Budget holders (TLBs).61   
 
Opinion varied over whether learning had continued once the contract was let.  One 
interviewee said that there had been ongoing reference to other experience, not just in 
terms of implementation but also in terms of contract management.62  Others felt that the 
effort of delivery had distracted the Group from taking a more strategic view.63  
However, it was also evident that, while some lessons from previous experience matched 
DII and improved it, others could not be applied to the MoD.  This supported the 
contention made by Lyneis et al that, if each project is unique, then learning across 
projects is difficult.64  Lessons are learned in a particular context and cannot be directly 
re-applied to a variable of that context.  The same mistakes may not have been repeated 
to the same degree within DII, but it has presented its own set of different problems: 
“there isn’t really a comparator”.65  As it matures, the project is becoming increasingly 
unique and so the lessons from previous projects, including NMCI, are less relevant.66  In 
the early stages, there was frequent referral to the US experience but this has now ceased 
as “the contract is different, the users are different, the environment is different, 
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everything has now moved on”.67  NMCI operates in fixed locations and only manages 
RESTRICTED information; DII is progressing into the above SECRET and deployed 
space.68  Therefore, there is little more that can be learned from other projects at this 
stage in the lifecycle.  
 
As well as learning lessons from external sources, there is also a wealth of experience 
within the DII Programme, enabling the team to deal with exceptions and to find 
solutions: personnel within the DII Group have been involved in a range of MoD IT 
projects, including previous infrastructure, IT and equipment projects, as well as a 
number of non-MoD projects; ATLAS has a wealth of experience of MoD, public and 
private sector projects.69  The array of military, ex-military and non-MoD working within 
the DII Programme provides a wide range of relevant experience, different blends of 
which are needed at different times.  Learning appears to be shared within the DII 
Programme and things are done slightly differently with each successive increment.  
However, it was thought that lessons tend to be tightly encapsulated in specific groups 
with specific responsibilities, rather than the same lesson being picked up across the 
board.70 
 
This discussion revealed that lessons had been learned and, where applicable, applied.  
The scrutiny that the project undergoes has made the Programme very aware of the CSFs 
stemming from the reports, suggesting that this form of oversight is beneficial and raising 
questions about Liu and Yetton’s assertion that conducting reviews in a high task 
uncertainty environment, such as might be found early in a project’s lifecycle and in an 
IT project, has a negative effect on performance.71  Other projects were observed and the 
lessons from these evidently applied.  However, learning external lessons appears to have 
utility only in the early stages of a project.  As it matures, it becomes increasingly unique 
and so develops its own specific solutions to problems.   
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6.3.2. Understanding and Application of CSFs: Self-Assessment 
 
As described in Chapter Four, twelve CSFs were synthesised from the lessons of ten key 
reports and tested against those identified in the scholarly literature.  Interviewees were 
shown the resulting list of CSFs and asked whether they recognised their importance, 
rating them on a scale ranging from Critical to Not Important.  All of the CSFs were 
recognised and understood with all receiving some level of Critical rating, as shown at 
Figure 6.3.  Benefits Certainty received the highest rating, closely followed by  
  
Figure 6.3. Understanding: Recognised Importance of Identified CSFs 
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Alternatives Certainty, then Consistency and Coherence.   
 
The interviewees were then asked to rate the extent to which they felt this importance had 
been recognised within the DII Programme using the same rating scale.  Whilst the 
response was less decisive, the same three CSFs were rated most critical and, again, all of 
the CSFs received a relatively high rating in terms of their criticality, as shown at Figure 
6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4. Application: Extent of CSF Recognition Within DII Programme 
0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00% 100.00%
Value for Money
Scalability and Flexibility
Stakeholder Management
Constraints Certainty
Consistency and Coherence
Complexity Management
Competence and Capacity
Clarity and Perception
Change Readiness
Benefits Certainty
Alternatives Certainty
Affordability
ID
EN
TI
FI
ED
 
CS
Fs
CRITICALITY RATING
Not Important
Low
Medium
High
Crit ical
 
Source: Author 
 6-17 
Finally, the interviewees were asked to assess the effect of the identified CSFs on the 
management of the project, using a rating scale ranging from strongly positive to strongly 
negative.  The most influential was undoubtedly Benefits Certainty followed by 
Consistency and Coherence, along with Constraints Certainty while Stakeholder 
Management and Scalability and Flexibility were not far behind, as shown at Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5. Effect of CSFs on Management of DII Programme 
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A broad comparison of the CSFs identified as part of this study shows little correlation 
between them, as shown at Table 6.2.  The CSFs identified for the DII Programme do not 
correspond with those identified for infrastructure projects or extracted from the general 
reports on IT projects.  Similarly, although the two literature sources showed some 
similarity, neither corresponds with the DII Programme.  The generic project 
management literature recognises that there are specific types of project in specific 
contexts, acknowledging that not all projects are the same, which means that they need to 
be managed in different ways using different CSFs.  These findings support this view.  
However, Pinto and his co-authors also suggested “that CSFs vary throughout a project 
lifecycle with some important in the early stages whilst others become critical later”.72  
Therefore, the interview discussion turned to the relative importance of the CSFs across  
 
Table 6.2. Top Three CSFs Compared 
 CSF 1 CSF 2 CSF 3 
DII Programme Benefits Certainty Alternatives Certainty Consistency and 
Coherence 
Infrastructure Reports Complexity 
Management 
Constraints Certainty Scalability and 
Flexibility 
General IT Reports Competence and 
Capacity 
Complexity 
Management 
Clarity and Perception 
IT Project 
Management 
Literature 
Clarity and Perception 
Stakeholder 
Management 
Alternatives Certainty 
Benefits Certainty 
Clarity and Perception 
Clarity and Perception 
Generic Project 
Management 
Literature 
Clarity and Perception Alternatives Certainty 
Benefits Certainty 
Clarity and Perception 
Alternatives Certainty 
Benefits Certainty 
Clarity and Perception 
Source: Author 
 
the Project Lifecycle and whether there had been different imperatives during the 
Planning, Development and Operational phases. 
 
6.3.3.  Relative Importance of CSFs across the Project Lifecycle 
 
Pinto and his co-authors noted that the important factors in the early stages of a project 
lifecycle are ‘internal’ (i.e. project related), meeting time, cost and scope; while ‘external 
factors’ (i.e. product related), such as customer needs and satisfaction, become important 
later.73  How then do these findings compare with the DII Programme?  Not surprisingly, 
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the answer to this question was not clear-cut: “they all come into play at different times 
and with different impact”.74  With interviewees representing seven different groups 
within the DII Group, as well as the ATLAS view coming from two different companies, 
it was inevitable that there would be different views.  Generally, Affordability, 
Alternatives Certainty, Benefits Certainty and Value for Money were seen as critical at 
the Planning stage in terms of gaining top-level support for the project.  However, in 
terms of gaining the necessary resources from the organisation, it was considered that 
Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management, Constraints Certainty and Scale 
and Flexibility were key.  During development and implementation, the stress is on 
Change Readiness, Clarity and Perception, and Stakeholder Management, but there are 
ongoing issues with Affordability, Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management, 
and Scalability and Flexibility.  These findings broadly support Pinto’s claims of an 
internal focus during planning, moving to the product during development and 
implementation.   
 
6.3.4.  Understanding and Application of CSFs: Analysis 
 
The in-depth discussion about the CSFs provided the basis for a more detailed and 
informed analysis.  The results presented here focus on those elements considered most 
relevant to this study.  It should be noted that, given that this research is driven by an 
interpretive philosophy, the evidence presented here is opinion.  However, this has been 
carefully referenced across the interview findings and supported by fact where possible.  
The tables show the percentage of respondents who recognised these CSFs, the extent to 
which they considered that they had been applied within the DII Programme and the 
effect that they were considered to have had.  The first two were rated according to a 
five-point scale: Critical, High, Medium, Low or Not Important; the latter was rated 
according to whether its effect was Double Plus, Plus, Negative, Minus or Double Minus.  
Most respondents rated most CSFs as Critical, as shown in the tables, or High, which is 
also included in the presentation of the results where necessary.   
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Affordability  Critical % High % 
Recognised 59 35 
An assessment of whether proposals can be paid 
for in terms of resources, cash flows and 
funding 
Extent  65 30 
 
Effect 
 
++ 
6 
+ 
82 
 
The need for sufficient, well allocated resources and an adequate budget was identified in 
the literature review but featured more prominently in the reports, particularly the 
infrastructure reports.  The interviewees gave it a similarly high rating, although its effect 
was considered positive, rather than strongly positive.  Most believed that the project was 
affordable at the time that the contract was let.75  However, irrespective of funding, the 
imperative to act overrode any funding constraints, as the MoD was perilously close to 
being unable to afford to either maintain its current systems or to replace them.76  The 
plan was to fund DII(F) from the savings made by discontinuing legacy systems.  Despite 
also receiving finance from the Defence Modernisation Fund (DMF) and the TLBs, it 
never had sufficient funding to deliver the entire infrastructure.77  Therefore, the project 
proceeded into its first phase with no assurance of approval for the second and third 
phases. From the beginning, therefore, the Programme was under funded and in search of 
additional savings.   
 
Due to delays, there has been continued expenditure on maintaining legacy systems, 
offset to some extent by savings on new terminals.  In addition, there have been delays in 
letting some of the increments with question marks about the future of the final 
increments due to the funding difficulties.  The delay to Increment 3a caused particular 
consternation during the summer of 2009.  Twenty MoD projects needed approval to 
continue.  Of those, the Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) took only four to the Treasury, 
including Increment 3a.  Initially refused, it was finally approved in December 2009, 
costing £540 million and providing a further 42,000 terminals to around 60,000 
personnel, mainly within the RAF.78  The delay was due to the overspent MoD budget 
and government spending constraints resulting from the global financial crisis.  Within 
the Programme, it is envisaged that DII(F) could be stopped after nine and a half years, 
six months early, as there is unlikely to be sufficient funding to continue.79  It is thought 
that alternative means will be found to deliver Increment 3b, which completes the 
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implementation in the deployed environment, and Increment 3c in the above SECRET 
environment, as “the appetite for putting in a note to Treasury is diminished”. 
 
Despite the views of the interviewees, it is questionable whether this CSF was either 
understood or applied.  It appears that the strength of will to initiate the project was 
paramount and that funding was secondary to necessity in this instance, confirming the 
‘conspiracy of optimism’, discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Alternatives Certainty  Critical % 
Recognised 94 
Consideration of alternative approaches capable of 
fulfilling the objectives creates project confidence and 
commitment with the key stakeholders i.e. Do Nothing, Do 
minimum, Defer, Outsource, Consolidate 
Extent  88 
 
Effect 
++ 
 
53 
 
Alternatives Certainty did not feature highly in the reports.  However, the interviewees 
recognised it as a CSF and treated it as such, although views on its effect were less 
emphatic.  Dvir et al identified an essential, urgent operational need as the most important 
factor for success.80  It is evident that DII(F) was considered both essential and urgent, 
which certainly gave great certainty.  There was a strong sense that doing nothing or the 
minimum were not feasible options and there was a single-minded view of the future 
within the Programme.81  More consideration was given to how to deliver it without 
sufficient authority or funding, rather than what to deliver.  Once outsourcing was 
identified, the alternatives concerned only the degree of outsourcing required. 82   
 
It was observed that this certainty should have been challenged at various intervals.83  
However, the appropriateness of the solution and the approach is tested with each 
successive increment.  As with equipment projects, there is significant governance and 
scrutiny of IT projects at the approvals stage by the MoD’s Investment Appraisals Board 
(IAB).84  Each increment also has to undergo the public sector comparator, used to assess 
whether a project provides better value if delivered by the government, by the 
government in partnership with the private sector, or by the private sector alone.85  The 
project has also been through the Gateway Review process, although reports on only two 
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are available in the public domain.  In their examination of Gateway Reviews, Liu and 
Yetton suggested that the outcome was dependent on the certainty of the task. 86  There 
appears to have been great certainty over DII and its Reviews have reflected that.  At its 
Initial Review in 2003, it was rated amber due to the need for more detailed 
implementation plans, a point that was to prove critical later, as discussed above.87  In 
2004, the Gateway Three Review rated DII in the top 10% of public sector IT projects, 
although requiring further work on its benefits plan.88  The NAO’s 2003 Major Projects 
Report criticised it heavily for underestimating risks and for time slippage.89  The DII 
Group also tested the Programme very positively against the NAO’s review of common 
causes of failure for IT projects, which is shown at Appendix 6.  Whilst this CSF 
appeared to be understood and applied, it is debatable how much analysis of alternatives 
actually took place.   Chapter One highlighted the danger of people inside the system 
considering it closed, paying little attention to the environment while overestimating their 
own power.  Referred to as ‘groupthink’, this is a potential source of project failure.90  It 
may be that an element of groupthink occurred with regard to DII. 
 
Benefits Certainty  Critical % 
Recognised 100 
Clear identification and definition of the business need for 
the project and the required performance improvement 
outcomes along with how these will be managed in terms 
of measures, owners, targets and strategic alignment 
Extent  94 
 
Effect 
++ 
 
94 
 
 
Benefits Certainty featured more highly in the infrastructure reports than in the general IT 
reports and received the highest ratings for the DII Progamme. The benefits that DII is 
expected to deliver are clearly identified and categorised, as discussed in Chapter Five.  
This focus on benefits, particularly indirect financial benefits, ultimately secured the 
initial funding.91  The delivery was, therefore, shaped around the benefits, ensuring that 
critical financial benefits would be achieved in the first few years, in particular via JPA, 
which enabled the biggest single benefit for the project.92  McCartney clearly identified 
the poor systems used to track benefits in government but the DII Programme has a 
robust benefits tracking mechanism, reporting at 2-star level and above, and also 
reviewed at every governance board.93  In addition, the DII Group tracks benefits back 
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from delivery to the Main Gate business case to ensure that they are being delivered as 
originally intended, whilst they also scan for potential risks to benefits.94   
 
In addition, there are currently seven CSFs for the Programme, as shown at Table 6.2.  
These are reviewed monthly, link to the strategic plan and are revised each year to ensure 
that they reflect critical issues at specific stages.  Furthermore, each service provided by 
ATLAS has a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) to ensure that the right level of 
performance is delivered and that benefits are being realized, as this is linked to payment.  
Discussion at interview suggested that these KPIs sometimes drive the wrong behaviour 
and result in more expensive design decisions than necessary.  For example, the original 
suggestion for the back-up of data was considered unaffordable and was downgraded.  
However, overall, benefits certainty has been central to the DII Programme, demonstrated 
by the extensive awareness of them: “We absolutely recognise the importance of 
delivering the benefits... (they) have been a strongly positive effect”.95   
 
Table 6.3. DII Programme: CSFs 
Critical Success Factor Comment 
Service Excellence 
CSF1: Live-Service Delivery Measured by KPIs for Availability and 
Performance, and User Satisfaction Survey 
CSF2: Legacy Closure Reducing expenditure on legacy is key to the 
affordability of the Programme 
CSF3: Enabled Benefits Delivery of support to other MoD systems and 
improved ways of working 
Capability Development 
CSF4: Capability Development Software releases, Labyrinth, infrastructure and 
applications 
CSF5: Fixed Implementation Terminals, applications and strategic sites 
CSF6: Deployed Implementation Land deployed and maritime 
Growth 
CSF7: New Increments Increment 3a and High Grade Messaging 
Source: Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment and Support, Information Systems 
and Services, Defence Information Infrastructure: Joint Business Plan 2009-2010, (London, HMSO, 
2009), page 12. 
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Change Readiness  Critical % High % 
Recognised 41 30 
The current state of the organisations involved 
in the project and their perceived ability to 
absorb, adapt to, and assimilate change 
Extent  47 17 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
6 
 
 
+  
82 
 
This CSF was not prominent in either set of reports or the analysis of the literature.  
Understood and applied in the DII Programme, although less so than some of the other 
CSFs, its effect was seen as positive.  Overall, the DII Group believed that they had 
learned lessons from previous projects and prepared Defence well for the change.  Some 
saw this as one of the project’s successes, encouraging the right response from the wider 
organisation and, as a result, “users have not given any problems”.96  Others thought that 
the Group had not driven the change as strongly as expected with less central direction 
than anticipated and change management left largely to the TLBs.97  There was also a 
view that it was not the DII Group’s role to drive cultural change, considered to be the 
domain of the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the Programme, the MoD’s Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), the Director General Information (DG Info) and the TLBs.98   
 
Others felt that DII is a change programme in its own right, set up to deliver 
organisational change, but these non-financial benefits have suffered due to the focus on 
financial benefits, resulting in most of the effort being focused on installing the system.99  
As discussed above, the move to Release 2 will drive significant change across 
Defence.100  Linking to the changing significance of CSFs over the project lifecycle, as 
discussed at Section 6.3.3, the Programme is becoming increasingly concerned with 
business change with the focus currently shifting to consideration of the performance of 
both system and service, and the KPIs.101   
 
Overall, there is a mixed understanding of the change readiness required as well as 
differing perceptions of the DII Group’s role in delivering change.  The application of 
this CSF within the project is, therefore, debatable.  It appears that the Programme has 
paid ever-diminishing attention to this.  The overall change readiness is gauged more 
clearly through the user survey discussed at Section 6.4.1. 
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Clarity and Perception  Critical % High % 
Recognised 53 47 
Clarity of the rationale, scope and scale of the 
project and shared understanding by key 
stakeholders across broad communities involved 
Extent  53 41 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
53 
 
 
+ 
41 
 
The need for shared understanding by key stakeholders has been understood by the DII 
Group and applied with a positive effect.  It was the second most important CSF 
identified in both the generic and IT project management literature recognising the need 
for clear, joint understanding about the project rationale along with a shared perception of 
how it is going to be developed and implemented.  It is evident from this case study that 
the rationale for DII, along with its scale and scope, has remained fixed throughout.  
Despite the change in security policy stemming from the Burton Report, it has not 
suffered from major changes in either policy or political direction, one of the key 
problems identified within the government context, as discussed in Chapter Two.  It 
emerged relatively unscathed from the halting of IT mega-projects by the newly elected 
Coalition Government in May 2010.   
 
There has been strong top-level support from a number of key people, in particular the 2nd 
PUS who held the MoD post during much of the planning and development phase, 
identified unanimously at interview as a major force in driving this project and, in doing 
so, increasing support and commitment at Defence Board (DB) level.102  In addition, as 
indicated in both Chapter Five and Section 6.2.2 above, he was willing to be directive.  It 
was his tenacity that enabled the funding of DII, requiring the TLBs to part with their 
funding.  In addition, DG Info, who was also CIO and SRO at the time of the project’s 
inception, was a strong supporter.103  There was a very positive working relationship 
between these two, along with the first DII Head and CEO of ATLAS, which the NAO 
recognised as a strength of this Programme.104  This integrated top-level support has 
become less important as the project has progressed through its lifecycle.  However, as it 
moves to a stage where it will bring greater levels of change, it is likely that such top-
level support will again become imperative. 
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The NAO Report noted that the maintenance of key personnel throughout the project has 
helped to maintain this clarity of purpose and recommended that this should be 
continued.105  This has been noted and, despite the military and civil service 
posting/appointing system, this stability has been particularly evident within the DII 
Group.106  Nearly all of the DII Group interviewees had been with the project since 
inception whilst, on the ATLAS side, three of the six interviewees had moved from the 
Group to work for ATLAS.  In addition, the first DII Group Head stayed in role for eight 
years, a major factor in maintaining the project’s vision and momentum.107  This CSF 
was undoubtedly both understood and applied within the DII Programme to good effect. 
 
Competence and Capacity  Critical % High % 
Recognised 41 53 
The requirement for individuals associated with 
the project to be able to properly perform 
specific jobs through a combination of 
knowledge, skills and behaviour, along with the 
capacity, in terms of the availability of the right 
people with the right skills, to execute and 
effectively deliver the option 
Extent  6 82 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
6 
 
 
+ 
88 
 
The reports discussed in Chapters Four and Five revealed an overwhelming emphasis on 
Competence and Capacity, an issue that was also very evident in the literature analysis.  
However, this CSF was less apparent in the DII Programme.  It was rated highly, rather 
than as critical, and treated as such with a positive effect.  As discussed at Section 6.3.1, 
there is a wealth of experience and understanding within the Programme and it was 
generally felt that both teams had the right skills.  However, there was a view that, early 
on, ATLAS had often failed to field the right expertise in the right quantity at the right 
time, blamed on HP’s “ruthless control of costs”.108  ATLAS interviewees admitted to 
having been challenged at times but felt that they had been able to access the relevant 
skills from within the Consortium as required.   
 
Despite this, there was strong evidence of key personnel possessing critical skills.  An 
engineer by background, the first DII Head had previously implemented three secure 
information infrastructures, including 55,000 terminals in Australia in just three years 
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using four contractor firms, bringing together 94 separate systems in the face of 
considerable resistance.  Similarly, the first CEO of ATLAS had led similar projects and 
spent a year “acclimatising” to Defence by working on other EDS MoD projects before 
leading the DII Programme. 109  The effect of experience and related skills cannot be 
underestimated in a project of this type.  As with Clarity and Perception, retention of 
personnel is critical to Competence and Capacity in maintaining knowledge, skills and 
understanding, as well as engendering the right behaviours.  However, it was also noted 
that there is an inherent danger of people becoming complacent, stagnant and constrained 
in their thinking if they stay for too long.110  A balance is required between retained 
understanding and the influx of fresh thinking.  Related to this, different skills are 
required at different stages in the project lifecycle, as demonstrated by the use of 
considerable external support during the contract phase, discussed in Chapter Five.   
 
As discussed in the literature review, Brown questioned whether it was possible for 
contractors to understand the government context sufficiently.111 ATLAS estimated that it 
normally takes six to 12 weeks to become embedded in an IT outsourcing account.112  
However, this has not been the experience with DII.  Many ATLAS personnel struggle to 
understand the structure and culture, “like working on a foreign account”.113  In order to 
deliver a service-based contract, there has to be some understanding of how the service is 
constructed.114  This underlines the need for retention of personnel to give them time to 
fully comprehend the context, so optimising their contribution.  However, the DII Group 
identified a high level of personnel changes within ATLAS, where there is a similar 
culture of short-term postings as a means of expanding skills and experience, as a 
negative factor.   
 
Despite the recognised complexity of the context, there was an expectation from the DII 
Group that ATLAS should be capable of understanding it but that it did not engage with 
the DII Group to improve its understanding, demonstrating a lack of appreciation of the 
available local knowledge.  In turn, ATLAS questioned the DII Group’s contextual 
understanding, raising questions about their oversight of, and insight into, the wider 
customer base and, therefore, their ability to either manage the delivery of capability to 
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the customer or to guide the supplier as intelligent customers.115  It was considered that 
decisions made by the DII Group might not be endorsed or even comprehended by the 
users receiving the solutions.116  By and large, the Group focused on managing the 
supplier’s delivery against the contract, although this did not necessarily reflect the user’s 
current requirement.  Therefore, ATLAS often negotiates with the DII Group on behalf of 
the users.117 
 
The contextual complexity is exacerbated by the inherent complication of the DII 
Programme itself.  Dvir et al noted the cohesion of the development team as a success 
factor.118  However, potentially, the interrelationships between a variety of groups and 
organisations within the DII Programme hamper cohesion.  The identified tensions 
between the military and the civil service make it a difficult environment for a supplier: 
“they don’t have a good impression of civil servants and the civil servants don’t have a 
good impression of them in the business space”.119  Some ATLAS interviewees (not ex-
military) questioned the role of military personnel in an IT outsourcing project and 
whether they were able to be “a jack of all trades”, noting a façade of presumed expertise 
and highlighting a tendency to over-complicate.120   
 
In turn, some of the military personnel expressed exasperation with ATLAS’s 
requirement for a process to be in place before taking action.121  Further complexity is 
created by the consortium construct, described by one DII Group interviewee as “a loose 
affiliation of warring tribes”.122  Whilst ATLAS understands the rationale, integration 
within the Consortium is described as “challenging”.123  As the lead supplier, discussions 
between HP and the customer concerning requirements and financing then have to be 
relayed to the other members of the Consortium.  Working within teams that consist of 
both HP and Fujitsu personnel means that every action has to be considered in terms of 
contractual and cost implications.  This requires not only integration but also trust.   
 
General Dynamics (GD), one of the second tier suppliers, left the Programme in 2010 as 
a result of “tensions between the Consortium partners” and was replaced by another 
provider.124  GD then began legal proceedings to obtain more than £1.7 million from 
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EDS, a row centred on a management charge and risk premium.125  There have also 
allegedly been tensions between HP and Fujitsu.126  Overall, there were suggestions that 
five companies is too many and that two might ensure the required certainty of supply, 
whilst enabling better communication, integration and, therefore, higher levels of trust.127  
However, there were some suggestions that single source supply was preferable: “this 
whole environment is down to relationships so if relationships are souring that makes it 
difficult”.128 
 
Despite having outsourced the project, there are still around 500 in the DII Group, 
including external contractors other than ATLAS.  One interviewee noted that BAE 
Systems manages a similar contract with a team of 50 people.129  However, the DII 
Group has remained very involved in the DII Programme.  From the ATLAS viewpoint, 
this has resulted in over-checking, needless activity and associated cost.130  This may be 
due to a lack of trust, but there was also a perception that it is part of the MoD culture.  
Many of the DII Group personnel are used to taking a project management role and feel 
duty bound to ensure the most effective solution, stepping in to take control where 
necessary.   
 
Ideally, an IT service contract should result in a reduced in-house IT department with the 
onus being on the supplier to deliver within certain measurable parameters.131  However, 
the DII Group Engineering team retains over 100 staff.132  Of these, around two thirds are 
contractors other than ATLAS, providing skills lacking in the MoD and making this an 
expensive resource.133  This contradicts Brown’s view that outsourcing is due to a lack of 
skills in government.134  Prior to the contract award, this team was closely involved in the 
software development.  However, it now acts as the ‘intelligent customer’, providing 
systems assurance, but with no reduction in size.  This change in role has caused great 
resentment, as personnel are still keen to be involved with the technical design.135   
 
With the benefit of hindsight, both sides recognise the difficulties with this arrangement, 
acknowledging that there was a need for effort earlier in the project to encourage more 
effective joint working between the ATLAS and DII Group engineers.136  Spending time 
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initially creating a culture of openness, co-operation, trust and a shared understanding of 
the assurance role would have made a major difference to the software development.137  
As discussed in Chapter Five, a great deal of effort went into selecting the right Delivery 
Provider (DP), but little consideration was then given to “how we were going to look 
after this beast”.138  As one interviewee stated, the management of the contract is 
arguably more critical than selecting the supplier.  If not managed well, then the supplier 
is unable to work to optimum capability.  Given its maturity in managing major projects 
and suppliers, there was an apparent lack of understanding and application on the MoD 
side of the roles required to manage a new, unique, service delivery contract, which 
requires taking action that benefits both buyer and supplier, as identified by Brown in 
Chapter Two.139    
 
The Group admitted to experiencing a ‘step change’ once the contract was let, identifying 
that their skill set was inappropriate for both managing the contract and creating a 
partnering relationship.140  Overall, there was a suggestion that there is a limited view of 
contract management, focusing on oversight of the contract while the supplier 
concentrates on the customer, rather than a broader view that considers the building of 
relationships and trust.141  However, ATLAS appears to take a more mature view, seeing 
their role as managing the client as well as the project.  Therefore, if they feel that the 
wrong actions are being taken, there should be a positive and corrective response, rather 
than simply saying, “they were wrong and we allowed them to be wrong”.142   
 
In 2009, Pinto et al discussed the importance of trust, particularly between project team 
and contractors.143  It is evident from this discussion that the contractual relationship, 
particularly one that also involves a consortium, contains “interesting human tensions”.144  
Ultimately, partnering overlays a commercial contract and, inevitably, client and supplier 
remain on different sides of that divide.  This potential for adversarial behaviour was 
fully recognised by the DII Group from the start and the requirement for good working 
relationships became a formal part of the evaluation process.145  There were also efforts 
to clarify ATLAS’s role in delivering the MoD’s requirements while the Group needed to 
be cognisant of their partner’s commercial realities.146  Further action has been taken on 
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this post-contract through the DII Partnering Charter and the Joint Partnering Board 
(JPB), which provide governance over the partnering relationship.147  Nevertheless, the 
Joint Business Plan for 2009/10 highlighted the intention to further improve relationships 
through more fully integrated working and mutual understanding, which appears to be 
taking effect in terms of the Technical Solution.148  However, it was felt that this 
relationship building is becoming increasingly difficult in the current financial climate 
where the commercial drivers on both sides appear to be overriding the partnering 
relationship.149  Despite this, it is apparent that, at the operational level, different groups 
within the Programme are at different stages in this partnering journey, with some 
working well, others in transition whilst others remain relatively adversarial.   
 
Overall, there was evidence of understanding and application of this CSF within the DII 
Programme and some confirmation that the findings of the many reports had permeated 
this operation.  However, the emphasis in this discussion is on the competence and 
capacity to ‘execute and effectively deliver the option’ within a contractual arrangement.  
Despite the NAO having reported positively on the partnering within this Programme, 
there was less evidence at the operational level of understanding of how to manage the 
contract and the related relationships.  This confirms the conclusions drawn in Chapter 
Five, Section 5.2 about the need for Contract/Supplier Management. 
 
Complexity Management  Critical % High % 
Recognised 59 29 
The level of likely risk and the scale, novelty, diversity, 
interdependency and volatility of a project 
Extent  64 29 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
23 
 
 
+ 
70 
 
Complexity Management was rated the second highest CSF in the analysis of the general 
IT reports and highest in the infrastructure reports, although it was not so evident in the 
literature analysis.  Just over half of the interviewees recognised it as critical with a 
slightly higher rating for its application within the Programme and its effect rated as 
positive.  Therefore, it seems that the complexity of the project has informed the overall 
approach but has not necessarily resulted in risk avoidance.150  Two key lessons emerged 
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from this discussion: the wisdom of overlaying complexity with similarly complex 
processes and the management of risk. 
 
There was much discussion about the use of the Fixed Rollout Methodology, with a 
suggestion that simple, flexible rules would have been a better option.151  Trying to 
impose conformity on something that was never going to conform was never going to 
work, in one view.152  Similarly, the standard solutions written into the contract were 
never intended to be applied regardless of cost, complexity or dependencies that could 
not have been foreseen at the time of writing the contract.  However, with rigid processes 
in place, both ATLAS and the DII Group tend to follow them without questioning their 
specific utility in a particular circumstance.  This strongly supports the view of Pich et al 
that appropriate action is preferable to the ‘instructionist’ approach.153  In retrospect, 
there needed to be a means of translating the intent of the contract to the operational 
level, indicating that standard solutions should be applied without redesign where 
possible but adapted to circumstances where necessary.154 
 
Similarly, there was an underlying belief that, ultimately, delivering the exact number of 
terminals required at each site was not cost-effective.  Any saving was believed to have 
been eradicated by the management costs incurred by both ATLAS and the DII Group in 
trying to achieve this, particularly as nothing in the MoD remained static long enough to 
enable a precise count.  With the benefit of hindsight, a ‘quick and dirty’ method might 
have been cheaper with a quick survey two weeks prior to implementation and then a 
rapid process of installing a terminal wherever one had been previously, whilst allowing 
some expansion capacity.  The implementation could then have been ‘fine tuned’ at a 
later date.  The extra cost of this flexibility and potentially paying for excess terminals 
would probably have been offset by the removal of bureaucracy, shorter timescales and 
minimal overheads, with savings on months of project management.155    
 
The second lesson concerns the questionable risk management in government projects, 
which has been addressed in a range of reports discussed in this study.  The DII 
Programme was required to have a risk management process in place and there is 
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evidence of inherent risk being both considered and, ostensibly, managed.156  The risk 
register lists around 800 risks.  Not surprisingly, the DII Group feel unable to understand, 
let alone manage, this number of risks concurrently and, therefore, tend to focus on five 
to ten key risks at any one time.  These alter according to the stage of the project 
lifecycle.  Some interviewees were concerned that risk management can become a 
mechanical process.  For example, one remarked that the risks had not been properly 
reviewed for three years, despite the fact that there was money put aside for them and a 
lot of people managing them.  As a result, a recent rapid review has released a substantial 
amount of the budget that had been set against dead risk.157   
 
The DII Group was aware of the risk involved in not surveying every site in advance.  
The lack of surveys led to the false assumption that sites were properly maintained and 
that this was documented.  However, it would have been impossible for them to do this, 
not least due to the time and cost involved.158  This was a foreseeable, known risk that 
could have been controlled and managed.  However, the perception of the Group was that 
senior management would not have been supportive of a project to ready the Defence 
estate, that the imperative was the infrastructure and not the preparation for it, which was 
considered not only unrealistic but, perhaps, also unattractive to senior officials.159  There 
was no available evidence that any form of cost-benefit analysis had been carried out for 
this, raising questions about whether time and money spent on preparation might have 
offset expenditure and delay further down the line.   
 
The implementation problems concerned known risk.  However, risk is not always known 
or foreseeable.  This is evidenced by the delay to Increment 3a, which could potentially 
have stopped the Programme in its tracks.  Whilst due to MoD budget constraints, these 
had become elevated as an issue due to the Treasury concern with the national deficit and 
its implications for public spending.  With risks related to sub-prime mortgages in 
Southern California causing reverberations around most of the developed world, it is 
questionable whether the DII Group could have foreseen risk in this form emerging from 
the environment, much less have set in place processes to manage it.  This suggests that it 
is impossible to provide the necessary funding to give a 90% confidence level on every 
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aspect of the Programme.160  The trick is to manage risk in such a way that progress can 
be made, rather than trying to manage every potential risk.    
 
Overall, there is evidence of understanding and application, along with some learning of 
lessons.  However, it is questionable that a project like the DII Programme can manage 
all risks, particularly unforeseen environmental disturbances.  As discussed in Chapter 
Five, in 2009, the OGC noted a range of factors likely to cause an IT project to stray from 
its original objectives, including global or national events, new policies or deliberate 
changes in scope.  This suggests that there is a growing understanding in government that 
projects of this complexity inevitably face unforeseeable risk. 
 
Consistency and Coherence  Critical % High % 
Recognised 70 29 
Integration of the selected option with 
established systems, processes and policies 
Extent  76 23 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
23 
 
 
+ 
70 
 
The interviewees recognised the importance of Consistency and Coherence, felt that it 
had been applied within the Programme and its effect was generally positive.  This CSF 
appeared as less of an issue in the analysis of the reports and the literature.  As well as 
integrating with established systems, processes and policies, the overall purpose of DII is 
to drive such integration with its stated aim of making a single system available 
everywhere, thereby delivering more uniform ways of working.161  The MoD is a 
microcosm of the vertical and insular structure of wider government, discussed in 
Chapters One and Two.  Each TLB interprets policy differently, adopting different ways 
of working.  As a major government body, the MoD needs to operate corporately.  
However, enforcing such commonality is seen as problematic due to the “fiefdoms and 
leadership”.162  During the Planning phase, as discussed in Chapter Five, it was evident 
that the people running the existing IT systems and the funding had to be gathered 
together.  One interviewee wryly observed that the Group was never going to corral the 
“forces of darkness” until they had them under their control.163   
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Previous IT provision in Defence was very diverse, variable and inconsistent.  Some 
users had local access to locally produced, advanced, client-specific IT systems, designed 
to meet their needs and supported by their own system administrators.  For those working 
on such systems or using DII (Convergence), the transfer to DII(F) has provided less 
capability or simply links back to the old system, data files and processes.164  Whilst still 
awaiting Release 2 and, therefore, without full functionality, this makes it difficult to 
appreciate DII(F)’s ultimate utility.  However, for those using “green screens and tablets 
of stone”, as one interviewee described the Army’s information systems, DII(F) is seen as 
delivering benefit.165  This variable experience means that DII(F) represents a retrograde 
step for some users, which affects their reaction to it.  A single infrastructure delivering 
uniform applications is a means of standardising Defence, thereby increasing 
organisational efficiency, but it is also introducing practices that are counter-cultural.166  
For example, DII(F) gives universal access to online calendars, exponentially cutting the 
time that it takes to arrange meetings, but causing disquiet amongst some high-ranking 
personnel, uncomfortable with this level of transparency and requesting RESTRICTED 
access to their personal information, rather than accepting the need to change their 
attitude and approach.167    
 
Issues relating to Consistency and Coherence, therefore, extend beyond the single 
infrastructure debate and can be seen more broadly in terms of integration within 
Defence.  The need for this is ostensibly recognised and welcomed, but is often thwarted 
by the underlying cultural factors.  This is demonstrated by a series of observations from 
the interviews.  The ATLAS team was very aware of the tendency towards partisanship 
within the armed services and the lack of enforced joint solutions, which often results in 
variants of the same solution being applied.168  This lack of a joint approach appears to be 
due to a relatively cavalier attitude to policy, seen as a moveable obstacle or simply 
ignored.169  As an example, the MoD has contracted ATLAS to provide data capacity for 
users within certain parameters.170  Many of the users far exceed that quota, thereby 
incurring costs, but do not have the funding to buy additional capacity.  However, the 
MoD does not enforce its rulings.171  Similarly, there is a policy that Microsoft Access 
should not be used within the department except in specific circumstances.172  This is also 
 6-36 
not enforced and Microsoft Access databases remain very popular with thousands in 
existence, some hundreds of megabytes in size.  Once simply useful, over time, these 
databases have often become business critical, although the way that they are managed 
does not reflect this status.  Not only does this use of Access fly in the face of policy, it 
also causes system problems for DII(F) as users access their data and applications 
remotely, rather than locally.  Microsoft does not recommend running Access over a 
Wide Area Network (WAN), as it then impedes system performance for all users, 
resulting in a large number of complaints about the speed of DII(F).173    
 
This CSF has been understood and is being applied to some extent.  However, given the 
strength of the culture that it is trying to change, the effect that this will have on Defence 
and, hence, the overall success of the DII Programme, remains open to question. 
 
Constraints Certainty  Critical % High % 
Recognised 47 41 
An estimate of costs, resource requirements and 
timescales with project planning, design and 
implementation 
Extent  47 41 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
29 
 
 
+ 
65 
 
Constraints Certainty was rated second highest CSF in the infrastructure reports but less 
highly in the general IT reports.  It received an average rating in the literature analysis, 
although it was spread across a range of CSFs.  The assessment at interview was that it 
had been understood and applied with a positive effect on the project.  The review of the 
literature confirmed its continuing importance with Dvir et al noting that exact definition 
of the operational and technical requirements of the product is a major factor for success, 
whilst also noting that changes in scope do not necessarily improve the end product and 
may even detract from user satisfaction.174  This project is perceived as having set 
achievable goals and there is general awareness of its constraints.  However, there is 
disagreement about their relative importance.  Some felt that the MoD is mainly 
concerned with scope and time.175  Others felt that scope is critical and the MoD is not 
interested in time delays.  Some ATLAS interviewees rated time and cost over scope, 
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considered to be a rational approach when dealing with a project of this size and 
complexity.176   
 
Time was the key measure and the key driver for this project.177  It was considered easier 
to acquire more funding than to regain lost time.178  The emphasis was on ‘maintaining 
traction’ and making progress, based on the premise that 90% of problems sort 
themselves out as the project proceeds, providing evidence of the MoD’s ‘conspiracy of 
optimism’, discussed in Chapter Five.179  This imperative was widely accepted, but there 
was evident concern that the timetable had not been adjusted following the delay to the 
contract, providing a key lesson.  The contract had defined plans, but the resource 
requirement to meet those plans was still unclear at that stage.  Although ATLAS agreed 
to adhere to the original timescale, sufficient time should have been given to recruit the 
required personnel, to clarify plans and to create the necessary working relationships.  It 
was suggested that a project of this size and complexity needs an eighteen-month start-up 
period for both organisations.180  However, the DII Group was under pressure to begin 
work due to the overwhelming benefits requirement of JPA, which meant that timescales 
for the original plan were unachievable from day one.181 
 
The number of terminals being installed is closely monitored by ATLAS as it has to 
supply monthly figures and is paid according to delivery.  During Increment 1 and 2a, 
which involved a large number of terminals being rolled out, this became the DII Group’s 
principle method of controlling time, providing an easy measure of success or failure.  
From the ATLAS viewpoint, this took no account of the time required to embed the 
implementation process or taken trying to cope with “the moving target of the MoD”.182  
Inevitably, this measurement drove certain behaviours, resulting in a focus on the 
quantity rather than the quality of the implementation: “we achieved it but we’re still 
picking up the pieces”.183  Despite this focus on time, the programme is significantly late, 
up to two years and possibly more in some areas.184  One interviewee expressed surprise 
that “there hasn’t been more outcry from Defence about those delays”.    
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Failure to deliver on time impacts on both the Consortium’s revenue and the DII Group’s 
ability to spend their annual allocation.  By the end of 2008, £334 million of the £528 
million contingency fund had been spent, although the Group believes optimistically that 
risk is likely to be greater during the initial stages of a project lifecycle.185  It is very 
difficult to ascertain the exact costs of DII, particularly the costs of delivery.  There is no 
publicly available account of how much has been spent to date: it is “hard to say and no 
one has tried to show the full picture”.186  The total estimated cost is reckoned to be 
around £7 billion, initially estimated at £5 billion and, as such, it is considered to be a 
successful contract.187  However, £1 billion is notional interest on capital and includes 
money not spent by the DII Group directly.  The actual contract value to ATLAS is 
around £4.5 billion.  However, as discussed above, cost appears to be largely disregarded 
as a metric of success and the overspend reportedly came as a complete surprise.188  At 
the time of writing, this was quoted as being in the order of £500 million, which both 
sides are currently trying to amend by trading requirements, such as reducing service 
cover at the help desk.189  Despite these issues, the DII Group firmly believe that they 
have managed to protect the benefits, totalling an estimated £1.6 billion, although some 
will be realised later than originally planned.   
 
There was a view that costs could have been better controlled if the Programme had been 
allocated a single sum, rather than being contracted in increments, although MOD 
annuality rules would probably still have applied and limited flexibility.  There was an 
associated view that this had resulted in the early years of the project being bountiful and 
the later years increasingly difficult financially.190  A greater availability of money would 
have given much greater flexibility, it was thought, so that problems could be managed 
more easily across the programme.  Increment 3a was a top priority in terms of releasing 
additional funding, making it even more critical for the Group to get the business case 
approved.  Allegedly, these programme-wide difficulties were played down in the IAB 
business case, driven by the fact that approval would be withheld if problems were 
identified.191  This supports the findings of Snow et al that project managers are reluctant 
to transmit bad news, presenting an optimistic view to senior management192 along with 
 6-39 
those of Oz and Sosik who noted the suppression of certain issues in communications 
between the project team and senior management.193   
 
The scope of the DII Programme was clearly defined two years before contact award.  
However, it was felt that the pressure to award the contract on time resulted in corners 
being cut.  In addition, the underlying rationale for the requirements was not 
communicated by the contract team to the rest of the Group, in order to control the 
release of information about the new contract.194  This has caused subsequent difficulties 
in translating the requirements into the services actually being delivered.  For example, 
an assumption about the long-term strategic direction of Microsoft has proved to be 
flawed, which means that selected products are likely to become obsolete so that “by 
2015, what we will have on the desktop will be a really big headache”.195  Overall, the 
requirements are considered to be very rigid, making it expensive and difficult to make 
changes.  One interviewee went so far as to state that “some of the requirements are 
insane”, referring to the mantra of the same level of information being available 
anywhere and questioning the viability of that approach in the deployed space, which is 
yet to be tested.  This suggests a need to re-balance the requirement against what is 
currently achievable and affordable.  An exercise to examine this ‘cost to complete’ has 
recently been completed.  ATLAS considers potential inflexibility with regard to delivery 
of the requirements a threat, specifically if they are expected to deliver every element of 
the original contract at the original cost, in the face of continual change within 
Defence.196    
 
There is an expectation that the requirement will remain unchanged for the duration of 
the contract, which is unlikely to be the case. 197  As the project has progressed, the pace 
of change in Defence has made some of the original requirements defunct and there have 
been thousands of requests for minor changes although very few major changes to the 
requirements.  This is partly due to the contract but also results from a strong motivation 
within the Group to resist changes, in order to obtain what has been contracted for and 
paid for, as well as protecting the MoD from financial penalty.198  Minor changes have 
cost around £300 million and are increasingly resulting from Urgent Operational 
 6-40 
Requirements (UORs), funded by extra Treasury money to provide fast solutions for 
operational needs.199  These are perceived as lucrative for ATLAS.200  It was felt that 
there had been very little change in ATLAS’s likely profit margins of about £560 million 
on this project, even though it is late and not everything has been delivered.201  The 
contract also focused on ‘fixed cost’, creating an attitude that the MoD could be more 
demanding of quality and less concerned about the cost or timescales, which were 
considered to be the supplier’s problem.202 
 
Although the DII Group set out with the laudable aim of creating a service contract, it 
then proved “too novel for them to handle”.203  The appendices to the contract contain 
detailed information about the core software functionality required to run, monitor and 
protect the system, as well as the office automation, web browsing and other standard 
activities.204  These requirements have changed very little since the contract was 
signed.205  This suggests that, ultimately, the MoD felt the need to constrain decisions and 
this created many of the “long winded IT design arguments”.206  ATLAS found the 
assurance oversight by the Engineering team difficult, questioning whether they had the 
breadth of knowledge to undertake this task.  It frequently hampered the technical 
decisions that were being made.   
 
Despite these observations, there was an overall view that the contract is detailed and 
well considered.  It specifically includes levers to ensure that ATLAS accesses additional 
resources and expertise as required.207  However, very often, the DII Group has chosen 
not to use these levers, even though they would have given the financial incentives to 
force ATLAS to deliver.208  For example, the Group paid between £300-400 million in 
compensation to ATLAS for delays, rather than challenging them more robustly, which 
meant that ATLAS received the same payment as if they had delivered on time.  
Culturally, it is felt that challenging ATLAS too robustly will not set the right 
relationship but there is also a worry that overt concerns about delivery performance 
might cause the Treasury to withhold funds.209  Finally, there is the need to align MoD 
spending with allocation year-on-year to avoid losing funding due to annuality rules 
alongside the requirement on ATLAS to meet corporate revenue profiles and targets. 
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Overall, the degree to which this CSF has been understood and applied is debatable.  
However, in terms of an IT mega-project, the delays to DII and the cost overruns are 
considered minimal.  In 2008, commenting on the NAO report on DII, the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) noted “disappointment to veterans of the Committee Of 
Public Accounts because it seems to indicate that you are only 3% overspending and only 
18 months behind before catching up.”   
 
Scalability and Flexibility  Critical % 
Recognised 59 
Consideration of the versatility of a future option and its 
anticipated survivability of an option in a future 
unpredictable environment, requiring an understanding of 
the scalability (both up and down) and of the degree of 
flexibility 
Extent  65 
 
Effect 
++ 
 
59 
 
Third highest in the infrastructure reports, this CSF was rated relatively highly in the 
literature analysis but was not a significant factor in the general IT reports.  Interviewees 
understood it, believed that it had been applied and considered it to have had a positive 
effect.  DII is being developed and implemented through a series of increments, as 
discussed in Chapter Five.  This gives the ability to scale the project up or down in terms 
of volume and was designed to meet McCartney’s recommendation of modular and 
incremental development.210  Therefore, increments are considered to be beneficial, 
driven by government due to problems with IT mega-projects and preferred by the IAB, 
wary of the potential risk that a contract the size of DII poses and seeing this as a means 
of mitigating that risk, controlling costs and complexity.  In addition, given the constant 
flux within Defence, the increments provide a means of managing and incorporating this 
change, which would have been very difficult to accommodate with a single contract.  
Despite these seemingly strong arguments, the original procurement strategy, which was 
rejected, was for a single contract.211   
 
The interviews suggested that incremental procurement has provided challenges.  For 
example, the DII Group felt that they had spent too much time worrying about obtaining 
approval for the next increment.212  For example, the Group had already stated the 
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benefits that would be delivered by Increment 2b at a cost of £750 million, but then had 
to spend additional time and effort on taking it through the government procurement 
process.213  Each increment is essentially an amendment to the original contract, requiring 
a separate assessment phase by the MoD, which means working out the scope, related 
TUPE issues, the transition process for extracting systems and money from the TLBs and 
a public sector comparator, while ATLAS has to provide a separate BAFO (Best and 
Final Offer) submission.214  A team of at least two within the DII Group work 
permanently on successive increments, whilst ATLAS also has a significant bid team.  
The incremental approach has, therefore, had resource impacts. 
 
This process has also had its effect on the implementation plan with many sites having to 
be revisited for each increment.  There was a view that it would have been easier in terms 
of the implementation to put the whole infrastructure and basic capability on contract 
with ATLAS and then look at a benefits-driven way to deliver it, resulting in greater 
flexibility with the implementation, rather than having to work within a specific 
increment providing a specific number of terminals.215  However, this approach was not 
affordable and would have not have delivered the initial indirect (enabled) benefits 
(principally JPA) in the required timeframe.  Despite the fact that Scalability and 
Flexibility is designed to provide control over the contract, there was much frustration 
over the hold up with Increment 3a, as already indicated.  However, it was pointed out 
that the purpose of this increment was not to deliver new capability but simply more 
terminals.  The required capability, in particular EDRMS, included in Increment 1, is yet 
to be delivered.216  Therefore, the letting of the contract by increments, which were 
largely divorced from the capability releases, which it was assumed would be delivered 
on time, has proved problematic in terms of operating this contract.217  Although this CSF 
has been understood and applied, it is apparent that it was with reluctance and that there 
are concerns about its benefit. 
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Stakeholder Management  Critical % 
Recognised 59 
The systematic identification, analysis and planning of 
actions to communicate with, negotiate with and influence 
all those who have an interest or role in the project or are 
impacted by the project. 
Extent  65 
 
Effect 
++ 
 
59 
 
As far back as 1989, Pinto and Slevin noted that the project team must work with the 
client organisation to ensure acceptance of the project.218  This stress on stakeholder 
engagement remains apparent in the literature to date, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Many studies of IT projects indicate that failure is due to organisational and social rather 
than technological factors.219  If organisational change goals are to be met, then users 
have to be both willing to use the system and to exploit its capabilities.  Despite this 
strong evidence from the literature, there were mixed views about the importance of this 
factor within the Programme.  On the one hand, it was felt that the cultural issues had 
been largely ignored and that this was a mistake.220  On the other, it was felt that this 
factor diminishes in importance at the operational level of the project if there is senior 
level support, which then drives the vision throughout the organisation, so ensuring 
cultural acceptance.221  Despite this discrepancy, the self-assessment of this CSF by the 
interviewees indicated that they understood the importance of Stakeholder Management 
and felt that it had been applied to relatively good effect.   
 
As discussed in relation to Change Readiness, a lot of work was carried out by the DII 
Group to inform the stakeholders, effectively the whole of the Defence community, and 
to increase their awareness of the benefits of a single infrastructure.222 This was 
reinforced by events such as Operation Telic, the codename for all British operations in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2009, and Operation Herrick, the codename for operations in 
Afghanistan.   This initial work was considered highly successful in gaining engagement 
with the project.223  However, as DII has become the largest single system in the MoD 
and delivery has slipped, this positive view has been eroded.  The initial stakeholder 
engagement has been overtaken by DII’s reputation which, it was felt, the Group and 
SRO have probably not done enough to protect.224  There was an acknowledgement that 
the concern with rolling out the Programme had been at the expense of continuing to 
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make the case to the users.  One interviewee believed that the Programme has repeated 
the mistake of the infrastructure project in the NHS: “we’ve bully-boyed our way through 
it...we haven’t really brought the stakeholders with us in quite the same way as we could 
have done”.225   
 
There was a suggestion that stakeholder management in relation to an IT project is 
difficult because of the familiarity of the users with the product; it is something that they 
use all the time, whether in the workplace or at home.  Therefore, they not only know 
what is available but are aware of the flexibility that it brings.226  ATLAS has instigated 
local engagement with stakeholders to improve its understanding of the customer 
requirements.  A Customer Service Management team liaises with the customer at site, 
regional or TLB level.227  Once the customer’s concerns are understood, they are then 
articulated back to the ATLAS Delivery Centre.  There are also three levels of customer 
service management review meetings, which discuss performance and the future 
requirement. This gives the opportunity to jointly understand what is working, what is 
failing and how to correct it.  A similar process is carried out within the DII Group and 
Information Systems and Services (ISS) regional organisation but pressure on staffing 
levels has limited its effectiveness.   
 
Overall, there appears to have been understanding of this CSF but limited application 
following the initial wave of stakeholder management.  Although this is now being 
addressed, it is debatable whether the reputation can be retrieved.  User satisfaction is 
seen as a key measure of success in the literature and was identified as such by the 
interviewees.  The user survey presented below will provide some insight into whether 
this Programme is perceived as successful by its user base. 
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Value for Money  Critical % High % 
Recognised 65 6 
The project offers the optimum economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency in delivering the 
product along with a qualitative and 
quantitative judgement over the manner in 
which resources have been utilised and 
managed and any reputational risk that has 
ensued to both public sector and supplier 
Extent  65 23 
 
Effect 
 
 
 
++ 
17 
 
 
+ 
65 
 
The VfM focus for this Programme revolves around finances, due to the limited budget 
and the need to demonstrate VfM as a key component of any IAB business case 
submission.  It did not feature highly in the general IT reports and was only slightly more 
prominent in the infrastructure reports.  However, it is becoming increasingly important 
within government as evidenced by the examination of the Programme, Policy and 
Political Context in Chapter Five.  While there was some slight variance, the ratings by 
the interviewees showed that it was recognised as critical, seen as such within the 
Programme and had a positive effect.  However, one interviewee felt that VfM is a very 
subjective measure,228 whilst another felt that there is no real understanding of VfM in 
the MoD: it is simply taken to be “just about good enough and affordable”.229  There was 
also a belief that VfM can only be delivered if every requirement is subject to 
competition.230  Given that this is impossible, a lot of the detail in the contract is 
motivated by the need to control VfM.  This means that government contracts are 
necessarily constrained and restrictive in terms of requirements.  It would be impossible 
to simply contract a supplier to deliver an information infrastructure as there would be no 
means of checking the ultimate VfM.   
 
The service costs per terminal are readily available, averaging £1600-£1800 a year, with 
criticisms that they are too costly.231  However, this sum includes the delivery of 
RESTRICTED, SECRET and above SECRET, the infrastructure and the service.  With 
the additional functionality that Release 2 will bring, users may well become more 
convinced that DII represents VfM.  From the point of view of the supplier, the service-
contract is not the main revenue earner as the margins are very tight.232  However, once 
the trust of the contracting organisation is gained, money is then earned by being the 
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preferred supplier for the inevitable changes to requirements or through new business 
with the buyer.  There was some concern from ATLAS that media reports on IT projects 
suggest that this is not a valid means of earning money.233  However, unless the IT 
outsourcing contract is fulfilled to requirement, the supplier will not be in a position to 
make that additional revenue or to re-compete for the contract.  Therefore, it is incumbent 
on the supplier to ensure VfM in order to protect the long term partnering interests and, 
more commercially, their potential income stream.  Again, there is a level of trust 
required that the supplier is providing VfM and not simply increasing profit, whilst 
producing an outcome that is good enough to meet the requirement. 
 
There is a formal process of VfM challenges.  If there is a query over costs, then this 
enables the MoD to question ATLAS over their proposed solutions to requirements.  
However, it was felt that this engenders the wrong behaviour.234  This ‘challenge’ process 
has frequently added to the delays as the cost of delayed delivery to users is rarely 
factored into the VfM equation.  If ATLAS reduces its cost as a result of a challenge, 
then it is likely to encourage another challenge.  Therefore, ATLAS is now more robustly 
resisting these challenges and defending its costs.  It has also set up some set itemised 
costs for various services, such as moving terminals between offices, to ensure that there 
is greater clarity about costs on both sides.  This gives some visibility of the VfM, which 
means that the contractor feels that they are getting better value.  Again, this 
demonstrates how learning has taken place with the Programme to improve its processes 
and outcomes.  It is questionable whether this CSF is either understood or applied. 
 
6.4.  Impact of CSFs 
 
One of the measures of performance for this study, as identified in Chapter Two, is 
‘meeting the expectations of the stakeholders, including the project team, in terms of 
value and usefulness’.  It is evident from the above discussion that the project team 
believes that the DII Programme is delivering value and utility.  However, it is also 
imperative to assess how users view the system in terms of its match with their 
requirements, their satisfaction and use of the system.  The need to satisfy the users came 
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out strongly from the interviews and was also apparent in the literature, evidenced in the 
reported work by Pinto and Slevin,235 Sauer, 236 Dvir et al,237 DeLone and McLean238 and 
Shenhar and Levy, for example.239  Dix et al identified four categories of stakeholders. 240  
It is the primary stakeholders that are of interest here: “those who actually use the system 
and whose needs are usually predominant”. 241  However, the 2008 PAC Report on DII 
noted that users were expressing low levels of satisfaction regarding the implementation, 
the training and the ‘user friendliness’ of the system.242  How then has this situation 
evolved since then?   
 
6.4.1. User Survey 
 
In order to obtain a user view of the performance of DII, a survey was conducted, as 
described in Chapter Three.  Of the 84 returns received, response rates to individual 
questions ranged from 79 to 84 as some respondents skipped some questions.  However, 
as it was impossible to ascertain which responses were which, it was decided to work 
with all available data rather than trying to purge the overall dataset.  It is recognised that 
this is by no means a representative sample but the purpose was simply to gauge user 
opinion generally.  With representation from 20 different sites around the world, most 
respondents having used the system for two years or more and most categorising 
themselves as experienced or expert IT users, it was considered that there was enough 
representative experience of the system to guarantee informed responses.  Interviewees 
were offered the option of commenting on each question with little expectation of a 
response.  However, a number were motivated to express their views, suggesting that the 
comments received are particularly pertinent.  The full questionnaire and results are 
presented at Appendix 7.   
 
In terms of stakeholder management, 28 of 82 (34.2%) respondents had known little or 
nothing about DII(F) before its implementation, suggesting that the DII Group’s 
assessment of having communicated the change well initially is somewhat misplaced.  
Most users (57 or 71.3%) said it gave them access to all of their hardware and software 
requirements, while 60 (75%) felt that they had received sufficient training.  However, in 
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comparing it with their previous IT provision, the view was split, with roughly half rating 
it the same or worse than their previous IT with a similar rating for its ease of use and the 
support received.  The comments perhaps reflect the capability disparity of previous 
provision and the fact that DII is still not offering full functionality, along with problems 
with speed, as discussed above.  Most (61 or 76.3%) were either neutral or disagreed that 
the system offered them high quality while 58 (71.6%) were neutral or disagreed about its 
responsiveness.  A small majority thought it was more reliable.  Issues raised concerned 
the speed of the system and its expense. 
 
The final stage of the survey was an assessment of the DII Programme.  The majority 
(79.2%) felt that they had not been consulted during its development and 65.4% during 
implementation.  Of the 74 respondents to this question, 46 or 62.2% thought the 
implementation had been successful and 54 (70.1%) thought it met user requirements.  In 
line with the views on consultation, 59 or 80.8% felt that they had not been involved with 
the project, perhaps justifying the DII Group view that they had lost sight of their user 
base during the implementation process.  In terms of whether it is delivering new 
technology, the vote was split, again probably due to the disparity of systems available 
previously.  In terms of improving services, 58 (78.4%) thought it had.  Finally, 
respondents were asked to rate its success.  The majority (89.7%) felt that it had not 
stayed within budget while 94.9% thought that it had failed to meet its time constraint.  
Just over half considered that it had delivered organisational benefits, while 62 (75.5%) 
were neutral or disagreed with its delivery of user satisfaction.  The vote was split in 
terms of whether it was a project to deliver new technology but most (45 or 56.3%) felt 
that it had improved IT services.   
 
Overall, the responses and comments are not very positive.  There is dissatisfaction 
expressed by the respondents in terms of their experience of using the system and their 
evaluation of its overall success.  However, as Markus and Robey observed, these 
adverse comments may not be sufficient to categorise DII as a failure in the users’ eyes: 
“it is by no means certain that validity will lead to effective use or invalidity to 
ineffective use”.243  The purpose of DII(F) is not to fit the organisational reality but, as 
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described by Heeks et al, to deliver a conception that shifts that reality.244  Therefore, it is 
likely that DII(F) will yield major improvements in organisational effectiveness in time, 
if it has not already done so.245  However, the poor perception may also signify that one 
viewpoint has dominated the design, resulting in an expectation failure, as discussed by 
Heeks et al. 246  The aim is to ensure that all stakeholders are involved in the initial design 
of the system, so that their views are aligned and given equal weighting.247  According to 
the respondents to this survey, this did not take place and failure can result from a 
mismatch between the design realities and the desired realities of a group of stakeholders.  
Despite this, there does seem to be an acknowledgement that DII(F) has achieved some 
success in improving IT services and a recognition that it is something that Defence must 
do. 
 
6.5. Analysis: “It’s Good for Defence, It’s the Right Thing to Do” 
 
The scholarly consensus is that IT projects fail due to organisational and social factors: 
they “never fail because of technical causes”.248  However, it is evident that the DII 
Programme has struggled with technical issues that were considered to be low risk.  
These technical problems can be traced back to the people issues, having insufficient 
personnel with the right skills and too much reliance on assumption, and to the process 
issues, trying to transfer a way of working that proved successful in one situation to 
another, different situation.  This problem of knowledge gained from past successes being 
incorrectly applied to present problems was evidenced in Chapter Two.249 These 
technical problems might also be due to the context into which they are being introduced.  
To implement an IT project successfully, not only does the technology have to be 
understood, but also the problems that the system is designed to solve, the architectural 
and design elements, the organisational processes, the people, the setting in which they 
work and the wider environment, as discussed in Chapter One.  It was evident from the 
interviews that if the DII Programme fails to deliver Release 2, then it will have failed to 
deliver the organisational change required by Defence.   
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When asked to describe success, the project team highlighted Benefits Certainty and 
Constraints Certainty: the need to deliver the requisite IT to Defence to enable 
organisational change and doing so without exceeding time, cost or scope: they do not 
want the DII Programme to become another MoD project failure.  When asked which 
factors would cause the project to fail, their answers covered lack of Clarity and 
Perception, Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management and Constraints 
Certainty.  Stakeholder Management was not seen as a key measure of success or failure.  
From the user viewpoint, DII is already struggling in terms of Constraints Certainty and 
Benefits Certainty but the results were more positive in terms of the overall improvement 
to IT services.  The philosophy behind DII is, undoubtedly, good for Defence and the 
right thing to do.  It will integrate Defence, make it more coherent and provide the basis 
for future development.  However, in order to bring its user base with it, it has to deliver 
more than cabling and hardware; the applications are critical.  Therefore, at present, DII 
sits on the cusp of failure. 
 
Given this, what has been the impact of the identified CSFs on the management and 
performance of this project?  It was evident from the interviews that these CSFs are 
understood.  They were recognised by experienced, committed personnel who 
demonstrated a high degree of reflection about the project, its management and 
performance.  However, the extent to which these interviews reflected the true state of the 
project is uncertain.  Very few interviewees rated the CSFs as being anything other than 
‘Critical’ or ‘High’ for both understanding and application.  Despite this, further 
examination showed that the extent to which they were applied or managed within the 
Programme is variable with differing effect.   
 
As the above discussion shows, there are real questions about Affordability, whether the 
Programme was ever affordable and whether it remains so in the light of the current 
financial crisis.  This reflects the view of Kirkpatrick and the NAO, discussed in Chapter 
Five, that the MoD is over-optimistic about forecast costs. 250   Alternatives Certainty 
demonstrated a certain amount of ‘group-think’ with the system apparently designed to 
match the expectations of the project team, rather than its users.  Technical rationality 
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dominates, rather than managerial or professional, as discussed in Chapter Two.  Change 
Readiness was dubious, particularly with regards to the lack of site surveys, reflecting the 
inadequate preparatory work undertaken, highlighted by the first Gateway Review, with 
resulting cost overruns and delays.251  Complexity Management was similarly 
problematic with an underestimation of the technical risks and their consequences, 
ignoring or underestimating risk to give a delusion of accuracy in budgets and schedules, 
again identified by the NAO.252  Constraints Certainty demonstrates immature and 
inadequate through life costs, whilst ignoring the financial and operational penalties of 
delay.253  Therefore, although the CSFs are understood, their application in the 
Organisational Setting of the MoD appears to be guided by the culture of that 
organisation.                                    
 
The NAO’s report, Helping Government to Learn, discussed in Chapter Five, drew 
attention to the lack of priority given to learning in government departments, suggesting 
that no time is allocated within projects to capturing the lessons.254  This was not the case 
in this project where appropriate lessons were both sought and applied.  The Head of the 
NAO noted that “…projects and programmes are more likely to succeed and keep to time 
and budget where lessons have been learned and experience shared”.  However, the DII 
Programme shows categorically that, whilst there is merit in learning from others, care 
has to be taken in applying this learning.  The initial delay and rising cost was largely due 
to the application of lessons learned in one context, which then proved non-transferable 
to the Defence context.  This confirms the point made in Chapter Two that not all 
projects are the same and that they should, therefore, be managed in different ways, 
raising questions not only about learning lessons but the practical use of CSFs.  However, 
learning lessons from experiences that occur within the project is critical.  It is evident 
that, confronted by problems, both contractor and supplier have worked together to learn 
from their mistakes and to apply a better solution.  The suggestion is that it is this internal 
learning of lessons that is more likely to lead to success, rather than simply applying 
generic solutions to highly specific problems.   
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Overall, the impact of the CSFs on the management and performance of the DII 
Programme seems to be debatable.  However, in order to clarify the performance of the 
project, the literature review sought a means of measuring the benefit of applying CSFs 
to a project.  The Formal Systems Method (FSM) was identified, which provides “a 
model of a robust system capable of purposeful activity without failure” (emphasis in 
original). 255  It encapsulates much of the research discussed in Chapter Two, sitting the 
project firmly in its context and environment, whilst showing the interrelationships.  In 
order to determine whether DII is a robust system capable of delivering without failure, 
the project was tested against the FSM, as shown at Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4. Discrepancies between the FSM and the DII Programme 
Environment 
(Programme, Policy and 
Political Context) 
Drive to outsourcing.  Problems with finance due to Financial Crisis beyond 
the control of the system.   
Formulates Initial Design Initial design generated by the System (the DII Programme) 
Provides Resources and 
Legitimates Area of 
Operation 
Endorsement and support.  Limited provision of financial resources. 
Continued affordability uncertain. Experienced personnel retained in post.  
No attempt to reduce team size in light of outsourcing.  Change readiness an 
issue. 
Makes Known 
Expectations 
Driving Defence integration.  Changes to security policy.  Perceived lack of 
user input.  Policy/directives ignored.  Senior Management understanding of 
project issues.  VfM concerns from users. 
Supplies Performance 
Information 
Clear governance structure and performance information provided.  Lack of 
financial monitoring.  No apparent concern about delays. 
Decision-Making Sub-
System 
Experienced DII Head retained in post for eight years, delivering clear vision 
and implementation strategy.  Urgency to act.  Assumptions resulting in risk.  
Understanding of users debatable.  Constraints of incremental contracting.  
Over-optimism about forecast costs.  Inadequate through life costs to support 
decision-making.  Ignores financial and operational penalties of delay. 
Subsystems that Carry 
Out Transformations 
Operated by ATLAS, closely controlled/overseen by DII Group.  Lack of 
time allocated to project initiation.  Competence and capacity issues.  
Initially ineffective processes but lessons learned.  Underestimation of 
technical risks and their consequences. Difficult context for contractors.  
Cohesion of project team problematic. Contract management: 
communication, relationships and trust. Cost increases and delays.  
Inadequate preparatory work.   
Performance Monitoring 
Subsystem 
Benefits, CSFs, KPIs.  Creates certain behaviours. 
Source: Author 
 
This Table is translated to diagrammatic form at Figure 6.6 to clearly show an estimation 
of the management and performance of the DII Programme.  This demonstrates that there 
are areas that could have been managed better and that the system could be performing 
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better.  This confirms the above conclusion that the overall success of the project is 
potentially at risk. 
 
Figure 6.6: DII Programme: An FSM Analysis 
Environment
disturbs attempts to 
influence
Wider System Boundary
WIDER SYSTEM
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initial design of
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of operation
makes known 
expectations
supplies 
performance 
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System Boundary
SYSTEM
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?
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?
 
Source: Adapted by author from Fortune, J. and Peters, G., Information Systems: Achieving Success 
by Avoiding Failure, (Chichester, Wiley, 2005), page 121. 
 
6.6.  Summary 
 
Both the NAO and PAC gave the DII Programme a relatively positive report, concluding 
that it had taken on board many of the things that the MoD had been advised to do in the 
past.  Although ambitious, the Programme has been well conceived with a good structure 
in place, they reported.  It has a robust commercial structure, sound governance and 
decision-making structures along with good continuity of staff.  Chapter Five confirmed 
that there has been sound planning within the DII Programme to provide a good basis for 
a successful outcome.  This chapter has examined the Technical Solution, the IT project, 
firstly considering the development and implementation of the hardware and software 
before going on to assess the understanding and application of the identified CSFs.  This 
has shown that both the DII Group and ATLAS appear to understand these CSFs and 
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have worked to apply them within the project.  In some instances, the effect of this has 
been strongly positive.  However, in others, the application is questionable.  It is evident 
that these CSFs are applied within a specific Organisational Setting, that this setting 
impacts on the project and, more particularly, on the way that the CSFs are understood 
and applied.  The overall assessment of the management of this Programme using the 
FSM suggests that the project is not as robust as it should be in terms of its management 
and performance.  This analysis has raised issues about the practical use of CSFs, the 
application of generic success factors to specific projects.  The final chapter will discuss 
this further and assess the extent to which the research question is answered by this study 
and the aim met.  It will, therefore, summarise the research, draw conclusions and make 
policy recommendations. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
 
The research question posed at the beginning of this study was whether the lessons 
learned from previous complex Information Technology (IT) projects in government 
have been used to improve the performance of subsequent projects.  ‘Lessons learned’ 
refers to lessons synthesised from ten reports published between 2000 and 2006; 
‘complex IT projects’ refers to mega-projects or programmes where the most 
complex, costly or resource demanding elements involve IT; and ‘government’, used 
interchangeably with public sector, is that part of the state dealing with the 
production, delivery and allocation of goods and services by and for the government 
or its citizens, whether national, regional or local.  The meaning of ‘performance’ in 
this context was derived from the literature review and was taken to be: reducing the 
risk of escalation to cost, time and scope; reducing the resource demands of cost, time 
and scope; meeting the expectations of the stakeholders, including the project team, in 
terms of value and usefulness; improving the scale or certainty of business benefits; 
improving the scale or certainty of the project’s contribution to defined strategic 
goals; and avoidance of identified strategic environment factors known to undermine 
delivery or future performance. 
 
This research question was underpinned by three subsidiary questions. 
 
1. Are the lessons learned from previous complex IT projects in government 
correct and comprehensively considered?  This required a point of 
comparison, which was the findings of the academic literature. 
2. Have the lessons learned been differentiated by the type of project?   This 
required identification of the different types of project and an assessment of 
the appropriateness of the lessons in relation to project type. 
3. Has the relative importance of the lessons learned been adequately explored 
and identified?  This required examination of how lessons vary across a 
project and product lifecycle. 
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These thought processes led to the aim of this study, which was to analyse the impact 
of identified Critical Success Factors (CSFs) on the management and subsequent 
performance of a major government IT project, taking as a case study the MoD’s 
Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme.  The enabling objectives 
included exploration of the key CSFs defined in academic studies of project 
management in general and IT project management specifically, along with an 
assessment of their impact; the identification of the key CSFs defined in reports on 
public sector IT project failure and reviews of infrastructure projects; synthesis of the 
identified CSFs and comparison with those defined in the academic literature to 
ensure that they are correct and comprehensively considered; development of a 
detailed case study of the design and delivery of the DII programme; examination of 
the extent to which the CSFs have been incorporated into the management of the DII 
Programme; and assessment of the effectiveness of CSFs as a means of delivering 
project success. 
 
The research was described and structured by a conceptual framework that resulted 
from a definition of an information system together with a description of the layers of 
complexity surrounding government IT initiatives: the Technical Solution sits at the 
core surrounded by the Business Process, Organisational Setting and Programme, 
Policy and Political Context.  This chapter summarises this research, presents the 
findings, provides policy recommendations and discusses possible areas of future 
research.  
 
7.2. Research Summary 
 
The UK Government sees IT as a means of delivering its services more efficiently and 
effectively.  To this end, it has enacted policy aimed at incorporating IT into its 
business, whilst commissioning complex IT mega-projects at significant cost to the 
taxpayer in order to fulfil that policy.  With budgets greater than £50 million and 
inevitable public impact, the complexity and magnitude of these projects increases 
their risk of failure.  Not surprisingly, therefore, government has a catalogue of very 
expensive IT mega-projects that have failed to deliver the anticipated benefit.  
However, not complacent about its poor record, it has made numerous attempts, along 
with academia and other reputable bodies, to understand why these projects fail and to 
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identify those factors that need to be given specific attention by project managers to 
ensure successful delivery.  In 2000, the McCartney Report, Successful IT: 
Modernising Government in Action, was published, identifying ten areas for 
improvement; in 2006, the National Audit Office (NAO) mirrored McCartney’s focus 
with Delivering Successful IT-Enabled Business Change.  Eight other major reports 
appeared in between, largely variations on a theme.  Despite this effort, the failure 
rate of government IT mega-projects remains high, raising questions about whether 
the identified CSFs have been noted, understood and applied by project managers in 
government and, if so, to what effect.  There is also an assumption that these CSFs 
have general applicability to all types of projects, whatever their funding, 
procurement, development or implementation model.   
 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD), one of the largest and most diverse government 
departments, initiated its Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme in 
2001, destined to be a £5 billion, ten-year overhaul of Defence IT systems.  With 
Defence IT based on disjointed and non-interoperable systems, DII will provide the 
foundations, the infrastructure, to support the flow and processing of information in 
Defence and, in doing so, will drive major business change, increasing coherence and 
integration.  The contract to provide DII was awarded to the ATLAS Consortium, an 
organisation made up of five separate companies, in March 2005.  DII is a complex 
mega-project being undertaken within the government context and, as such, provides 
an ideal case study to examine whether the CSFs have been understood and applied at 
the operational level.  As DII enters the sixth year of its contract, the MoD is faced 
with a constrained and falling budget, in part due to its poor record of delivering 
complex technology projects.  It is charged with being over-optimistic with its 
investment decisions, whilst failing to control costs and to deliver Value for Money 
(VfM).  DII sits at the crux of these two problems: government IT project failure and 
MoD procurement failure.  Developed and implemented within the shadow of these 
ten reports, the expectation is that some, if not all, of the CSFs should have been 
incorporated and embedded into its project management to good effect. 
 
The MoD operates within the government context, which is organised vertically with 
an insular culture, whilst authority is dissipated across multiple decision makers with 
no central mandatory control.  The overriding purpose of government is to create 
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public value whilst meeting its mandate and fulfilling its mission.  Certain layers of its 
business are no different to those of a private sector organisation: the IT project or the 
Technical Solution has to work within a Business Process and an Organisational 
Setting.  However, the difference in government lies in its outer layer, the 
Programme, Policy and Political Context, delivering the political priorities of the 
Government but based on ‘short-termism’ and subject to a range of checks and 
balances, which ultimately impact the other three layers.  It is questionable whether 
generic CSFs can provide the means of tackling failure in such a disparate and 
complex environment.   
 
7.2.1.  Summarising the Literature: Understanding Failure and Defining Success 
  
A systematic literature review process was based around examination of four factors: 
Context, Intervention, Mechanism and Outcome.  The examination of the government 
context revealed little empirical research on public sector IT project management.  
However, a series of relevant issues was extracted from the few articles identified.  
Changes in policy and political direction, along with the many levels of 
accountability, are likely to impact on IT projects, while their cultural decentralisation 
reinforces the insular nature of government.  There is a propensity to undertake IT 
mega-projects based on leading edge technology despite the shortage of specialist 
inhouse IT project development staff while the resulting outsourcing of projects is 
hampered by the lack of available commercial knowledge.  In addition, external 
personnel may struggle to understand the complexity of the government context 
making it difficult to deliver the requirement.  These projects tend to be based on the 
traditional linear project lifecycle with pre-defined requirements and a pre-determined 
timetable, making it difficult to keep pace with rapid technology change.  Overall, 
there is an identified need for improved organisational learning in government to 
counteract the problems with IT projects.  Interestingly, these issues appear to be 
unique to the UK, suggesting that the failures may relate to specific problems with 
government processes in the UK, such as political hyperactivism and operating on a 
national rather than a regional scale.  
‘Intervention’ refers to the application of CSFs to project management and was 
examined firstly in relation to generic project management.  The evolution of thinking 
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has identified the need to differentiate the project and the product lifecycle, whilst 
recognising that CSFs vary throughout this lifecycle, relating to the ‘internal’ factors 
(the project) early on, while ‘external’ factors (the product) become important later.  
In addition, different projects operate in different contexts and, therefore, require 
different approaches, leading to a move to apply contingency theory to project 
management followed by the more recent idea of strategic project management.  Over 
time, research has moved from lists of CSFs to the production of multi-dimensional 
frameworks, emphasising the criticality of their interactions, as well as moving from a 
focus on time, cost and scope, the so-called ‘iron triangle’, to incorporate wider 
organisational and environmental factors as well as an increased focus on 
stakeholders.  
IT projects are differentiated from other types of project by their complex and 
unpredictable products, which are closely tied to their organisational context.  
However, not only do IT projects differ from other types of project but there are also 
different types of IT project requiring different types of management.  Understanding 
the type of project enables greater clarity in assessing the associated risks and in 
identifying the most relevant CSFs.  Studies on IT project management have followed 
a similar route to the generic literature but have moved more rapidly towards 
organisational factors, an emphasis on the end-user and the development of 
frameworks that highlight the organisational validity and fit of the IT project, along 
with the influence of its context and wider environment.  These models were closely 
examined to find a measure of the impact of CSFs on a project, thereby enabling their 
ultimate effect on the performance of the DII Programme to be assessed.  The Formal 
Systems Method (FSM) encapsulates much of the previous research, clearly 
considering both the context and the environment, picking up on subjective issues, 
such as expectations and decision-making, whilst also showing the interrelationships.  
As such, it provides an ideal measure.  Having reviewed the IT project management 
literature, the CSFs were extracted and compared to the CSFs identified in the generic 
project management literature.  These proved to be broadly comparable, particularly 
in terms of the top three CSFs.   
Discussion of the Mechanism critiqued definitions of ‘project’ and ‘project 
management’, and also considered the project lifecycle, questioning the utility of 
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project reviews, particularly for IT projects, and noting the move to more dynamic 
development lifecycles along with attempts to incorporate organisational elements.  
The discussion then moved to the Outcome, firstly reviewing the effect of the 
Intervention through an examination of the study of risk management.  Whilst at an 
immature stage, studies in this area are following the same route as the work on CSFs, 
moving from the identification of lists to the creation of frameworks.  The top three 
risk factors were the mirror image of the top three CSFs for IT project management, 
further corroborating the CSFs identified in the literature.  This section then 
considered how definitions of success have evolved, resulting in the creation of the 
definition and measure of ‘performance’, discussed above.  Finally, some key themes 
relating to learning from experience were discussed, including the failure to learn and 
the commitment to troubled projects. 
The literature review revealed two gaps: a lack of research on IT project management 
in the public sector and a lack of evidence that the identified CSFs are being 
understood and applied in practice.  It also identified the FSM as a means of 
measuring the impact of the CSFs on the selected case study, the DII Programme.  
Finally, it satisfied the first objective of this study, which was the exploration of the 
key CSFs defined in academic studies of project management in general and IT 
project management specifically, along with an assessment of their impact. 
7.2.2. Summarising the Research I: Identifying the Critical Success Factors 
 
Based on an interpretivist philosophy, this research considers the world to be socially 
constructed and subjective, requiring human behaviour to be understood rather than 
explained.  The purpose is causal or analytical in that it examines the effect of one 
variable (CSFs) on another (the DII Programme) to ascertain if there has been a 
specific change from existing norms.  The process is based on a mixture of qualitative 
and quantitative methods and its logic is deductive.  Finally, the outcome is applied 
research, designed to apply its findings to a specific existing problem.   
 
The first stage of the research was to identify the CSFs from reports on IT project 
failure and information infrastructure projects, then to compare them with the CSFs 
identified in the literature in order to produce a synthesised list.  The understanding 
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and application of this list and its impact could then be examined through the case 
study.  In 2000, McCartney produced his authoritative report, followed by nine 
reports that generally reiterated his themes.  Following the trail of McCartney 
demonstrated that policy is simply a suggested course of action, rather than mandated 
regulation.  This theme recurred in the subsequent reports, raising questions about 
how to ensure that government departments and agencies comply with these CSFs.  
McCartney’s principal legacies are the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) appointment 
and Gateway Reviews but the report also initiated a number of mechanisms to 
improve skills and knowledge in government.  In addition, it highlighted the 
importance of delivering benefits, initiating smaller more manageable projects and 
improving relations with suppliers.   
 
Three key themes emerged from this analysis.  Firstly, knowledge, understanding and 
skills are a major issue in the government context and underpin a range of the other 
identified CSFs.  Secondly, governance is critical: the means to success are known; 
the issue is compliance with those means.  Thirdly, the contract needs to be managed, 
raising further questions about skills and the relationship with the supplier, given a 
clash of cultures.  The themes derived from these general IT failure reports were then 
compared with those in the five information infrastructure projects with no additional 
themes identified. The infrastructure reports highlighted poor project management, 
problems with procurement and supplier relations, as well as skills and competence.  
They also identified problems resulting from changes to the project team and failing 
to engage the stakeholders.  This process satisfied the second objective, which was the 
identification of the key CSFs defined in reports on public sector IT project failure 
and reviews of infrastructure projects. 
 
The themes were then refined to produce a list of twelve CSFs, clearly identifying the 
required activity, rather than simply being a broad generic term.  These are shown 
again at Table 7.1.  They were then verified against the literature to positively answer 
the first subsidiary research question: are the lessons learned from previous complex 
IT projects in government correct and comprehensively considered?   This also 
satisfied the third objective, which was synthesis of the identified CSFs and 
comparison with those defined in the academic literature to ensure that they are 
correct and comprehensively considered. 
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Table 7.1: Identified CSFs 
Affordability 
An assessment of whether proposals can be paid for in terms of resources, cash-flows and funding 
Alternatives Certainty 
Consideration of alternative approaches capable of fulfilling the objectives creates project confidence 
and commitment with the key stakeholders i.e. Do Nothing, Do minimum, Defer, Outsource, 
Consolidate 
Benefits Certainty 
Clear identification and definition of the business need for the project and the required performance 
improvement outcomes along with how these will be managed in terms of measures, owners, targets 
and strategic alignment 
Change Readiness 
The current state of the organisations involved in the project and their perceived ability to absorb, 
adapt to, and assimilate change 
Clarity and Perception 
Clarity of the rationale, scope and scale of the project and shared understanding by key stakeholders 
across broad communities involved 
Competence and Capacity 
The requirement for individuals associated with the project to be able to properly perform specific jobs 
through a combination of knowledge, skills and behaviour, along with the capacity, in terms of the 
availability of the right people with the right skills, to execute and effectively deliver the option 
Complexity Management 
The level of likely risk and the scale, novelty, diversity, interdependency and volatility of a project 
Consistency and Coherence 
Integration of the selected option with established systems, processes and policies 
Constraints Certainty 
An estimate of costs, resource requirements and timescales along with project planning, design and 
implementation 
Scalability and Flexibility 
Consideration of the versatility of a future option and its anticipated survivability in a future and 
unpredictable environment, requiring an understanding of the scalability (both up and down) and of 
the degree of flexibility 
Stakeholder Management 
The systematic identification, analysis and planning of actions to communicate with, negotiate with and 
influence all those who have an interest or role in the project or those who are impacted by the project. 
Value for Money  
The project offers the optimum economy, effectiveness and efficiency in delivering the product along 
with a qualitative and quantitative judgement over the manner in which resources are utilised and 
managed and any reputational risk that has ensued to both public sector and supplier 
Source: Author 
 
The next stage of this study was to assess whether the CSFs have been understood and 
applied and, if so, whether they have improved the performance of a complex IT 
project within the government context.  A case study was selected as the research 
methodology, incorporating a number of methods, including interviews and surveys, 
satisfying the fourth objective of developing a detailed case study. 
 
7.2.3. Summarising the Research II: The DII Programme Case Study 
 
The conceptual framework structured the approach to the case study of the DII 
Programme, which began by unpeeling the layers surrounding the Technical Solution, 
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the IT project under review: the Programme, Policy and Political Context; the 
Organisational Setting; and the Business Process.  The Programme, Policy and 
Political Context has been the source of a number of initiatives aimed at providing 
more effective government procurement and project management.  Four key themes 
arose from this discussion, three relating to CSFs identified previously: the need for 
common practices and processes along with some means of ensuring compliance 
(Consistency and Coherence); the need for an improvement in government’s skills 
and knowledge in the areas of commercial management, financial management, 
project and risk management, and IT capability (Competence and Capacity); ensuring 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in terms of both procurement and project 
management (Value for Money); and a much greater emphasis on the need to manage 
contracts.  These are potentially undeliverable without also tackling two overarching 
themes: the need for increased governance, much stronger authority in terms of 
directed and required compliance, and the lack of priority given to the learning of 
lessons in government.   
 
Within the Organisational Setting, the MoD has translated these policy initiatives in 
order to deliver changes in practice within its own specific context.  The description 
of the structure and organisation of the MoD shows a department with strong lines of 
authority facing strong drivers for change.  Its systems appear to be well considered 
and logical, providing the basis for a successful organisation operating within the 
boundaries of public expenditure planning, control and accountability.  However, it is 
suffering serious problems with its procurement and project management.  Therefore, 
while there is evidence that the MoD is translating policy to the Defence context, 
there seems to be little evidence that it is having any impact on the ‘Business 
Process’. 
 
The final stage of the discussion examined this Business Process, exploring the urgent 
need to improve the state of Defence information leading to the setting up of the DII 
Programme.  The DII Group was formally established in 2000, began designing the 
structure and processes to deliver a single information infrastructure and, over time, 
obtained senior management support and funding.  The decision was then taken to 
outsource the project to a consortium, dividing it into three stages: DII(Current), 
DII(Convergent) and DII(Future), known as DII(F).  DII(F) was then divided into 
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three increments, which were broken into separate elements.  The software was to be 
delivered in two batches: Release 1 (basic functionality) and Release 2 (full 
functionality).  Delayed by three months, the contract was finally let in March 2005 to 
the ATLAS consortium, made up of five separate companies, led by EDS, which later 
merged with Hewlett Packard (HP).  Despite the delayed contract, it was agreed to 
keep to the original timetable, which meant that the three-month start-up period was 
lost and ATLAS had to recruit and build its organisation at the same time as initiating 
the DII Programme. 
 
Despite the assertion that the activity undertaken within the Programme, Policy and 
Political Context and the Organisational Setting layers has had little effect on the 
Business Process, this initial examination of the DII Programme suggests that there 
has been sound planning, providing a good basis for a successful outcome.  The next 
stage of the case study, again structured by the conceptual framework, was to examine 
the Technical Solution at the centre of these layers, to ascertain whether the identified 
CSFs have been understood and applied, and, if so, to estimate their impact.  In order 
to answer the second subsidiary research question, the first step in examining the 
Technical Solution was to find out if the project had been categorised by type and 
whether the CSFs had been differentiated accordingly.  Although the utility of this 
process was recognised, the DII Programme had not been classified this way.  DII was 
identified as Strategic, meaning that it will deliver sustainable competitive advantage 
or, in MoD terms, best value and operational capability.   
 
The examination of the Technical Solution then focused on the software development 
and the implementation of DII(F).  Both were identified as being of low technical risk, 
yet both presented problems.  The processes for each had been used previously for the 
infrastructure project at DWP.  Both failed in the MoD context and were rethought, 
resulting in delays, inconvenience to users, the retention of legacy systems and 
associated cost.  ATLAS underestimated the technical difficulty of the software 
development and the required manpower, a situation further exacerbated by the 
security accreditation process and a new policy on security requirements.  This 
resulted in delays to the delivery of a version of DII(F) that could handle SECRET 
material, demonstrating that changes in policy can cause critical problems, 
particularly to an IT system under development.  The delays to Release 2 are 
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significant, resulting in delivery via smaller work packages with the final one due in 
2013, seven years late.  This means that the MoD and armed services will only 
receive two years of benefit from DII(F) working at full functionality, rather than 
nine, raising significant questions about its VfM.   
 
The implementation process for the hardware and software was based on a series of 
assumptions about sites within Defence, which then needed substantial work to bring 
them to the required standard.  However, in the midst of this, the DII Programme 
managed to ensure delivery of the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) application, 
thereby enabling the biggest single benefit for the project.  In both cases, the DII 
Group and ATLAS worked together on devising solutions that better fitted the 
Organisational Setting.  Despite this, further problems have been encountered as the 
Programme has progressed and further challenges lie ahead as it moves into the 
deployed and maritime environments. 
 
Having considered the Technical Solution and identified issues, the next stage was to 
consider the understanding and application of the CSFs within the Programme.  
Firstly, the DII Group and ATLAS interviewees were asked about lessons learned.  It 
was apparent that the DII Programme had actively sought and applied appropriate 
lessons, despite the view from the Programme, Policy and Political Context that no 
priority or time was given to learning lessons within projects.  The lessons from the 
reports have permeated the project via specific policy and processes or as a result of 
oversight and assessment by external bodies.  Lessons were also gleaned from similar 
projects and applied accordingly.  However, as it has developed over time the DII 
Programme has become unique, thereby making it self-reliant in terms of finding 
solutions to problems.   
 
Asked to assess their understanding and application of CSFs within the Programme, 
the interviewees rated Consistency and Coherence, Benefits Certainty and 
Alternatives Certainty as most critical in terms of both understanding and application.  
However, in terms of having a strongly positive effect on the Programme, the two 
former CSFs were joined by Stakeholder Management along with Scalability and 
Flexibility, rather than Alternatives Certainty.  These results enabled the range of 
CSFs identified as part of this study to be compared.  Looking at CSFs from the 
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project management literature, IT project management literature, general IT and 
infrastructure reports, as well as the DII Programme case study, there was little 
correspondence, supporting the assertion that there are specific types of project in 
specific contexts and that not all projects are the same. 
 
The next phase of this research was to examine whether the relative importance of the 
CSFs has been adequately explored and identified.  The findings broadly support the 
assertions in the literature of an internal focus during planning, moving to the product 
during development and implementation.  Affordability, Alternatives Certainty, 
Benefits Certainty and Value for Money were critical at the planning stage while 
Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management, Constraints Certainty, and Scale 
and Flexibility were considered critical to obtaining the relevant resources.  During 
the development and implementation, the stress is on Change Readiness, Clarity and 
Perception and Stakeholder Management, but there are ongoing issues with 
Affordability, Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management, and Scalability 
and Flexibility.  This answered the third subsidiary question, showing that CSFs vary 
across the project and product lifecycle.  Generally, it is the more technical factors 
that are critical upfront, such as finance, scope and time, along with business benefit, 
moving to organisational and social factors as the project progresses into 
implementation.   
 
The understanding and application of the CSFs was then explored further with the 
interviewees.  In accordance with the interpretive stance taken by this research, the 
evidence is subjective, based on opinion stemming from the way that each 
interviewee interprets the world.  These opinions were cross-referenced and compared 
with fact.  It is evident that the DII Programme has struggled with technical issues that 
were considered to be low risk.  These can be traced back to people and process 
issues.  However, they also relate to the context into which they are being introduced 
and the need to understand not only related architectural and design problems within 
that context but also the organisational processes, the people, the setting and the wider 
environment.  If the DII Programme fails to deliver Release 2, then it will have failed 
to deliver the organisational change required by Defence.   
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The interviewees identified the measures of success for DII in terms of Benefits 
Certainty and Constraints Certainty: the need to deliver the requisite IT to Defence, 
enabling organisational change, without exceeding time, cost or scope.  It was 
considered that the project might fail if lack of attention is given to Clarity and 
Perception, Competence and Capacity, Complexity Management and Constraints 
Certainty.  Stakeholder Management was not seen as a key measure of success or a 
component of failure.  However, from the user viewpoint, DII is failing with regards 
to Constraints Certainty and Benefits Certainty although there is a more positive view 
of DII(F) in terms of it delivering an overall improvement to IT services (Clarity and 
Perception).  Creating an information infrastructure for Defence is a necessity in 
terms of integration, increasing coherence and implementing innovative changes in 
working practices and business solutions.  Not least, it will provide the basis for future 
development.  However, in order to convince its users of its utility, the delivery of full 
functionality is critical.   
 
The fifth objective was to examine the extent to which the CSFs have been 
incorporated into the management of the DII Programme.  It was evident that they 
were recognised and they appeared to have been understood by the interviewees.  
However, the extent to which they have been applied within the Programme is 
variable with differing effect.  There are questions about the application of 
Affordability, whether the Programme was ever affordable and whether it remains so, 
reflecting the view that the MoD is over-optimistic with its forecast costs.  
Alternatives Certainty demonstrated ‘group-think’ with technical rationality 
dominating, rather than managerial or professional, which may explain the 
expectation failure on behalf of the users.  There was inadequate Change Readiness in 
terms of the preparatory work undertaken, with resulting cost overruns and delays.  
Complexity Management demonstrated an underestimation of risk, whilst Constraints 
Certainty showed inadequate through life costs and, apparently, little regard for the 
financial and operational impact of delay.  It is evident that the Organisational Setting 
and its Business Process impact on the Technical Solution.  The CSFs are interpreted 
according to the culture and ways of working within the MoD, which effects the way 
in which they are then applied. Therefore, the impact that CSFs have had on the 
management of the DII Programme is debatable.   
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Turning to an assessment of the performance, the selected means of measuring the 
benefit of applying CSFs to a project was the Formal Systems Method (FSM), which 
encapsulates much of the research identified in the literature review and provides an 
ideal system against which to measure reality.  If a project is managed in such a way 
that all of the operations and their interactions within this model are in place then it 
should perform, thereby delivering a successful product.  In other words, it is a robust 
system that should operate without failure.  Tested against this model on the basis of 
the evidence derived from the case study, it appears DII(F) could be managed better 
and, therefore, could be performing better, suggesting that the overall success of the 
project is potentially at risk.   
 
The research question asked whether the lessons learned from previous complex IT 
projects in government have been used to improve the performance of subsequent 
projects.  Performance was defined through the scholarly literature to provide eight 
measures of success. These showed that the DII Programme has not reduced costs, 
timescales or resource demands or reduced the risk of them escalating. Cost and 
timescales have increased while resource has remained largely static since the project 
was initiated.  The scale or certainty of business benefits has not been maintained, 
largely due to the delays with software, although it is well tracked.  The scale or 
certainty of the project’s contribution to defined strategic goals is also threatened by 
the problems surrounding Release 2, which enables major organisational benefit from 
this project, thereby delivering best value and operational capability.  Finally, there 
has been some degree of avoidance of identified doctrinal, procedural and/or strategic 
environment factors known to undermine delivery or future performance, although the 
project has been hampered by changes to the security policy and the effects of the 
Financial Crisis in the wider environment.   
 
Therefore, the answer to the research question is that the lessons learned from 
previous complex IT projects in government have been used to some degree but have 
not improved the performance of the DII Programme.  In other words, the 
understanding and application of CSFs to the management of this project will not 
necessarily result in improved performance or, in other words, a successful outcome.  
This fulfils the final objective of assessing the effectiveness of CSFs as a means of 
delivering project success and meets the aim of this study, which was to analyse the 
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impact of identified CSFs on the management and subsequent performance of a major 
government IT project, taking as a case study the MoD’s Defence Information 
Infrastructure.  This leads to the following conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
7.3.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
The overarching conclusion of this study is that, in terms of the management of the 
DII Programme, the impact of the identified CSFs is variable but, where they are not 
applied, there is an adverse effect on its performance. This suggests a causal 
relationship.   
 
More generally, whilst not applying generic CSFs to project management is likely to 
lead to failure, it appears that identifying them is not the solution to the problems 
experienced with major government IT projects, unique projects operating in highly 
specific and complex contexts; more contingent solutions should be sought.  This 
overarching conclusion leads to eight more focused conclusions along with related 
policy recommendations. 
 
7.3.1. Lessons Learned and Identified CSFs 
 
Since the 1960s, many scholars have spent time trying to identify a limited number of 
factors that will lead to success.  In this study, success was defined in terms of 
‘performance’, which was broken down into six key areas.  Recently, the UK 
government has put more emphasis on the need to learn lessons and the lack of 
priority given to this, identifying the requirement for a central mandatory system of 
assurance to systematically propagate lessons learned.  The case study demonstrated, 
however, that lessons have to be applied with care and that it is dangerous to assume 
that they are easily transferable (Chapter Six, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2).  It also 
showed that, as these IT mega-projects mature, the chance of finding a reference 
source becomes more unlikely (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.1).  Therefore, the major 
learning is from experiences that occur within the project, raising the critical issue of 
being able to learn from mistakes within these major government projects and then to 
apply a better solution.  This form of learning is more likely to lead to success, rather 
than simply applying generic solutions to highly specific problems.   
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However, project teams are often driven to hide mistakes and to present an optimistic 
view to senior management in order to avoid inevitable financial and resource 
penalties (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Constraints Certainty)).  In addition, they are 
subject to a great deal of scrutiny and accountability, not least by the media, making 
government a difficult environment in which to learn lessons.  However, there appears 
to be an emerging awareness in government that these projects are highly complex, 
that complexity brings risk from numerous sources and that this risk is often 
unpredictable (Chapter 5, Section 5.2). 
 
In terms of then translating these lessons into CSFs, it is evident that there is little 
unanimity about CSFs.  Whilst there was some cross-reference in some cases, it was 
impossible to categorically identify the critical  factors for success, sifting across a 
range of sources.  CSFs were shown to vary throughout the project and product 
lifecycle; some are within the control of the project team, while others may not be; the 
factors leading to success are multi-dimensional and interlinked; a combination of 
multiple factors vary in importance through the lifecycle; and, finally, not all projects 
are the same and they should, therefore, be managed in different ways using different 
CSFs, demonstrating that they are highly context specific.  It is questionable whether 
the same approach can be adopted, whatever the funding, procurement, development 
or implementation model for a project, with simply some fine tuning to reflect variety, 
scale and complexity.   
 
This draws into dispute the whole basis of the CSF as a project management tool, 
particularly with regard to the emphasis on ‘success’.  Even if the project is fully 
aligned to the CSFs, they will not necessarily guarantee its success.  The notion that 
the management of ‘a few key areas’ will result in a successful outcome, along with 
the idea that this is applicable to all projects in all contexts, is too simplistic a view for 
an increasingly complex world with increasingly complex projects.  It is impossible to 
identify CSFs that have general applicability across a range of different projects in a 
disparate and complex environment.  It is evident that project managers need to 
understand CSFs, but they also need to be considered critically in the context of the 
specific project being managed, which justifies the recent application of contingency 
theory to project management.  Overall, ‘Critical Success Factors’ is a misnomer.  
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They are key areas that might improve the management of the project, adding to its 
resilience and enabling it to cope with risk and threats, but they cannot assure success. 
 
Conclusion 1: Whilst CSFs have utility in terms of strengthening the resilience of the 
project management, they cannot guarantee success in a major government IT project. 
 
Policy Recommendation 1: There needs to be greater recognition of the complexity 
of these projects, which makes them unpredictable, encouraging more tolerance of 
error and allowing learning to take place and to be applied openly. 
 
7.3.2. Public Sector IT Project Management 
 
The vertical structure and insular culture of government, often referred to as a 
federated system, means that any pan-government initiative can only be achieved 
through persuasion and by attempting to build a common sense of purpose.  The 
McCartney Report demonstrated that policy is simply a suggested course of action, 
rather than mandated regulations, further evidenced by the recurrent themes being 
highlighted with regard to project management and procurement.  It is evidently very 
easy for government departments and agencies to erect barriers to change, whilst it is 
also evident that central government policy and departmental policy is often ignored 
without repercussion (Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3).  There is an identified need for 
greater governance in government along with a more centralised approach to IT and 
its management (Chapter 5, Section 5.2).   
 
However, given the above discussion about the application of generic CSFs to unique 
projects, it may be that a command and control approach along with a higher degree 
of standardisation is not the answer.  It is likely that central expertise in procurement 
and management is not used because it is not applicable to specific contexts and 
requires more variation.  It may be that more checks on departments carrying out IT 
projects will result in more constraints on action, rather than improved performance, 
and a continuing presentation of only the good news in order to ensure funding and 
resources.  With influence based on informal relationships rather than authority, it 
may be that the focus from the centre should be on giving its departments and 
agencies the capabilities to operate in a complex and shifting environment, whilst also 
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considering greater authority to intervene from the centre on a highly selective basis 
when projects go awry.  
 
Whilst there is some evidence that good practice has been spread, more could be done 
to ensure that government has the right capabilities, as well as providing the right 
environment, for learning to take place.  If government is to manage complex IT 
mega-projects in a complex environment, then it needs to ensure that it has the right 
number of personnel with the right level of skills and knowledge to make success 
more likely.  This means ensuring that there is an understanding and clarity about the 
organisation’s purpose, so that project teams understand the system output and then 
design a system to meet that demand, ensuring that decision-making is integrated with 
the project while removing controls so that the project team can respond in the right 
way to the changing environment.  In other words, building a self-organising system 
capable of dealing with unforeseen challenges, able to adjust, correct and augment its 
own capabilities to meet the needs of the environment.  As the demands of the project 
change, therefore, the system can change and evolve.  Any organisation in today’s 
economy has to continuously adapt to rapidly changing environments. 
 
Conclusion 2: There is an evident association between the culture of the Programme, 
Policy and Political Layer and the Technical Solution.  The impact of the one on the 
other needs further investigation in order to understand the issues relating to 
procurement and project management in the government environment. 
 
Policy Recommendation 2: Further academic study is required on the nature of 
government and its impact on IT project management. 
 
Conclusion 3: Although increased governance and control from the centre appears a 
solution to IT project failure, it potentially forces generic solutions on to unique 
problems, further constraining action and potentially resulting in less reliable 
reporting in order to protect funding and resources.     
 
Policy Recommendation 3:  Rather than focusing on specific and narrow bands of 
skills, government needs to consider encouraging and providing broader, more 
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adaptable capabilities to enable its personnel to manage complex projects in an 
increasingly complex and changing environment. 
 
7.3.3.  MoD IT Project Management 
 
The Public Accounts Committee facetiously expressed its disappointment at the level 
of the DII Programme’s cost and time overruns, demonstrating that, by government 
measures, it is not a failure (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Constraints Certainty)).  
Indeed, given its complexity and over-ambitious timetable, it is surprising that it has 
not faced more issues, particarly in the light of the project initiation process.  A 
number of lines of evidence in the case study suggest that this was not given sufficient 
attention.  
 
 As an IT mega-project designed to transform Defence, this study identified DII(F) as 
a Strategic project for Defence, a major investment decision.  However, as it was not 
categorised in this way, there was apparently no identification of its key CSFs.  
Therefore, despite its intent of delivering strategic outcomes that would create change 
throughout the whole of Defence, it was not treated as a key strategic project initially, 
demonstrated by the lack of resources allocated and the fight for top level support  
(Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2).  Over time, this support has dwindled.  However, it is 
likely to become important again as the Programme increasingly concerns itself with 
the wider business change (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Clarity and Perception)).   
 
A number of assumptions were made regarding the implementation and the project 
proceeded on the basis of known risk.  However, it might have been more cost-
effective in the long run to exert greater control over these risks by spending more 
time on the site surveys.  It would certainly have prevented delays further down the 
line.  However, this was seen to be unattractive to senior management in terms of 
resource, suggesting that the impetus to begin a project overrides careful preparation.  
Similar issues are likely to be faced as the project moves to the maritime and 
deployed environment (Chapter Six, Section 6.2.2).  In addition, time should have 
been allowed for the project team to engage with the supplier and for the supplier to 
recruit and create an organisation of almost 2000 personnel (Chapter Six, Section 
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6.3.4 (Constraints Certainty)).  As it was, the Programme began life with an inbuilt 
time delay.   
 
These factors underline the claims in government reports that the MoD has an over-
ambitious procurement methodology, a lack of clarity of thought about the basics and 
a tendancy to ignore the fundamentals of project planning, such as funding and 
resource provision, before the project is initiated (Chapter Five, Section 5.3.2).   
Overall, the project was never given a firm foundation of resources and was initiated 
on an over-optimistic basis.   
 
Conclusion 4: There is strong evidence from this case study that it is beneficial in the 
long term to spend more time on the project initiation phase and to be prepared to 
expend resource on preparation rather than rushing into development.  This is 
potentially a cultural problem within MoD procurement. 
 
Policy Recommendation 4: The MoD should spend more time on the project 
initiation phase of a project as investment in the initial preparation is likely to save 
expenditure later in the project lifecycle.  
 
Conclusion 5: There was an apparent lack of top level engagement with this project 
initially, particularly in terms of recognising it as a Strategic project and allocating the 
necessary resource. 
 
Policy Recommendation 5: There should be more central involvement with projects, 
particularly at initiation stage, and, if a project is considered both viable and 
beneficial, then it should be given the required resource and support.  In other words, 
top level oversight of projects should be more professional. 
 
7.3.4.  Contract Management: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
A key finding from this research concerned the importance of contract management.  
This was highlighted in the reports analysed in Chapter Five and was a key point to 
emerge from the case study.  It is evident that the contractor cannot abdicate 
responsibility for the contract or the supplier once it is let, but actually takes on a 
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more critical role in terms of contract management to ensure that the supplier can 
work to their optimum (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Competence and Capacity).  
However, at operational level, the appropriate skill set was lacking and, in some areas, 
there was a limited view of the extent of contract management, focusing on oversight 
of the contract, rather than a broader view related to building relationships and trust.  
It was evident that different areas of the Programme had very different relationships 
with the supplier (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Competence and Capacity).  Ultimately, 
the management of the contract and the associated relationships revolve around 
human behaviour and the attitudes of the individuals involved, which helps to build 
greater commitment from suppliers.  As with any relationship, open lines of 
communication are critical to the resolution of problems and this relies on trust.   
 
At the core of the contract is the contractor/supplier relationship, which potentially 
impedes the building of relationships and, therefore, the associated communication 
and trust.  Ultimately and inevitably, the purpose of a private sector company is to 
deliver a return to its shareholders.  Obviously, this cannot be achieved by delivering 
a bad service so there is an onus on the supplier to meet the requirements of the 
contract and, potentially, to obtain further business as a result (Chapter Six, Section 
6.3.4 (Competence and Capacity).  In spite of all the attempts to create a different 
relationship, the main focus for the supplier is revenue, suggesting that any control 
that the contractor has over supplier performance is based on finance.  If action or 
delivery is required, then financial levers should be used.  In fact, given the lack of 
financial hardship to ATLAS over delivery delays to date, this may be the only way to 
ensure the delivery of Release 2 (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Competence and 
Capacity).  However, the DII Group has chosen not to use these levers, partly due to 
the effect that it might have on the working relationship but also due to the anticipated 
perceptions of the resource providers (Chapter Six, Section 6.3.4 (Value for Money).   
 
Conclusion 6: There is an evident disconnect between the need to build relationships, 
communication and trust between contractor and supplier and the commercial realities 
of a contractual situation.   
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Policy Recommendation 6: There needs to be further academic research into the 
issues of contract management and contractual relationships, specifically with regard 
to IT project management in the public sector. 
 
Conclusion 7: It takes time to build trust in a contractual situation but it is critical as 
it provides the basis for sound working relationships and communication.  However, 
in this instance, there was an apparent lack of awareness of the need to manage the 
contract once it had been awarded, other than in ensuring delivery of requirements, 
and a lack of competence to do so. 
  
Policy Recommendation 7: The MoD should allocate appropriate skills and 
resources to ensure more proactive management of contracts and improved interaction 
with suppliers. 
 
Conclusion 8:  With the success of this project dependent on the delivery of Release 
2, it seems that the MoD will have to exert further pressure on ATLAS to ensure its 
delivery.  However, it is prevented from doing so by the effect that it might have on 
the relationship and also the message that it would send to the resource providers. 
 
Policy Recommendation 8:  The MoD should make better use of financial incentives 
and disincentives to improve the performance of its suppliers, whilst tackling the 
perceived cultural and organisational constraints to doing so. 
 
7.4.  Limitations, Reflections and Future Research 
 
This study has been limited by a number of factors.  Firstly, some key report material 
providing primary data about government IT and produced by organisations like 
Kable and Standish was not accessible due to its cost and lack of availability for loan.  
Secondly, the size of the DII Programme as a case study made it a major task to 
investigate as a solo researcher.  Its complexity means that it has been impossible to 
gain a full picture.  Therefore, it should be noted that these findings are based on a 
relatively limited evidence source, given the size of the project team and the extent of 
the user base.  Despite this, a wealth of data was collected, which had to be carefully 
edited for the purposes of presentation in this thesis.  Every effort has been made to 
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ensure the validity and reliability of the data presented.  Thirdly, the DII Group and 
ATLAS were extremely helpful in giving their co-operation to this project.  However, 
this meant that interviews were arranged via a DII Group sponsor who selected the 
interviewees.  This may have impacted on the objectivity of the views expressed here.  
Associated with this and discussed in full in Chapter Three, dependence on a single 
case can be problematic.  The original intent was to cross-compare with another 
government IT mega-project, but this would have been unfeasible in terms of time 
and resources.  Therefore, these results are unique to the DII Programme.  However, it 
has been possible to generate some theory out of these findings.  Finally, some of the 
data collected proved to be sensitive and likely to attract commercial or management-
in-confidence caveats.  Therefore, it has either been presented in a very general way 
or excluded from the discussion. 
 
Many of these limitations relate to the research process.  By the end of the study, with 
knowledge gained and increased insight, it is likely that the primary research would 
have been approached in a different way.  For example, different questions might 
have been posed in order to elicit more in-depth responses.  Despite this, the research 
process has proved rigorous, providing a wealth of reliable data.  However, issues 
regarding truth and potential bias were confronted.  The fact that it is a ‘live’ project 
makes many of the issues very sensitive for interviewees and the reporting of them 
difficult.  Linked to the issues surrounding the ‘conspiracy of optimism’ and the 
tendency not to report bad news, there were occasions when it was uncertain that the 
truth of the DII Programme was being presented.  However, this is inevitable in all 
research projects of this type.  Effort was made to overcome this by cross-referencing 
interviews and relating them to factual information in the public domain.  In addition, 
there were certain key members of the Programme with whom a level of trust was 
achieved and, therefore, more open discussions could be had.  The final issue relating 
to the research was the problem of causation.  How could it be proved that the 
application of CSFs was causing improved management and performance?  It may be 
that there is a third factor that is controlling them both or it could be simply 
correlation without causality.  Overall, the cause and effect relationship appeared to 
be disturbed by the Organisational Setting. 
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In terms of further research, as discussed above, this thesis has focused on one case 
study.  As highlighted in the conclusions, there is potential for further study into the 
nature of government and its impact on IT project management, along with contract 
management and contractual relationships. It would also be worthwhile to carry out 
further case study work on other government IT mega-projects in order to see if the 
same conclusion can be drawn regarding the impact of context on the use of CSFs.    
 
7.5.  Contribution to Knowledge 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, this research adds to the body of work that attempts to 
close the gap between what is known about project failure and the application of this 
knowledge.  It also contributes to the relatively limited study of public sector IT 
project management, identified as a very different and difficult context, which makes 
the provision of such generic solutions as CSFs problematic.  The study has attempted 
to fill a gap by assessing whether CSFs, particularly those generated by government 
and related bodies, have been noted and adopted by public sector IT project managers 
and, as a result, have improved the performance of the projects in question: not only 
do the lessons have to be identified, they also have to be learned, which means 
understanding and applying them.  In addition, it has compared the factors identified 
by studies on general project management with those identified by studies on IT 
project management, which are generally treated as interchangeable, whilst also 
comparing the theoretical CSFs identified in the scholarly literature with those 
identified in government reports.  In doing so, this thesis contributes to knowledge on 
four fronts: comparing factors identified by studies on general project management 
with those identified by studies on IT project management; comparing of theoretical 
CSFs identified in the scholarly literature with those identified in government reports; 
assessing whether this theory is being applied in practice to public sector project 
management and to what effect; and, finally, examining the value of CSFs to public 
sector IT projects.   
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APPENDIX 1:  
TEMPLATE FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A TEXT 
 
Text: 
 
 
 
1. What review question am I asking of this text? 
(e.g. What is my research question? Why select this text? Does the Critical Analysis of this text fit into 
my investigation with a wider focus? What is my constructive purpose in undertaking a Critical Analysis 
of this text?) 
 
 
 
2. What type of literature is this? 
(e.g. Theoretical, research, practice, policy? Are there links with other types of literature?) 
 
 
 
3. What sort of intellectual project for study is being undertaken? 
 
a) How clear is it which project the authors are undertaking? (e.g. Knowledge-for-understanding, 
knowledge-for-critical evaluation, knowledge-for-action, instrumentalism, reflexive action?) 
 
 
 
b) How is the project reflected in the authors’ mode of working? (e.g. A social science or a practical 
orientation? Choice of methodology and methods? An interest in understanding or in improving 
practice?) 
 
 
 
c) What value stance is adopted towards the practice or policy investigated? (e.g. Relatively impartial, 
critical, positive, unclear? What assumptions are made about the possibility of improvement? Whose 
practice or policy is the focus of interest?) 
 
 
 
d) How does the sort of project being undertaken affect the research questions addressed? (e.g. 
Investigating what happens? What is wrong? How well does a particular policy or intervention work in 
practice?) 
 
 
 
e) How does the sort of project being undertaken affect the place of theory? (e.g. Is the investigation 
informed by theory? Generating theory? Atheoretical? Developing social science theory or a practical 
theory?) 
 
 
 
f) How does the authors’ target audience affect the reporting of research? (e.g. Do they assume 
academic knowledge of methods? Criticise policy? Offer recommendations for action?) 
 
 
 
4. What is being claimed? 
 
a) What are the main kinds of knowledge claim that the authors are making? (e.g. Theoretical knowledge, 
research knowledge, practice knowledge?) 
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b) What is the content of the main claims to knowledge and of the overall argument? (e.g. What, in a 
sentence, is being argued? What are the three to five most significant claims that encompass much of 
the detail? Are there key prescriptions for improving policy or practice?) 
 
 
 
c) How clear are the authors’ claims and overall argument? (e.g. Stated in an abstract, introduction or 
conclusion? Unclear?) 
 
 
 
d) With what degree of certainty do the authors make their claims? (e.g. Do they indicate tentativeness? 
Qualify their claims by acknowledging limitations of their evidence? Acknowledge others’ counter-
evidence? Acknowledge that the situation may have changed since data collection?) 
 
 
 
e) How generalized are the authors’ claims – to what range of phenomena are they claimed to apply? 
(e.g. The specific context from which the claims were derived? Other similar contexts? A national 
system? A culture? Universal? Implicit? Unspecified?) 
 
 
 
f) How consistent are the authors’ claims with each other? (e.g. Do all claims fit together in supporting an 
argument? Do any claims contradict each other?) 
 
 
 
5. To what extent is there backing for claims? 
 
a) How transparent is it what, if any, sources are used to back the claims? (e.g. Is there any statement of 
the basis for assertions? Are sources unspecified?) 
 
 
 
b) What, if any, range of sources is used to back the claims? (e.g. First hand experience? The authors’ 
own practice knowledge or research? Literature about others’ practice knowledge or research? 
Literature about reviews of practice knowledge or research? Literature about others’ polemic?) 
 
 
 
c) If claims are at least partly based on the authors’ own research, how robust is the evidence? (e.g. Is the 
range of sources adequate? Are there methodological limitations or flaws in the methods employed? 
Do they include cross-checking or ‘triangulation’ of accounts? What is the sample size and is it large 
enough to support the claims being made? Is there an adequately detailed account of data collection 
and analysis? Is a summary given of all data reported?) 
 
 
 
d) Are sources of backing for claims consistent with degree of certainty and the degree of generalisation? 
(e.g. Is there sufficient evidence to support claims made with a high degree of certainty? Is there 
sufficient evidence from other contexts to support claims entailing extensive generalization?) 
 
 
 
6. How adequate is any theoretical orientation to back claims? 
 
a) How explicit are the authors about any theoretical orientation or conceptual framework? (e.g. Is there a 
conceptual framework guiding data collection? Is a conceptual framework selected after data collection 
to guide analysis? Is there a largely implicit theoretical orientation?) 
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b) What assumptions does any explicit or implicit theoretical orientation make that may affect the authors’ 
claims? (e.g. Does a perspective focus attention on some aspects and under-emphasise others? If 
more than one perspective is used, how coherently do the different perspectives relate to each other?) 
 
 
 
c) What are the key concepts underpinning any explicit or implicit theoretical orientation? (e.g. Are they 
listed? Are they stipulatively defined? Are concepts mutually compatible? Is use of concepts 
consistent? Is the use of concepts congruent with others’ use of the same concepts?) 
 
 
 
7. To what extent does any value stance adopted affect claims? 
 
a) How explicit are the authors about any value stance connected with the phenomena? (e.g. A relatively 
impartial, critical, or positive stance? Is this stance informed by a particular ideology? Is it adopted 
before or after data collection?) 
 
 
 
b) How may any explicit or implicit value stance adopted by the authors affect their claims? (e.g. Have 
they pre-judged the phenomena discussed? Are they biased? Is it legitimate for the authors to adopt 
their particular value stance? Have they over-emphasised some aspects of the phenomenon while 
under-emphasising others?) 
 
 
 
8. To what extent are claims supported or challenged by others’ work? 
 
a) Do the authors relate their claims to others’ work? (e.g. Do the authors refer to others’ published 
evidence, theoretical orientations or value stances to support their claims? Do they acknowledge 
others’ counter-evidence?) 
 
 
 
b) If the authors use evidence from others’ work to support their claims, how robust is it? (e.g. As for 5c) 
 
 
 
c) Is there any evidence from others’ work that challenges the authors’ claims, and if so, how robust is it? 
(e.g. Is there relevant research or practice literature? Check any as for 5c) 
 
 
 
9. To what extent are claims consistent with my experience? 
 
 
 
10. What is my summary evaluation of the text in relation to my review question or issue? 
 
a) How convincing are the authors’ claims, and why? 
 
 
 
b) How, if at all, could the authors have provided stronger backing for their claims? 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wallace, M. and Wray, A., Critical Reading and Writing for Postgraduates, (London, Sage, 2006). 
 A-4
APPENDIX 2:  
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING CRITICAL 
SUCCESS/FAILURE FACTORS IN PROJECTS:  
Expanded Version of CSFs 
 
 
Belassi, W. and Tukel, O.I., 'A 
New Framework for Determining 
Critical Success/Failure Factors in 
Projects', International Journal of 
Project Management, 1996, Vol. 
14, No.3, pages 141-152. 
Factors relating to the project 
manager: 
Ability to delegate authority, trade-off 
and coordinate 
Perception of role and responsibilities 
Competence and commitment 
Project team members 
Technical background 
Communication skills 
Trouble-shooting 
Commitment 
Factors related to the project 
Size and value 
Uniqueness of project activities 
Density of a project 
Lifecycle 
Urgency 
Factors related to the 
organisation 
Top management support 
Project organisational structure 
Functional managers’ support 
Project champion 
Client consultation and 
acceptance 
Project manager’s performance 
on the job 
Effective planning and scheduling 
Effective coordination and 
communication 
Effective use of managerial skills 
Effective control and monitoring 
Effective use of technology 
Project preliminary estimates 
Availability of resources 
Human 
Financial 
Raw materials 
Facilities 
Factors related to the external 
environment 
Political environment 
Economical environment 
Social environment 
Technological environment 
Nature 
Client 
Competition 
Sub-contractors 
Links to Morris and Hough, 1987 
and Pinto and Slevin, 1989. 
Based on a literature review that 
identified seven theoretical 
studies and nine empirical 
studies. 
Success or failure is due to a 
combination of many factors at 
different stages of the project 
lifecycle. 
Moves to a CSF framework. 
CSFs vary depending on the 
industry under scrutiny but top 
management support is vital 
whichever sector. 
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APPENDIX 3:  
INTERVIEW AGENDA 
 
 
Research Interest 
 
To examine the impact of Critical Success Factors (CSFs) on the MoD’s DII 
programme. 
 
(Have lessons learned from previous complex IT projects been used to 
improve the performance of the DII programme?) 
 
 
Research Objectives 
 
To identify CSFs identified in academic studies and reports on public sector IT 
project failure; 
 
To define ‘success’ in terms of the DII programme; 
 
To explore the CSFs that have contributed to the ongoing success or failure of 
the programme;  
 
To assess the effectiveness of CSFs as a means of delivering IT project 
success. 
 
 
Approach 
 
The research is divided into two stages. 
 
Stage One examines the academic theory and government-identified CSFs 
pertaining to IT projects. 
 
Stage Two is a case study of the progress of the DII programme and its 
perceived success.  This is assessed against the model derived at Stage 
Two.   
 
 
Purpose of Interview 
 
The purpose of this interview is to gather: 
 
1.  Your views on whether the lessons learned from the success and failure of 
IT projects in government has informed the DII programme. 
 
2.  Your definition of ‘success’ in terms of the outcome of the DII programme.  
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3.  Your assessment of the organisational factors relating to the success or 
failure of the DII programme (programme type, strategic environment and 
others).  
 
 
Confidentiality and Ethics 
 
You have kindly given your voluntary informed consent to partake in this 
research.  If at any point you wish to withdraw from the investigation, all 
record of contact with you will be deleted.  Everything that will be said and 
discussed during this interview will be treated in confidence and will be used 
ONLY for the purpose of this research.  The results of the research are 
shared with the examining panel at Cranfield University, who are themselves 
bound by a confidentiality agreement.  If you require, your name will not be 
disclosed to the examining panel or stated in the thesis in relation to the 
information gathered during this interview.  You will be given access to the 
final write-up of the analysis. 
 
 
Interview Structure: Overview 
 
The following is an indication of the areas that I would like to explore the 
following: 
 
1.     Taking a general perspective, your experience of the issues and problems 
encountered in implementing a complex major IT programme. 
 
2. Your perceptions of what is meant by ‘success’ in the context of IT 
projects/programmes in government and in terms of the DII programme in 
particular. 
 
3. Your view of the three factors that have contributed to the success of the 
DII programme and the three factors most likely to lead to failure. 
 
4. Your identification of DII’s key stakeholders. 
 
5. Your evaluation of the extent to which CSFs have driven the right 
behaviours amongst the stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX 4:   
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
 
 The Implementation of 
the National Probation 
Service Information 
Systems Strategy 
(Home Office), NAO 
2001 
New IT Systems for 
Magistrates’ Courts: the 
Libra Project, NAO 2003 
Delivering Digital 
Tactical 
Communications 
through the 
Bowman CIP 
Programme 
(Ministry of 
Defence), NAO 
2006 
The National 
Programme for IT 
in the NHS 
(Department of 
Health), NAO 2006 
Information 
Technology: DoD 
Needs to Ensure 
that Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet 
Program is 
Meeting Goals and 
Satisfying 
Customers, GAO 
2006 
Background The UK Probation Service 
supports the work of the courts 
and other justice agencies by 
providing reports on offenders, 
running bail hostels and 
supervising offenders.  There 
were 54 autonomous regional 
probation services until April 
2001 when the service was 
reorganized into 42 local areas 
to match police regions.  Each 
had its own IT strategy and 
local, stand-alone IT systems. 
Administered by 42 Magistrates’ 
Courts Committees, the 
Magistrates’ Courts were using 
different systems and different 
working practices, preventing the 
sharing of information and the 
use of common databases.  The 
Government intended to 
integrate the management of the 
Magistrates’ Courts with the 
other criminal, civil and family 
courts in England and Wales to 
produce a single courts’ 
organisation.  The target date 
was April 2005 and Libra, the 
new IT infrastructure, was 
considered essential to this. 
The Army urgently needed 
to replace the Clansman 
battlefield radios with 
Bowman to provide 
secure, reliable voice 
communications.  Bowman 
delivered the hardware 
and the Combat 
Infrastructure Project (CIP) 
additional hardware and 
information handling 
capacity, integrating these 
functions into armoured 
vehicles.  Both were to 
operate on a military 
‘tactical internet’ with a 
portable infrastructure.   
Disparate IT systems in 
the NHS prevented 
communication and 
sharing of information.  
The National Programme 
for IT is creating a 
national infrastructure to 
make medical records 
and X-rays available, to 
enable transmission of 
prescriptions and 
electronic appointment 
booking.  It is a 
combination of national 
projects and local 
projects run by four 
Local Service Providers. 
Independent networks 
were to be replaced with 
a single network for 
about 550 Navy and 
Marine Corps sites in the 
United States and Japan.  
These ranged from small 
offices to large shipyards 
and air depots. The 
contractor would supply 
and own the desktop 
hardware and software 
and provide services, 
varying in performance 
depending on whether 
they were rated 
standard, high-end or 
mission-critical. 
Project Aim To provide a national 
information infrastructure and a 
Case Recording and 
Management System (CRAMS) 
across all of the probation 
services in England and Wales. 
To provide a national IT 
infrastructure with links to other 
criminal justice agencies and a 
standard national application to 
support court work. 
To improve military 
communications; to 
enable faster planning; 
and to allow 
communication across the 
armed forces. 
To reform information 
use; to improve services 
and the quality of care; 
and to provide direction 
for IT development and 
the use of advanced IT. 
To provide information 
superiority and to foster 
innovative ways of 
operating through an 
interoperable and shared 
network.   
Chronology 
   
   
1988  
 Project initiated with an 
implementation date of 
December 1995.   
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1989 
 
 
 
 
   
1990  
.   
Two attempts were made to 
procure an infrastructure but 
failed due to poor project 
management, problems in 
working with a disparate set of 
suppliers and the extending 
timescales.  In 1996, the 
Department began procurement 
of a PFI contract for Libra.  19 
expressions of interest were 
received. 
   
1991     
1992     
1993 The project was initiated.    
1994 An agreement was signed with 
Bull Information Systems to 
install the infrastructure, 
CRAMS and provide a 
managed service by March 
1999. 
   
1995  The MoD pursued a non-
competitive solution with 
the Archer consortium 
(BAE Systems, Racal and 
ITT) with an 
implementation date that 
moved from March 2002 
to March 2004.   
  
1996    
1997  Two detailed proposals were 
received from ICL and EDS. 
  
1998 
 EDS did not bid.  ICL increased 
their bid and signed a PFI 
contract for £184 million over 
10.5 years. 
  
1999 Work on CRAMS was halted in 
favour of a successor called 
Copernicus. 
Again, ICL renegotiated the 
contract as its financial forecast 
for the project showed a deficit. 
 
  
2000 By March, 36 of the 54 services 
had received a complete 
CRAMS rollout, a year late.  
Ten services refused to 
implement it and only 16 were 
using it in earnest.  By the end 
of the year, 47 of the 54 
services were connected to the 
infrastructure. 
A revised contract was signed The Archer Consortium 
contract was terminated 
and the MoD launched a 
new competition, which 
was conducted at speed. 
 A five-year contract 
worth $9.3 billion was 
awarded to EDS.  The 
acquisition approach and 
implementation plan 
were weak and 
introduced unnecessary 
risk. There was no plan 
in place to deal with the 
requirements or the 
impact on staff. 
 
2001 The agreement with Bull 
expired. 
The contract was renegotiated 
as a new ICL management team 
said it was undeliverable.  ICL 
failed to deliver the core 
application to the first site and 
was in breach of contract.  The 
Court Service took over 
responsibility for the project. 
The MoD appointed 
General Dynamics (GD) 
for a single Bowman CIP 
programme costing £2.4 
billion, having already 
spent five years, £397 
million and written off £51 
million.   
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2002 
 The Department failed to reach 
agreement with ICL to continue 
the contract but signed a 
variation.  ICL would deliver only 
the national IT infrastructure and 
office automation. 
MoD added further 
requirements to Bowman 
due to Networked Enabled 
Capability (NEC).  A 
Training Needs Analysis 
showed that 50 more 
computer-equipped 
classrooms were required. 
The Programme was 
launched and the first 
Director General for NHS 
IT appointed with a unit 
set up to procure and 
deliver the IT systems. 
Implementation issues 
and transition costs for 
shipyards and air depots 
were making it difficult 
for them to plan and 
budget.  54% of users 
were satisfied with 
NMCI. 
2003 
 The Department signed a 
contract with STL to provide the 
core software application.   
A systems integrator was also 
appointed to roll out and run the 
application. 
Bodies of Suppliers and 
Departmental officials 
were established to link up 
Bowman CIP with 
complementary projects. 
Contracts were 
negotiated and let.  
Having relied on a dated 
inventory of legacy 
applications, there was a 
substantial under-
estimate, causing a 
major delay. 
2004 
 
 Bowman’s In-Service Date 
was achieved with 27 
provisos. Ten of the CIP 
requirements still had 
significant shortfalls.  The 
programme was over-
ambitious and needed to 
be revised. 
A number of systems 
were delivered on time.  
A set of five software 
releases replaced the 
National Data Spine 
releases with revised 
delivery dates that were 
subsequently met.   
The rate of improvement 
in end user satisfaction 
dropped off. 
2005 
 
 CIP was integrated with 
Bowman used in Iraq. 
MoD and GD agree a 
recast programme with an 
increased cost and 
timescale.   
The NHS IT unit became 
an agency of the 
Department of Health.  
The remaining parts of 
the National Data Spine 
were ten months late but 
met the revised 
timescales.  Choose and 
Book was a year behind 
schedule with take up 
slower than expected. 
The March 2006 target 
for N3 was achieved 
three months early. 
Release 5 was deployed 
but part of BT’s payment 
was withheld due to 
defects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The percentage of 
satisfied end users rose 
to about 80% in 
September 2005. 
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2006 
 
 The MoD established a 
programme office to 
coordinate the delivery of 
the networks and 
programmes supporting 
NEC, incorporating 
Bowman CIP.  CIP was 
declared In-Service from 
December 2005 with 32 
provisos.  The revised 
programme was 
approved.  Funding was 
raised by £121 million and 
the timescale extended by 
two years to mid 2007. 
Expenditure was lower 
than planned due to 
slower delivery of some 
systems and successful 
operation of contracts. 
Use of Choose and Book 
was growing at around 
40 per cent a month. 
167,946 staff were 
registered for NHSmail 
with 80,183 active users. 
1,034 GP sites were live 
with 296 using the 
Prescription Service.  Of 
the 148 live community, 
11 pharmacies were 
using the system.  
The Navy reported that 
about 303,000 seats 
were operational at 
about 550 sites. $3.7bn 
had been spent. The 
percentage of end users 
that the Navy considers 
to be satisfied was below 
the Navy-wide target of 
85%.   
2007 
 
  The number of Spine 
releases was limited to 
two a year. 
 
2008 
 
 Bowman was rolled out 
across the Armed Forces 
until approximately 2026. 
  
2009 
 
 Two contracts worth £231 
million were awarded to 
GD to upgrade Bowman.   
  
CSFs 
 
    
Business Change The Home Office did not 
ensure that the development of 
CRAMS kept pace with 
changing business needs. 
There was no overall strategy 
for communicating with 
stakeholders leading to 
increased resistance to its 
implementation. 
The Project did not develop a 
best business process model 
before developing the IT 
solution.  Business processes 
should be redesigned and 
aligned before standardised IT 
systems are implemented 
across a number of disparate 
bodies. 
   
Leadership and 
Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Central Committee running 
the IT strategy had no means 
of promoting acceptance and 
ownership by local services, 
who decided themselves 
whether or not to use the 
system.   
 
 
 
The Department expected the 
Committees to adapt their 
processes to the system but 
they were determined to operate 
independently.  It did not have 
the authority to impose business 
change and did not want to 
attempt further change due to 
the amalgamation.   
 
The Assistant Chief of the 
General Staff had 
oversight of the project 
and was assumed to be 
the SRO.  However, he 
did not have time to 
undertake this role. 
 
 
 
There was strong 
ministerial and senior 
management support 
and commitment along 
with continuity of 
leadership.   
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Leadership and 
Responsibility cont. 
There was no project 
assurance function within the 
management structure and a 
lack of continuity in the 
leadership of the programme 
management team, which was 
insufficiently resourced.  There 
were seven programme 
directors during the project with 
only two having had experience 
of major IT projects.   
It did not use its reserve powers 
to force the Committees to take 
specified goods and services.  
There were many changes at a 
senior level within the project 
management team.     
The Directorate did not 
have the direct budgetary 
responsibility or the 
resources to act as a 
programme office. 
The managerial and 
budgetary structures 
needed to be overseen by 
a fully empowered SRO at 
the right level and with 
sufficient time.   
National leadership of 
engagement with NHS 
organisations and staff in 
implementing and 
making best use of the 
systems changed a 
number of times and 
resource constraints 
limited the scale of early 
engagement efforts. 
Project Management Formal project management 
methods were not embedded 
and fell into disuse.  The 
requirement for CRAMS to 
produce reports was not 
adequately specified nor was a 
subsequent requirement from 
the Home Office for standard 
reports using specialist 
software.  Poor specification of 
expected outputs, weaknesses 
in service monitoring and 
inadequate control by the 
Home Office contributed to the 
higher than expected cost of 
the programme.  In terms of 
day-to-day project 
management, responsibilities 
were not always clear, and 
communication between the 
Home Office and the services 
was not always effective. 
The Department consulted with 
a large number of staff from the 
Committees to define the 
requirements but a single view 
was difficult to achieve. 
Requirements were clarified or 
changed during the course of 
the project.   
 
The aggressive timescale 
for such a hi-tech 
programme meant project 
managers had to cope 
with complexity and 
change as well as 
managing the time and 
resources.  The trebling of 
the required training 
facilities added £24 million 
and £204 million in total 
operating costs over 25 
years.  Thirty high level 
Key User Requirements 
were defined supported by 
numerous detailed 
requirements, which 
should have been tracked 
and managed.  Lack of 
attention to user needs led 
to around 300 changes 
and 2000 concessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Best practice structures 
were in place but 
changes in scope after 
signing the contract left 
some suppliers 
struggling to meet 
delivery dates and 
requests from users for 
more extensive pilot 
tests.  This resulted in 
the delivery timetable 
being reviewed. 
Several additional tasks 
were delivered that had 
not been in the original 
requirement.  There 
needed to be a robust 
engineering-based and 
achievable timetable for 
delivery. 
 
Customer satisfaction 
improvement efforts 
were not guided by 
effective planning. 
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Risk Management The Home Office 
underestimated the technical 
risks and did not prevent the 
roll out of poor quality software. 
Consultants reported that the 
user interface contained 
defects that compromised the 
ability of users to perform their 
work and users found CRAMS 
difficult to operate.  This was 
evident from an early stage, 
along with other technical 
problems and faults not 
resolved by initial testing. 
Around 27 probation services 
used alternative IT systems to 
record or manage their cases.  
This resulted in case records 
being held in a number of 
different formats, creating 
problems for the transfer of 
cases. 
The technical assessment of the 
bid was done in-house.  The 
Department should have made 
further inquiries into the 
technical competence of ICL 
and should have verified the 
financial model on which the 
tender was based.  ICL based 
its bid on the MASS software but 
within three months of signing 
the contract had decided to 
proceed with its own software 
development instead.  Lack of 
bids should be taken as a 
warning sign. 
 
Costs, timescales and 
technical challenges were 
underestimated in the 
business case, resulting in 
the need for extra funding.   
The radios were delivered 
rapidly but extensive trial 
and development of CIP 
caused a delay to delivery. 
The size of the new radio 
had been considered a 
problem since the 1990s 
but its development 
continued.  The challenge 
of installing Bowman in 
the land vehicle fleet was 
underestimated, including 
the variation within the 
20,000 vehicles.  This 
caused technical 
challenges, taking time 
and resources.  Risks 
were not well tracked and 
mitigated.  The SRO did 
not share a risk register 
with the supplier.  
The scope, vision, scale 
and complexity of the 
Programme was wider 
and more extensive than 
any ongoing or planned 
healthcare IT 
development project in 
the world with associated 
risks.  
 
Modular and 
Incremental 
Development 
   To reduce risk, the 
Programme used an 
incremental approach. 
 
Benefit Realisation Forty-two of the services 
thought that the system had 
delivered improved 
communications but other 
benefits were not actively 
monitored, including business 
change. This made it 
impossible to quantify the 
business benefits.  Costs and 
achievements were not 
monitored against projections 
in the original business case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 The programme was 
approved on the basis of 
significant benefits.  
However, there was only 
limited, formal tracking.  
Strong benefits realisation 
and tracking would have 
helped managers to make 
better decisions when 
trading benefits against 
time and cost. 
 
Benefits were costed 
where possible, but the 
aim was to improve 
services not reduce 
costs.  The Treasury 
accepted this. 
Considerable efforts 
were made to specify the 
high level benefits. 
The Navy defined 
strategic goals for its 
NMCI programme and 
developed a plan for 
measuring and reporting 
on the achievement of 
these goals. However, 
this plan was not 
implemented as they 
chose instead to focus 
on defining and 
measuring contractually 
specified SLAs.   
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Procurement and 
Supplier Relations 
The performance of Bull was 
not managed effectively. 
Monitoring of service levels 
against the enabling agreement 
was sporadic; and performance 
against the service level 
agreement, not agreed until 
1998, was not monitored 
systematically.  Changes in the 
management team made it 
difficult for Bull to know which 
manager to contact about 
contractual issues. 
With only one formal bidder, 
there was a lack of competitive 
tension.  ICL was chosen 
despite the problems that it was 
having with the Benefits 
Payment Card project.  The 
procurement took over two 
years, rather than 14 months, 
partly due to the time needed to 
get full involvement and 
agreement of the users. In 2001, 
ICL appointed a senior 
management team who 
concluded that the requirements 
were insufficiently detailed, 
wasting a year of work by the 
Magistrates’ Courts Committee 
and Department staff.   
 
Such a complex 
programme needed to be 
procured in a flexible, 
responsive way and to 
have systems to measure 
the customer/supplier 
relationship, including 
shared and maintained 
listings of assumptions 
and understandings. 
There was over-optimism 
about the supplier’s ability 
to mature the design while 
developing and integrating 
the new battlefield system. 
When re-competed, the 
requirements were 
immature and GD did not 
have enough time to fully 
understand the Army’s 
use of the system. 
Contracts were placed 
very quickly, after 
securing large reductions 
in prices. Financial and 
delivery risk was 
transferred to the 
suppliers, who are not 
paid until services are 
delivered and working, 
giving strong incentives 
to deliver on time, and 
mechanisms such as 
tight change control 
procedures are in place.  
When problems have 
arisen, action has been 
taken to address 
deficiencies in suppliers’ 
performance.  
While EDS had largely 
met many of the service 
level agreements, it had 
not met others 
consistently. 
Cross-Cutting 
Initiatives 
 Higher level programme 
management was required to 
understand the complex 
integration challenges that span 
multiple projects 
There were limited 
arrangements to manage 
Bowman CIP inter-
dependencies with other 
projects and programmes. 
The system integration 
was highly complex and 
took longer than the 
suppliers initially 
planned. A National 
Integration Centre was 
established to de-risk 
this process and to 
accredit compliant 
systems. The 
heterogeneous nature of 
the NHS has resulted in 
suppliers having to tailor 
their solutions to each 
organisation, making roll 
out much harder. 
 
People and Skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There were frequent changes 
of staff in the programme 
management team.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A user board was established to 
represent the many 
organisations involved.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
End user requirements 
and expectations could 
have been managed 
better.  Technology 
implementation needed to 
be managed alongside 
training and support.  
 
 
Engagement with users 
did not start until the 
procurement reached a 
sufficient stage of 
maturity.  Better 
communication might 
have eased some of the 
significant concerns.  
 
NMCI Customer Groups’ 
satisfaction levels varied, 
but overall customer 
satisfaction was low. 
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People and Skills cont. Technical experts and 
specialists within the team 
tended to be consultants 
working on short-term 
assignments.  
The Department appointed 
legal, financial and contract 
advisers but no IT advisers; 
rather they employed external 
specialists as part of the team. 
Training costs were under-
estimated with no 
provision for more 
advanced and specific 
training. 
Training was urgently 
required as the lack of IT 
skills was considered a 
risk to implementation. 
 
 
Learning Lessons National Probation Service 
needs to pay full regard to 
recent recommendations made 
by the Committee of Public 
Accounts and the Cabinet 
Office relating to the 
management of IT projects. 
  The programme needed 
to evaluate the 
experience of other 
organisations with similar 
IT projects to help 
identify and quantify 
efficiency improvements. 
Many of the key lessons 
of prior public IT failures 
were adopted.  
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APPENDIX 5: 
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
 
Year Report/Initiative Headlines 
1998 Smart Acquisition (SA)1 
First launched as the Smart 
Procurement Initiative (SPI) in 
1997 with a mission to deliver 
defence equipment ‘faster, 
cheaper, better’. 
SA had seven principles: 
1. A whole-life approach, typified by applying Through Life 
Costing techniques (Complexity Management) ; 
2. Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) with clearly identified 
customers  (Competence and Capacity) ; 
3. A better, more open relationship with industry (Clarity and 
Perception); 
4. More investment during early project phases 
(Affordability); 
5. Effective trade-offs between system performance, 
through-life costs and time (Constraints Certainty); 
6. New procurement approaches, including incremental 
acquisition (Complexity Management); and 
7. A streamlined process for project approvals (Affordability). 
2005 NAO:  Driving the Successful 
Delivery of Major Defence 
Projects: Effective Project Control.2   
Following 20 years of critical 
reports, the NAO itself analysed 
ways of making defence 
procurement faster, cheaper and 
better, setting out best practice for 
project controls and conditions to 
provide the right environment for 
project success. 
• Establishing and sustaining the right cultural 
environment - open, trusting and honest relations 
between contractor and supplier; an open corporate 
environment (Clarity and Perception). 
• Creating clear structures and boundaries – effective 
organisational structures, responsibilities and lines of 
authority (Clarity and Perception); project 
management, commercial, financial and technical 
skills available (Competence and Capacity); thorough 
review and understanding of project delivery plan, 
objectives, assumptions, risks and opportunities 
(Constraints Certainty); set performance, time and 
cost boundaries when all risks are understood/formal 
investment approval gates (Constraints Certainty); 
ability to make trade-offs/change management 
mechanism (Constraints Certainty). 
• Measuring progress and making decisions focused on 
successful project delivery (Constraints Certainty): 
analysis of credible, timely and relevant metrics 
monitoring progress against the performance, time 
and cost baseline (Constraints Certainty); 
arrangements for transparency and accuracy (Clarity 
and Perception); contract as key component of project 
control (Constraints Certainty; Stakeholder 
Management); project-to-project peer reviews and 
Learning From Experience (Competence and 
Capacity). 
• Reporting to enable strategic decisions - consistent 
reporting system for all projects feeding into analysis 
for senior management (Clarity and Perception); 
formalised, regular system of senior management 
review to give assurance of delivery (Benefits 
Certainty); independent, non-advocate reviews 
(Benefits Certainty); ongoing measurement of supplier 
performance to learn lessons (Competence and 
Capacity). 
2005 MoD: Defence Industrial Strategy3 
This confirmed the use of Smart 
Acquisition but put the emphasis 
on through life considerations. 
Set specific initiatives to achieve: 
 
• The primacy of through-life considerations 
(Complexity Management); 
• The coherence of defence spread across research, 
                development, procurement and support  
                (Consistency and Coherence); 
• The successful management of acquisition. 
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(Competence and Capacity) 
 
It sought industry’s commitment to:  
 
• plan more effectively and jointly for the long term 
(Complexity Management); 
• embrace the vision of Through Life Capability 
Management (TLCM) (Complexity Management); 
• meet requirements cost-effectively (Value for Money); 
• invest in growing and maintaining a high-quality 
                systems engineering capability within the UK 
        (Competence and Capacity); 
• promote greater interaction and collaboration between 
MoD, prime contractors, Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) and the universities to stimulate 
innovation in science, technology and engineering 
(Competence and Capacity); 
• encourage trust, openness, transparency and 
communication with MoD at all levels (Clarity and    
Perception); 
• embrace open systems architecture principles and 
incremental acquisition approaches throughout the 
supply chain (Complexity Management; Scalability 
and Flexibility); 
• work jointly to foster better understanding of each 
others’ objectives and business processes, including a 
greater commitment to joint education, staff 
development and interchange opportunities (Clarity 
and Perception; Competence and Capacity). 
2006 Enabling Acquisition Change (the 
McKane Report)4 
Building on previous initiatives, this 
report was commissioned to 
advise on changes to structures, 
process, culture and behaviours in 
order to facilitate good Through 
Life Capability Management 
(TLCM). 
 
 
Culture, Behaviour, Skills and Training 
 
• Improved skills are key to improving the MoD’s TLCM 
performance (Competence and Capacity); 
• Ensure that the skills agenda is given prominence in 
the programme of implementing the recommended 
changes (Competence and Capacity). 
 
Planning Process Issues 
 
• A 10 year plan for all defence costs and assumptions 
detailing the costs of new equipment, equipment 
support and non-equipment investment plus the costs 
of other DLoDs over the first four years and in 
aggregate over years 5-10 (Affordability); 
• Building on the Cost of Defence analysis of the 
defence budget, a capability-based view of defence 
plans should be developed, as a complementary tool 
to assist strategic planning by the Defence 
Management Board (Complexity Management); 
• The cost of supporting in-service equipment over the 
Short Term Plan (STP) period should be programmed 
by the Front Line Commands. The Equipment 
Capability Customer (ECC) should programme 
support costs for all new equipment and in-service 
equipment beyond the STP years and any other net 
additional cost, such as infrastructure, associated with 
new capability above a materiality threshold 
(Affordability); 
• The Department should maintain a clear focus on 
committing sufficient resources to the early stages of 
new projects (Affordability); 
• The apparent imbalance between Capital 
Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) and 
                Resource DEL should be addressed (Affordability); 
• Directors of Equipment Capability (DECs) and 
Integrated Project Team (IPT) Leaders should be able 
to exchange Capital DEL for Resource DEL if required 
to adequately de-risk a project (Affordability); 
• The MoD should develop options to eliminate negative 
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contingencies from the Equipment Plan; ensure, in the 
short term, that the Equipment Plan overall matches 
approval levels, by retaining a centrally held 
contingency, and continue to explore other options; 
introduce an uncommitted element into the Equipment 
Plan in order to respond to the increasing premium 
placed on agility and room for manoeuvre 
(Affordability). 
 
Customer Roles and Responsibilities and the Role of the Senior 
Responsible Owner 
 
• The different roles and responsibilities of the various 
stakeholders, who together perform the MoD’s role as 
a customer of industry, be clarified by the adoption of 
new nomenclature: ‘customer’ for the MoD as a 
whole; ‘sponsor’ for Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff 
(DCDS) Equipment Capability (EC)’s organisation; 
and ‘user’ for the Single Service Chiefs of Staff and 
the Front Line Commands (‘Joint User’ for Vice Chief 
of Defence Staff (VCDS) and Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ)  (Stakeholder  
         Management). 
• The MoD’s instructions to be amended to reflect these 
changes and to reinforce the IPTL as the commercial 
interface between the MoD and industry  (Stakeholder 
Management). 
• Renewed efforts should be made to: reinvigorate and 
standardise the operation of the Capability Working 
Groups; review the effectiveness and application of 
Customer Supplier Agreements, Through Life 
Management Plans and Through Life Maturity Models 
(Complexity Management). 
• Every major new capability in the MoD’s forward plans 
should be assigned a 2-star Senior Responsible 
Officer (SRO) residing in the ECC (Clarity and 
Perception). 
• Consideration should be given to establishing Board 
level championship of the most significant new 
capabilities (Clarity and Perception). 
 
An Integrated Procurement and Support Organisation  
 
• The establishment of an integrated procurement and 
support organisation (Complexity Management); 
• The new organisation should continue to identify 
areas where there are prospects of securing better 
value for money from buying in services from the 
private sector (Value for Money). 
 
Approvals and Scrutiny 
 
• A strong commercial team should be built around the 
Defence Commercial Director to spread good 
commercial practice, developing a consistent and 
effective due diligence function (Competence and 
Capacity); 
• Contract documents for all Category A projects should 
be subject to comprehensive legal due diligence and 
independent technical advice (Competence and 
Capacity); 
• Increase the overall commercial awareness of all 
those involved in acquisition to form a fundamental 
element of the training and qualification of 
procurement practitioners (Competence and 
Capacity); 
• Detailed consideration should be given to the benefits 
of a one-stop shop and consolidated advice to the 
Investment Appraisal Board (IAB) on business cases 
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(Competence and Capacity); 
• Responsibility for approval of projects below Category 
B (i.e. Cat C & D) should be delegated to the 
Customer and Supplier. Delegations would need to 
flow from Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) to Top 
Level Budget holders (TLBs), who would determine 
the levels at which approvals could take place. 
Assurance about the quality of decision taking would 
be obtained through independent post-project review 
(Benefits Certainty; Affordability); 
• The Main Gate business cases for Category A 
projects should contain an independent cost estimate 
(Affordability); 
• Main Gate approvals should cover support costs, 
acknowledging that in some cases this will only cover 
the early years (Affordability); 
• Approvals Thresholds should be reviewed in 
discussion with the Treasury as soon as practicable  
(Affordability). 
 
Governance  
 
• The Defence Management Board (DMB) should be 
involved in the Initial and Main Gate decision for the 
highest value and strategic investment decisions, 
making recommendations to Ministers (Affordability; 
Benefits Certainty); 
• The Defence Commercial Director should become a 
full member of the IAB when appointed, acting as a 
neutral, commercially aware authority (Competence 
and Capacity); 
• The head of the new integrated procurement and 
support organisation should be ‘in attendance’ at IAB 
meetings, rather than acting as a full member. He 
would provide assurance to the Board on the 
procurement and support arrangements (Benefits 
Certainty); 
• Consideration to be given to appointing the Finance 
Director to the IAB from 1 April 2007 in place of 2nd 
PUS (Competence and Capacity); 
• The Department should seek to appoint one or more 
Non-Executive Directors to the IAB (Competence and 
Capacity); 
• The Defence Commercial Director should also 
become a member of the National Defence Industries 
Council allowing formal engagement with Industry at 
the strategic level (Clarity and Perception); 
• The Defence Commercial Director should become the 
owner of the Procurement Process, also taking 
responsibility for the Commodity Procurement sub-
process (Clarity and Perception). 
 
Incentives and Targets 
 
• The adoption of a target set which reinforces through 
life delivery by setting targets for the delivery of a 
defined level of project performance and its cost-
effective sustainment through life (Constraints 
Certainty); 
• The development of a set of Acquisition System 
performance metrics, allowing management to 
address systemic acquisition issues and focus on 
TLCM  (Constraints Certainty). 
 
Research and Development  
 
• The Directors Equipment Capability (DECs) need to 
specify research goals (Clarity and Perception); 
• The new integrated acquisition organisation needs to 
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assist the Research Acquisition Organisation to 
develop a detailed research plan, to agree exploitation 
mechanisms and to ensure pull through of research 
(Benefits Certainty); 
• There is a single research Output which supports 
technology development (Competence and Capacity); 
• There should be an explicit link between each DIS 
sector strategy and the strategy for commissioning 
and exploiting research (Consistency and 
Coherence); 
• Work is undertaken to explore whether sufficient 
head-room could be created within the Department’s 
R&D spend to make a Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) Model a starter  
(Competence and Capacity). 
 
Implementation 
 
• The appointment of a senior official as programme 
manager charged with co-ordinating and driving 
overall implementation. He or she will require Board 
level SRO support (Competence and Capacity). 
2007 MoD: Defence Technology 
Strategy5 
The Defence Industrial Strategy 
reviewed the MoD’s approach to 
R&D. The Defence Technology 
Strategy (DTS) outlines its 
priorities for R&D, funding, skills, 
improved processes, opportunities 
and areas for international 
research collaboration. 
• Sets out science and technology priorities 
(Competence and Capacity); 
• Improved delivery process to speed up R&D 
exploitation (Complexity Management); 
• Recommends a joint MoD/Industry framework for 
investment (Clarity and Perception); 
• Working closely through DSTL (Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratories) with the universities to 
support defence science and technology 
(Competence and Capacity); 
• A well documented supply chain that stimulates and 
exploits innovation (Complexity Management); 
• Investment in science and engineering skills of 
relevance to defence technologies (Competence and 
Capacity). 
2009 Review of Acquisition for the 
Secretary of State for Defence 
(The Gray Report)6 
The then Defence Secretary 
commissioned Bernard Gray to 
assess the MoD’s approach to 
reforming its procurement process 
and to make recommendations for 
further improvements. 
Strategic Defence Review to be held in the first session of a new 
Parliament  
 
a) The requirement for such reviews should be 
enshrined in statute (Consistency and Coherence); 
b) The output of the reviews should be fully costed and 
audited (Affordability); 
c) These costings to include 10 year defence and 20 
year equipment budgets (Affordability); 
d) The results of the review, including costings, to be 
published to Parliament (Complexity Management); 
e) The PUS, as Accounting Officer, as a key enabler to a 
realistic defence budget, to be held accountable for 
overall costings in the strongest possible terms, 
ideally legally (Clarity and Perception). 
 
A rolling 10 year budget should be agreed for the MoD  
 
a) Budget to be enshrined in law, in line with the French 
example (Affordability); 
b) To encompass manpower, estates, equipment and 
support funding (Affordability). 
 
An Executive Committee of the Defence Board should be 
formed to be accountable for an affordable Equipment 
Programme  
 
a) The Committee is charged with creating and   
managing an affordable Equipment Plan (EP) to be 
submitted to the Defence Board & Ministers 
(Affordability); 
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b) Membership of this Committee to be the PUS (Chair), 
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Director General (DG) 
Finance, 2nd PUS, Vice Chief of Defence Staff 
(VCDS) and no other. No alternates (Clarity and 
Perception); 
c) DCDS (Capability) to be responsible for drawing 
together the plan, in consultation with the DG Strategy 
and the nominated representative of the DG Finance 
(Clarity and Perception); 
d) The Committee to meet at least quarterly, and to 
submit its EP to the Defence Board as part of the 
annual planning process (Clarity and Perception); 
e) The costing of the EP and its affordability against the 
10 year defence budget should be the responsibility of 
the MoD DG Finance (Affordability; Clarity and 
Perception); 
f) All known liabilities to be included within the costed 
plan (Constraints Certainty); 
g) These costings, and the veracity of the estimates, to 
be subject to independent audit by a major accounting 
firm. This audit to be published, with the MoD having 
to pass a “going concern” test of plan against budget 
(Competence and Capacity); 
h) The Defence Board could only accept or reject the EP 
proposed by the Committee as a whole. No ‘cherry 
picking’ (Clarity and Perception); 
i) Ministers, the Services, industry and others would be 
expected to offer direction or views in the process of 
the formation of the plan, rather than after its creation, 
to ensure a balanced and affordable plan was 
produced (Affordability); 
j) The PUS, as Accounting Officer, would be 
accountable to Parliament annually for the 
affordability and accuracy of the plan. The PUS to 
become the true “owner” of the equipment plan, 
enabling the PUS sufficient authority (Affordability). 
 
Clarify roles and create a real customer-supplier relationship 
between the capability sponsor (MoD centre) and project 
delivery (DE&S) 
 
a) DCDS (Capability) to be responsible for the creation 
and control of requirements, and required to control 
the budget of the agreed EP as a single point of 
MoD contact with Defence Equipment and Support 
(DE&S) for equipment  (Clarity and Perception); 
b) Clear ownership of each project/requirement to be 
allocated to a single individual within DCDS 
(Capability) team, including business case 
formulation (Clarity and Perception); 
c) DE&S to be responsible for programme 
management and delivery against agreed 
requirements specification and budget (Constraints 
Certainty); 
d) Changes to requirements, programme delays, etc. to 
be specifically and realistically costed and included 
in the next iteration of the plan. If any increases 
threaten affordability (as is likely), cuts must be 
made elsewhere (Affordability); 
e) Cost of DE&S resources on projects should be 
tracked and charged (Constraints Certainty). 
 
Revise aspects of the Approval process to improve decision 
making  
 
a) IAB to report to Executive Committee on control of 
equipment approvals. IAB charged with 
consideration of the affordability of total programme, 
not just single projects. Chair of IAB to be taken on 
by MoD DG Finance (Affordability); 
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b) Current Initial Gate/Main Gate approval process to 
be retained (Benefits Certainty); 
c) Scrutiny community to be expanded/up-skilled to 
provide early advice to IPT Leaders on the 
preparation of business cases  (Benefits Certainty; 
Competence and Capacity); 
d) Mandatory use of parametric data, independent cost 
estimations and other “should cost” tools to be used 
as basis of preparation of business cases 
(Affordability); 
e) Projects pre-Main Gate should be included in the 
plan at 90th percentile cost (Affordability); 
f) No business case should be accepted, nor 
requirement included in the overall plan, other than 
on the basis of costs derived as above 
(Affordability). 
 
Further cost reductions within in-service support should be 
pursued vigorously and the aspirations of TLCM should be 
reappraised  
 
a) Significant further external work should be 
commissioned as a matter of urgency into the costs 
and function of in-service equipments (Affordability; 
Benefits Certainty); 
b) Once a new Strategic Defence Review has 
determined the future force structure for the MoD 
there should be much more use of contracting for 
availability to be included in initial equipment 
acquisition to align incentives between 
manufacturers and MoD (Consistency and 
Coherence); 
c) Role of TLCM and Programme Boards to be re-
considered. Current structure overly complex and 
lacking data for decisions (Complexity 
Management); 
d) TLCM to focus in first instance on financial 
Modelling of acquisition vs. support costs. Financial 
Models to be acquired to Model these variables (cf. 
British Airways), DG Commercial to control, 
reporting to MoD DG Finance (Affordability). 
 
Improve the ability of DE&S to deliver efficiently on new 
equipment and support  
 
a) Scope of DE&S to be rationalised to focus on 
programme management of acquisition of new 
equipment and support of in-service equipment. 
Other functions to be hived off into separate 
entities. Management structure of DE&S to be 
revised. Two joint Chief Operating Officer (COO) 3* 
positions created to handle IPT workload. Chief of 
Materiel (CoM) role to be abolished. Chief of 
Defence Materiel (CDM) to be a very senior civilian 
Programme Management position, recruited 
externally. Chief of Staff and Chief of Corporate 
Services roles to be merged (Complexity 
Management); 
b) Develop better skills in the workforce. Significantly 
increase programme and project management 
skills within DE&S at all levels of the organisation. 
Increase central technical staffs resource available 
to individual projects as needed. No person, civil or 
military, to be appointed to a post of 1* or above 
without extensive programme management 
experience (Competence and Capacity); 
c) Ensure greater independence from the customer. 
Hard charging interfaces to be created between 
DE&S and DCDS (Capability) for future equipment 
programme, and any change requests, and Front 
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Line Commands for in-service support. Full 
reporting on output delivered for budget input 
required. Level of resources and skills of 
independent cost estimators to be substantially 
increased. CDM and the joint COO 3* posts to 
have full control over appointment of 2* Cluster 
heads and 1* team leaders, with this control 
cascading down through DE&S. Military personnel 
may be seconded to teams to provide advice on 
user needs without programme management 
experience, but may not occupy line management 
positions in this guise (Competence and Capacity; 
Affordability); 
d) Institute a regime of strict financial discipline. 
Levels of resources and influence of Finance 
Function to be substantially increased. DE&S 
Financial Director (FD) to be recognised as de-
facto and de-jure second in command to CDM with 
a strong dotted line to MoD DG Finance. Carrying 
forward into new Financial Year (FY) of planned 
activity in excess of annual budgets (currently 
running at over 10% of DE&S spend) to be banned 
(Affordability); 
e) Improve accountability for project performance. 
Assurance process to be reduced and potentially 
removed as duplicative of Scrutiny role. Consistent 
programme and project management tools to be 
used across DE&S to ensure transparency of 
management information and easy migration of 
staff across teams. IPT leaders and above to be 
retained in post for a minimum 4-year double tour. 
Military officers seeking to serve as line managers 
must also follow this rule. Empowerment of cluster 
heads, and then IPT leaders, to be re-instated, as 
envisioned in Smart Acquisition (Benefits Certainty; 
Competence and Capacity; Constraints Certainty; 
Clarity and Perception). 
 
Change the status of DE&S  
 
a) Status of DE&S to be considered. At the very 
minimum it should become a Trading Fund. If a 
credible plan for delivery of objectives set out in 
Recommendation 7 within government ownership 
cannot be brought forward within 12 months, 
DE&S to be contractorised as a formal Go-Co 
(Change Readiness; Clarity and Perception). 
 
2009 An Independent Review into the 
Broader Issues Surrounding the 
Loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 
Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 
2006 (the Haddon-Cave Report)7 
 
Whilst the focus of this report was 
the issue of airworthiness, the 
headline statement was ‘a failure 
of leadership, culture and 
priorities’.  Part IV, Chapters 13 
(Cuts, Change, Dilution and 
Distraction (1998-2006)) and 14 
(Procurement) consider the 
organisational setting and it is 
these issues that are reported 
here. 
The Nimrod Integrated Project Team (IPT) 
 
• Inappropriately delegated project management; poor 
project management (Constraints Certainty);  
• A failure to act as an ‘intelligent customer’ (Value for 
Money); 
• Failure to read carefully the reports of the supplier, 
BAE Systems, or check their work (Competence and 
Capacity; Value for Money);  
• Failure to follow the inhouse Safety Management Plan 
(Competence and Capacity);  
• Failure to appoint an Independent Safety Advisor to 
audit the Nimrod Safety Case (Competence and 
Capacity);  
• The signing-off of BAE Systems’ work when it was 
manifestly inappropriate to do so (Competence and 
Capacity); 
• In short, Haddon-Cave considered the Nimrod IPT to 
be “sloppy and complacent and outsourced its 
thinking” (Competence and Capacity).   
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The supplier, BAE Systems 
 
• Poorly planned, poorly managed and poorly executed 
work, resulting in a seriously defective end product 
(Competence and Capacity); 
• The contractor was given the impression that the task 
had been properly completed and there were only 
vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was 
required, raising question marks about the prevailing 
ethical culture at BAE Systems (Competence and 
Capacity).    
 
Organisational Changes 
 
• A shift from organisation along purely ‘functional’ to 
project oriented lines (Change Readiness);  
• The ‘rolling up’ of organisations to create larger and 
larger ‘purple’ and ‘throughlife’ management 
structures (Change Readiness);  
• ‘Outsourcing’ to industry (Competence and Capacity); 
• “A sustained period of deep organisational trauma 
between 1998 and 2006”, beginning with the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review. Financial pressures and 
cuts drove a cascade of multifarious organisational 
changes, which led to a dilution of the airworthiness 
regime and culture within the MoD, and distraction 
from safety and airworthiness issues as the top 
priority (Change Readiness; Competence and 
Capacity).   
• A shift in culture and priorities in the MoD towards 
‘business’ and financial targets, at the expense of 
functional values such as safety and airworthiness 
(Competence and Capacity); 
• The Defence Logistics Organisation, in particular, 
came under huge pressure. Its primary focus became 
delivering ‘change’ and the ‘change programme’ and 
achieving the ‘Strategic Goal’ of a 20% reduction in 
output costs in five years and other financial savings 
(Change Readiness); 
• The history of Procurement in the MoD as one of 
years of major delays and cost overruns (Affordability; 
Value for Money); 
• Poor procurement practices have helped create ‘bow 
waves’ of deferred financial problems, the knock-on 
effects of which have been visited on In-Service 
Support, with concomitant change, confusion, dilution, 
and distraction as occurred in the post-Strategic 
Defence Review period 1998-2006 (Affordability; 
Competence and Capacity). 
2010 National Audit Office: Defence: 
Strategic Financial Management of 
the Defence Budget8 
 
This report considered whether the 
MoD’s approach to financial 
management was sufficient to fulfil 
the objectives of the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review of 
2010. Central to this was the issue 
of reducing the shortfall and 
restoring balance to future defence 
spending while ensuring the ability 
to maintain this balance in the 
future.  
Findings 
 
The MoD faces a number of challenges due to the nature of the 
defence environment  
• It has been operating above the level of activity for 
which it is routinely resourced and additional funding 
for Iraq and Afghanistan will be withdrawn when these 
operations end. 
• The growth in the input costs of defence has been 
more than general inflation.  
• The Defence plans require a longer horizon than 
Government spending plans and are relatively 
inflexible. 
• There are a number of other influences in the Defence 
environment which have affected the MoD’s plans 
over time. 
 
The MoD could use financial management more effectively to 
address those factors that are within its control 
• The outcome of the annual planning rounds 
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contributed to significant in-year budgetary pressure.  
• Although the MoD uses the planning round to set 
strategic priorities, it has not routinely prioritised 
individual elements of its spending programme. 
• It would find it easier to prioritise and find efficiencies 
if it had better visibility of its costs.  
• It could place greater focus on the extent to which its 
assets are used efficiently.  
• The MoD has some of the financial management 
capabilities it needs but could use them more 
effectively.  
 
Over-committed plans have significant consequences 
• At the end of the last two spending rounds, the MoD’s 
over-committed plans have led to budgetary pressure 
in the new financial year. This has led to additional 
savings being necessary. 
• Delaying projects leads to significant increases in 
costs. 
 
The MoD has started to take action to improve financial planning 
• The Strategy for Defence published in October 2009 
helped to set out key priorities by identifying success 
in Afghanistan as the main effort.  
• The introduction of new governance arrangements, 
planning tools and systems to improve strategic 
financial management. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The MoD should use the Strategic Defence and Security Review 
to rebalance its programme and take action to keep it in balance 
for the future.  (Affordability; Constraints Certainty) 
 
It should: 
-underpin the Strategic Defence and Security Review with an 
explicit financial strategy; 
-set out the relative priorities of expenditure; 
-regularly review performance against financial plans;  
-reprioritise funds to keep the programme in balance without 
using delays and de-scoping projects as the default approach to 
reducing expenditure (Affordability; Constraints Certainty). 
 
The financial strategy should be reflected in financial plans.  
 
The MoD should ensure that the plans:  
-articulate and review spending priorities annually;  
-revisit at least annually the assumptions that underpin the 
financial plans;  
-contain adequate financial provision for risk and to counter 
optimism bias;  
-consider changes to the assets held and not just the HM 
Treasury control regime (Benefits Certainty; Constraints 
Certainty). 
 
The MoD should use the financial capability it has to best effect 
and enhance its capability further.  
 
It should:  
-use professionally skilled finance staff to develop the long term 
financial strategy and associated risk management strategy 
(Competence and Capacity); 
-drive out the culture of optimism bias that fails to recognise the 
full cost of projects (Constraints Certainty); 
-enhance visibility and understanding of the cost of delivering 
outputs and cross-cutting activities (Clarity and Perception; 
Competence and Capacity). 
Source: Author  
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APPENDIX 6:  
NAO’S KEY QUESTIONS FOR DEPARTMENTS UNDERTAKING  
MAJOR IT-ENABLED BUSINESS CHANGE  
Question Analysis of the DII Programme’s Performance 
 
1. Is the board able to make 
informed judgments about 
the MoD’s capacity to 
manage change? 
Key decisions taken about the Programme take into consideration other 
defence business change programmes that impact on or are enabled by DII. 
Dependency of the JPA Programme was recognised and managed. 
Considerable work to understand the required scope of DII and action to 
manage risks including centralising control of legacy systems and 
rationalising applications. 
Not enough work to understand the physical environment. The Fixed Rollout 
Methodology proved inappropriate. 
2. Does the MoD have in 
place a decision-making 
structure that will ensure 
strong and effective 
leadership of the IT-
enabled business change? 
The Programme created robust governance structures at the outset with 
members drawn from the MoD and Atlas. They incorporated all of the 
important internal stakeholders. The Programme has secured the engagement 
of senior management both within the MoD and Atlas. 
3. What incentives exist to 
drive performance? 
The MoD has structured the DII contract so that ATLAS recoups the 
majority of its investment through performance-based payments. The 
decision that the consortium would receive the majority of the payment for 
work only when terminals had been installed has protected the MoD from 
paying for services before they have been delivered, when delays have 
occurred because of contractor error. 
The MoD is using an incremental approach that has been refined as the 
Programme has progressed. This has been used to drive contractor 
performance and to manage risk. 
4. Does the MoD have the 
necessary programme 
management skills? 
Both the IPTL and the SRO have well-resourced teams of staff.   Many have 
undergone formal training to acquire programme management skills. 
After letting the contract, the MoD kept the team of people responsible for 
the contract in post for much longer than usual. Key individuals in the MoD 
have considerable experience of IT programmes and the acquisition of major 
defence equipment. 
5. What is the natural 
division of duties between 
the Programme and Project 
Management Centre 
of Excellence and the Chief 
Information Officer? 
The SRO for the Programme is also the MoD’s CIO. 
6. How will the MoD 
establish and promote an 
open and constructive 
relationship with suppliers? 
Governance structures contain members drawn from both the MoD and 
Atlas. At the highest levels within the MoD and Atlas’s constituent 
companies, senior management have been well engaged in the DII 
Programme. 
The MoD’s and the contractor’s senior management have done much to 
instill a partnering ethos throughout their organisations. The development of 
partnering methods is assessed through a maturity model. 
7. How clear is the MoD 
about the business process 
that it is seeking to change 
or develop? 
The MoD had a sound rationale and a convincing business case for the 
Programme in terms of improved military operational effectiveness, more 
effective and efficient running of the business, and particularly through the 
business change programmes that DII supports. 
Source: Great Britain, National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Defence Information 
Infrastructure, (London, HMSO, 2008). 
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APPENDIX 7:  
SURVEY 
 
 
1. Background to the Research 
 
This research is examining whether the lessons from previous IT projects in government 
have been applied to current projects and, if so, whether they have improved the 
outcomes.   
 
I am currently studying the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII) Programme and 
have access to the inhouse User Survey but am keen to ask some slightly different 
questions. Therefore, this questionnaire is only relevant to you if you are a DII user. If 
you are, then I would be grateful if you could take the time to complete this 
questionnaire, which has been designed to be quick and easy. It is only nine questions 
long and should take no more than ten minutes to complete.  
 
Your anonymity is assured. The results of this survey will not be used for any other 
purpose and will be deleted on completion of this research. 
 
If you wish to comment further, then space has been allowed on the form or you can 
contact me directly via email or telephone to discuss your views in greater detail: 
a.maddison@cranfield.ac.uk/01793-785035. 
 
I would be grateful if you could forward this link to any friends and colleagues who 
would be willing to add their views to this survey. 
 
Annie Maddison 
Cranfield University 
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Section 1: Background Information 
 
Q1:  Please enter your work location here and any additional comment that you 
wish to make. 
 
Location Responses 
Afghanistan 1 
Blandford Camp 3 
Celle, Germany 1 
Corsham 16 
Cyprus 9 
DE&S Abbeywood 13 
DE&S, Foreign Liaison Office, US 1 
Defence Academy, Shrivenham 8 
Ensleigh, Bath 1 
Foxhill, Bath 1 
Haverfordwest 1 
Herford, Germany 1 
HMS Forward 1 
Main Building, London 1 
Navy Command HQ 1 
Old War Office, London 1 
Pentagon, US 1 
RAF Waddington 16 
RSME Chatham/Minley 1 
Yeovilton 1 
Total 79 
Skipped Question 5 
Source: Author 
 
Q2:  With regard to DII, how long has it been available at your work location? 
 
Less than 1 year 10  (13%) 
1 year 5    (6.5%) 
2 years 21  (27.3%) 
3 years 20  (26%) 
4 years 6    (7.8%) 
More than 4 years 15  (19.5%) 
Total 77 
Skipped Question 7 
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With regard to DII, how long have you been using it? 
 
Less than 1 year 8   (9.9%) 
1 year 3   (3.7%) 
2 years 20 (24.7%) 
3 years 23 (28.4%) 
4 years 9   (11.1%) 
More than 4 years 18 (22.2%) 
Total 81 
Skipped Question 3 
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Comments (Optional) 
Have not had DII as long as colleagues as based overseas - had to write business case to be allowed DII 
laptop! 
In previous Units. 
Whether working in-office or from home using the DII(F) multi-point connectivity logging in is very slow. 
Moreover, the logging on procedure when working from home requires FIVE log-on security steps (B-
Crypt key insertion, password, 4 number password + 6 number RSA Security ID fob random generated 
number, personal DII profile ID, followed finally by personal password = Well over the top! 
I first used DII whilst serving with my Regiment in 2007 (in Germany). 
DII F available in my last location for about 2 years, of which I was there for the first 9 months or so. I 
have also been a user of DII-C and DII-D in 2005 and 2006. 
I do not know how long it has been available. I have only used it 3 or 4 times to gain access to JPA. I do 
not have my own terminal. 
I am unsure how long Cranfield has had had DII access but I have had it in every job since 2004 except for 
an 18 month period where I used TAFMIS. 
Have been able to use it at a variety of sites in the southwest. 
Real pain with DII is time to log on and inability to connect peripheral devices i.e. PDAs. Industry manage 
it but not the MoD. 
Not 100% sure on how long DII has been in NCHQ. 
In early adopter group. 
Migrated from DII/C to DII/F. 
This is to my knowledge. I am a contractor. 
Move to a new build is the reason for apparent contradiction in response. 
Not available at current work location. Closest UK site is the British Embassy which expects to receive 
limited DII later this year. 
Moved to present post a year ago. 
Don’t know. 
DII was at my last location in Celle, Germany. We are going to get DII here in Cyprus this year, though it 
is behind schedule! 
We had DII in Germany and are currently awaiting an installation of DII in Cyprus. 
Waiting for it to be rolled out in Cyprus. 
There is no DII facility at this location yet as we are still using Cyprusnet. 
DII is currently not available in my unit. It is supposed to be rolled out within the next couple of months. 
Haven't got DII yet but have used before. 
Not available as yet. 
 
Q3:  How would you rate your IT Skills? 
 
Novice 
(I never use computers) 
0 
Adequate 
(I can carry out my job adequately using a computer 
but I would benefit from learning additional 
computer skills) 
 
9   (10.7%) 
Experienced 
(I am a confident user for all routine tasks required) 
42 (50%) 
Expert 
(I am a confident user and am asked by others to 
help them when they have difficulties) 
 
 
33 (39.3%) 
Total 84 
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Comments (Optional) 
DII is restrictive with regards to what you can do with your computer. The PC is capable of more than what 
we are restricted to use it for. 
I am studying the IMT MSc, could there be any better qualification to prove expertise in IT skills? 
Work in Software Support. 
I am a Management Consultant who specialises in web technologies. 
Masters Degree in Information Systems plus over ten years experience in technical and programme 
management roles. 
IT Lead within my unit and Local Security Officer/Authorised Demander on DII. 
Better in some applications than others but a regular user. 
Designed a Sharepoint site for the Battalion Info Manager. 
 
Section 2: The DII Programme: Evaluation of Use 
 
Q4: How much did you know about DII before its implementation? 
 
Nothing 10 (12.2%) 
A Little  
(I knew what it was) 
18 (22%) 
Some  
(I knew what it was and what it was going to do) 
27 (32.9%) 
A Lot  
(I knew about the plans for its development and 
implementation) 
19 (23.2%) 
A Great Deal  
(I knew about the background and strategy for the 
Programme as well as the plan for its development 
and implementation) 
8   (9.8%) 
Total 82 
Skipped 2 
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Comments (Optional) 
I knew that it would replace our stations network with something else. 
Whilst information was published on the Intranet, I noted its availability and decided to access the 
information on the basis of Need and When to know. 
I was the Signal Officer and therefore had been to centralised NEC meetings. 
I was a minor part of the implementation team in my last unit (assistant security officer). 
Worked in DII IPT at the time. 
On project team. 
Helped put in DII in Main Building. 
Prior to migration at my previous unit and my role as Business Unit Point of Contact (BUPOC), I made a 
point of reading as much as I could on the subject. 
Part of the DII team to implement increment 2a and 3a. 
I worked as part of the implementation team. 
I used DII with my current unit when we were based in Celle, Germany from Jan-Aug 2010. 
 
Q5:  With regard to DII,  
 
Does it give you access to all the hardware/software that you need to do your job?  
 
Yes 57 (71.3%)  
No  23 (28.8%) (Total: 80; Skipped: 4) 
 
Comments (Optional) 
But it was a battle to get the hardware and speed of service required. 
Seems it all comes down to cost... and how much ATLAS can get away with charging! 
The reason for No is that the work environment requires Microsoft Access although in use now is to be 
rescinded causing major work issues. Also DII does not have drivers for legacy Smartboards and issues 
with colour printers. 
Only if you have been give permission to use the software. Getting permissions can be difficult. 
I do not have my own terminal so it does not give me access to everything I need when I need it. 
I think the roll out of shared areas has been far too slow and the software is often limiting. 
I don't know if it has other capabilities that could help me. Document and records management is hopeless. 
No access to Internet. 
Like to be able to synchronise PDA/Mobile phone. Internet restrictions are archaic. 
A decent file registry and archive system would be useful. 
 
Have you received sufficient training to use it (i.e. enough to mean that you can use 
it without assistance)? 
 
Yes 60 (75%)  
No  20 (25%) (Total: 80; Skipped: 4) 
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Comments (Optional) 
Received no training - probably because 'off site’. 
All knowledge gained leading to its effective use has been gained by help received from friend or has been 
self-learned. 
Training... not really, although it is hardly on a par with the science of rocketry. 
Problem with this question is that it doesn't take into account the abilities of the user.  For example as a 
Hons Degree in Computing holder I can determine how to do things better than others. 
I am aware it is down to me to seek further training as required. I am content I can use DII to the extent that 
is necessary for me to do my job. 
I have not received any training to use DII. 
I have not been trained to publish to the web pages. 
I received no formal training, but just muddled through. 
Training has been sufficient for me, but I consider myself to be on the high-side of IT-capable. Information 
management training and automation could be considerably better – the current situation would be tolerable 
if we had a decent search function. 
Whilst I can confidently use it I received no training in DII and believe that I am not aware of how to do 
some functions that have been self-taught via trial and error. 
No continuation training offered for new initiatives such as MOSS. 
I have had sufficient training but I fear most users without my background struggle through a lack of 
training. 
One of the challenges experienced when I first used DII was that the user guide is an electronic document 
based on the Defence web. As a first time user this presents a mild difficulty in accessing the system and 
understanding the security and encryption settings due to the requirement to log in through the security 
process before accessing the guides and learning material. 
The MOSS (Microsoft Office SharePoint Server) training is a bit light, but everything else I'm happy with. 
DII programme did not provide any training direct. All my training was gathered from previous exposure to 
legacy systems and it is my primary Trade. 
Can use it but there has never been any training. 
No training given. 
 
Q6:  How would you rate DII compared to the IT that you used previously in terms 
of: 
 
 The support that you 
have received? 
Its usefulness compared 
to your previous IT 
provision? 
(It makes my job easier 
and it makes me more 
effective and efficient) 
Ease of use? 
 
Worse 24 (30.4%) 12 (16%) 5   (6.3%) 
Same 23 (29.1%) 28 (37.3%) 39 (49.4%) 
Better 27 (34.2%) 30 (40%) 34 (43%) 
Excellent 5   (6.3%) 5   (6.7%) 3   (3.8%) 
Total 81   
Skipped 3   
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Comments (Optional) 
DII more useful as incorporates new capabilities such as JPA. Ease of use same as primarily driven by 
Microsoft Office. 
DII(F) lost capability over DII(C) particularly with regards to data management. 
Relatively comparable, but all systems that I have used have offered poor support and ease of use. 
I previously had Land CSSR or none! 
We had our own LAN that was tuned to our needs. 
Support used to be in-house. If there was a problem which was difficult to resolve over the telephone 
someone would present themselves at your workstation within minutes... at no extra charge. 
Frustratingly if DII had been implemented correctly (SAMs Networking in 21 Days) then this system 
would help me work better, instead I am having to work around its issues. 
Smart screens previously supported are no longer supported due to lack of drivers. 
Regarding support, having people on the ground will always get a faster response to problems. 
The design and utility is very good with the caveat that the user needs to give time to familiarise his/herself 
on its layout and structure. The extent of familiarisation / detailed application usage training needs to be 
tailored to the individual. 
There were some limitations due to restrictions with its civilian internet services when I was the Media 
Officer. 
DII - F was no significant change from the existing Land CSSR except the ability to log on when deployed 
to other units locations. DII Secret was a step change in capability over the existing system as it gave 
greater connectivity to non military and non UK based partners. 
My only criticism is that the bandwidth is barely enough for a network of this size and consequently it runs 
slowly sometimes. 
TAFMIS was better thought out (possibly the result of a more mature system) and provided easier file 
sharing and collaboration. Prior to DII I was expected to use my own laptop for work and send memos 
instead of emails. 
Help desk (SPOC) can usually resolve problems quickly. 
The search function is woeful – I know an autonomy-based search is around the corner but we’ve had to 
put up with an under-powered search since the implementation of DII. 
The old network was windows NT4 with no flexibility. 
Several issues around closing and opening new accounts takes too long and not in the suppliers interest to 
disestablish dormant accounts that they are getting paid for. 
Compared to CHOTS! 
Loss of local IT support organisation has removed flexibility. It also erodes our collective intelligent 
customer role. 
Previous systems have been UNICOM as a field commander. That was pretty rubbish ... although you 
could get the vital things done if you bothered to learn the keystrokes. Most people didn't and could not 
send mail outside of their own unit. 
The global access and use have enormous benefits but speed is generally slower than required. 
Still missing a lot of functionality through collaborative working and numerous applications. 
Support is not necessarily better in that CHOTS support was very good, however it is much more efficient - 
most being carried out remotely and quickly. 
I had my own IT staff who enabled me to do whatever I required. I had an Electronic Documents and 
Records Management System that was disabled leaving my records in a mess. 
Having gone back to a legacy system in Cyprus it is very clear how much better DII is than Cyprus net. 
Having only used DII for 7 months I didn't really get to use it that much or properly investigate its full 
potential. 
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Q7: Do you think the system is: 
 
 High quality?  
(DII offers everything 
that I need to do my job 
and the cost of DII is 
reasonable given what it 
offers to me in my day-
to-day work) 
Responsive? 
(Does what I want when 
I want to) 
Reliable enough for you 
to do your job (most of 
the time)? 
(Does not fail when I 
want to use it) 
Totally disagree 11 (13.8%) 8   (9.9%) 5   (6.3%) 
Disagree 22 (27.5%) 24 (29.6%) 16 (20%) 
Neither Agree/Disagree 28 (35%) 26 (32.1%) 25 (31.3%) 
Agree 16 (20%) 21 (25.9%) 32 (40%) 
Totally Agree 3   (3.8%) 2   (2.5%) 2   (2.5%) 
Total 81   
Skipped 3   
 
Comments (Optional) 
I have encountered some connectivity issues - Remote Access. 
DII (F) is 10 times more expensive that our local LAN system. 
In the main the system works, although it can be slow at times and the search engine is very poor. 
I do not know the cost of DIIF so I cannot comment on whether it is value for money or not. Its speed and 
reliability seem to have reduced. 
I have heard conjecture with regards to the cost of DII but I am not aware of the actual costs. 
- It is certainly not a high quality system from this user's perspective! -I am not in a position to comment on 
cost. -Does it do want I want it to do? = Eventually, often very slowly, and sometimes erratically! -If MOD 
masters are content with delays in work being completed because of DII lack of connectivity to servers, or 
the slow working of the system, which slows users work rhythm, the system is usually adequate for this 
user! 
Annoying that applications have to be reinstalled when logging on to another work station. 
The poor thought in some of the rules makes this a frustrating system to use given its potential. 
Whilst the service is usually reliable it does not do everything I require it to do. 
Network is slow. Cannot put free software packages on without having to pay for a license to assist with 
our job. 
DII has extreme cost implications which as an end User are not acceptable considering how Public Sector 
working is changing requiring different usage of original installed IT.  
DII is highly expensive for what it offers. As it only offers the most basic of computer needs. A word 
document of average size can take approx 5 mins to open. The printers now always print an error page 
before they finally print. A known problem that they are trying to resolve but has been on going for the past 
2 months. 
Unit cost of hardware/software very expensive when compared to other providers. 
Early day reliability faults have been significantly reduced. 
I have failed to get access to it on a couple of occasions. 
It’s generally available although there are significant bugs in the system that have cost time to fix. It is slow 
to respond when used in non-Headquarters roles due to the centralised servers, dispersed locations and lack 
of bandwidth. It is fairly average in its provision of basic office functionality. 
We pay a fortune the provision of accounts. There must be hundreds of accounts that have not been closed 
so the MoD pays for them. Inactive accounts should be closed down. 
I'm not aware of the costs associated with DII. 
I have no idea of the VFM of DII as I have nothing to compare it against but some of the charges do seem 
extortionate. 
Very slow for some things - initial log-on especially. 
Very expensive. 
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DII suffers from many network/power issues and user experience depends on their location. In general 
responsiveness is poor and downtime far beyond that which is acceptable. 
Initial installation came with performance issues (speed) especially when trying to access old data (not yet 
migrated) through 'Reachback' connectivity. 
It is a little bit sluggish, due in part to the amount of security and background tasks, but is reliable. 
I feel that the cost for DII is far too expensive. 
I think that DII is expensive for general use but does have good functionality, it is also frequently pretty 
slow, however most of the time it does perform adequately. 
The use of CD re-writing is imperative for my job but it does not have this function. 
DII is still a very slow system – is adequate for the job but in some aspects only just.  I have used better 
systems in NI and Cyprus. 
The system is slow most of time because too many people using the server at the same time. 
 
Section 3: The DII Programme: Assessment 
 
Q8: With regard to DII, in your view: 
 
 Yes No Total Skipped 
Were users fully 
consulted during 
development i.e. when 
decisions were being 
taken about the 
system? 
 
16 (20.8%) 
 
61 (79.2%) 
 
77 
 
7 
Were users fully 
consulted during 
implementation i.e. 
when the system was 
being set up in your 
workplace? 
 
27 (34.6%) 
 
51 (65.4%) 
 
78 
 
6 
Was the 
implementation 
successful i.e. was 
there minimum 
disruption? 
 
46 (62.2%) 
 
28 (37.8%) 
 
74 
 
10 
Does it meet the 
requirements of its 
users? 
 
54 (70.1%) 
 
23 (29.9%) 
 
77 
 
7 
Were users involved at 
all stages of the 
project? 
 
14 (19.2%) 
 
59 (80.8%) 
 
73 
 
11 
Is it a project to deliver 
new technology? 
 
32 (42.7%) 
 
43 (57.3%) 
 
75 
 
9 
Is it a project to 
improve services? 
 
58 (78.4%) 
 
16 (21.6%) 
 
74 
 
10 
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Comments (Optional) 
Meets the requirement - just. 
Does it meet the requirements of users = After a fashion! -Is it a project to deliver new technology? = I don't know 
about "new technology" but can be used to deliver varied functionality depending on the security clearance of its 
various Increments. 
No business needs analysis was carried out at this site. A policy of '1 size fits all' was employed. 
My opinion, it seems someone is making a lot of money and providing nothing more for it. 
I had to use a profile set up for a different post, if not I would be unable to use it for 6 months while money was being 
found. The basic level of users is not suitable for the software development work that my section does. In addition if 
the general network goes down our section goes down. A step back from our old position of having our own network. 
Where are the bridges routers and network segmentation (again SAMS Networking in 21 Days, duh)? 
It is difficult to comment on whether users were involved in the project as the time lines between planning the 
implementation and the actual delivery were longer than the normal length of military assignments. Hence few 
personnel were actually still in the unit during implementation who were around during initial planning. The unit’s role 
had changed significantly during the intervening period. 
New tech with respect to the MoD - Yes. Up-To-Date Tech- No, but there are some good reasons for this. 
Some of these answers are not really yes/no! e.g. individual users were not all consulted (300000 of them!) 
representatives for groups of users (e.g. TLB representatives (x 12) were. 
Teething problem caused massive disruption to my team everything from not rollback to spelling usernames wrong and 
loss of profiles. In some cases migration can take up to 12 weeks, totally unacceptable.... 
DII is a huge IT implementation in anybody's terms - there was only so much that could be done with regard to 
engaging with users. 
Definitely a cost saving exercise that will deliver benefit through easier communication, i.e. ability to have a common, 
maintainable estate wide address book. Delivery of support to users still catching up with equipment. Training appears 
lacking especially for Authorised Demanders, the people who enable local changes, as many simple maintenance 
jobs/checks are not being carried out. 
Limited consultation. In some cases this has removed some functionality in an attempt to provide a homogenous one 
size fits all solution for Defence. 
A focus on service rather than technology has been and continues to be a key weakness in DII strategy. The notion that 
a detailed requirement for what is at the end of the day largely just an office system can be usefully and reliably created 
by some consultants (and I am a consultant) and then stuck to is not very sensible. The reality is that for 90% or more 
of what is required can be met by Microsoft Office products (including SharePoint) and the requirement then boils 
down to 'give us the Office suite and harden it to suit our special security needs' rather than deliver the technology 
Microsoft has already invested billions of dollars in.  We have gone down the route of dreaming up a requirement 
(which is less well thought through than Microsoft’s) and then given this to an inherently and predictably schizophrenic 
consortium to build. Predictable flaws in this requirement are then fodder for discord between MOD and ALTAS, the 
root of much wastage in time and money. Strategically of course the real question is whether to Microsoft or Not to 
Microsoft. Looking at the lay of the land over the long term my money is on Not to Microsoft. HM Government should 
look to harness its own flavour of a Unix based operating system and working with the open source fraternity to build 
and control its own digital assets. Both programs and data are digital assets and DII should lead the way in the nation’s 
long term interests in this area. 
The all-in-one, singing from the same songsheet product. Let down slightly by delays and a poor user perception. 
From my personal experience of DII is that it provided an office automation tool with email connectivity across the 
MoD. The Information Management and Exploitation is somewhat different as there is no IM collaboration toolset 
within organisation to utilise. I know that DII are implementing MOSS later this year, which will be interesting to see 
the data migration plan and policy. 
No involvement.   It was just delivered; we lost lots of data on the transition and a lot of false promises to have this data 
returned. 
I think it offers potential future improvements - information sharing, joint working and an EDRMS. Has good 
functionality and ability to download number of applications (providing they are already on DII) is good. 
I have never seen the benefits argument for DII. It can't deliver new technology; several of its applications are obsolete. 
The removal to manipulate files on removable storage was a pain that was never forecast. 
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Q9: Would you consider DII to be a success in terms of: 
 
 Agree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Disagree Total Skipped 
Staying within 
budget? 
 
8  (10.4%) 
 
   32 (41.6%) 
 
   37 (48.1%) 
 
77 
 
7 
Being delivered 
within the time 
stated? 
 
   4   (5.1%) 
 
   24 (30.4%) 
 
51 (64.5%) 
 
79 
 
5 
Delivering 
organisational 
benefits? 
 
   40 (51.7%) 
 
   25 (31.6%) 
 
14 (17.7%) 
 
79 
 
5 
Giving high user 
satisfaction? 
 
 
17 (21.6%) 
 
   30 (38%) 
 
32 (40.5%) 
 
79 
 
5 
Delivering new 
technology? 
 
   30 (38%) 
 
   27 (34.2%) 
 
22 (27.9%) 
 
79 
 
5 
Improving IT 
services? 
 
 
45 (56.3%) 
 
   19 (23.8%) 
 
16 (20.1%) 
 
80 
 
4 
Making your 
working life 
easier? 
 
33 (42.3%) 
 
   29 (37.2%) 
 
16 (20.5%) 
 
78 
 
6 
Being a project to 
improve MoD 
efficiency? 
 
43 (53.8%) 
 
   20 (25%) 
 
17 (21.3%) 
 
80 
 
4 
 
Comments (Optional) 
Believe IT in general improves efficiency although it has increased workload at the desk officer level - e.g. 
removal of typing pools and commcens. 
Any IT system that provides basic Office software and comms would improve what was there before. Not a 
high benchmark. I do not know whether the programme stayed within budget or whether it has been 
delivered in time or not. 
It has the potential to make life easier and MOD more efficient but we should stop limiting the capability of 
new software because we are worried the users will not use it properly (start treating the users as adults not 
children). 
The system can be slow and the search engine poor, but overall the system works and has the potential to 
improve IT across the MoD. Enhancements with Microsoft office 2010 will also help. 
It does improve MOD efficiency and delivers organisational benefits by connecting all areas of the 
department. However the speed and reliability of the system appears to have reduced. 
-Global connectivity is undoubtedly a benefit to MOD, as is the actuality of MOD achieving savings by 
delivery training to users electronically, and of forcing on users the requirement for users to do much of 
their own personal administration online. -Global connectivity also does improve efficiency of rapid 
communication. -Enabling means of flowing new functionality to users is also a plus. 
The restrictions and issues that this new network has brought have not improved things any more than 
everybody with suitable training and software on the old systems. 
When compared with our previous system… 
Number of computers within the office was decreased but overall cost per year is more. Within the last 3 
years none of the computers have been upgraded. 
The technology used is poor. For instance why no ie8. All the advice given by the IT industry is to use the 
latest browser with the latest updates. Why are we using a 6 year old browser and a 9 year old OS? 
Once in place it is a very useful tool. 
I don't know whether it has stayed within budget. 
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The increased budget cost is due to added functionality. Delivery on time has failed due to human 
negligence and not system based faults. 
DII is only a small step in the right direction. Future technologies should improve efficiency, but it is 
mostly about the culture and not the technology. 
Once implemented most of it works well (e.g. logon anywhere is a boon and saves taking a laptop around) 
BUT some facilities still missing - e.g. records management and deployed capability. 
Improvement at a cost. 
The idea behind the project is laudable but the delivery and a poor perception of both the delivering 
consortium and the MOD procurement process has seen a level of user resistance to the process that is 
based on the aforementioned perceptions rather than the technology. 
For reasons stated in question above and the advent of new shared working sites like MOSS I think that DII 
has been an improvement. 
Intuitive responses. I have never seen the business case, so don't know what its objectives were. 
The MOD is still plagued by inefficiency. 
I was not there when it was being set up. 
 
Section 4: The DII Programme: Comments 
 
Please add any additional comments here: 
The DII Programme has been a big endeavor with many benefits being achieved.  However, it could have 
been better executed had the Statement of User Requirement been better articulated.  The advice and 
comments of various MOD SMEs been heeded during the Development phase of each Programme 
Increment (each a discreet project).  MOD met users’ expectations for each Increment with the necessary 
funding to make them possible. 
No Business Needs Analysis carried out so what did it have to do with the users? 
Why are we stuck using the most vulnerable version of Internet Explorer? Why is our Office suite 7 years 
out of date? File naming conventions make it really difficult to find/organise files. 
DII, considering its cost and support has been a total failure. The system is slower than the previous system 
which we thought was already slow. The setup of accounts has taken up to six months for some personnel 
and as the use of DII is an essential part of their work this is completely unacceptable. Even the inability of 
not being able to send an email to more that 30 people is a major drawback of the system as this should be 
basic functionality.  
DII has been a prime example of how not to "Network the Enterprise" (one of the Degree subjects). What 
we have given away in terms of resources and what we have gotten in return would make excellent 
headlines for the Sun, the person who authorised this billion pound white elephant should hang their head 
in shame for the money spent I expected to be running something akin to the CTU setup in the show 24. 
DII could be good but because the contract to set it up was drawn up by non-users/experts, we have a 
system set up that doesn't appear to be easily changeable or updateable. Oh and why does it cost so much? 
DII is operationally effective; in my opinion is was/ is let down by poor project management and 
leadership. The project was inward looking and failed to consider the wider system and environment it was 
to be deployed in. It suffered from two significant additional frictions. First, it was introduced at the same 
time as a number of other significant IT systems and business processes; JPA, JAMES, BLENHIEM. 
Second, it has occurred during a period of unparalleled operational commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This has been the MOD's focus and main effort; I think this has led to insufficient time and attention from 
Senior Management in considering Strategic Projects such as DII. 
In my experience, Users have an adjustment phase where they compare the old with the new and feel DII is 
not meeting their requirements. After a short period the benefits of DII are realised and Users accept that it 
is a better system. This is mostly due to a lack of training about DII. 
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Admittedly, specialist users may have had to take a step back to go two forward but for the vast majority of 
users who use DII for comms, data storage and office automation there was a seamless improvement on 
legacy systems. In my experience all historical data was successfully migrated, I had what I had the day 
before DII and I could take advantage of better services albeit slowly at times. My only other point is why 
you have to on DIIF put in your user details and password every time you use the EGS gateway to internet 
instead of being allowed to save the details. When you have to log onto your DII acct in the first place and 
SyOps dictate that when you are away from your desk you CTL ALT DEL I can't see what risk it is 
mitigating? Is someone worried that whilst sat at my desk logged in someone else may conduct 
inappropriate activity on the internet and that I may fail to notice this going on in front of my very eyes..?!? 
My perspective on DII has been largely garrison based (i.e. used in an Infantry Battalion not a 
Headquarters) therefore DII was the first networked IT system installed. Anything is better than nothing. In 
general it provides the majority of required functionality but whether it could have been done better for less 
is open to debate. 
DII whilst frustrating at times does seem to be a step in the right direction. It is very hard to judge it as I 
have nothing to compare it against apart from previous MOD systems against which just about anything 
would be an improvement. 
Overall there are some good and bad points to DII. It is definitely an improvement, but still has a way to 
go. My biggest criticism is its lack of flexibility and adaptability, though these are more down to MoD 
culture and the contracts that were signed with ATLAS rather than failings with the technology. 
DII is not great but its predecessors were much worse and not interoperable. However, DII is conceived and 
managed as a system and not as a means of providing services to the consumer. As such the attitude 
towards DII in service support is keep the system going. Regrettably the system and the service being 
consumed are different and the user gets benefit/value from a service not a system. This will change if we 
can get MOD ISS to think in terms of services and not just procuring systems and kit. 
Now most of Defence who need it, have it, a single system is a real boon in terms of training and access 
from multiple locations. Some irritations (slow service, sometimes indifferent help-desk responses) are 
annoying - but not critical. 
I agree with the principles of having a single Network but I believe the MoD should have retained 
ownership and skills in house and onsite to deal with issues. The contract is set in favour of the supplier, 
which is single source. The risks are still held in the MoD and there is no compensation to individual 
business units for downtime. 
You are quite right to ask these questions: the DII survey was designed to avoid them (in my view). Two 
biggest issues for me are responsiveness (i.e. speed) and stability (DII can, at times, lose its connection to 
the shared drive without warning and then the IT hangs meaning a hard reboot and a total loss of work 
since last save). Using DII on a 3G card is almost useless as it is too slow, although occasionally it does 
seem to have good speed. The restrictions on Internet access are too strict (I cannot access the Cranfield 
Webmail for example). The help desk performance monitoring is suspect as reported faults have been 
closed off without notice (I think this is now being addressed). However, if you were to telephone the help 
desk for them to tell you that you have the wrong help desk that still gets recorded as a 'fault' with a 
turnaround time of seconds. 
All we have done is replace one ageing system with a new one that does exactly the same. Office 
automation and email. Access to everything else is either extremely difficult and takes too long or there is 
no funding or no appetite to complete. The system is fast enough however if you wish to use an application 
to carry out your work it can take months to get the package delivered to your desktop. I can only use the 
system whilst at my desk. With the amount of meetings etc with civilian company that do not have access it 
is impossible to take crucial information with me due to security restrictions, cost etc. 
The ways of working should have been developed first, not the technology. 
DII is a much improved system to the legacy systems. It is a shame it has taken so long to roll out. The 
biggest problem in Cyprus is infrastructure and a lack of thought when planning infrastructure. 
DII was supposed to be rolled out between Dec 2010 and Mar 2011 in Cyprus.  It’s now 18-Mar-2011 and 
we’re still waiting.  More MOD inefficiency? 
As yet we do not have DII but having used it previously in prior employment I would say that it went down 
far too often. 
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